railiance-platform/workplans/RPF-WP-0029-backup-credential-default-removal.md

---
id: RPF-WP-0029
type: workplan
title: "Remove backup credential default and verify governed replacement"
domain: financials
repo: railiance-platform
status: active
owner: codex
created: "2026-09-05"
updated: "2026-09-05"
state_hub_workstream_id: "bb326ebb-a313-549e-b35f-1bf17e1c58fd"
---

# Remove backup credential default and verify governed replacement

Source: State Hub message `ee702ac9-9118-4b9b-963a-01943052b65a`. Reviewed against current repository state
on 2026-09-05. Repository implementation is complete; live closure remains pending.

## Remove source fallback and verify fail-closed behavior

```task
id: RPF-WP-0029-T01
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "4b5aefdb-a746-54f9-ba29-ebb840e7848d"
```

Removed the literal upload credential default from tools/cmd/forgejo-backup. Missing governed input now fails before cluster operations with a value-free diagnostic; encryption dry-runs skip upload authentication. Offline tests prove missing-input denial, explicit input, and mocked OpenBao resolution.

2026-09-05 continuation: removed credentials and credential-bearing URLs from
curl argv; curl config travels through stdin with curlrc disabled. Both upload
backends suppress credential-bearing diagnostics, require HTTPS and reject
redirects/non-success status. Added transport containment and failure tests.

## Invalidate predecessor and prove replacement recovery

```task
id: RPF-WP-0029-T02
status: wait
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "b3f3402f-890b-5781-9b3e-1c9c0d28cea8"
```

Provider-side invalidation and replacement custody need the attended provider owner and CCR-2026-0004 lifecycle procedure. Record only non-secret invalidation, encrypted upload and restore receipts. No provider authority or replacement receipt was available; source removal alone does not close the reported exposure. Never record the predecessor value, fingerprint, length, or shape.

Prepared owner execution procedure: `docs/backup-credential-recovery.md`.
Awaiting the Nextcloud share owner/account and replacement custody coordinates;
OpenBao authority is not provider share-management authority. Activity-core is
also a consumer of this upload lane. Preserve AGE_PRIVATE_KEY and historical
exposure evidence; upload-token rotation cannot clear recovery-key taint.
No provider mutation, backup upload or restore has been run in this continuation.

## Portfolio review — 2026-09-05

INTENT binding: dependable backup custody and recovery. Retain T02 until the
provider owner invalidates the predecessor and supplies replacement upload and
restore receipts through CCR-2026-0004. Source removal is already complete.
S1 backup scheduling belongs to RAIL-HO-WP-0012; forge backup orchestration and
artifact retention belong to railiance-forge. RPF-WP-0036-T06 will obtain an
accepted compatibility handoff, but this exposure obligation stays visible
here until its evidence is accepted. No rotation was executed in this review.

## Move future backups to the dedicated Backup account

```task
id: RPF-WP-0029-T03
status: progress
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "f85b1b4e-9a20-56e2-9e7d-d1d6f1c77bd9"
```

User explicitly selected Nextcloud user `Backup` with 10 GB quota and operator
credentials at UI `secrets/operators/nextcloud/backup`. Live resolution is KVv2
`operators/nextcloud/backup`, fields BACKUP_USERNAME/BACKUP_PASSWORD. Native
WebDAV login verified; actual quota is 10737418240 bytes (10 GiB). Keep the
account password in operator custody, create a Backup-owned create-only share
for workload delivery, and preserve the existing age escrow and retained data.
Prove encrypted upload/download/decryption and workload delivery. No automatic
pruning or personal-account revocation is inferred from this account change.
The historical predecessor invalidation obligation in T02 remains separate.