# Reef Production Readiness Contract Date: 2026-07-26 Status: Adopted for the second implementation wave ## Purpose Prevent a topology declaration from being mistaken for permission to run a critical workload. `hosts_rail` and `binds_rapp` describe intended composition. Production use requires explicit readiness evidence. ## Admission States Every hosted rail and bound `rapp` uses: - `declared` - `installed` - `verified` - `production-approved` - `deprecated` Promotion is monotonic only while its evidence remains current. Failed or expired evidence returns the binding to the last proven state. ## Required Reef Evidence Before a rail becomes `verified`, the reef must provide machine-readable evidence for: - substrate and Kubernetes version compatibility - control-plane and workload capacity with documented headroom - ingress, DNS, and certificate path - storage and stateful-workload constraints - workload identity and approved secret-delivery path - network isolation and egress enforcement - logs, metrics, traces, alerting, and audit delivery - backup, restore, and rollback path - upgrade and maintenance ownership - failure-domain and recovery assumptions ## Critical Workload Gate Before a critical, internet-facing, or high-value-credential workload becomes `production-approved`, its binding must additionally record: - threat-model reference - availability, cold-start, and recovery objectives - identity, secret revocation, and audit evidence - negative authorization and network tests - rollback and temporary-fallback rules - accepted residual risks and their owner The single-server and shared-control-plane risks of `reef-railiance` must be explicitly accepted or mitigated for `rapp-qonto`; the reef name or `high` criticality label is not evidence by itself. ## Mixed-Rail Rule `reef-railiance` may host `rail-kubernetes` and `rail-knative` during the second wave, while `rail-kubernetes` remains primary. Reassess or split the reef when any of these triggers occurs: - incompatible maintenance or upgrade windows - inability to meet a critical workload recovery objective - control-plane or workload resource contention - materially different network or tenant-isolation requirements - independent scaling or availability requirements - failure in one rail cannot be contained from the other - premium-security or regulatory policy requires a separate boundary ## Automation Requirement Readiness evidence should be produced by idempotent probes and stored as source-linked, timestamped records. Agents may execute and reconcile the probes. Human approval should consume the evidence only where policy requires explicit risk acceptance; it should not be used as a substitute for tests.