railiance-apps/build/forgejo

Forgejo release preparation (build only)

The Apps Makefile targets package the digest-bound 49-path Forgejo 11.0.3 source candidate in forgejo-security-extension.patch. It combines the original three-group any-of gate, private secret-file input, private source-operation DB primitives and the producer-owned Access Engine client in the OIDC callback. Coordinator source tests and complete release checks are recorded separately; independent owner review and operational admission of this revision remain open. They never deploy, push, change default values or choose an operational image. Third-party application source is expanded only into a new /tmp workspace; this repository retains a release input lock and exact reviewed patch, not a second source-code tree. Upstream source ownership and publication remain separate owner work.

Supply explicit public input archives/cache paths to make forgejo-release-prepare: FORGEJO_SOURCE_ARCHIVE, FORGEJO_GO_ARCHIVE, FORGEJO_NODE_ARCHIVE, FORGEJO_BUILD_GOMODCACHE, optionally FORGEJO_BUILD_GOCACHE_SEED and FORGEJO_BUILD_NPM_CACHE_SEED. Every archive, patch, source output, dependency lock and selected host compiler tool is digest-bound by inputs.lock.json. Go's official checksums and Node's official SHASUMS must be independently checked when acquiring those public archives. The source archive is official Forgejo v11.0.3; archive PAX commit b81aa4d0807cc1e2d6a2fbafd0b75c46cc0ae237.

The workspace must not exist. Existing trials are preserved, never restarted because an observer timed out. The recipe's process.json records the exact active child PID, phase and command, then completion; logs and receipts stay in the workspace. Do not run two phases against the same workspace concurrently.

make forgejo-release-acquire-npm explicitly acquires only public registry packages, with fresh HOME/config paths, integrity-bound lockfile and lifecycle scripts disabled. With the cache ready, make forgejo-release-build reruns npm ci --offline --ignore-scripts, Go module verification, upstream frontend compilation and upstream generation/static backend targets inside a network namespace without connectivity. It uses the exact Go/Node distributions, local compiler inputs, bindata timetzdata sqlite sqlite_unlock_notify plus upstream static target's netgo osusergo, explicit Make GOFLAGS for trimpath/buildvcs and fixed file/directory timestamps. Build tags retain the upstream rootless build profile. make forgejo-release-verify compares every embedded public/options/ template file to actual generated source bytes, checks the extension CLI and checks the ELF has no dynamic interpreter. These are local artifact checks, not application login, DB, native rollout or architecture acceptance.

For a local container build only, first acquire the locked public amd64 base with an empty Docker client config and the explicit local socket. Then make forgejo-release-container uses that exact digest as a build input and a minimal context containing only the verified executable and generated Dockerfile. It directly exports a local OCI archive with rewrite-timestamp=true, no-cache, no image load or push. SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH alone does not fix COPY parent-directory timestamps. The image epoch is max(source epoch,ceil immutable base created instant), so the original base layers remain exact while new metadata is stable. The recipe verifies every OCI blob, original base layer prefix, rootless runtime configuration, provenance labels and exact final executable. Two no-cache exports must reproduce the frozen output image and archive digests before claiming reproducibility. The actual local proof receipts are in the accompanying source proposal packet, not an admission of the resulting artifact.

There is no deployment tag, registry publication, RUN directive, privileged container or Docker host/secret mount. Public base acquisition and a standard local Docker/buildx daemon supporting OCI export/layer timestamp rewriting are explicit prerequisites. An unavailable feature is a retained blocker; do not switch to a privileged builder or claim a successful image from a backend-only binary. Existing contexts/output archives refuse overwrite. Reconcile an actual failed export explicitly, retaining original metadata/logs/artifacts; observation timeouts never justify another build. Older prototype load/save behavior and its config-versus-manifest-ID issue are retained in the source trial history, not shipped as a production continuation.

The static host toolchain is pinned for this Linux amd64 review estate. Broader cross-host reproducibility or a different architecture/compiler/libc is a new input revision, not an implicit fallback. The glibc static-linker's optional SQLite dlopen diagnostic is retained; no SQLite-extension runtime compatibility or production platform admission is inferred from ELF inspection or asset checks. An accepted owner image/source/backend, authenticated access-engine decision, private secret-input boundary, type/case/descriptor re-freeze, current operation/ inverse sessions, durable journal and application/Helm writer exclusion are separate gates. Helm omission/rollback does not remove persisted OAuth source. The existing case gate is compatibility code, not a single-PDP exception.

KeyCape identity and callback admission

The callback independently verifies the ID token against owner-admitted public keys, algorithms, issuer, audience and token type. Public trust is loaded from FORGEJO_ACCESS_ENGINE_ADMISSION_FILE; only an absolute private file reference is used for the PDP caller token. No admission file or operational keys are supplied by this build. New fields tenant_source_claim and max_authentication_age are mandatory. The KeyCape v0.3 profile uses assurance_claim: assurance and tenant_source_claim: tenant_source. Maximum identity age and maximum authentication age are separate positive durations chosen by the owner, not implicit defaults.

The signed assurance object preserves level, methods, boolean mfa, source: key-cape and integer at. Its authentication time must not follow issuance or the current time, and must satisfy the admitted authentication-age bound. Identity validity ends at the earliest token expiration, issued-at age bound or authentication-age bound. Directory, registration and default tenant provenance remain distinct in the request. Mutable UserInfo cannot replace these authenticated facts. Current UserInfo subject and the Goth subject must match the independently verified token; the three required group alternatives remain policy input.

The parser also represents valid lower-assurance facts. Application policy continues to decide authorization. The Check client and unchanged canonical signature bytes are a generated source slice of Access Engine ca0cb757; Forgejo adds no policy evaluator. Exact caller/policy/registry/signer/request/lifetime pins, an authenticated HTTPS connection and a current ALLOW are required. Synthetic callback fixtures test ALLOW, DENY and adverse cases, including an ID token serialized by the actual pinned KeyCape handler. Those fixtures do not prove an actual browser, factor, custody or native rollout.

The current integration covers this guarded OIDC callback. Ongoing application HTTP/API/Git/SSH paths, current operation/inverse sessions, durable private evidence and retention, deployed PostgreSQL/custody acceptance and exclusion of all release writers remain open in RAPPS-WP-0016-T08/T09 and NK-WP-0048-T43. An old image approval or source test result cannot admit this candidate.

PostgreSQL operation-source verification

The source primitive has now run on a disposable PostgreSQL 16.14 instance using the actual Forgejo engine, model schemas and OAuth configuration types. Tests cover default, explicit-public and named schemas, exact source restoration, drift and linked-account refusals, trigger rollback, uncooperative SQL writer exclusion and concurrent preparation. Independent client processes and an actual server restart verify prepared/applied/inverse journal recovery. The test-only source_operation_postgres tag selects the integration tests; no runtime route, credential, session or authority callback is added. The companion Custodian forgejo-postgres-source-r1 packet holds the isolated fixture, commands, source pins, counterexamples and original failed attempts.

Actual PostgreSQL diagnostics exposed a tracing-hook composition crash. Tracing now publishes its task context to the shared XORM hook context so later hooks retain it. Ordinary and private SQLite traces and actual PostgreSQL failure queries exercise this path. Controlled copies without the table lock or private query marker fail their respective regressions. These are source/database mechanics checks; owner admission, current authenticated operation/inverse sessions, runtime/backup custody, retention, every release writer and native deployed-database acceptance remain separate obligations. The previous frozen release is historical and does not contain this context correction.

Current-token callback source continuation

The 49-path candidate additionally vendors the unchanged, producer-generated KeyCape current-token adapter from 08c083ba; no consumer token registry or handwritten copy is introduced. current_token (explicit HTTPS issuer, resource audience, owning client, CA/JWKS/private-client-file references and maximum token age) and application_tenant are mandatory in the independently admitted FORGEJO_ACCESS_ENGINE_ADMISSION_FILE for this guarded callback profile. A signed caller cannot select the application's tenant. No operational configuration or credential is supplied by the build.

The callback requires the online KeyCape human ID token's exact RS256 at_hash access-grant binding before private caller use. Access-only jti/scope cannot substitute for an ID token. It joins independently verified subject/tenant/type, issuance, assurance/authentication time and tenant provenance to a fresh issuer observation before the PDP, then checks current status again after the decision. Source tests refuse mixed, revoked, suspended, stale, malformed and unavailable inputs; actual HTTPS issuer PKCE/discovery/UserInfo/status/revocation and real Forgejo provider/callback run in five isolated consumer processes. MFA session seeds and PDP admissions are synthetic. Complete release build/asset/OCI evidence for the preceding patch remains historical; this revision requires its own build and independent owner/package/type/custody admission before operational use.

The user selected current KeyCape checks on every ongoing API/Git/SSH operation for NetKingdom-linked accounts, while retaining the separate local break-glass path. That is an implementation requirement under RAPPS16-T09/NK48-T43, not a claim that the callback implements those routes or a native deployment grant. Ongoing resource/action/current-group decisions, protected operation/inverse and all release writers/journal custody remain acceptance work.

Final composed source validation passes 116 test/subtest results without skips. The initial 114-pass run skipped its private file-replacement check because a reused fixture was exhausted; the runner now creates fresh private/read-only aliases. That initial skip is retained and is not PostgreSQL acceptance.