ops-warden/examples/warden.production.example.yaml
tegwick 0a331413a2
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Send a caller identity to flex-auth so policy.enabled can flip
flex-auth's flex-auth-ops-warden pin (FLEX-WP-0016) TokenReviews the caller and
binds resource.system: ops-warden to system:serviceaccount:ops-warden:ops-warden.
policy.py posted /v1/check with no Authorization header, so the pin logs
"caller authentication warning" and can only run callerAuth.mode: warn — which,
under ADHOC-2026-08-17-T01, is exactly what blocks policy.enabled: true.

- policy.caller_auth (none | file | env | command) + src/warden/caller_identity.py:
  token resolved per call, never cached, written, or logged (ADR-0002)
- both check_sign_policy and check_fetch_policy attach the bearer header; an
  unobtainable token fails closed rather than retrying anonymously
- scripts/check_policy_caller_identity.py: read-only gate, prints length and a
  truncated fingerprint only, distinguishes 401 (audience/binding) from 403
- example config: caller_auth block, and flex_auth_url corrected — it pointed at
  flex-auth.flex-auth.svc, a Service that does not exist
- WARDEN-WP-0031, PolicyGatedSigning caller-identity section and flip sequence

Default stays mode: none, so behaviour is unchanged until an operator opts in.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-19 15:08:34 +02:00

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YAML

# Non-secret production template — copy to ~/.config/warden/warden.yaml
# Never commit tokens or CA private keys. See wiki/OpsWardenConfig.md
backend: vault
vault:
addr: https://bao.coulomb.social
mount: ssh
role_map:
adm: adm-role
agt: agt-role
atm: atm-role
token_env: VAULT_TOKEN
inventory_path: ~/.config/warden/inventory.yaml
state_dir: ~/.local/state/warden
# Opt-in flex-auth gate — enable only when flex-auth is reachable at flex_auth_url.
# Registry: registry/flex-auth/production_registry_snapshot.json (build from inventory).
# See wiki/PolicyGatedSigning.md (operator checklist) and wiki/playbooks/operator-openbao-token-hygiene.md
policy:
# Keep false until the flex-auth ops-warden pin runs callerAuth.mode: enforce.
# Gate: python scripts/check_policy_caller_identity.py (WARDEN-WP-0031)
enabled: false
# The in-cluster pin for ops-warden's signing policy (FLEX-WP-0016). A bare
# flex-auth.flex-auth.svc Service does not exist. From a workstation, reach it
# through a port-forward or tunnel and point this at that local address.
flex_auth_url: http://flex-auth-ops-warden.flex-auth.svc.cluster.local:8080
fail_closed: true
tenant: tenant:platform
subject_env: WARDEN_POLICY_SUBJECT
system: ops-warden
# How ops-warden proves it is ops-warden. flex-auth TokenReviews this bearer
# token and requires the principal system:serviceaccount:ops-warden:ops-warden
# for resource.system: ops-warden. Mode none sends no header, which is what
# holds the pin in warn.
caller_auth:
mode: none # none | file | env | command
# In-cluster PEP — projected ServiceAccount token, audience-bound:
# mode: file
# token_path: /var/run/secrets/flex-auth/token
# Workstation — mint a short-lived bound token per call:
# mode: command
# command: kubectl create token ops-warden -n ops-warden
# --audience flex-auth --duration 10m
token_env: WARDEN_POLICY_CALLER_TOKEN
audience: flex-auth