tegwick
94f32bd160
All three v0.4 findings were acted on — §9.1 split into pending/declared-gap and §5's scope rule adopted as recommended and credited, and §9.6 ruled via the load-bearing/attributive distinction with ops-warden's `# audit must not block signing` named as the estate's live example. Checked the favourable ruling rather than accepting it. §9.6's test is "no control branches on its presence": the only consumer of audit.jsonl is `warden activity`, which displays. Nothing gates on a signing record, so the lane is genuinely attributive. AuditTrail.md now records the ruling instead of the open question, and states that the trade must be revisited if a control ever gates on the trail. CONFORMANCE ACTION. §6.4 obligation 3 requires a stance map "published rather than held in code", and requires every PEP-shaped consumer to publish one so the maps can be inventoried — naming ADR-0009 as the reference shape. ops-warden was not doing it: the map lived in PolicyConfig.failure_modes, a dataclass default. Not a code comment, but not published either. pep-stance.yaml publishes it, and the test asserts the published map EQUALS the shipped default. A published map that may drift from the code is worse than no map, because it invites reliance it cannot support. Two findings sent to gate-house, in history/2026-08-29-layer-model-v06-review.md: §6.4 obligation 1 (no side effect without a decision record) contradicts obligation 3 and §9.3, with ops-warden's blessed fail-open stance as the instance; and §6.4 mandates a stance-map inventory in §13 that §13 does not implement — where ops-warden is currently the only PEP to have published one. 402 tests pass, ruff clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YWBMovyFoy9RRrfL7zKvPJ Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 4014535@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: d0036016-73e8-4da1-8e47-563e3ab39a3c
128 lines
5.5 KiB
YAML
128 lines
5.5 KiB
YAML
# ops-warden — NetKingdom security layer declaration
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#
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# Framework: net-kingdom/canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.4.md
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# Assent: docs/adr/ADR-0010 (ops-warden's own voice, per §11 "who must declare")
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# Validate: python3 scripts/check_layer_conformance.py
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#
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# §11 makes one check mechanical: "every direct Tooling client in a Staff
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# repository maps to a declared §5.1, §5.2, or §5.3 entry". This file is that
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# map. It is machine-readable because §5.3 requires it to be — ops-warden
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# proposed that shape and is implementing it rather than declaring in prose.
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#
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# Conformance rule inherited from tenancy.yaml: accuracy, not altitude. A
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# declared gap is TRACKED NON-CONFORMANCE (§11), never a claim of conformance.
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schema_version: "0.1"
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framework: netkingdom-security-layer-model
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standard_version: "0.4"
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repository: ops-warden
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layer: staff
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declared_by: docs/adr/ADR-0010
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declared_at: "2026-08-29"
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# §6.4 — ops-warden is PEP-shaped (it causes a protected side effect: issuing a
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# certificate). Its unreachable-engine stance map is published separately, and
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# asserted equal to shipped behaviour by tests/test_layer_conformance.py.
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pep_stance: pep-stance.yaml
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# Every direct contact with a Tooling-layer system (§4), one entry each.
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tooling_contacts:
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- id: ssh-ca-signing-write
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shape: "5.3" # declared engine gap
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module: src/warden/vault.py
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symbol: VaultCA.sign
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tooling: OpenBao
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operation: "HTTP POST <addr>/v1/<mount>/sign/<role> with X-Vault-Token"
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write: true
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capability: "Sign a short-lived SSH certificate for an adm/agt/atm actor"
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intended_owner: secrets-engine
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blocked_on: >-
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No engine exposes an SSH certificate signing surface. secrets-engine owns
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credential abstraction, custody and lifecycle, which is the layer this
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belongs in, but fronts no SSH-CA API today.
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review: "2026-11-28"
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note: >-
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Production-verified and in daily use. This is the one lane ops-warden owns
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permanently (§4). Signing continues while the gap is open: refusing would
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remove production host access to close a documentation gap.
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- id: desk-paste-once-provision
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shape: "5.3"
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module: src/warden/desk.py
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symbol: _provision_to_openbao
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tooling: OpenBao
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operation: "bao kv put <path> <field>=- (value on stdin, never argv)"
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write: true
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capability: "Founder paste-once provisioning of a secret straight into OpenBao"
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intended_owner: secrets-engine
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blocked_on: >-
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No engine exposes an attended provisioning surface for a value the founder
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holds and no automated path can produce.
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review: "2026-11-28"
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note: >-
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Attended and founder-operated (WP-0029). The value reaches OpenBao without
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passing through a terminal, an argv, or the audit log.
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- id: taint-metadata-read
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shape: "5.1" # read-only diagnostic observation
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module: src/warden/taint.py
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symbol: fetch_taint_status
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tooling: OpenBao
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operation: "bao kv metadata get -format=json <path>"
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write: false
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capability: "Report EXPOSED taint (custom_metadata) without reading secret data"
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intended_owner: secrets-engine
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blocked_on: >-
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No engine exposes a disclosure-taint query. Metadata-only by construction —
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reading the data would be the 2026-07-16 vector this exists to avoid.
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review: "2026-11-28"
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- id: access-proxy-conduit
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shape: "5.2" # conduit
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module: src/warden/proxy.py
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symbol: proxy_fetch, proxy_attended_login_exec
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tooling: OpenBao, key-cape
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operation: "Runs the catalog-declared owner fetch_command as a child process"
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write: false
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capability: "warden access --fetch/--exec/--out/--wrap for exec_capable lanes"
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supplied_authority: none
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evidence:
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no_own_credential: src/warden/proxy.py::_caller_env
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test: tests/test_proxy.py::test_conduit_supplies_no_authority_of_its_own
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audit: "audit.jsonl records the caller, the lane, and the outcome; never a value"
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note: >-
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The §5.2 test is the supplied-authority property: ops-warden presents no
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credential of its own, cannot widen what the caller could already do, and
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the action reconstructs as the caller's. Governed by ADR-0002.
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- id: caller-identity-token
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shape: "5.2"
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module: src/warden/caller_identity.py
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symbol: resolve_caller_token
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tooling: OpenBao
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operation: "Runs the operator-configured caller_auth command, or reads token env"
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write: false
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capability: "Establish the caller's own identity for the pre-sign policy gate"
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supplied_authority: none
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detection: voluntary # runs an operator-configured command, so no fixed
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# argv shape to scan for; declared rather than omitted
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note: >-
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Obtains the CALLER's credential by the operator's configured means; adds no
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authority. Never mints, and never persists what it resolves.
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# Contacts that are deliberately NOT Tooling contacts, recorded so the check is
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# total rather than silently selective.
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non_tooling_clients:
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- module: src/warden/policy.py
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target: access-engine (flex-auth)
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rationale: "Engine API — §5 permits it; this is the shape §5 prescribes."
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- module: src/warden/worker.py
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target: state-hub, llm-connect
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rationale: >-
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Not catalogued in §4. The layer catalog scopes the security estate, and
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neither the State Hub nor llm-connect appears in it, so no §5 shape applies
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on the standard's own terms. Raised with gate-house 2026-08-29 as a scope
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question rather than resolved unilaterally — see the assessment note.
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