---
id: RAILIANCE-WP-0006
type: workplan
title: "Workload KV Access Lanes for ops-warden Fetch"
domain: financials
repo: railiance-platform
status: finished
owner: codex
topic_slug: railiance
planning_priority: high
planning_order: 6
created: "2026-06-27"
updated: "2026-06-29"
depends_on_workplans:
  - RAIL-PL-WP-0002
  - RAILIANCE-WP-0004
related_state_hub_messages:
  - "551031d1-335e-4db8-9535-820fea52d0a3"
  - "f76d3a9e-a98f-4081-885d-b79d94312699"
state_hub_workstream_id: "96c8a93d-7a5a-4fa9-8f7b-865119551da3"
---

> **Terminology note:** Historical text in this archived workplan may use the legacy term "workstream". The fleet term is **workplan** (`canon/standards/workplan-terminology-fleet_v0.1.md`).

# RAILIANCE-WP-0006 - Workload KV Access Lanes for ops-warden Fetch

## Goal

Provision concrete, least-privilege OpenBao workload KV read lanes that
`ops-warden` can expose through `warden access --fetch` / `--exec` without
holding secret values itself.

The immediate request is for `whynot-design` to retrieve its npm publish token.
The path must be concrete, policy-scoped, and documented so the ops-warden
catalog can replace the current unresolved template path with a live
`whynot-design-npm-publish` entry.

No task in this workplan may paste, commit, log, or send secret values through
Git, State Hub, chat, prompts, or workplan text.

## Requirements Reviewed

Ops-warden message `551031d1-335e-4db8-9535-820fea52d0a3` asks
`railiance-platform` to provide non-secret pointers for:

- a concrete OpenBao KV path and field for `NPM_AUTH_TOKEN`;
- the KV mount used by the path;
- the OIDC login role for whynot-design or its operator identity;
- a read policy scoped to whynot-design's identity/service account;
- the flex-auth policy reference, if pre-approval is required.

Once these pointers are live, ops-warden will add a dedicated
`whynot-design-npm-publish` access catalog entry and a playbook, then notify
whynot-design.

## Proposed Contract

Use the workload credential convention documented in `docs/openbao.md`:

```text
platform/workloads/<tenant-or-org>/<workload>/<secret-purpose>
```

For this lane, the proposed non-secret contract is:

| Item | Proposed value |
| --- | --- |
| KV mount | `platform` |
| Tenant/org | `coulomb` |
| Workload/project | `whynot-design` |
| CLI path | `platform/workloads/coulomb/whynot-design/npm-publish` |
| KV-v2 policy data path | `platform/data/workloads/coulomb/whynot-design/npm-publish` |
| KV-v2 policy metadata path | `platform/metadata/workloads/coulomb/whynot-design/npm-publish` |
| Secret field | `NPM_AUTH_TOKEN` |
| OpenBao read policy | `workload-kv-read-whynot-design-npm-publish` |
| OIDC auth mount | `netkingdom` unless KeyCape compatibility requires `keycape` |
| OIDC role | `whynot-design-workload-kv-read` |
| Kubernetes auth role | `whynot-design-workload-kv-read` if an in-cluster service account consumes it |
| flex-auth ref | `secret.read:whynot-design` if tenant policy requires pre-approval |

The expected caller-facing read shape is:

```bash
bao login -method=oidc -path=netkingdom role=whynot-design-workload-kv-read
bao kv get -field=NPM_AUTH_TOKEN platform/workloads/coulomb/whynot-design/npm-publish
```

The command shape is illustrative only. Verification must avoid printing the
secret value; use attended operator checks or commands that prove read access
without persisting the token in logs.

## Tasks

## T01 - Capture ops-warden request and path contract

```task
id: RAILIANCE-WP-0006-T01
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "0c93496a-48bf-44e7-a75b-52e51e2639bc"
```

Record the ops-warden request, existing workload path convention, and proposed
whynot-design contract in this workplan.

Acceptance:

- The workplan names the concrete path, field, mount, policy, auth role, and
  optional flex-auth ref needed by ops-warden.
- The plan distinguishes non-secret pointers from secret values.
- The plan keeps this workload KV read lane separate from
  `RAILIANCE-WP-0005`, which tracks short-lived OpenBao token issuance for the
  ops-warden signing smoke.

**2026-06-27:** Reviewed the unread ops-warden request and existing
`platform/workloads/<tenant-or-org>/<workload>/<secret-purpose>` convention.
Captured the proposed `whynot-design` npm publish lane above with no secret
values.

## T02 - Add least-privilege OpenBao read policy

```task
id: RAILIANCE-WP-0006-T02
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "9c06d531-2566-4767-aa2f-8339605f23d5"
```

Create a concrete policy artifact for the whynot-design npm publish lane,
derived from `openbao/policies/workload-kv-read-template.hcl` but narrowed to
the selected `npm-publish` path.

Acceptance:

- A policy file under `openbao/policies/` defines read access to the exact
  `platform/data/workloads/coulomb/whynot-design/npm-publish` path.
- Metadata/list capabilities are only as broad as needed for the caller and
  ops-warden fetch UX.
- The policy grants no write, delete, patch, sudo, auth, or unrelated workload
  capabilities.
- The policy name matches the pointer intended for ops-warden:
  `workload-kv-read-whynot-design-npm-publish`.

**2026-06-27:** Added the concrete policy artifact at
`openbao/policies/workload-kv-read-whynot-design-npm-publish.hcl`. It grants
only `read` on the exact KV-v2 data and metadata paths for
`platform/workloads/coulomb/whynot-design/npm-publish`; it does not grant
write/delete/list/sudo/auth or sibling workload access. Added
`scripts/openbao-apply-workload-kv-lanes.sh`,
`make openbao-workload-kv-lanes-dry-run`, and
`make openbao-configure-workload-kv-lanes` for the source-owned policy apply
step. Dry-run passed. A live apply attempt with
`OPENBAO_WORKLOAD_KV_ARGS=--use-token-helper` reached unsealed OpenBao but was
denied with `403 permission denied` while writing the policy, so live policy
application waits on an approved platform-admin/operator token or a narrow
token-helper capability.

**2026-06-28:** Using the temporary operator token provided outside the repo,
Codex applied/confirmed the live policy in OpenBao. The verification read of the
policy succeeded and no secret values were printed or recorded.

## T03 - Define and apply auth bindings

```task
id: RAILIANCE-WP-0006-T03
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "a217371a-0f85-40c6-b691-ac67834c86b5"
```

Define the auth role that lets whynot-design or an approved operator identity
read the lane as itself.

Acceptance:

- The OIDC login role is documented as
  `bao login -method=oidc -path=netkingdom role=whynot-design-workload-kv-read`,
  or a different approved role is recorded with the reason.
- The role attaches only the whynot-design npm publish read policy.
- If an in-cluster whynot-design service account consumes the token, the
  Kubernetes auth role binds only the approved namespace and service account.
- Compatibility with the legacy `keycape` auth mount is either configured or
  explicitly declined.

**2026-06-27:** Documented the intended OIDC role pointer as
`auth/netkingdom/role/whynot-design-workload-kv-read` in
`docs/workload-kv-access-lanes.md`. Live application is waiting on confirmation
of the KeyCape/NetKingdom whynot-design bound claim or approved service-account
subject; do not create an unbounded OIDC role.

**2026-06-28:** Created/confirmed
`auth/netkingdom/role/whynot-design-workload-kv-read` with
`groups=["whynot-design"]`, only the
`workload-kv-read-whynot-design-npm-publish` policy, `ttl=15m`, and the approved
browser/local CLI callback URIs.

**2026-06-28:** Positive verification found the OIDC role was missing
`oidc_scopes`, causing OpenBao login to fail with `groups claim not found`.
Updated the live role and source CCR to request `openid`, `profile`, `email`,
and `groups`, matching the platform-admin OIDC scope shape.

## T04 - Provision the KV path without exposing the token

```task
id: RAILIANCE-WP-0006-T04
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "c43724a3-c83e-4ab6-b7d1-e427fd93a9a9"
```

Have an approved operator create or confirm the OpenBao KV entry for the npm
publish token.

Acceptance:

- The path exists at
  `platform/workloads/coulomb/whynot-design/npm-publish`.
- The field is named exactly `NPM_AUTH_TOKEN`.
- The token value is entered through an approved operator/OpenBao path and is
  never written to Git, State Hub, chat, prompts, shell history, or workplan
  text.
- Non-secret evidence records only the path, field name, actor, timestamp,
  policy name, and verification result.

**2026-06-27:** The concrete path and field are now documented. Live secret
provisioning is waiting on an approved operator/OpenBao custody path for the
actual `NPM_AUTH_TOKEN` value.

**2026-06-28:** Confirmed the OpenBao metadata at
`platform/workloads/coulomb/whynot-design/npm-publish` includes
`catalog-id=whynot-design-npm-publish` and that the `NPM_AUTH_TOKEN` field is
present. The value was not printed, recorded, or copied into Git, State Hub,
chat, or workplans.

## T05 - Verify caller-scoped fetch behavior

```task
id: RAILIANCE-WP-0006-T05
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "dc1f470b-e78a-48a9-9957-965aed47861f"
```

Prove that the authorized identity can read the token through the intended
OpenBao path and that unauthorized identities cannot.

Acceptance:

- An approved whynot-design identity or operator role can authenticate and
  perform the fetch without unresolved `<...>` placeholders.
- Negative verification shows a non-whynot identity cannot read the path.
- Verification output contains no token value.
- OpenBao audit evidence exists for the authorized read and denied read, with
  only non-secret request ids/timestamps recorded in the workplan or State Hub.

**2026-06-27:** Verification is waiting on live policy/role application and
secret provisioning. The runbook requires positive and negative fetch evidence
without printing the token value.

**2026-06-28:** Non-secret operator checks now pass for policy, auth role,
metadata, and field presence. Remaining verification is the attended
whynot-design OIDC positive check and a non-whynot denial check, both without
printing the token.

**2026-06-29:** Positive and negative caller verification passed without
printing the token value. The negative check failed OIDC login with the expected
groups bound-claim mismatch. `platform-root` was restored to the
`whynot-design` group after the temporary negative-test removal.

## T06 - Coordinate ops-warden catalog activation

```task
id: RAILIANCE-WP-0006-T06
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "8e84ec19-01db-4baf-a532-de87e51d4994"
```

Send ops-warden the non-secret pointers needed to create and activate its
dedicated access catalog entry.

Acceptance:

- The State Hub reply to ops-warden includes only path, field, KV mount,
  OIDC role, policy name/path, optional flex-auth ref, and runbook location.
- Ops-warden confirms the `whynot-design-npm-publish` catalog entry no longer
  contains unresolved placeholders.
- `warden access "npm auth token" --fetch` or the agreed exact selector resolves
  to the whynot-design lane and proxies the read as the caller.
- ops-warden confirms it holds no token value and only proxies OpenBao access.

**2026-06-27:** Added `docs/workload-kv-access-lanes.md` with the non-secret
handoff payload for ops-warden and sent the pointers by State Hub message. The
entry should remain draft/non-active until live OpenBao provisioning and
verification complete.

**2026-06-28:** The generic `openbao-api-key` ops-warden access lane can proxy
the check with explicit `--path` and `--field`, but the dedicated
`whynot-design-npm-publish` route is not yet present in the ops-warden routing
catalog. Keep activation pending until caller verification and catalog update.

**2026-06-29:** `CCR-2026-0001` is now active with
`access_frontdoor.readiness=ready` and `resolvable=true`. ops-warden still needs
to confirm that its dedicated `whynot-design-npm-publish` catalog selector
resolves through the caller-scoped lane.

**2026-06-29:** ops-warden confirmed in State Hub message
`f76d3a9e-a98f-4081-885d-b79d94312699` that catalog selector
`whynot-design-npm-publish` is `status: active`, `resolvable: true`, and wired
to the owner-confirmed lane:
`platform/workloads/coulomb/whynot-design/npm-publish`, field
`NPM_AUTH_TOKEN`, OIDC role `whynot-design-workload-kv-read`, and policy
`workload-kv-read-whynot-design-npm-publish`. ops-warden also confirmed it
notified whynot-design with `warden access whynot-design-npm-publish --exec -- npm publish`,
and that the sibling lanes remain draft for separate planning.

## T07 - Decide whether to batch sibling workload-KV requests

```task
id: RAILIANCE-WP-0006-T07
status: done
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "0b3ab5f5-e933-41f2-b29a-ab4ac50593aa"
```

Ops-warden noted similar still-open access lanes for
`issue-core-ingestion-api-key` and `openrouter-llm-connect`. Decide whether to
batch those paths in the same provisioning pass or keep this workplan scoped to
whynot-design.

Acceptance:

- The decision is recorded without secret values.
- If batching is approved, add concrete sub-tasks or a follow-up workplan for
  each additional lane.
- If batching is deferred, notify ops-warden that this workplan will deliver
  whynot-design first and leave the sibling entries for separate planning.

**2026-06-27:** Initially deferred sibling lanes (`issue-core-ingestion-api-key`
and `openrouter-llm-connect`) so the whynot-design npm token request could be
serviced first. The later ops-warden batch follow-up is now represented as
proposed CCRs in `RAILIANCE-WP-0007`, still unapproved and unresolvable until
human review and verification.

**2026-06-29:** Reviewed the sibling lane suggestions against `INTENT.md`.
Created follow-up workplans `RAILIANCE-WP-0009` for the issue-core runtime
ingestion credential lane and `RAILIANCE-WP-0010` for the llm-connect
OpenRouter provider key lane. Both plans keep this repo's scope limited to
shared platform secret custody, least-privilege OpenBao/External Secrets
delivery, verification, and ops-warden front-door handoff.

## Exit Criteria

- The whynot-design npm publish token has a concrete OpenBao KV path, field,
  read policy, and auth role.
- The authorized caller can fetch the token as itself through OpenBao and
  ops-warden without ops-warden storing the value.
- Unauthorized reads are denied.
- ops-warden has enough non-secret pointers to activate
  `whynot-design-npm-publish`.
- No secret values appear in Git, State Hub, chat, prompts, logs, or workplans.
