Define derived rail and Qonto readiness architecture
This commit is contained in:
parent
0b95c3029c
commit
8901ae4b15
9 changed files with 845 additions and 0 deletions
79
docs/reef-production-readiness-contract.md
Normal file
79
docs/reef-production-readiness-contract.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
|
|||
# Reef Production Readiness Contract
|
||||
|
||||
Date: 2026-07-26
|
||||
Status: Adopted for the second implementation wave
|
||||
|
||||
## Purpose
|
||||
|
||||
Prevent a topology declaration from being mistaken for permission to run a
|
||||
critical workload.
|
||||
|
||||
`hosts_rail` and `binds_rapp` describe intended composition. Production use
|
||||
requires explicit readiness evidence.
|
||||
|
||||
## Admission States
|
||||
|
||||
Every hosted rail and bound `rapp` uses:
|
||||
|
||||
- `declared`
|
||||
- `installed`
|
||||
- `verified`
|
||||
- `production-approved`
|
||||
- `deprecated`
|
||||
|
||||
Promotion is monotonic only while its evidence remains current. Failed or
|
||||
expired evidence returns the binding to the last proven state.
|
||||
|
||||
## Required Reef Evidence
|
||||
|
||||
Before a rail becomes `verified`, the reef must provide machine-readable
|
||||
evidence for:
|
||||
|
||||
- substrate and Kubernetes version compatibility
|
||||
- control-plane and workload capacity with documented headroom
|
||||
- ingress, DNS, and certificate path
|
||||
- storage and stateful-workload constraints
|
||||
- workload identity and approved secret-delivery path
|
||||
- network isolation and egress enforcement
|
||||
- logs, metrics, traces, alerting, and audit delivery
|
||||
- backup, restore, and rollback path
|
||||
- upgrade and maintenance ownership
|
||||
- failure-domain and recovery assumptions
|
||||
|
||||
## Critical Workload Gate
|
||||
|
||||
Before a critical, internet-facing, or high-value-credential workload becomes
|
||||
`production-approved`, its binding must additionally record:
|
||||
|
||||
- threat-model reference
|
||||
- availability, cold-start, and recovery objectives
|
||||
- identity, secret revocation, and audit evidence
|
||||
- negative authorization and network tests
|
||||
- rollback and temporary-fallback rules
|
||||
- accepted residual risks and their owner
|
||||
|
||||
The single-server and shared-control-plane risks of `reef-railiance` must be
|
||||
explicitly accepted or mitigated for `rapp-qonto`; the reef name or `high`
|
||||
criticality label is not evidence by itself.
|
||||
|
||||
## Mixed-Rail Rule
|
||||
|
||||
`reef-railiance` may host `rail-kubernetes` and `rail-knative` during the
|
||||
second wave, while `rail-kubernetes` remains primary.
|
||||
|
||||
Reassess or split the reef when any of these triggers occurs:
|
||||
|
||||
- incompatible maintenance or upgrade windows
|
||||
- inability to meet a critical workload recovery objective
|
||||
- control-plane or workload resource contention
|
||||
- materially different network or tenant-isolation requirements
|
||||
- independent scaling or availability requirements
|
||||
- failure in one rail cannot be contained from the other
|
||||
- premium-security or regulatory policy requires a separate boundary
|
||||
|
||||
## Automation Requirement
|
||||
|
||||
Readiness evidence should be produced by idempotent probes and stored as
|
||||
source-linked, timestamped records. Agents may execute and reconcile the
|
||||
probes. Human approval should consume the evidence only where policy requires
|
||||
explicit risk acceptance; it should not be used as a substitute for tests.
|
||||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue