---
id: WARDEN-WP-0027
type: workplan
title: "Tamper-resistant credential governance + mass rotation/lockdown (Strand B)"
domain: infotech
repo: ops-warden
status: backlog
owner: codex
topic_slug: custodian
planning_priority: medium
planning_order: 27
created: "2026-07-16"
updated: "2026-08-15"
state_hub_workstream_id: "7d697c52-766a-4562-b2ad-a722880bcdcb"
---

# Tamper-resistant credential governance + mass rotation/lockdown (Strand B)

## Origin

Explicitly deferred from `WARDEN-WP-0026` (credential disclosure hygiene, Strand A).
WP-0026 "Out of scope" carves out the heavyweight governance machinery and directs
that it be "capture[d] separately if/when justified." This workplan is that capture.

Strand A makes accidental disclosure structurally hard and gives every lane
**advisory** rotation guidance. Strand B is the **executable, tamper-resistant**
layer: turning that advisory guidance into one-command action and hardening policy
governance against silent drift or malicious change.

## Status: backlog (captured, not scheduled)

Tasks are **`cancel`** (deferred with the workplan, not abandoned) so hub
consistency C-23 does not force `active`. On activation: set workplan to
`ready`/`active` and re-open tasks as `todo`/`progress`.

Frontmatter `status: backlog` as of 2026-07-17 (Strand A / WP-0026 and tenant
custody WP-0028 are finished; no activation gate has fired). Tasks remain
`todo` (not `wait`/`progress`) so hub consistency **C-23** does not force the
workplan back to `active`. This is deliberately **not `ready`**. It carries
real cost and blast radius (break-glass re-key, trust-root design) that is not
justified until a concrete trigger appears. See **Activation gate** below.
Nothing here is implemented until the gate is met and Bernd promotes it to
`ready` (then move tasks `todo` → `progress` as work starts).

## Activation gate (promote to `ready` only when ≥1 holds)

- A real disclosure incident requires rotating **more than a couple** of secrets at
  once, making manual per-lane rotation (Strand A) too slow.
- Fleet policy for OpenBao mandates tamper-evident policy governance or a designed
  break-glass path.
- Audit/compliance requires provable "reconcile policy to a known-good commit."

## Goal

Make credential response **executable and trustworthy at fleet scale**: one command
rotates or re-establishes a set of tainted secrets; policy changes are tamper-evident
and reconcilable to a known-good state; a graded lockdown / break-glass path exists
with an explicit trust-root.

## Scope boundary (unchanged from Strand A)

ops-warden still **custodies no secret values**. Strand B orchestrates the owner's
tools (OpenBao, provider re-mint, railiance-platform credential broker) as the
caller — it does not hold or vend secrets. Rotation execution runs the owner-native
path; ops-warden sequences and verifies it.

## Task: Executable mass rotation driver

```task
id: WARDEN-WP-0027-T01
status: cancel
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "604aad14-d398-4c02-85e5-7ff37a905a1b"
```

Turn Strand A's per-lane `rotation:` guidance (WP-0026 T06) into an executable
driver: `warden rotate <id>` (single lane) and `warden rotate --tainted` (all lanes
marked EXPOSED per WP-0026 T05). Each step runs the owner-native command
(provider re-mint, `bao kv put`, re-encrypt+reupload for re-establish lanes) as the
caller, verifies via capabilities (never reads the value), and clears the
`exposed_at` taint on success. Dry-run first; idempotent; per-lane failure isolates.

**Done when:** a tainted set of lanes can be rotated/re-established with one command,
each verified capabilities-safe, taint cleared only on success.

**Depends on:** WP-0026 T05 (taint convention), T06 (rotation registry).

## Task: Graded lockdown / break-glass with explicit trust-root

```task
id: WARDEN-WP-0027-T02
status: cancel
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "9d004d8f-6215-4178-bd13-5785d24fd152"
```

Design and document a graded lockdown: (a) soft — deny agent roles read on all
high-risk lanes; (b) hard — seal + re-key with a pre-designed trust-root and quorum.
Define the trust-root (who holds unseal shares, recovery keys), the break-glass
invocation, and the re-entry path. **Design + runbook first**; any executable seal
step is opt-in and attended.

**Done when:** a documented, rehearsed break-glass path exists with a named
trust-root and quorum, and soft-lockdown is executable via capabilities-based
policy toggles.

**Parked input — the warden-sign AppRole (2026-08-11).** secrets-engine holds a
validated dry-run for a `warden-sign` AppRole (policy + role, `update` on
`ssh/sign/{agt,adm,atm}-role` only). It was **parked** rather than withdrawn
specifically because it is an input to this task: today the credential broker is the
only *autonomous* path to a signing token, so if its issuer lapses, recovery is a
founder OIDC act. Whether a second autonomous path should exist — and whether it is
the AppRole or something this trust-root design supersedes — is a break-glass
question, not a routing one. Resolve it here. Context and the counter-argument
(AppRole is narrower in capability than placing the broker's issuer token on a remote
host) are in `workplans/ADHOC-2026-08-11.md` T03 (ad-hoc **finished** 2026-08-15;
question lives here now); secrets-engine was told to stop holding apply
readiness until this task or the ops-bridge cutover fires (msg `863c7b57`).

## Task: Tamper-evident policy governance + reconcile

```task
id: WARDEN-WP-0027-T03
status: cancel
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "94d5dcaf-abf0-417c-a6ef-26e8c50905a8"
```

Policy-as-code for OpenBao policies/roles with tamper-evidence: a signed/hashed
manifest of the intended policy set, drift **detection** against live OpenBao, and a
reconcile-to-known-good-commit path. (Drift detection may land independently even if
full reconcile stays gated.) Coordinate ownership with railiance-platform (OpenBao
deployment) — ops-warden contributes the ops-access policy surface, not the cluster.

**Done when:** live OpenBao policy state is diffable against a signed known-good
manifest, and an attended reconcile can restore it.

**Cross-repo:** railiance-platform (OpenBao cluster + policy custody).

## References

- `WARDEN-WP-0026` — Strand A (disclosure hygiene, advisory rotation) — prerequisite
- `.claude/rules/credential-routing.md` — ops-warden custodies no secret values
- `railiance-platform` — OpenBao cluster, policy custody, credential broker
- `wiki/AccessRouting.md` — issue vs route vs assist boundary
- `workplans/ADHOC-2026-08-11.md` T03 — parked warden-sign AppRole (ad-hoc finished
  2026-08-15); un-parks on this workplan's break-glass task or the ops-bridge
  cert_command cutover
- `secrets-engine` `SECRETS-WP-0004` — the parked AppRole apply/handoff