tegwick
baf53602ca
Five inbox items worked, none of which changed a credential value or moved a
secret.
whynot-design-npm-publish: field reverted npm_token -> NPM_AUTH_TOKEN and the
path confirmed, on railiance-platform's attended, read-only, no-value field
enumeration (their docs/evidence/2026-09-10-npm-lane-field-resolution.json).
Exactly one field is present at the governed path. The 2026-09-09 change was
adopted from a coordination message and would have failed at the WP-0037-T03
rotation. The ungoverned second location is recorded as an explicit non-lane,
not deleted and not tidied away.
pep-stance coverage: published figures were stale by eight lanes (unknown
18->20, not_applicable 12->15) while resolved stayed at 3 — the denominator
moved, the classification did not. Caught by the test that asserts the published
block equals what report_coverage.py measures. tests/test_workload_join.py held
the same stale counts; both now measure the same populations.
rapp-qonto-keycape-client: blocker character updated — authority exists and is
unexercised by owner decision ("not yet", offer open), which is not the same as
no authority existing. Reopen triggers are events, never elapsed time.
flex-auth -> access-engine rename (WARDEN-IN-0003): access-engine added to the
policy-check lane's keywords so routing resolves under both names from today.
owner_repo deliberately not flipped — policy.py sends it as resource.system on
every /v1/check, and FLEX-DEC-2026-013 keeps runtime names as flex-auth.
layer declaration: INTENT.md says Staff, layer.yaml says staff, section 11 does
not say which governs. Neither changed; gate-house holds the ruling. Position in
docs/layer-declaration-precedence.md, wait in WARDEN-WP-0034-T06, and a comment
in layer.yaml telling the next session not to "fix" it — the divergence is the
evidence the ruling is made against.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 63291@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 8bd77868-ca68-4f49-bb1e-d539ecc0d703
134 lines
6 KiB
YAML
134 lines
6 KiB
YAML
# ops-warden — NetKingdom security layer declaration
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#
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# Framework: net-kingdom/canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.7.md
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# Assent: docs/adr/ADR-0010 (ops-warden's own voice, per §11 "who must declare")
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# Validate: python3 scripts/check_layer_conformance.py
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#
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# §11 makes one check mechanical: "every direct Tooling client in a Staff
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# repository maps to a declared §5.1, §5.2, or §5.3 entry". This file is that
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# map. It is machine-readable because §5.3 requires it to be — ops-warden
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# proposed that shape and is implementing it rather than declaring in prose.
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#
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# Conformance rule inherited from tenancy.yaml: accuracy, not altitude. A
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# declared gap is TRACKED NON-CONFORMANCE (§11), never a claim of conformance.
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schema_version: "0.1"
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framework: netkingdom-security-layer-model
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standard_version: "0.7"
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repository: ops-warden
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# UNRULED, 2026-09-21: INTENT.md frontmatter declares `Staff` and this file
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# declares `staff`. §11 permits both forms and does not say which governs when
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# both exist and disagree; gate-house holds that ruling and the case-sensitivity
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# one. NEITHER VALUE IS BEING CHANGED until it rules — see
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# docs/layer-declaration-precedence.md and WARDEN-WP-0034-T06. Do not "fix" this
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# line to match INTENT.md, or the reverse: the divergence is the evidence.
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layer: staff
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declared_by: docs/adr/ADR-0010
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declared_at: "2026-08-29"
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# §6.4 — ops-warden is PEP-shaped (it causes a protected side effect: issuing a
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# certificate). Its unreachable-engine stance map is published separately, and
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# asserted equal to shipped behaviour by tests/test_layer_conformance.py.
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pep_stance: pep-stance.yaml
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# Every direct contact with a Tooling-layer system (§4), one entry each.
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tooling_contacts:
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- id: ssh-ca-signing-write
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shape: "5.3" # declared engine gap
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module: src/warden/vault.py
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symbol: VaultCA.sign
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tooling: OpenBao
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operation: "HTTP POST <addr>/v1/<mount>/sign/<role> with X-Vault-Token"
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write: true
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capability: "Sign a short-lived SSH certificate for an adm/agt/atm actor"
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intended_owner: secrets-engine
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blocked_on: >-
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No engine exposes an SSH certificate signing surface. secrets-engine owns
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credential abstraction, custody and lifecycle, which is the layer this
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belongs in, but fronts no SSH-CA API today.
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review: "2026-11-28"
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note: >-
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Production-verified and in daily use. This is the one lane ops-warden owns
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permanently (§4). Signing continues while the gap is open: refusing would
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remove production host access to close a documentation gap.
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- id: desk-paste-once-provision
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shape: "5.3"
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module: src/warden/desk.py
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symbol: _provision_to_openbao
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tooling: OpenBao
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operation: "bao kv put <path> <field>=- (value on stdin, never argv)"
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write: true
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capability: "Founder paste-once provisioning of a secret straight into OpenBao"
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intended_owner: secrets-engine
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blocked_on: >-
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No engine exposes an attended provisioning surface for a value the founder
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holds and no automated path can produce.
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review: "2026-11-28"
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note: >-
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Attended and founder-operated (WP-0029). The value reaches OpenBao without
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passing through a terminal, an argv, or the audit log.
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- id: taint-metadata-read
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shape: "5.1" # read-only diagnostic observation
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module: src/warden/taint.py
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symbol: fetch_taint_status
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tooling: OpenBao
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operation: "bao kv metadata get -format=json <path>"
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write: false
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capability: "Report EXPOSED taint (custom_metadata) without reading secret data"
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intended_owner: secrets-engine
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blocked_on: >-
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No engine exposes a disclosure-taint query. Metadata-only by construction —
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reading the data would be the 2026-07-16 vector this exists to avoid.
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review: "2026-11-28"
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- id: access-proxy-conduit
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shape: "5.2" # conduit
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module: src/warden/proxy.py
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symbol: proxy_fetch, proxy_attended_login_exec
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tooling: OpenBao, key-cape
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operation: "Runs the catalog-declared owner fetch_command as a child process"
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write: false
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capability: "warden access --fetch/--exec/--out/--wrap for exec_capable lanes"
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supplied_authority: none
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evidence:
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no_own_credential: src/warden/proxy.py::_caller_env
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test: tests/test_proxy.py::test_conduit_supplies_no_authority_of_its_own
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audit: "audit.jsonl records the caller, the lane, and the outcome; never a value"
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note: >-
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The §5.2 test is the supplied-authority property: ops-warden presents no
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credential of its own, cannot widen what the caller could already do, and
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the action reconstructs as the caller's. Governed by ADR-0002.
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- id: caller-identity-token
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shape: "5.2"
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module: src/warden/caller_identity.py
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symbol: resolve_caller_token
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tooling: OpenBao
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operation: "Runs the operator-configured caller_auth command, or reads token env"
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write: false
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capability: "Establish the caller's own identity for the pre-sign policy gate"
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supplied_authority: none
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detection: voluntary # runs an operator-configured command, so no fixed
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# argv shape to scan for; declared rather than omitted
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note: >-
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Obtains the CALLER's credential by the operator's configured means; adds no
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authority. Never mints, and never persists what it resolves.
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# Contacts that are deliberately NOT Tooling contacts, recorded so the check is
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# total rather than silently selective.
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non_tooling_clients:
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- module: src/warden/policy.py
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target: access-engine (flex-auth)
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rationale: "Engine API — §5 permits it; this is the shape §5 prescribes."
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- module: src/warden/worker.py
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target: state-hub, llm-connect
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rationale: >-
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Not catalogued in §4. The layer catalog scopes the security estate, and
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neither the State Hub nor llm-connect appears in it, so no §5 shape applies
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on the standard's own terms. Raised with gate-house 2026-08-29 as a scope
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question rather than resolved unilaterally — see the assessment note.
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