qonto-assistant/tests/test_deny_escalation.py
tegwick 3faf1fed71 Add SecurityPractice.md, Security Genome record, and deny-escalation lockout
Design doc for hardening qonto-assistant before deployment to
railiance01: this is the first fleet service that must be
internet-reachable (external harness clients, not just in-cluster
jobs) while holding a real bank credential. Covers identity (key-cape
in place of the interim bearer token), authorization (finance.qonto.read
in flex-auth + tenant-engine capability roles instead of the
hardcoded default_tenant_id), network exposure (facade-only internet
address), isolation profile, and a Kings Guard mapping (the existing
audit stream is already Immune-Observation-shaped; nothing to rebuild
later).

Ships one concrete, dependency-free piece of that design now:
DenyEscalationTracker locks out an actor who repeatedly triggers
arg_constraint/credential_exfil denies within a short window, closing
the gap where a probing client could retry indefinitely at whatever
rate the existing rate limiter otherwise allows. Wired through
CapabilityService, on by default, configurable via
QONTO_DENY_ESCALATION_* env vars. Ordinary denies (authz_denied,
tenant_scope) never count toward it.

Also adds specs/security-genome.yaml (kings-guard's genome-record
shape, populated now so no rework is needed once a consumer exists).

Verified: pytest -> 39 passed (8 new); REST and MCP smoke scripts both
pass against fixtures; compileall clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 22:59:06 +02:00

179 lines
6.5 KiB
Python

from pathlib import Path
import pytest
from qonto_assistant.audit import AuditLogger
from qonto_assistant.contracts import ActorClaims
from qonto_assistant.errors import PolicyDeniedError
from qonto_assistant.policy import PolicyEngine
from qonto_assistant.qonto_client import FixtureQontoClient
from qonto_assistant.rate_limits import ConcurrencyLimiter, RateLimiter
from qonto_assistant.security_watch import (
ActorLockedOutError,
DenyEscalationTracker,
)
from qonto_assistant.service import CapabilityService
POLICY_FILE = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / "src" / "qonto_assistant" / "policy" / "qonto-v1.yaml"
FIXTURE_DIR = Path(__file__).resolve().parent / "fixtures" / "qonto"
class _FakeClock:
def __init__(self) -> None:
self.now = 0.0
def __call__(self) -> float:
return self.now
def advance(self, seconds: float) -> None:
self.now += seconds
def _claims(actor_id: str = "prober") -> ActorClaims:
return ActorClaims(actor_id=actor_id, tenant_id="binky", lane="green")
def _service(tracker: DenyEscalationTracker, events: list[dict[str, object]]) -> CapabilityService:
return CapabilityService(
client=FixtureQontoClient(fixture_dir=FIXTURE_DIR),
policy=PolicyEngine.from_file(
POLICY_FILE,
required_scope="finance.qonto.read",
enforce_scope=False,
),
audit_logger=AuditLogger(sink=events.append),
rate_limiter=RateLimiter(limit=100, window_seconds=60),
concurrency_limiter=ConcurrencyLimiter(limit=4),
deny_escalation_tracker=tracker,
)
# --- Unit tests for the tracker itself -------------------------------------------------
def test_tracker_allows_denies_below_threshold() -> None:
clock = _FakeClock()
tracker = DenyEscalationTracker(threshold=3, window_seconds=60, lockout_seconds=300, clock=clock)
tracker.record_deny("binky:prober", "arg_constraint")
tracker.record_deny("binky:prober", "arg_constraint")
tracker.check("binky:prober") # should not raise
def test_tracker_locks_out_after_threshold_within_window() -> None:
clock = _FakeClock()
tracker = DenyEscalationTracker(threshold=3, window_seconds=60, lockout_seconds=300, clock=clock)
for _ in range(3):
tracker.record_deny("binky:prober", "arg_constraint")
with pytest.raises(ActorLockedOutError):
tracker.check("binky:prober")
def test_tracker_ignores_non_escalating_deny_reasons() -> None:
clock = _FakeClock()
tracker = DenyEscalationTracker(threshold=3, window_seconds=60, lockout_seconds=300, clock=clock)
for _ in range(10):
tracker.record_deny("binky:prober", "tenant_scope")
tracker.record_deny("binky:prober", "authz_denied")
tracker.check("binky:prober") # should not raise -- neither reason escalates
def test_tracker_denies_outside_window_do_not_accumulate() -> None:
clock = _FakeClock()
tracker = DenyEscalationTracker(threshold=3, window_seconds=60, lockout_seconds=300, clock=clock)
tracker.record_deny("binky:prober", "arg_constraint")
clock.advance(61)
tracker.record_deny("binky:prober", "arg_constraint")
clock.advance(61)
tracker.record_deny("binky:prober", "arg_constraint")
tracker.check("binky:prober") # should not raise -- each deny fell outside the prior window
def test_tracker_lockout_expires_after_lockout_window() -> None:
clock = _FakeClock()
tracker = DenyEscalationTracker(threshold=3, window_seconds=60, lockout_seconds=300, clock=clock)
for _ in range(3):
tracker.record_deny("binky:prober", "arg_constraint")
with pytest.raises(ActorLockedOutError):
tracker.check("binky:prober")
clock.advance(301)
tracker.check("binky:prober") # should not raise -- lockout window elapsed
# Escalation state was cleared, not just the lockout: it takes a full
# fresh threshold of denies to lock out again.
tracker.record_deny("binky:prober", "arg_constraint")
tracker.record_deny("binky:prober", "arg_constraint")
tracker.check("binky:prober") # should not raise -- only 2 denies since the reset
def test_tracker_is_scoped_per_actor() -> None:
clock = _FakeClock()
tracker = DenyEscalationTracker(threshold=3, window_seconds=60, lockout_seconds=300, clock=clock)
for _ in range(3):
tracker.record_deny("binky:prober", "arg_constraint")
tracker.check("binky:other-actor") # should not raise -- different actor, untouched
# --- Integration through CapabilityService ---------------------------------------------
def test_service_locks_out_actor_after_repeated_arg_constraint_denies() -> None:
clock = _FakeClock()
tracker = DenyEscalationTracker(threshold=2, window_seconds=60, lockout_seconds=300, clock=clock)
events: list[dict[str, object]] = []
service = _service(tracker, events)
def _oversized_page_call() -> None:
service.list_transactions(
claims=_claims(),
request_id="req-probe",
account_slug=None,
page=1,
page_size=10_000, # far beyond max_per_page -> arg_constraint
window_days=31,
status="completed",
side=None,
protocol="rest",
)
# First two denies cross the threshold=2 escalation bar.
for _ in range(2):
with pytest.raises(PolicyDeniedError):
_oversized_page_call()
# A third call -- even to an unrelated, otherwise-allowed capability --
# is now rejected before the policy kernel is consulted at all.
with pytest.raises(ActorLockedOutError):
service.get_accounts(claims=_claims(), request_id="req-locked", protocol="rest")
lockout_events = [event for event in events if event.get("deny_reason") == "actor_locked_out"]
assert len(lockout_events) == 1
def test_service_does_not_lock_out_for_ordinary_denies() -> None:
clock = _FakeClock()
tracker = DenyEscalationTracker(threshold=2, window_seconds=60, lockout_seconds=300, clock=clock)
events: list[dict[str, object]] = []
service = _service(tracker, events)
red_lane_claims = ActorClaims(actor_id="prober", tenant_id="binky", lane="red")
for _ in range(5):
with pytest.raises(PolicyDeniedError):
service.get_accounts(claims=red_lane_claims, request_id="req-lane", protocol="rest")
# authz_denied (wrong lane) never escalates -- the actor should still be
# able to make a legitimate, correctly-scoped call afterwards.
payload = service.get_accounts(claims=_claims(), request_id="req-ok", protocol="rest")
assert "organization" in payload