diff --git a/WORK-RECORDS.md b/WORK-RECORDS.md
index 244bb39..3a049b2 100644
--- a/WORK-RECORDS.md
+++ b/WORK-RECORDS.md
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 | workplan | RAIL-HO-WP-0008 | finished | — | workplans/RAIL-HO-WP-0008-railiance01-resource-and-commercial-evidence.md |
 | workplan | RAIL-HO-WP-0009 | finished | — | workplans/RAIL-HO-WP-0009-firewall-declared-state-and-api-exposure.md |
 | workplan | RAIL-HO-WP-0010 | finished | — | workplans/RAIL-HO-WP-0010-new-reef-ports-need-a-grant.md |
+| workplan | RAIL-HO-WP-0011 | ready | — | workplans/RAIL-HO-WP-0011-reproducible-s1-declaration-and-handoff.md |
 | task | ADHOC-2026-08-22-T01 | done | — | workplans/ADHOC-2026-08-22.md |
 | task | ADHOC-2026-08-22-T02 | done | — | workplans/ADHOC-2026-08-22.md |
 | task | ADHOC-2026-08-22-T03 | done | — | workplans/ADHOC-2026-08-22.md |
@@ -40,3 +41,11 @@
 | task | RAIL-HO-WP-0009-T05 | done | — | workplans/RAIL-HO-WP-0009-firewall-declared-state-and-api-exposure.md |
 | task | RAIL-HO-WP-0009-T06 | done | — | workplans/RAIL-HO-WP-0009-firewall-declared-state-and-api-exposure.md |
 | task | RAIL-HO-WP-0010-T01 | done | — | workplans/RAIL-HO-WP-0010-new-reef-ports-need-a-grant.md |
+| task | RAIL-HO-WP-0011-T01 | todo | — | workplans/RAIL-HO-WP-0011-reproducible-s1-declaration-and-handoff.md |
+| task | RAIL-HO-WP-0011-T02 | todo | — | workplans/RAIL-HO-WP-0011-reproducible-s1-declaration-and-handoff.md |
+| task | RAIL-HO-WP-0011-T03 | todo | — | workplans/RAIL-HO-WP-0011-reproducible-s1-declaration-and-handoff.md |
+| task | RAIL-HO-WP-0011-T04 | todo | — | workplans/RAIL-HO-WP-0011-reproducible-s1-declaration-and-handoff.md |
+| task | RAIL-HO-WP-0011-T05 | todo | — | workplans/RAIL-HO-WP-0011-reproducible-s1-declaration-and-handoff.md |
+| task | RAIL-HO-WP-0011-T06 | todo | — | workplans/RAIL-HO-WP-0011-reproducible-s1-declaration-and-handoff.md |
+| task | RAIL-HO-WP-0011-T07 | todo | — | workplans/RAIL-HO-WP-0011-reproducible-s1-declaration-and-handoff.md |
+| task | RAIL-HO-WP-0011-T08 | todo | — | workplans/RAIL-HO-WP-0011-reproducible-s1-declaration-and-handoff.md |
diff --git a/workplans/RAIL-HO-WP-0011-reproducible-s1-declaration-and-handoff.md b/workplans/RAIL-HO-WP-0011-reproducible-s1-declaration-and-handoff.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b07e131
--- /dev/null
+++ b/workplans/RAIL-HO-WP-0011-reproducible-s1-declaration-and-handoff.md
@@ -0,0 +1,234 @@
+---
+id: RAIL-HO-WP-0011
+type: workplan
+title: "Make the S1 declaration reproducible and the handoff verifiably green"
+domain: financials
+repo: railiance-infra
+status: ready
+owner: codex
+topic_slug: railiance
+created: "2026-08-23"
+updated: "2026-08-23"
+related:
+  - RAIL-HO-WP-0002
+  - RAIL-HO-WP-0009
+---
+
+# RAIL-HO-WP-0011 — reproducible S1 declaration and handoff
+
+## Goal
+
+Close the highest-leverage gaps identified in
+`history/2026-08-23-scope-against-intent.md`: distinguish adopted resources
+from provider-managed resources, make the host baseline contract executable,
+produce a green per-host handoff gate, and make every declared secret input
+fail closed. Then add the evidence and rotation mechanics needed for an
+auditable provisioning path.
+
+This workplan improves the source and validation path. It does **not** authorize
+a Terraform apply or destroy, a live firewall change, a credential rotation,
+or any other live-host mutation. Those actions require their normal reviewed
+plan and operator approval.
+
+## Delivery Order
+
+The critical path is T01 → T02 and T03 → T04 → T05. T06 can proceed
+independently. T07 depends on T02 and T05. T08 depends on T06.
+
+## T01 — Define and validate adopted-versus-managed inventory
+
+```task
+id: RAIL-HO-WP-0011-T01
+status: todo
+priority: high
+```
+
+Define one explicit inventory contract for common host identity and
+provider-specific lifecycle fields. At minimum it must distinguish:
+
+- provider (`hosteurope`, `hetzner`, or a documented extension value)
+- lifecycle mode (`adopted` versus provider-managed)
+- connection identity used by Ansible
+- provider-specific provisioning fields used by Terraform
+
+Add a side-effect-free validator and fixtures for the two current adopted Host
+Europe hosts, a valid provisionable Hetzner host, and invalid mixed records.
+Preserve stable host names and connection behavior.
+
+**Done when:** the current inventory validates as adopted Host Europe
+resources, a complete Hetzner fixture validates, incomplete or contradictory
+records fail with actionable errors, and no provider command is needed to run
+the validation.
+
+## T02 — Make Hetzner planning select only managed Hetzner resources
+
+```task
+id: RAIL-HO-WP-0011-T02
+status: todo
+priority: high
+```
+
+Update the Terraform and helper path to consume the T01 contract and exclude
+adopted or non-Hetzner records. Audit any existing Terraform state before
+changing resource addresses or selection logic. Correct provisioning docs and
+Make targets so they name the provider-token source actually used.
+
+Add an isolated plan test or equivalent deterministic validation that proves
+the current Host Europe records cannot become Hetzner creates or destroys.
+
+**Done when:** current adopted records pass through the inventory-to-Terraform
+boundary without missing-field errors or managed resources, a provisionable
+Hetzner fixture produces the expected resource shape, and a reviewed plan shows
+no unintended create, replace, or destroy. Do not apply the plan in this task.
+
+## T03 — Model host-specific baseline profiles and reconcile declared state
+
+```task
+id: RAIL-HO-WP-0011-T03
+status: todo
+priority: high
+```
+
+Replace the permanent `CoulombCore` expected failure with an explicit baseline
+profile or declared exception. Reconcile `spec/server-baseline.yaml`, Ansible,
+and the intended live posture for packages, users/sudo, SSH, firewall,
+fail2ban, SOPS tooling, swap, and resource limits.
+
+Exceptions must say which control replaces the default, why it is accepted,
+and who owns removing it. An unmanaged control must not silently count as
+verified.
+
+**Done when:** both current hosts resolve to complete declared profiles, the
+UFW-managed and externally-filtered postures have explicit assertions, and the
+spec no longer claims properties that convergence neither establishes nor
+deliberately delegates.
+
+## T04 — Add automated baseline contract-parity tests
+
+```task
+id: RAIL-HO-WP-0011-T04
+status: todo
+priority: high
+```
+
+Add repository tests that fail when the human baseline, convergence roles, and
+Goss assertions diverge on governed properties. Prefer a single
+machine-readable model or generated artifacts where that reduces duplicated
+declarations; otherwise implement explicit parity checks with clear failure
+messages.
+
+Cover the profiles introduced by T03 and run the tests in Forgejo CI without
+requiring host access or secrets.
+
+**Done when:** a deliberate mismatch in a governed package, SSH setting,
+firewall rule, service, or user property fails locally and in CI, while all
+declared profiles pass from a clean checkout.
+
+## T05 — Provide a fresh green S1 handoff gate
+
+```task
+id: RAIL-HO-WP-0011-T05
+status: todo
+priority: high
+```
+
+Provide one operator-facing, non-ambiguous command that checks inventory and
+contract validity, runs the applicable profile for every selected host,
+collects evidence, and exits non-zero if any required control is failed,
+unknown, stale, or skipped without an accepted declaration.
+
+The receipt must identify the source revision, inventory digest, host/profile,
+check time, and result without including credentials or sensitive host output.
+Define freshness and the exact interface S2 can consume.
+
+**Done when:** both current hosts can return green against their declared
+profiles in an attended verification run, a failing or stale host makes the
+aggregate gate fail, and the evidence is sufficient for an S2 handoff without
+interpreting an expected-red exception.
+
+## T06 — Repair and enforce the secret-source contract
+
+```task
+id: RAIL-HO-WP-0011-T06
+status: todo
+priority: high
+```
+
+Remove, relocate, or SOPS-encrypt the plaintext
+`inventory/group_vars/secrets.sops.yaml` placeholder. Inventory every path that
+documentation or automation describes as secret-bearing, extend the
+pre-commit/CI check to those paths, and make playbooks fail clearly when an
+expected encrypted input is absent or malformed.
+
+Align README, provisioning, convergence, Make targets, and playbooks on the
+actual Hetzner token source and on the fact that the host role installs tools
+but does not distribute an age private key.
+
+**Done when:** plaintext fixtures at any declared secret path are rejected,
+the committed tree contains no file falsely presented as encrypted input, and
+the documented controller and host secret flows match the executable paths.
+
+## T07 — Emit non-secret provisioning and handoff receipts
+
+```task
+id: RAIL-HO-WP-0011-T07
+status: todo
+priority: medium
+```
+
+Define a versioned receipt linking inventory and source revisions, provider
+plan/apply identity, provider resource ID, cloud-init completion, Ansible
+convergence, and the T05 handoff result. Separate plan, apply, and verification
+events so a plan receipt cannot be mistaken for proof of a live change.
+
+Exercise the format with a dry-run or synthetic fixture first. A live provider
+apply remains separately approved and is not required merely to prove schema
+and redaction behavior.
+
+**Done when:** the receipt schema validates, sensitive fields and provider
+tokens cannot be serialized, incomplete phases fail closed, and a synthetic
+end-to-end example is consumable without prose interpretation.
+
+## T08 — Automate bounded SOPS recipient rotation
+
+```task
+id: RAIL-HO-WP-0011-T08
+status: todo
+priority: medium
+```
+
+Build a dry-run-first rotation workflow for the repository's SOPS files. It
+must inventory affected files and recipients, detect recipient drift, require a
+reviewed change set, verify decryption through an approved non-printing check,
+and emit a metadata-only receipt. Never print a decrypted value or private age
+key.
+
+Live recipient removal or credential replacement requires explicit operator
+approval after the dry run. Scheduling may be proposed only after rollback and
+recovery-key custody are documented.
+
+**Done when:** CI can detect recipient drift without secrets, an attended dry
+run identifies the exact files and before/after recipient set, rollback is
+documented, and a sample receipt proves verification without exposing values.
+
+## Acceptance
+
+- [ ] Adopted Host Europe records and provider-managed Hetzner records cannot
+      be confused by validation or Terraform selection.
+- [ ] The declared baseline, Ansible convergence, and Goss verification have an
+      automated parity contract.
+- [ ] Every current host can produce a fresh green result against an explicit
+      profile, and the aggregate handoff fails closed.
+- [ ] Every documented secret-bearing path is encrypted or deliberately absent
+      and protected by local and CI checks.
+- [ ] Provisioning/handoff and rotation paths emit metadata-only receipts with
+      reviewed redaction behavior.
+- [ ] No live provider, firewall, credential, or host mutation occurs without a
+      separately reviewed plan and the required operator approval.
+
+## Completion Evidence
+
+Record the final inventory schema and examples, Terraform plan safety result,
+baseline parity tests, CI run, attended all-host gate receipt, secret-path
+negative tests, provisioning receipt fixture, and SOPS rotation dry-run receipt
+here before marking the workplan finished.