Document actual infrastructure scope and intent gaps
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SCOPE.md
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SCOPE.md
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# SCOPE
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> This file helps you quickly understand what this repository is about,
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> when it is relevant, and when it is not.
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> It is intentionally lightweight and may be incomplete.
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> This file describes the repository as it works today. Aspirational direction
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> belongs in `INTENT.md`; known differences are recorded under `history/`.
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---
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## One-liner
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S1 Infrastructure Substrate of the Railiance OAS Stack — Git-driven OS provisioning, security hardening, and server baseline using Terraform, cloud-init, and Ansible.
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The S1 host substrate for Railiance: source-backed inventory, Ansible OS
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convergence, host firewall policy, SSH bootstrap, and recurring baseline
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verification for the existing Railiance servers.
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---
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## Core Idea
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Railiance is structured as five independent repos per OAS Stack layer. This repo
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is S1 — the foundation and the canonical ownership home for infrastructure
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substrate facts. It provisions bare-metal or cloud servers (Hetzner,
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HostEurope), hardens the OS, manages secrets (SOPS/age), and validates the
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resulting baseline with Goss tests. Future `reef-*` repos will model
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purpose-bound substrates, but the source-backed OS baseline, inventory, and
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server identity facts start here. S1 must be converged and verified before any
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higher layer (Kubernetes, platform, etc.) can run.
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`railiance-infra` owns host-level facts and controls below Kubernetes. It keeps
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the current server identities in source, converges supported Linux hosts toward
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a security baseline, and checks the resulting live state. A higher layer should
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receive a reachable, hardened host rather than needing to configure the host
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itself.
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The two current managed hosts are existing Host Europe virtual servers. The
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repository also contains a Hetzner Terraform and cloud-init path, but that path
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is not an operable representation of the current inventory: it supports only
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Hetzner and expects provisioning fields that the two adopted Host Europe
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entries do not contain.
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---
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## In Scope
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- OS provisioning via Terraform (Hetzner, HostEurope providers)
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- First-boot configuration via cloud-init
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- OS convergence via Ansible (base, security, sops_agent roles)
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- Security hardening and firewall rules
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- Secret management: SOPS/age encryption at rest in Git
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- Goss specification and test suite for OS baseline validation
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- Server inventory management (`inventory/servers.yaml` — source of truth)
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- SSH access management
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- Canonical S1 identity and substrate-fact base for future `reef-*` repos
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- Source-backed server and workstation substrate facts needed by higher-layer
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architecture work
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- Canonical connection inventory for `Railiance01` and `CoulombCore` in
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`inventory/servers.yaml`
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- Dynamic Ansible inventory, including per-host exceptions
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- Debian/Ubuntu host convergence for base packages, SSH hardening, fail2ban,
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timezone, swap, user resource limits, and host access keys
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- Declared UFW management where `ufw_manage` is enabled
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- Tunnel-only k3s API policy, source-restricted Flannel grants, and removal of
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retired public grants
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- Grant validation before opening public web ports 80/443 for a reef
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- Installation of OpenBao SSH user-CA trust and per-user principals
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- Installation of SOPS/age tooling and SOPS-encrypted storage of the Hetzner
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provider token
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- Goss host checks, TAP evidence, and an hourly on-host pass/fail signal
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- Non-secret `Railiance01` identity, capacity, utilization, and host-operations
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evidence for downstream resource accounting
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- Local age-encrypted snapshots of selected S1 OS configuration and installed
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package selections
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- A reference NetKingdom host-bootstrap capability declaration
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---
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## Out of Scope
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- Kubernetes runtime → railiance-cluster (S2)
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- Platform services → railiance-platform (S3)
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- Developer tooling → railiance-enablement (S4)
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- Application deployments → railiance-apps (S5)
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- Workload execution semantics or rail contracts → `rail-*` repos
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- Purpose-specific reef repo ownership and workload-placement policy beyond the
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S1 source-backed substrate facts
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- No cross-layer re-configuration from higher layers
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- Kubernetes installation and runtime management (`railiance-cluster`, S2)
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- OpenBao, databases, ingress, Forgejo, and other platform services
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(`railiance-platform`, S3)
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- Developer tooling and application deployment (S4/S5)
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- Workload execution contracts (`rail-*`) and workload packaging (`rapp-*`)
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- Reef topology, workload placement, and exposure decisions; this repo only
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enforces a supplied substrate grant
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- Provider billing, contracts, lifecycle dates, and cost records
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- Secret issuance or live credential custody; this repo encrypts selected
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material at rest and installs client tooling
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- Host Europe provisioning or lifecycle automation; the current Host Europe
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servers are adopted resources
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- Cluster, database, or application backup and restore
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Historical Forgejo migration and restore-drill material remains in this repo,
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but it is not an S1 capability or an ownership precedent.
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---
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## Relevant When
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- Provisioning new servers for the Railiance stack
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- OS hardening, Ansible convergence, or Goss verification
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- Managing server inventory or SSH access
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- Rotating SOPS/age keys or updating secrets
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- Preparing or validating first-wave `reef-*` rollout identity facts
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- Adding or changing a managed host identity
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- Converging or auditing host packages, SSH, fail2ban, UFW, swap, or resource
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limits
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- Changing host-level network grants or proving k3s API exposure remains
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tunnel-only
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- Installing SSH CA trust or automation public keys on a host
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- Running or collecting host baseline checks
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- Producing non-secret host-capacity evidence
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- Developing or repairing the Hetzner provisioning path
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---
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## Not Relevant When
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- Kubernetes, platform services, or application work (wrong layer)
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- Server is already provisioned and converged (use cluster/platform repos)
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- The change is to Kubernetes objects, cluster components, platform services,
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or applications
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- The request is for a secret value, login token, provider contract, or invoice
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- The decision concerns which workloads or rails belong in a reef
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- A backup or restore concerns persistent application or cluster data
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An already-provisioned host can still be in scope: convergence, firewall
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maintenance, evidence collection, and drift checks are ongoing S1 work.
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---
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## Current State
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- Status: maintained / productive
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- Implementation: HostEurope substrate baseline active for `Railiance01` and
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`CoulombCore`; server spec + test suite active; first reef rollout source map
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defined. Railiance is classified along four repo-family axes (`railiance-*`,
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`rail-*`, `rapp-*`, `reef-*`), of which five `railiance-*` repos cover S1–S5;
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this file previously said "5-repo stack architecture", which predates that
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model
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- Stability: high for the current single-server and transitional two-server
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substrate reality; proven in production on `92.205.62.239`
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- Usage: foundation for all Railiance deployments; canonical S1 source for
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higher-layer and future reef planning. `railiance-hosts` is **superseded** by
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this repo and carries a banner saying so; its retirement is pending in
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`railiance-master`
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- **Firewall posture**: `RAIL-HO-WP-0009` finished. k3s API is tunnel-only
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(ADR-005); live `Railiance01` UFW matches the declaration. CoulombCore
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UFW stays unmanaged (`ufw_manage: false`)
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- **Resource evidence**: `RAIL-HO-WP-0008` finished. Non-secret identity,
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capacity observations, and host-ops labor live under
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`docs/evidence/resource-hosteurope-railiance01/`
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- Status: maintained and operational for adopted-host convergence and
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verification
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- Managed inventory: `Railiance01` (`92.205.62.239`) and `CoulombCore`
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(`92.205.130.254`), both reached as user `tegwick`
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- `Railiance01`: UFW is managed from this repo; the k3s API is tunnel-only and
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the Host Europe Nydus exception is declared
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- `CoulombCore`: UFW is deliberately unmanaged because its live packet filter
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has not been migrated safely to this repo's UFW model
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- Verification: Goss can run on demand and hourly on-host. `CoulombCore` is a
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documented expected failure for the uniform UFW-active assertion, so the
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repository does not currently provide an all-host green handoff gate
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- Provisioning: a Hetzner-only Terraform template and helper scripts exist.
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They do not currently plan against the mixed/adopted inventory and do not
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provision either live Host Europe server
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- Secrets: `secrets/hetzner-token.yaml` is SOPS-encrypted. The Ansible
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`sops_agent` role installs tools but intentionally does not place a private
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age key on a host
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- Evidence: the latest committed `Railiance01` capacity observation is a
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point-in-time record, not continuous resource telemetry
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---
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## How It Fits
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- Upstream dependencies: Terraform, Ansible, SOPS/age (external tools); cloud provider APIs
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- Downstream consumers: railiance-cluster (S2) depends on a converged, verified OS from this layer; all higher layers transitively depend on S1
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- Future substrate-boundary consumers: first-wave `reef-*` repos should project
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from the source-backed facts here rather than creating a second S1 inventory
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- Often used with: railiance-cluster (next layer), ops-bridge (SSH tunnel for remote State Hub access)
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- Upstream tools: Ansible, Goss, SOPS/age, Terraform, SSH, and provider APIs
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- Downstream: `railiance-cluster` depends on host reachability and an acceptable
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S1 posture; higher layers depend on it transitively
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- Access path: `ops-bridge` supplies the SSH tunnels used for private cluster
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and State Hub access; this repo declares host-side SSH access and firewall
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posture but does not own tunnel orchestration
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- Resource accounting: `resource-control` consumes the non-secret evidence
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interface under `docs/evidence/resource-hosteurope-railiance01/`; `fin-hub`
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owns booked cost
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---
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## Terminology
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- Preferred terms: OAS Stack Level S1, convergence, verification, SOPS/age, Goss specification, boundary rule
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- Potentially confusing terms: "convergence" = applying Ansible to reach desired state; "verification" = running Goss tests to validate it
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- **Adopted host**: an existing provider resource represented and managed here,
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but not created by this repo
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- **Convergence**: applying Ansible roles to move a host toward declared state
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- **Verification**: evaluating live host state with Goss
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- **Substrate grant**: an approved host-level network opening supplied by the
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owning reef declaration
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- **S1**: the infrastructure-substrate layer below the cluster runtime
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---
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## Related / Overlapping
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- `railiance-cluster` (S2) — consumes the OS baseline provided by S1
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- `railiance-hosts` — predecessor or migration-duplicate S1 line; not the
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canonical repo for new architecture work
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- `ops-bridge` — used to reach local State Hub from remote HostEurope server
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- `railiance-cluster` — owns the S2 Kubernetes runtime
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- `railiance-platform` — owns S3 shared services and service data protection
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- `ops-bridge` — owns workstation-to-host tunnel orchestration
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- `resource-control` — owns the resource portfolio assembled from evidence
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produced here
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- `reef-*` repos — own substrate grouping and exposure intent
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- `railiance-hosts` — superseded predecessor; not a second source of truth
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---
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## Getting Oriented
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- Start with: `CLAUDE.md` (session protocol, remote execution), `README.md` (provisioning workflow)
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- Key files / directories: `inventory/servers.yaml` (authoritative server
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list), `ansible/` (playbooks/roles), `terraform/` (provider configs), `goss/`
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(spec + tests), `docs/reef-first-wave-source-map.md`,
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`docs/adr/ADR-003-railiance-5repo-stack-architecture.md`
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- Entry points: `make tf-plan`, `make tf-apply`, `make converge`, `make verify`
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- Session and work routing: `AGENTS.md` and `.custodian-brief.md`
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- Current host identities: `inventory/servers.yaml`
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- Host convergence: `ansible/playbooks/bootstrap.yaml` and `ansible/roles/`
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- Host-specific posture: `ansible/inventory/host_vars/`
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- Firewall defaults: `ansible/roles/base/defaults/main.yml`
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- Verification: `goss/baseline.yaml.j2`, `docs/verification.md`, and
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`docs/conformance-loop.md`
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- Hetzner prototype path: `terraform/hetzner/` and `docs/provisioning.md`
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- Operator entry points: `make converge`, `make converge-check`,
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`make converge-firewall`, `make verify`, and `make goss-status`
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---
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@ -136,31 +181,43 @@ higher layer (Kubernetes, platform, etc.) can run.
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```capability
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type: infrastructure
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title: Server provisioning (Terraform)
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description: Provision bare-metal and cloud servers on Hetzner and HostEurope via Terraform with cloud-init first-boot configuration.
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keywords: [terraform, server, provisioning, hetzner, hosteurope, cloud-init, infrastructure]
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```
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```capability
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type: infrastructure
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title: OS hardening and convergence (Ansible)
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description: Harden and converge server OS via Ansible (base, security, sops_agent roles) with Goss test suite for baseline validation.
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keywords: [ansible, os, hardening, convergence, goss, security, baseline, validation]
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title: Adopted-host inventory and convergence
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description: Resolve the two current server identities into Ansible inventory and converge supported Debian/Ubuntu host packages, SSH posture, fail2ban, swap, resource limits, and access keys.
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keywords: [ansible, inventory, host, convergence, hardening, linux]
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```
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```capability
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type: security
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title: Secret management (SOPS/age)
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description: Manage encrypted secrets at rest in Git using SOPS/age — encrypt, rotate, and distribute secrets for Railiance infrastructure components.
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keywords: [sops, age, secrets, encryption, gitops, key-rotation, credential]
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title: Host firewall grant enforcement
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description: Converge declared UFW rules, keep the k3s API tunnel-only, restrict Flannel peers, revoke retired sources, and require a reef exposure grant before opening public web ports.
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keywords: [ufw, firewall, k3s, tunnel, flannel, reef, exposure]
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```
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```capability
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type: infrastructure
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title: Recurring host baseline verification
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description: Render inventory-aware Goss checks, run them on demand or hourly on-host, retain local failure state, and collect TAP evidence; the current all-host gate has a documented CoulombCore exception.
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keywords: [goss, verification, drift, systemd-timer, tap, evidence]
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```
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```capability
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type: security
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title: SSH trust bootstrap
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description: Install automation public keys and OpenBao SSH user-CA trust with host-specific authorized principals; certificate issuance remains with ops-warden.
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keywords: [ssh, certificate-authority, openbao, principals, access]
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```
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```capability
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type: infrastructure
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title: Host capacity evidence interface
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description: Collect a bounded, non-secret Railiance01 observation across provider metadata, operating-system capacity, and k3s allocatable state for resource-control.
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keywords: [capacity, evidence, hosteurope, resource-control, inventory]
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```
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---
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## Notes
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Targets two current server substrates: `CoulombCore` (`92.205.130.254`) and
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`Railiance01` (`92.205.62.239`). The first-wave reef rollout also recognizes a
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grouped operator workstation substrate. State Hub access uses ops-bridge —
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`bridge up state-hub-coulombcore` or `bridge up state-hub-railiance01` from the
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workstation (see ADR-004).
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The exact differences between this operational scope and the aspirational
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mission in `INTENT.md` are assessed in
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`history/2026-08-23-scope-against-intent.md`.
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124
history/2026-08-23-scope-against-intent.md
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124
history/2026-08-23-scope-against-intent.md
Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
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# Scope Against Intent Assessment — 2026-08-23
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## Purpose
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This assessment compares the repository's executable state on 2026-08-23 with
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the stable direction in `INTENT.md`. It describes gaps; it does not create or
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authorize implementation work.
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The assessment was made after confirming that the repository had no actionable
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local work: no ready, active, or blocked workplan; no task assigned to
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`railiance-infra` in `todo`, `progress`, or `wait`; no unread inbox message; no
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active repo dispatch; and no open Forgejo issue or pull request.
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## Overall Assessment
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The repository is a useful host-convergence and verification substrate, but it
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does not yet meet the full intent of reproducibly turning bare machines into a
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verified handoff. Its strongest implemented area is post-provisioning host
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control. Its largest gap is the seam before that: neither current Host Europe
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server is provisioned from source, and the only Terraform module cannot consume
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the current inventory.
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The intent is therefore **partially realized**. The repo can maintain important
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parts of S1 for existing hosts; it cannot currently rebuild the live S1 estate
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from its declared source alone.
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## Principle-by-Principle Assessment
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| Intent principle | Assessment | Current evidence | Gap |
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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
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| Declarative and reproducible | Partial | Ansible roles, firewall variables, a baseline spec, dynamic inventory, and a Hetzner Terraform module are source-controlled. | The live hosts are adopted Host Europe resources. The Terraform module iterates every inventory entry but requires `type`, `region`, `image`, and `role`, which the current entries lack. Host Europe lifecycle is manual, and no source path can recreate the current estate end to end. |
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| Hardened by default | Partial | SSH password/root login are disabled by Ansible; fail2ban and UFW policy exist; k3s API access is tunnel-only; public web ports require a reef grant. | Hardening is applied after access exists rather than guaranteed as one provisioning transaction. `CoulombCore` deliberately bypasses UFW management. The generic cloud-init template still contains a placeholder SSH key and is not the Terraform template. |
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| Verified before handoff | Partial | Goss renders inventory-aware checks, emits TAP, and runs hourly plus five minutes after boot. | The uniform baseline intentionally fails on `CoulombCore` because UFW is inactive. Verification is not a mandatory provisioning/handoff gate, and no repository CI exercises the Ansible/Goss contract. |
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| Recorded source of truth | Partial | `inventory/servers.yaml` records the two names, IPs, and SSH users; host variables record the CoulombCore exception; Railiance01 has a non-secret evidence interface. | The inventory is authoritative for connection identity but not full resource shape or lifecycle. Current-host provider, location, flavor, image, and role are not modeled there. Evidence coverage is asymmetric and point-in-time. |
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| Secure at rest | Partial | The Hetzner token is SOPS/age encrypted and repo hooks check files under `secrets/`. The host role installs SOPS/age without placing the private age key. | Rotation is manual. `inventory/group_vars/secrets.sops.yaml` is a plaintext placeholder outside the hook's checked path, while the docs describe it as encrypted input. The implementation and documentation disagree about the provider-token source. |
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| Foundation, not tenant | Mostly met | Active convergence, firewall, SSH, inventory, and verification code stay at host level; cluster and platform ownership are documented elsewhere. | Historical Forgejo migration, runner, and restore-drill artifacts remain in the repo and blur discovery, although they do not form the current S1 execution path. |
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## Direction-of-Evolution Assessment
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### Stronger reproducibility and drift detection — partial
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The hourly Goss timer is a real drift detector and its firewall assertions are
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derived from the same inventory variables used for convergence. It records a
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host flag and journald event, with an optional State Hub progress post.
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Gaps:
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- No central reaction is guaranteed; paging, task creation, and rollout
|
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blocking belong elsewhere and are not wired as a dependable end-to-end loop.
|
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- `spec/server-baseline.yaml` is described as authoritative but is not consumed
|
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by Ansible or Goss. Maintaining the spec, roles, and template remains a manual
|
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three-way synchronization task.
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- The declared spec and convergence are already imperfectly aligned: for
|
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example, the spec requires `htop` and a `tegwick` passwordless-sudo posture,
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while the base role does not establish both of those properties.
|
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- A known expected failure means the all-host signal cannot distinguish only
|
||||
new regressions without host-profile semantics.
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|
||||
### Broader provider support — gap
|
||||
|
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Only Hetzner has Terraform resources. Host Europe is represented by adopted
|
||||
identity/evidence and manual lifecycle notes, not a provider implementation.
|
||||
The current single inventory cannot safely mix adopted Host Europe records with
|
||||
the Hetzner `for_each` model.
|
||||
|
||||
### Continuous baseline verification — partial
|
||||
|
||||
The on-host hourly timer satisfies the cadence part of the direction. It is not
|
||||
yet a complete continuous assurance capability because deployment does not
|
||||
require a fresh green result, the failure route is optional, and one managed
|
||||
host is expected to remain red.
|
||||
|
||||
### Automated rotation of at-rest secret material — gap
|
||||
|
||||
The repository provides `sops --rotate` as an operator command. It has no
|
||||
scheduled or policy-driven rotation, recipient-age enforcement, rotation
|
||||
receipt, or consumer rollout verification.
|
||||
|
||||
### Self-evidencing, auditable provisioning — partial
|
||||
|
||||
Goss TAP reports, capacity observations, ADRs, and workplan evidence are useful
|
||||
records. The actual create/apply/converge sequence has no unified immutable
|
||||
receipt tying together source revision, provider plan, created resource,
|
||||
cloud-init completion, Ansible result, and a fresh verification result.
|
||||
|
||||
The local S1 backup command encrypts selected `/etc` files and package
|
||||
selections, but it is not scheduled, does not copy off-host, and has no restore
|
||||
procedure or drill in this repo. It should not be treated as proof that the
|
||||
substrate is recoverable.
|
||||
|
||||
## Concrete Gaps, Ordered by Leverage
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Separate adopted and provisionable inventory semantics.** Add an explicit
|
||||
provider/lifecycle mode and validate the schema, or give each provider a
|
||||
filtered declaration. A Terraform plan must never interpret an adopted Host
|
||||
Europe entry as a Hetzner resource.
|
||||
2. **Make one baseline contract executable.** Generate convergence and checks
|
||||
from a shared model, or add automated tests that fail when the human spec,
|
||||
Ansible roles, and Goss assertions diverge.
|
||||
3. **Define host profiles and a real handoff gate.** Express the CoulombCore
|
||||
firewall exception in verification rather than accepting a permanently red
|
||||
host, and require a fresh result before S2 handoff.
|
||||
4. **Repair the secret-source contract.** Remove or encrypt the plaintext
|
||||
placeholder file, extend plaintext checks to every declared secret path, and
|
||||
make the documentation name the provider-token source actually used by the
|
||||
Makefile.
|
||||
5. **Capture provisioning receipts.** Record source revision, plan/apply
|
||||
identity, provider resource identifiers, convergence result, and verification
|
||||
result without recording secrets.
|
||||
6. **Close recovery and rotation loops.** Automate age-recipient rotation with
|
||||
evidence, and give the local S1 backup a scheduled off-host copy plus a
|
||||
tested restore procedure if live-state backup remains part of this repo.
|
||||
7. **Reduce scope noise.** Archive or relocate historical Forgejo/platform
|
||||
artifacts so current S1 ownership is evident from the file tree as well as
|
||||
from `SCOPE.md`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Bottom Line
|
||||
|
||||
Today the repo can answer: **"How do we keep these existing Linux hosts closer
|
||||
to a hardened, observable S1 baseline?"**
|
||||
|
||||
It cannot yet answer the full guiding question in `INTENT.md`: **"Can we rebuild
|
||||
the live substrate from source and prove, through a mandatory auditable gate,
|
||||
that it is ready before higher layers use it?"**
|
||||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue