railiance-platform/credential-change-requests/CCR-2026-0008-binky-qonto-api.yaml

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id: CCR-2026-0008
kind: credential-change-request
schema_version: 1
request_type: workload-kv-read
title: Binky Qonto bank API credentials (tenant lane, read-only MCP)
status: approved
created: '2026-07-21'
updated: '2026-07-21'
requester:
agent: grok
reason: Establish OpenBao custody for Binky Hedgehog GmbH / Operational Knowledge
GmbH Qonto API credentials used by the self-hosted qonto/qonto-mcp-server (binky-control
BINKY-WP-0005; DEC-2026-004 approved). Read-only use enforced at harness tool
allow-list; payments/transfers remain founder Red lane forever.
review:
required: true
required_approvers:
- platform-operator
comments:
- at: '2026-07-21T19:26:02+00:00'
reviewer: bernd.worsch
decision: approved
comment: 'Approved as platform implemention of DEC-2026-004 (founder 2026-07-19):
self-hosted qonto-mcp-server, tenants/binky/qonto/api custody, read-only harness.
Proceed with policy+OIDC role apply; secret values remain founder Red-lane only.'
target:
domain: financials
tenant: binky
workload: qonto
environment: production
purpose: Read-only Qonto MCP for balance/transactions/CostRunRate feeds
openbao:
mount: tenants
kv_path: tenants/binky/qonto/api
fields:
- QONTO_API_KEY
- QONTO_ORGANIZATION_ID
policy_name: workload-kv-read-binky-qonto-api
policy_file: openbao/policies/workload-kv-read-binky-qonto-api.hcl
auth:
method: oidc
mount: netkingdom
role: binky-qonto-api-workload-kv-read
allowed_redirect_uris:
- https://bao.coulomb.social/ui/vault/auth/netkingdom/oidc/callback
- http://localhost:8250/oidc/callback
- http://127.0.0.1:8250/oidc/callback
oidc_scopes:
- openid
- profile
- email
- groups
user_claim: sub
groups_claim: groups
bound_claims:
groups:
- net-kingdom-admins
bound_claims_confirmed: true
policies:
- workload-kv-read-binky-qonto-api
ttl: 15m
access_frontdoor:
type: ops-warden
catalog_id: binky-qonto-api
selector: binky qonto api bank
command: warden access binky-qonto-api --out FILE
resolvable: false
readiness: approved-pending-apply
delivery:
surface: operator-workstation
target: qonto-mcp-server via env QONTO_API_KEY/QONTO_ORGANIZATION_ID (names only);
binky-control finance/ for metadata-only evidence (no bulk statements in git)
risk:
classification: high
notes:
- Full-scope bank API key (Qonto keys are not scope-limited server-side).
- Read-only is harness-enforced (tool allow-list); never allow payment/transfer
tools.
- "High-risk lane (WP-0026 T04) \u2014 agents must not stream raw values; use --out/--exec/--wrap."
- Values must not appear in Git, State Hub, chat, or workplans.
- ops-warden proxies as the caller and must not retain values.
- Distinct from platform/workloads/* fleet lanes; lives on mount tenants/.
verification:
positive:
- Approved net-kingdom-admins identity can read the data path (capabilities include
read) without printing values.
negative:
- default-policy token denied on tenants/data/binky/qonto/api.
activation_conditions:
- tenants/ KV v2 mount enabled on bao.coulomb.social (already from CCR-2026-0007).
- Policy and OIDC role applied.
- Secret values provisioned by founder (Red lane) through approved custody.
- Positive and negative capabilities-safe verification recorded.
- ops-warden catalog promoted after verify + provision.
evidence: []
lifecycle:
deactivate: Disable ops-warden catalog entry and detach OIDC role policy; revoke
API key in Qonto dashboard.
rotate: Mint a new API key in Qonto /settings/integrations; bao kv put tenants/binky/qonto/api
QONTO_API_KEY=@file (and QONTO_ORGANIZATION_ID if changed); revoke old key; verify
capabilities-safe.
compromised: Deactivate front door, revoke key in Qonto, clear EXPOSED taint after
rotation, record blast-radius notes.
state_hub:
workplan_id: BINKY-WP-0005