under `archived/`; their IDs and UUIDs are preserved. The number of blocked
plans is not a count of missing implementations or independent incidents.
| Workplan | Purpose and next gate | S3 boundary |
| --- | --- | --- |
| [RPF-WP-0027](RPF-WP-0027-keycape-live-secret-exposure-recovery.md) | Incident custody and final evidence; accept NetKingdom's residual disposition and publish exact custody handoff | The bundle was already rotated. Provider/MFA reconciliation belongs to NetKingdom. |
| [RPF-WP-0029](RPF-WP-0029-backup-credential-default-removal.md) | Backup credential exposure; attended provider invalidation and replacement recovery receipts | S3 retains custody acceptance; S1 and forge own their backup execution. |
| [RPF-WP-0025](RPF-WP-0025-openbao-operator-only-access.md) | Private OpenBao access; fresh attended callback/login then guarded retraction | Coordinate package, issuer, tunnel and DNS owners; keep the window separate. |
| [RPF-WP-0015](RPF-WP-0015-audit-core-custody-and-recovery-coordination.md) | Two prepared recovery exercises; fresh synthetic-load/outage approvals and custody readiness | S3 contributes lease/ESO and snapshot/unseal proof; S1/S2 and audit-core execute their parts. |
| [RPF-WP-0035](RPF-WP-0035-credential-lane-implementation.md) | One implementation queue for secrets-engine JWT, Fluid operator KV and preflight signing | Three independent task gates; no new approval inherited from the completed designs. |
| [RPF-WP-0036](RPF-WP-0036-platform-service-assurance.md) | Implemented local assurance/admission; waits for recurring restore evidence, Q2 reception and owner handoff | Run the assurance commands; live acceptance and external ownership remain gated. |
