Cover local acceptance gaps and reject nonfinite JSON exponents

Assistant: codex
Assistant-Model: gpt-6-astra
Assistant-Session: 01a0e6f0-a6f6-7b93-9124-55ef584930e2

docs/acceptance-coverage.md

@@ -3,31 +3,31 @@
 This maps the current repository tests to the obligations in
 [acceptance v0.1](../specs/acceptance-v0.1.md). A listed test is evidence for its
 specific assertion, not completion of the whole criterion. The local suite uses
-disposable keys, fake clocks and loopback HTTP; it does not prove independent UTC
+disposable keys, fake clocks and loopback HTTP/TLS; it does not prove independent UTC
 accuracy, production admission or native consumer correctness.
 
-Test names below are in `tests/test_clock.py`, `tests/test_authority.py`, and
+Test names below are in `tests/test_*.py`; the added protocol, transport,
-`tests/test_health.py` unless otherwise noted. Parameterized cases count as tests,
+attribution and interval sweeps have dedicated files. Parameterized cases count as tests,
 not additional acceptance criteria. The release smoke script is separate from
 pytest and runs against an installed wheel.
 
 | ID | Existing local evidence | Uncovered or native obligation; existing owner record |
 | --- | --- | --- |
 | C01 | `test_interval_contains_send_with_asymmetric_delay` changes `time.time` and exercises the injected timer | No complete ±5-minute/zone/wall-step platform matrix; native Windows is unsupported by LinuxTimer. Supported Linux/WSL evidence: 0002-T03, 0004-T02 |
-| C02 | `test_interval_contains_send_with_asymmetric_delay`; `test_lifecycle_during_exchange_refuses[delay]` | One deterministic asymmetric-delay case, not property-based interval coverage or measured network guarantees: 0002-T03, 0004-T02 |
+| C02 | `test_interval_encloses_true_receipt_across_asymmetry_and_drift` sweeps 324 combinations of outbound/inbound delay, processing, authority error, verification delay and timer drift; delayed exchange refusal | A finite deterministic sweep under explicit error assumptions is not measured network or oscillator evidence: 0002-T03, 0004-T02 |
-| C03 | `test_signed_wrong_binding_refuses`, `test_bad_signature`, `test_rotation_requires_fresh_client_and_matching_signer`; wheel smoke refuses wrong key | No exhaustive version/header/modified-uncertainty matrix; accepted signing/trust profile: 0002-T02 |
+| C03 | `test_signed_wrong_binding_refuses`, `test_bad_signature`, signed invalid version/number samples, unadmitted and malformed headers, modified uncertainty, signer rotation; wheel smoke refuses wrong key | Finite adversarial cases do not exhaust possible inputs; accepted signing/trust profile: 0002-T02 |
 | C04 | `test_replay_refused`, delayed-exchange refusal, `test_restart_preserves_floor`, `test_new_client_cannot_reset_expired_trust` | Exact replay across process restart and every nonce-timeout interleaving are not separately tested; native lifecycle evidence: 0004-T02 |
 | C05 | `test_authority_refuses_unusable_health`, `test_restart_changes_epoch`, `test_step_at_final_timestamp_latches_refusal`, `test_health_expires_during_sample_preparation`, `test_health_model_refusals`, collector replacement test | Disposable host upstream outage/reboot/recovery and accepted error model: 0005-T02/T05, RAIL-HO-WP-0013 |
-| C06 | `test_lifecycle_during_exchange_refuses[suspend/domain/backward]`; boot-bound admission behavior | Fake timer disruption does not establish real VM suspend/reboot detection or oscillator bounds: 0002-T03, 0004-T02 |
+| C06 | `test_lifecycle_during_exchange_refuses[suspend/domain/backward]`; boot-bound admission; 45 elapsed-time cases spanning drift bounds and timer disagreement | Fake timer disruption does not establish real VM suspend/reboot detection or oscillator bounds: 0002-T03, 0004-T02 |
 | C07 | `test_validity_uses_entire_interval` checks entirely valid, not-before overlap and exact expiry | Native signed-artifact semantics and protected-side-effect recheck remain consumer-owned: 0002-T04, 0004-T03 |
 | C08 | Expired-session, delayed-sample and lifecycle refusals; health expiry during preparation | No general offline holdover offered; native loss/age/uncertainty policy evidence: 0004-T02 |
-| C09 | Wrong signer and changed/revoked trust refusal; wheel smoke requires explicit disposable loopback admission | No real invalid-date TLS bootstrap or redirect-server integration test in this suite. Transport trust acceptance: 0002-T02, 0005-T03 |
+| C09 | Real TLS positive control and expired/not-yet-valid/wrong-host/untrusted certificate refusals; all five redirect statuses refused without following; wrong signer and changed/revoked trust refusal | Disposable CA tests do not prove production bootstrap or trust distribution. Transport trust acceptance: 0002-T02, 0005-T03 |
 | C10 | No approval/CAS concurrency fixture in this repository | Clock interval checks do not establish atomic consume or check-to-use safety. Consumer native proof: 0002-T04, 0004-T03 |
-| C11 | `attribution.py` emits recording-time evidence; no direct attribution test | No historical occurrence translation or calibration-domain proof is implemented here. Audit/consumer contract and native evidence: 0002-T04, 0004-T03 |
+| C11 | `test_recording_evidence_preserves_original_event` verifies additive recording-time labels and preservation when merged; disabled, unavailable and expired-clock paths are tested | No historical occurrence translation or calibration-domain proof is implemented here. Audit/consumer contract and native evidence: 0002-T04, 0004-T03 |
 | C12 | No occurrence-ordering test; application clock returns intervals | Overlap/order handling belongs to the consuming event system; audit acceptance: 0002-T04, 0004-T03 |
-| C13 | `test_strict_json`, `test_http_framing_refused`, `test_malformed_health_is_stable_http_refusal`, `test_bad_policy_refuses`, `test_helper_failures_are_sanitized` | Coverage is not exhaustive numeric/schema fuzzing. Profile acceptance remains 0002-T02/T03 |
+| C13 | Signed numeric overflow, units/types, malformed headers/envelopes and nonfinite exponent refusal; strict JSON, HTTP framing, malformed health/policy/helper tests | Coverage is not exhaustive numeric/schema fuzzing. Profile acceptance remains 0002-T02/T03 |
 | C14 | `test_rotation_requires_fresh_client_and_matching_signer`, changed-trust refusal, expired admission and persisted rollback tests | Local file replacement is not distributed revocation; custody visibility deadlines and compromise recovery: 0002-T02, 0005-T03/T05 |
-| C15 | `test_connection_limit_and_capacity_recovery`, HTTP liveness/readiness separation, framing and delayed-exchange tests | Eight held connections and recovery are not sustained-load/SLO proof. Host measurements and alerts: 0004-T02, 0005-T06 |
+| C15 | `test_connection_limit_and_capacity_recovery`, HTTP liveness/readiness separation, unexpected status/media/encoding refusals, framing and delayed-exchange tests | Eight held connections and recovery are not sustained-load/SLO proof. Host measurements and alerts: 0004-T02, 0005-T06 |
 | C16 | `tools/wheel_smoke.py` checks installed CLI and signed authority/client HTTP exchange, wrong-key and unhealthy refusal | This is reference integration only. Named native consumer identity/tenant/expiry/CAS migration: 0004-T03 |
 
 ## Release and dependency evidence
@@ -45,3 +45,19 @@ reproduction procedure. No test or artifact publication makes the proposed
 contract adopted. The 0003 closeout is limited to the reference implementation;
 its original task prose is broader than the evidence in several rows above.
 Those unproven native claims remain in existing 0002/0004/0005 records.
+
+
+## Local gap follow-up
+
+The expanded suite passes 167 tests and 4 subtests. The two arithmetic sweep
+tests additionally exercise 324 signed-exchange scenarios and 45 elapsed-time
+scenarios internally; these are not separate pytest counts. The true-time oracle
+uses independent simulated transit/processing/verification time and authority
+error, with ±500ppm simulated timer drift inside the declared 1000ppm allowance.
+This validates containment under that model, not a universal platform drift bound.
+
+The nonfinite exponent regression exposed a parser gap: Python JSON parsing can
+turn `1e999` into infinity without invoking the literal-constant callback. The
+parser now rejects nonfinite floats at every nesting level while retaining finite
+JSON numbers. All certificates and keys in the transport tests are disposable;
+TLS verification remains enabled and each refusal checks its certificate reason.

docs/evidence/2026-09-28-protocol-hardening/runtime.cdx.json

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+{
+  "bomFormat": "CycloneDX",
+  "components": [
+    {
+      "name": "PyJWT",
+      "purl": "pkg:pypi/pyjwt@2.14.0",
+      "type": "library",
+      "version": "2.14.0"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "attrs",
+      "purl": "pkg:pypi/attrs@26.1.0",
+      "type": "library",
+      "version": "26.1.0"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "cffi",
+      "purl": "pkg:pypi/cffi@2.1.1",
+      "type": "library",
+      "version": "2.1.1"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "cryptography",
+      "purl": "pkg:pypi/cryptography@50.0.1",
+      "type": "library",
+      "version": "50.0.1"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "jsonschema",
+      "purl": "pkg:pypi/jsonschema@4.26.0",
+      "type": "library",
+      "version": "4.26.0"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "jsonschema-specifications",
+      "purl": "pkg:pypi/jsonschema-specifications@2025.9.1",
+      "type": "library",
+      "version": "2025.9.1"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "pycparser",
+      "purl": "pkg:pypi/pycparser@3.0",
+      "type": "library",
+      "version": "3.0"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "railiance-clock",
+      "purl": "pkg:pypi/railiance-clock@0.1.0",
+      "type": "library",
+      "version": "0.1.0"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "referencing",
+      "purl": "pkg:pypi/referencing@0.37.0",
+      "type": "library",
+      "version": "0.37.0"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "rpds-py",
+      "purl": "pkg:pypi/rpds-py@2026.6.3",
+      "type": "library",
+      "version": "2026.6.3"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "typing_extensions",
+      "purl": "pkg:pypi/typing-extensions@4.16.0",
+      "type": "library",
+      "version": "4.16.0"
+    }
+  ],
+  "specVersion": "1.5",
+  "version": 1
+}

docs/evidence/2026-09-28-protocol-hardening/verification.json

@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+{
+  "build_requirements_sha256": "ff153e73ea3a33c7d33858be50eda03943c5ef5e2706477a90ca76d250878adb",
+  "build_tools": [
+    [
+      "hatchling",
+      "1.32.4"
+    ],
+    [
+      "packaging",
+      "26.3"
+    ],
+    [
+      "pathspec",
+      "1.1.1"
+    ],
+    [
+      "pluggy",
+      "1.6.0"
+    ],
+    [
+      "tomlkit",
+      "0.15.1"
+    ],
+    [
+      "trove-classifiers",
+      "2026.9.21.13"
+    ]
+  ],
+  "byte_identical": true,
+  "checkout_build": {
+    "railiance_clock-0.1.0-py3-none-any.whl": "d6816343fe20007e05d50bf5b8578cdf68e4c12db2f32df6fd71766e40a69fd0",
+    "railiance_clock-0.1.0.tar.gz": "4465d517f9636ec2243394abdc8e0a3086ad809b81d338be5d0620e0febf90ad"
+  },
+  "independent_builds": [
+    {
+      "railiance_clock-0.1.0-py3-none-any.whl": "d6816343fe20007e05d50bf5b8578cdf68e4c12db2f32df6fd71766e40a69fd0",
+      "railiance_clock-0.1.0.tar.gz": "4465d517f9636ec2243394abdc8e0a3086ad809b81d338be5d0620e0febf90ad"
+    },
+    {
+      "railiance_clock-0.1.0-py3-none-any.whl": "d6816343fe20007e05d50bf5b8578cdf68e4c12db2f32df6fd71766e40a69fd0",
+      "railiance_clock-0.1.0.tar.gz": "4465d517f9636ec2243394abdc8e0a3086ad809b81d338be5d0620e0febf90ad"
+    }
+  ],
+  "limits": "Local Linux build/install evidence; no native UTC, security admission, vulnerability audit or cross-platform reproducibility claim.",
+  "platform": "Linux/x86_64",
+  "python": "3.12.3",
+  "runtime_lock_sha256": "fe4b4ab7fb1740648a13ff87d028914d94e4c793bb5957830e776a878c9adbb9",
+  "sbom_sha256": "69b45bf19e94e485d08e7af238f2aa3e3fa4f3969d8a552fcf874a12aa1eb07d",
+  "smoke": {
+    "checks": [
+      "installed_import",
+      "three_packaged_schemas",
+      "cli_help",
+      "signed_http_cli_read",
+      "wrong_key_refusal",
+      "unhealthy_cli_refusal"
+    ],
+    "distributions": [
+      [
+        "PyJWT",
+        "2.14.0"
+      ],
+      [
+        "attrs",
+        "26.1.0"
+      ],
+      [
+        "cffi",
+        "2.1.1"
+      ],
+      [
+        "cryptography",
+        "50.0.1"
+      ],
+      [
+        "jsonschema",
+        "4.26.0"
+      ],
+      [
+        "jsonschema-specifications",
+        "2025.9.1"
+      ],
+      [
+        "pycparser",
+        "3.0"
+      ],
+      [
+        "railiance-clock",
+        "0.1.0"
+      ],
+      [
+        "referencing",
+        "0.37.0"
+      ],
+      [
+        "rpds-py",
+        "2026.6.3"
+      ],
+      [
+        "typing_extensions",
+        "4.16.0"
+      ]
+    ]
+  },
+  "smoke_script_sha256": "cdb3adb57a68f95d8fd6878195d0ee7dd7a0a00060bacc2a3f95073e6c0b27ec",
+  "source_base_commit": "c29bf39b5dab1c69d9fa2baf80c974417d7d4e63",
+  "source_date_epoch": "315532800",
+  "source_inputs_sha256": {
+    ".gitignore": "74e4a2bdd348ce27bd64fbafbc09bef61433a821df2f23c726b062ead4896ebf",
+    "README.md": "c544450bc755e5743bac961fd3832f20ec4d9f86ec3562ca4a2d734a2d694a3e",
+    "pyproject.toml": "11a3e79fcd7b2929137ebad31647c839edc40572958b08b95f08b0605482416d",
+    "src/railiance_clock/__init__.py": "7c9c93a7d6bee6c68da5c19055c899d84040ecd5186169441f3a4d24d12c45c4",
+    "src/railiance_clock/admission.py": "afbea12a31e8ac6bea002a4d0477564d76698b633e88edeb0d2f60c582b5fc47",
+    "src/railiance_clock/attribution.py": "6cc6a5603295bda8fed47c5b144bdec1c6faff8b27acc440a65b81eb376415bd",
+    "src/railiance_clock/authority.py": "9a7ba85d17d70aeaad86cbb850b36515b7a82aef085799591bdfdf410cd023ee",
+    "src/railiance_clock/cli.py": "8ed77836cbdd823b86de849f76f228355bf47fcbfbbc572e22e6e48662929b59",
+    "src/railiance_clock/client.py": "34401db8cecf76a791013b383f9dc6bd56c0478472fe222f86b2be93505ac00f",
+    "src/railiance_clock/core.py": "32ac078f8729533dbbee15166cd6e450cd8638d178294304c1c60665d536b9a1",
+    "src/railiance_clock/health.py": "366e725eaf68d88df3a236d1f71bde5e5b7f24846932041fbaa46182e88d0f07",
+    "src/railiance_clock/protocol.py": "3aa7755ffc8c03cbf656bc8c82012ba0bf09fc09d9f8647838b6c0f56229f9eb",
+    "src/railiance_clock/schemas/protected-header-v0.1.schema.json": "15de9f38e61b49677479b431c3ef7e37a674e4b817ef8f78a19bc8fc47bbf4f8",
+    "src/railiance_clock/schemas/time-request-v0.1.schema.json": "c5a122b1f1f48872a25fffa5950e60dddd585e87a4da502fc4e873a44ae60f4c",
+    "src/railiance_clock/schemas/time-sample-v0.1.schema.json": "97e026520fff98c7140b8a91b9332ffcba22fd5d509fa983057c7cac6e6aa2d2"
+  },
+  "uv": "uv 0.5.9",
+  "verifier_sha256": "f3eb2a489ddf32bca164a78c0b3c22358bf45703bcd6d0572413353c1875fb81"
+}

docs/release-verification.md

@@ -42,9 +42,11 @@ installation similarly uses `uv export --locked` and verifies archive hashes.
 
 ## Retained evidence
 
-The September 28 run is in
+The current parser-hardening run is in
-[evidence/2026-09-28-release/verification.json](evidence/2026-09-28-release/verification.json)
+[evidence/2026-09-28-protocol-hardening/verification.json](evidence/2026-09-28-protocol-hardening/verification.json)
-and its [runtime SBOM](evidence/2026-09-28-release/runtime.cdx.json).
+and its [runtime SBOM](evidence/2026-09-28-protocol-hardening/runtime.cdx.json).
+The earlier [release-verification receipt](evidence/2026-09-28-release/verification.json)
+is retained as historical evidence.
 The receipt records source-input hashes, lock/build-requirement hashes, verifier
 hashes, Python/uv/build-tool versions, artifact digests and smoke checks. Its base
 commit identifies the checkout before the verification changes were committed;

src/railiance_clock/protocol.py

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 """Strict profile decoding; JWS cryptography is delegated to PyJWT."""
 import base64
 import json
+import math
 import re
 from pathlib import Path
 import jwt
@@ -43,6 +44,8 @@ def strict_json(raw, limit=8192):
     def depth(item, level=0):
         if level > 4:
             raise ClockError('JSON nesting too deep')
+        if isinstance(item, float) and not math.isfinite(item):
+            raise ClockError('nonfinite JSON number')
         if isinstance(item, dict):
             for child in item.values(): depth(child, level + 1)
         if isinstance(item, list):

tests/conftest.py

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+import json
+import os
+import pytest
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
+from railiance_clock.core import Tick
+from railiance_clock.protocol import sign
+
+class Timer:
+    def __init__(self): self.n=0; self.boot=0; self.domain='boot1'
+    def read(self): return Tick(self.n, self.n+self.boot, self.domain)
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def setup(tmp_path):
+    key=ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())
+    data={'status':'admitted','authority_id':'railiance01','environment':'test','epoch':'epoch1','policy_id':'test-v1','kid':'test-key',
+          'endpoint':'https://clock.invalid/v1/time-samples',
+          'public_key_pem':key.public_key().public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM,serialization.PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo).decode(),
+          'limits':{'max_age_ns':5_000_000_000,'max_rtt_ns':2_000_000_000,'max_width_ns':3_000_000_000,'max_server_error_ns':50_000_000,'timer_ppm':1000,'timer_resolution_ns':1000,'suspend_tolerance_ns':5_000_000,'trust_session_ns':60_000_000_000}}
+    tmp_path.chmod(0o700)
+    state=tmp_path/'state.json';state.write_text(json.dumps({'authority_id':'railiance01','epoch':'epoch1','lower_ns':0}));state.chmod(0o600)
+    data.update(client_boot_id='boot1',trust_not_after_boottime_ns=60_000_000_000,rollback_state_file=str(state))
+    path=tmp_path/'trust.json';path.write_text(json.dumps(data));path.chmod(0o600)
+    timer=Timer()
+    def transport(request):
+        timer.n+=10_000_000
+        return sign(dict(request,epoch='epoch1',policy_id='test-v1',quality='bounded',receive_unix_ns='100000000000',send_unix_ns='100001000000',error_ns='1000000',max_age_ns='5000000000'),key,'test-key')
+    return path,key,timer,transport
+

tests/test_attribution.py

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+from copy import deepcopy
+
+import pytest
+
+from railiance_clock import attribution
+from railiance_clock.client import Clock, FileTrust
+from railiance_clock.core import ClockError
+
+
+def test_disabled_attribution_does_not_construct_clock(monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.delenv('TEST_CLOCK_TRUST', raising=False)
+    def unexpected(_):
+        pytest.fail('unconfigured attribution constructed a clock')
+    monkeypatch.setattr(attribution, '_clock', unexpected)
+    assert attribution.from_environment('TEST_CLOCK_TRUST') == {}
+
+
+def test_recording_evidence_preserves_original_event(setup, monkeypatch):
+    path, _, timer, transport = setup
+    clock = Clock(FileTrust(path), timer=timer, transport=transport)
+    monkeypatch.setenv('TEST_CLOCK_TRUST', str(path))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(attribution, '_clock', lambda _: clock)
+    event = {'event_id': 'old-event', 'timestamp': '1999-01-01T10:00:00+01:00',
+             'clock_domain': 'old-boot', 'sequence': 7, 'predecessors': ['earlier']}
+    original = deepcopy(event)
+    evidence = attribution.from_environment('TEST_CLOCK_TRUST')
+    enriched = {**event, **evidence}
+    assert event == original
+    assert all(enriched[k] == v for k, v in original.items())
+    assert set(evidence) == {'railiance_time'}
+    sample = evidence['railiance_time']
+    assert sample['kind'] == 'recording_time' and sample['status'] == 'usable'
+    assert sample['lower_ns'] <= sample['upper_ns']
+    assert sample['sample_id'] and sample['authority_id'] == 'railiance01'
+    assert 'occurrence_time' not in sample
+    # A wall-clock label is retained as provenance, not recalibrated by this API.
+    assert enriched['timestamp'] == original['timestamp']
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('error', [OSError('secret-path'), ClockError('private reason'),
+                                  KeyError('private field'), TypeError('private type')])
+def test_unavailable_attribution_is_sanitized(monkeypatch, error):
+    monkeypatch.setenv('TEST_CLOCK_TRUST', '/unused')
+    def unavailable(_):
+        raise error
+    monkeypatch.setattr(attribution, '_clock', unavailable)
+    assert attribution.from_environment('TEST_CLOCK_TRUST') == {
+        'railiance_time': {'status': 'unavailable', 'kind': 'recording_time'}}
+
+
+def test_expired_cached_clock_never_returns_old_evidence(setup, monkeypatch):
+    path, _, timer, transport = setup
+    clock = Clock(FileTrust(path), timer=timer, transport=transport)
+    monkeypatch.setenv('TEST_CLOCK_TRUST', str(path))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(attribution, '_clock', lambda _: clock)
+    assert attribution.from_environment('TEST_CLOCK_TRUST')['railiance_time']['status'] == 'usable'
+    timer.n = 61_000_000_000
+    assert attribution.from_environment('TEST_CLOCK_TRUST') == {
+        'railiance_time': {'status': 'unavailable', 'kind': 'recording_time'}}

tests/test_clock.py

@@ -8,27 +8,6 @@ from railiance_clock.client import Clock, FileTrust
 from railiance_clock.core import ClockError, Tick, Window
 from railiance_clock.protocol import sign, strict_json, encode64, verify
 
-class Timer:
-    def __init__(self): self.n=0; self.boot=0; self.domain='boot1'
-    def read(self): return Tick(self.n, self.n+self.boot, self.domain)
-
-@pytest.fixture
-def setup(tmp_path):
-    key=ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())
-    data={'status':'admitted','authority_id':'railiance01','environment':'test','epoch':'epoch1','policy_id':'test-v1','kid':'test-key',
-          'endpoint':'https://clock.invalid/v1/time-samples',
-          'public_key_pem':key.public_key().public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM,serialization.PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo).decode(),
-          'limits':{'max_age_ns':5_000_000_000,'max_rtt_ns':2_000_000_000,'max_width_ns':3_000_000_000,'max_server_error_ns':50_000_000,'timer_ppm':1000,'timer_resolution_ns':1000,'suspend_tolerance_ns':5_000_000,'trust_session_ns':60_000_000_000}}
-    tmp_path.chmod(0o700)
-    state=tmp_path/'state.json';state.write_text(json.dumps({'authority_id':'railiance01','epoch':'epoch1','lower_ns':0}));state.chmod(0o600)
-    data.update(client_boot_id='boot1',trust_not_after_boottime_ns=60_000_000_000,rollback_state_file=str(state))
-    path=tmp_path/'trust.json';path.write_text(json.dumps(data));path.chmod(0o600)
-    timer=Timer()
-    def transport(request):
-        timer.n+=10_000_000
-        return sign(dict(request,epoch='epoch1',policy_id='test-v1',quality='bounded',receive_unix_ns='100000000000',send_unix_ns='100001000000',error_ns='1000000',max_age_ns='5000000000'),key,'test-key')
-    return path,key,timer,transport
-
 def test_interval_contains_send_with_asymmetric_delay(setup, monkeypatch):
     path,key,timer,transport=setup
     import time

tests/test_interval_properties.py

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+"""Deterministic bounded-domain sweeps; true-time oracle is independent of UTC arithmetic."""
+from itertools import product
+import json
+
+from railiance_clock.client import Clock, FileTrust
+from railiance_clock.core import Tick, elapsed
+from railiance_clock.protocol import sign
+
+
+def test_elapsed_encloses_admitted_drift_and_timer_disagreement():
+    start = Tick(0, 0, 'boot')
+    for measured, ppm, disagreement in product(
+        (0, 1, 999, 1_000_000, 1_000_000_000), (1, 1000, 100000), (0, 1, 1000)):
+        lo, hi = elapsed(start, Tick(measured, measured + disagreement, 'boot'),
+                         ppm=ppm, resolution_ns=1, suspend_tolerance_ns=1000)
+        # Assumption being tested: admitted timer error is bounded relative to
+        # measured elapsed time, plus resolution and observed clock disagreement.
+        drift = measured * ppm // 1_000_000
+        assert lo <= max(0, measured - drift) <= hi
+        assert lo <= measured + disagreement + drift <= hi
+
+
+def test_interval_encloses_true_receipt_across_asymmetry_and_drift(setup, monkeypatch):
+    path, key, _, _ = setup
+    import railiance_clock.client as client
+    original_verify = client.verify
+    base = 100_000_000_000
+    # 324 cases cover each direction of extreme asymmetry, server offset at
+    # both edges of its bound, verification delay and admitted timer drift.
+    for outbound, inbound, processing, offset, verify_delay, drift_sign in product(
+        (0, 1_000_000, 100_000_000), (0, 1_000_000, 100_000_000),
+        (0, 10_000_000), (-1_000_000, 0, 1_000_000), (0, 1_000_000, 20_000_000), (-1, 1)):
+        class Timer:
+            true = 0
+            def read(self):
+                # 500ppm true-time-relative drift sits within the admitted
+                # 1000ppm measured-time-relative bound, including rounding.
+                measured = self.true + drift_sign * (self.true * 500 // 1_000_000)
+                return Tick(measured, measured, 'boot1')
+        timer = Timer()
+        data = json.loads(path.read_text())
+        from pathlib import Path
+        Path(data['rollback_state_file']).write_text(json.dumps(
+            {'authority_id': 'railiance01', 'epoch': 'epoch1', 'lower_ns': 0}))
+        def transport(request):
+            received = base + outbound + offset
+            sent = received + processing
+            timer.true = outbound + processing + inbound
+            return sign(dict(request, epoch='epoch1', policy_id='test-v1', quality='bounded',
+                receive_unix_ns=str(received), send_unix_ns=str(sent), error_ns='1000000',
+                max_age_ns='5000000000'), key, 'test-key')
+        def verify(*args, **kwargs):
+            value = original_verify(*args, **kwargs)
+            timer.true += verify_delay
+            return value
+        monkeypatch.setattr(client, 'verify', verify)
+        window = Clock(FileTrust(path), timer=timer, transport=transport).read()
+        true_now = base + outbound + processing + inbound + verify_delay
+        assert window.lower_ns <= true_now <= window.upper_ns, (
+            outbound, inbound, processing, offset, verify_delay, drift_sign, window)

tests/test_protocol.py

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+import json
+
+import jwt
+import pytest
+
+from railiance_clock.core import ClockError, MAX_NS
+from railiance_clock.protocol import TYPE, decode64, encode64, sign, strict_json, verify
+
+
+def payload(setup):
+    _, key, _, transport = setup
+    from railiance_clock.protocol import PROFILE
+    request = {'profile': PROFILE, 'authority_id': 'railiance01', 'environment': 'test',
+               'nonce': encode64(bytes(range(32)))}
+    return verify(transport(request), key.public_key(), 'test-key')
+
+
+def signed_unchecked(value, key, header=None):
+    return jwt.encode(value, key, algorithm='ES256',
+        headers=header or {'kid': 'test-key', 'typ': TYPE}).encode()
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('field,value', [
+    ('profile', 'railiance-clock-v9'), ('quality', 'unknown'), ('unexpected', 1),
+    *[(field, bad) for field in ('receive_unix_ns', 'send_unix_ns', 'error_ns', 'max_age_ns')
+      for bad in (str(MAX_NS + 1), '-1', '01', '1.0', '1e3', '1ms', '1\n', 1, True, None)],
+    ('max_age_ns', '0'), ('nonce', encode64(b'short')),
+])
+def test_signed_invalid_sample_refused(setup, field, value):
+    _, key, _, _ = setup
+    value_dict = payload(setup); value_dict[field] = value
+    # Bypass our sign() validator: this is an authentic but invalid authority statement.
+    raw = signed_unchecked(value_dict, key)
+    with pytest.raises(ClockError):
+        verify(raw, key.public_key(), 'test-key')
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('header', [
+    {'kid': 'test-key', 'typ': 'wrong'}, {'kid': 'other-key', 'typ': TYPE},
+    {'kid': 'test-key', 'typ': TYPE, 'jku': 'https://untrusted.invalid/key'},
+    {'kid': 'test-key', 'typ': TYPE, 'crit': ['unknown']},
+])
+def test_authentic_unadmitted_header_refused(setup, header):
+    _, key, _, _ = setup
+    with pytest.raises(ClockError):
+        verify(signed_unchecked(payload(setup), key, header), key.public_key(), 'test-key')
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('header', [b'null', b'[]', b'{}', b'{',
+    b'{"alg":"ES256","alg":"ES256","kid":"test-key","typ":"railiance-clock-sample-v0.1"}',
+    b'{"alg":"none","kid":"test-key","typ":"railiance-clock-sample-v0.1"}'])
+def test_malformed_header_refused(setup, header):
+    _, key, _, _ = setup
+    raw = sign(payload(setup), key, 'test-key').split(b'.')
+    raw[0] = encode64(header).encode()
+    with pytest.raises(ClockError):
+        verify(b'.'.join(raw), key.public_key(), 'test-key')
+
+
+def test_modified_uncertainty_invalidates_signature(setup):
+    _, key, _, _ = setup
+    parts = sign(payload(setup), key, 'test-key').split(b'.')
+    changed = json.loads(decode64(parts[1].decode())); changed['error_ns'] = '0'
+    parts[1] = encode64(json.dumps(changed).encode()).encode()
+    with pytest.raises(ClockError):
+        verify(b'.'.join(parts), key.public_key(), 'test-key')
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('raw', [b'{"a":1e999}', b'{"a":[-1e999]}', b'{"a":Infinity}'])
+def test_nonfinite_exponent_refused(raw):
+    with pytest.raises(ClockError):
+        strict_json(raw)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('raw', [b'x' * 8193, b'\xff.abc.def', b'a.b', b'a.b.c.d'])
+def test_invalid_envelope_refused(setup, raw):
+    _, key, _, _ = setup
+    with pytest.raises(ClockError):
+        verify(raw, key.public_key(), 'test-key')
+
+
+def test_finite_json_numbers_remain_supported():
+    assert strict_json(b'{"a":1.25,"b":1e100}') == {'a': 1.25, 'b': 1e100}

tests/test_transport.py

@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
+import ipaddress
+import json
+import ssl
+import threading
+
+from cryptography import x509
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes, serialization
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
+from cryptography.x509.oid import NameOID
+import pytest
+
+from railiance_clock.client import Clock, FileTrust
+from railiance_clock.core import ClockError
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def endpoint(setup):
+    path, _, timer, transport = setup
+    servers = []
+    def create(*, status=200, media='application/jose', encoding=None, tls=None):
+        calls = []
+        class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+            def log_message(self, *_):
+                pass
+            def do_GET(self):
+                calls.append(self.path)
+                self.send_response(500); self.end_headers()
+            def do_POST(self):
+                calls.append(self.path)
+                body = transport(json.loads(self.rfile.read(int(self.headers['Content-Length']))))
+                self.send_response(status)
+                self.send_header('Content-Type', media)
+                self.send_header('Content-Length', str(len(body)))
+                if 300 <= status < 400:
+                    self.send_header('Location', '/must-not-follow')
+                if encoding:
+                    self.send_header('Content-Encoding', encoding)
+                self.end_headers(); self.wfile.write(body)
+        server = ThreadingHTTPServer(('127.0.0.1', 0), Handler)
+        if tls:
+            server.socket = tls.wrap_socket(server.socket, server_side=True)
+        thread = threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever); thread.start()
+        servers.append((server, thread))
+        data = json.loads(path.read_text())
+        data['endpoint'] = f'{"https" if tls else "http"}://127.0.0.1:{server.server_port}/v1/time-samples'
+        data['transport'] = 'https' if tls else 'admitted-loopback'
+        path.write_text(json.dumps(data))
+        return Clock(FileTrust(path), timer=timer), calls
+    yield create
+    for server, thread in servers:
+        server.shutdown(); server.server_close(); thread.join()
+
+
+def test_http_response_positive_control(endpoint):
+    clock, calls = endpoint()
+    assert clock.read().authority_id == 'railiance01'
+    assert calls == ['/v1/time-samples']
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('status', [301, 302, 303, 307, 308])
+def test_redirect_is_never_followed(endpoint, status):
+    clock, calls = endpoint(status=status)
+    with pytest.raises(ClockError):
+        clock.read()
+    assert calls == ['/v1/time-samples']
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('options', [{'media': 'application/json'}, {'media': 'text/plain'},
+    {'encoding': 'gzip'}, {'status': 201}, {'status': 503}])
+def test_unexpected_http_response_refused(endpoint, options):
+    clock, calls = endpoint(**options)
+    with pytest.raises(ClockError):
+        clock.read()
+    assert calls == ['/v1/time-samples']
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('case', ['valid', 'expired', 'future', 'wrong-host', 'untrusted'])
+def test_tls_certificate_validation(endpoint, tmp_path, monkeypatch, case):
+    now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+    ca_key = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())
+    ca_name = x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, 'Disposable test CA')])
+    ca = (x509.CertificateBuilder().subject_name(ca_name).issuer_name(ca_name)
+          .public_key(ca_key.public_key()).serial_number(x509.random_serial_number())
+          .not_valid_before(now - timedelta(days=2)).not_valid_after(now + timedelta(days=2))
+          .add_extension(x509.BasicConstraints(ca=True, path_length=0), critical=True)
+          .sign(ca_key, hashes.SHA256()))
+    key = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())
+    start, end = now - timedelta(hours=1), now + timedelta(hours=1)
+    if case == 'expired':
+        start, end = now - timedelta(days=1), now - timedelta(hours=1)
+    if case == 'future':
+        start, end = now + timedelta(hours=1), now + timedelta(days=1)
+    san = x509.DNSName('wrong.invalid') if case == 'wrong-host' else x509.IPAddress(ipaddress.ip_address('127.0.0.1'))
+    leaf_name = x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, 'Disposable test server')])
+    cert = (x509.CertificateBuilder().subject_name(leaf_name).issuer_name(ca_name)
+            .public_key(key.public_key()).serial_number(x509.random_serial_number())
+            .not_valid_before(start).not_valid_after(end)
+            .add_extension(x509.BasicConstraints(ca=False, path_length=None), critical=True)
+            .add_extension(x509.SubjectAlternativeName([san]), critical=False)
+            .sign(ca_key, hashes.SHA256()))
+    ca_file, cert_file, key_file = (tmp_path / name for name in ('ca.pem', 'cert.pem', 'key.pem'))
+    ca_file.write_bytes(ca.public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM))
+    cert_file.write_bytes(cert.public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM))
+    key_file.write_bytes(key.private_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM,
+        serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8, serialization.NoEncryption()))
+    key_file.chmod(0o600)
+    empty = tmp_path / 'empty-ca-directory'; empty.mkdir()
+    # Exercise urllib's real default verification; no permissive SSL context.
+    monkeypatch.setenv('SSL_CERT_FILE', str(ca_file if case != 'untrusted' else empty / 'missing.pem'))
+    monkeypatch.setenv('SSL_CERT_DIR', str(empty))
+    context = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLS_SERVER)
+    context.load_cert_chain(cert_file, key_file)
+    clock, calls = endpoint(tls=context)
+    if case == 'valid':
+        assert clock.read().authority_id == 'railiance01'
+        assert calls == ['/v1/time-samples']
+    else:
+        with pytest.raises(ClockError) as exc:
+            clock.read()
+        reason = exc.value.__cause__.reason
+        assert isinstance(reason, ssl.SSLCertVerificationError)
+        expected = {'expired': 'expired', 'future': 'not yet valid',
+                    'wrong-host': 'IP address mismatch', 'untrusted': 'issuer certificate'}
+        assert expected[case] in reason.verify_message
+        assert calls == []  # Refused during TLS, before application data.

workplans/RCLK-WP-0003-reference-implementation.md

@@ -76,3 +76,15 @@ concurrency fixture or historical event-translation test, and no complete native
 platform or consumer proof. Finished status retains only the previously stated
 reference boundary; those broader claims are not asserted. Existing
 0002-T04/0004-T02/T03 and 0005 retain their owner/native gates.
+
+
+### Local acceptance-gap follow-up — 2026-09-28
+
+Added attribution recording-label/preservation/failure checks, real loopback TLS
+and redirect/response refusal tests, authenticated invalid protocol and numeric
+boundary tests, and deterministic interval/drift sweeps. Fixed nonfinite JSON
+exponents escaping the literal-constant check. The suite now passes 167 tests
+and 4 subtests; see the updated [coverage map](../docs/acceptance-coverage.md).
+Recording-time attribution is tested; historical occurrence translation and
+consumer CAS/native platform proof remain outside these local claims. Existing
+blocked owner plans retain those gates; no work record was created.