railiance-platform/workplans/RPF-WP-0013-agent-high-risk-boundary-coverage.md

---
id: RPF-WP-0013
type: workplan
title: "Close agent high-risk OpenBao boundary coverage"
domain: financials
repo: railiance-platform
status: finished
owner: codex
topic_slug: railiance
created: "2026-08-21"
updated: "2026-08-22"
related:
  - WARDEN-WP-0032
  - RISK-F-0009
origin: routed
origin_ref: "State Hub message 828e4903-30fe-4903-acfd-cd2ecdda437d"
state_hub_workstream_id: "25c0b1c9-a1b7-5844-bd39-9db165fe196c"
---

# RPF-WP-0013 — Agent high-risk boundary coverage

## Goal

Make the OpenBao `agent-high-risk-boundary` deny every concrete high-risk KV
data path in the ops-warden routing catalog, verify the deployed policy, and
establish whether any agent identity actually carries the boundary.

## Boundaries

- Read policy documents, token-role metadata and capabilities only; never read
  a Secret value.
- A deny is added only for a concrete catalog path graded `risk: high`.
- Pattern-only and non-KV lanes are reported but do not produce invented paths.
- Operator identities do not receive this boundary; it is for coding-agent
  identities where deny must override any coincident workload read policy.

## T01 — Reconcile catalog coverage

```task
id: RPF-WP-0013-T01
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "35855316-3282-52d2-922e-43af1c4495c0"
```

Run the capabilities-only ops-warden audit against the policy. The initial
2026-08-21 reconciliation found 17 high-risk lanes: six covered, six concrete
uncovered, and five without a concrete KV address. The final generated input
contains 19 high-risk lanes, 14 concrete entries, and five without an address.
No credential value was read.

## T02 — Close the concrete deny gaps

```task
id: RPF-WP-0013-T02
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "9f2a6ffc-5f48-5e45-b636-76dff7d41743"
```

Add deny-data/read-metadata pairs for the six catalog paths: whynot-design npm,
rapp-qonto Keycape client, agent-harness Forgejo deploy key, audit-core senders,
email-connect transactional, and Scaleway bootstrap. Add regression coverage
for every concrete path currently emitted by the catalog audit.

Completed 2026-08-22. After ops-warden corrected two multi-field grades, the
source policy covers all 13 unique concrete catalog paths plus the additional
reviewed Core Hub path. The generated-input check reports all 14 concrete
catalog entries covered with none uncovered.

## T03 — Apply and verify live

```task
id: RPF-WP-0013-T03
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "92b4b531-986d-54b4-a18b-cd8785dca5ce"
```

Under attended platform authority, upload the reviewed policy, read it back,
and rerun the catalog audit with `policy_source: server`. Inspect policy/token
role metadata to determine whether an agent identity carries the boundary and
whether any role combines it with a workload-read policy. Do not mint a token.

Completed initially on 2026-08-21 and reconciled again on 2026-08-22 under
attended `platform-admin` OIDC. OpenBao accepted the policy; normalized
readback matched source, and the final server-backed audit reported 19
high-risk lanes, 14 covered entries, zero uncovered, and five pattern/non-KV
lanes without a concrete address. No Secret value was read.

## T04 — Route the result

```task
id: RPF-WP-0013-T04
status: done
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "d394fcb7-1477-5dfe-9e4b-65bd14f08346"
```

Reply to ops-warden with the deployment evidence and remaining attachment
finding. Request a generated, versioned concrete-deny artifact so future policy
updates consume catalog output rather than relying on a hand-maintained list.

Completed 2026-08-21 via State Hub message
`fe727451-163a-4e14-8ce3-187fea8ce5b3`, including live audit counts, the zero-
attachment finding, the distinct-agent-identity blocker, and the requested
versioned generated artifact shape.

Ops-warden delivered revision `55f0f47a021375b8b25c924953d1b49a24e002c5`
on 2026-08-21. The platform now vendors it as a checked policy input and has a
repeatable upstream-equality plus policy-coverage command.

## T05 — Establish a distinct coding-agent identity

```task
id: RPF-WP-0013-T05
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "6805ef60-bd20-5549-b955-cee94eb69dad"
```

The policy is live but no role attaches it. Do not add the boundary to
`platform-admin`: that is an attended human/operator role whose legitimate
recovery work may require the protected values. The identity owner must define
a distinct coding-agent issuance path, attach this boundary there, and prove
deny-wins behavior when combined with an otherwise readable workload policy.
Completed 2026-08-22. State Hub decision
`f0955252-7b20-4c80-86e9-f8080ec60793` establishes the platform-owned AppRole
`coding-agent-railiance-platform` as the operational machine identity. Its
single-use SecretIDs expire after five minutes; its tokens last at most 15
minutes, have eight uses, omit the default policy, and attach both
`agent-high-risk-boundary` and the otherwise-readable issue-core workload
policy. A live ephemeral login proved data capabilities resolve to `deny` and
metadata to `read`; the token was revoked without reading the KV value.

The exact-bound KeyCape JWT role is also live as the issuer-backed migration
target. KeyCape principal registration remains an identity hardening follow-up,
not a blocker to the active AppRole boundary.

## T06 — Consume the generated catalog artifact

```task
id: RPF-WP-0013-T06
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "1b0c4f03-0ec7-5fcc-908d-beed236e4865"
```


Consume ops-warden's versioned `high-risk-data-paths.yaml` as a policy-check
input, add the two newly regraded issue-core and reuse-surface paths, and rerun
source plus live coverage. The input remains ops-warden's risk statement, not
the policy authority; railiance-platform continues to own every deny decision.

Completed 2026-08-22. The vendored input matches the clean upstream artifact,
the repository check covers all 14 entries, and the server-backed audit reports
zero uncovered. Evidence: `docs/evidence/agent-high-risk-boundary-2026-08-21.md`.

## Acceptance

- [x] Every concrete high-risk catalog path is denied in the source policy.
- [x] The live policy matches source and the server-backed audit passes.
- [x] A distinct AppRole attachment is established from live metadata.
- [x] Result and generated-artifact follow-up are routed to ops-warden.
- [x] A distinct coding-agent identity actually attaches the boundary.