Harden backup credentials and add durable image inventory publication

Assistant: codex
Assistant-Model: gpt-6-astra
Assistant-Session: 01a06ecb-456a-71c2-b41e-0755d336e883

Makefile

@@ -471,6 +471,14 @@ forgejo-backup-status: ## Show last Forgejo backup success and 7-day gate
 forgejo-package-prune-dry-run: ## List Forgejo package versions beyond retention depth (no deletes)
 	tools/cmd/forgejo-package-prune
 
+LIVE_IMAGES_OUTPUT ?= $(HOME)/.local/state/railiance-platform/live-images/all.txt
+LIVE_IMAGES_SOURCES ?=
+.PHONY: live-images-refresh
+live-images-refresh: ## Atomically preserve and merge image exports outside the checkout
+	@test -n "$(LIVE_IMAGES_SOURCES)" || { echo 'set LIVE_IMAGES_SOURCES to nonempty cluster export files' >&2; exit 2; }
+	python3 scripts/refresh_live_images.py --output "$(LIVE_IMAGES_OUTPUT)" \
+	  $(foreach source,$(LIVE_IMAGES_SOURCES),--source "$(source)")
+
 forgejo-package-prune: ## Prune Forgejo packages — keep newest 3 versions per package
 	tools/cmd/forgejo-package-prune --apply
 

WORK-RECORDS.md

@@ -26,13 +26,13 @@
 | workplan | RPF-WP-0015 | active | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0015-audit-core-custody-and-recovery-coordination.md |
 | workplan | RPF-WP-0016 | finished | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0016-versioned-ephemeral-custody-lifecycle.md |
 | workplan | RPF-WP-0017 | finished | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0017-attended-login-output-containment.md |
-| workplan | RPF-WP-0018 | blocked | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0018-openbao-operator-only-access.md |
 | workplan | RPF-WP-0018 | finished | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0018-policy-surface-alignment.md |
 | workplan | RPF-WP-0019 | finished | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0019-apps-pg-recoverability-and-controls.md |
-| workplan | RPF-WP-0019 | finished | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0019-flex-auth-credential-grant-integration.md |
 | workplan | RPF-WP-0020 | finished | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0020-ccr-schema-drift.md |
-| workplan | RPF-WP-0020 | active | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0020-keycape-live-secret-exposure-recovery.md |
 | workplan | RPF-WP-0021 | finished | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0021-core-hub-platform-onboarding.md |
+| workplan | RPF-WP-0025 | blocked | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0025-openbao-operator-only-access.md |
+| workplan | RPF-WP-0026 | finished | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0026-flex-auth-credential-grant-integration.md |
+| workplan | RPF-WP-0027 | active | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0027-keycape-live-secret-exposure-recovery.md |
 | task | ADHOC-2026-08-23-T01 | done | — | workplans/ADHOC-2026-08-23.md |
 | task | ADHOC-2026-08-23-T02 | done | — | workplans/ADHOC-2026-08-23.md |
 | task | RPF-WP-0001-T01 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0001-credential-request-and-lease-broker.md |
@@ -116,9 +116,6 @@
 | task | RPF-WP-0016-T05 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0016-versioned-ephemeral-custody-lifecycle.md |
 | task | RPF-WP-0016-T06 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0016-versioned-ephemeral-custody-lifecycle.md |
 | task | RPF-WP-0017-T01 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0017-attended-login-output-containment.md |
-| task | RPF-WP-0018-T01 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0018-openbao-operator-only-access.md |
-| task | RPF-WP-0018-T02 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0018-openbao-operator-only-access.md |
-| task | RPF-WP-0018-T03 | wait | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0018-openbao-operator-only-access.md |
 | task | RPF-WP-0018-T01 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0018-policy-surface-alignment.md |
 | task | RPF-WP-0018-T02 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0018-policy-surface-alignment.md |
 | task | RPF-WP-0018-T03 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0018-policy-surface-alignment.md |
@@ -130,21 +127,24 @@
 | task | RPF-WP-0019-T02 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0019-apps-pg-recoverability-and-controls.md |
 | task | RPF-WP-0019-T03 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0019-apps-pg-recoverability-and-controls.md |
 | task | RPF-WP-0019-T04 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0019-apps-pg-recoverability-and-controls.md |
-| task | RPF-WP-0019-T01 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0019-flex-auth-credential-grant-integration.md |
-| task | RPF-WP-0019-T02 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0019-flex-auth-credential-grant-integration.md |
-| task | RPF-WP-0019-T03 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0019-flex-auth-credential-grant-integration.md |
 | task | RPF-WP-0020-T01 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0020-ccr-schema-drift.md |
 | task | RPF-WP-0020-T02 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0020-ccr-schema-drift.md |
 | task | RPF-WP-0020-T03 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0020-ccr-schema-drift.md |
 | task | RPF-WP-0020-T04 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0020-ccr-schema-drift.md |
-| task | RPF-WP-0020-T01 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0020-keycape-live-secret-exposure-recovery.md |
-| task | RPF-WP-0020-T02 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0020-keycape-live-secret-exposure-recovery.md |
-| task | RPF-WP-0020-T03 | progress | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0020-keycape-live-secret-exposure-recovery.md |
-| task | RPF-WP-0020-T04 | wait | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0020-keycape-live-secret-exposure-recovery.md |
-| task | RPF-WP-0020-T05 | wait | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0020-keycape-live-secret-exposure-recovery.md |
-| task | RPF-WP-0020-T06 | progress | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0020-keycape-live-secret-exposure-recovery.md |
 | task | RPF-WP-0021-T01 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0021-core-hub-platform-onboarding.md |
 | task | RPF-WP-0021-T02 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0021-core-hub-platform-onboarding.md |
 | task | RPF-WP-0021-T03 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0021-core-hub-platform-onboarding.md |
 | task | RPF-WP-0021-T04 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0021-core-hub-platform-onboarding.md |
 | task | RPF-WP-0021-T05 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0021-core-hub-platform-onboarding.md |
+| task | RPF-WP-0025-T01 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0025-openbao-operator-only-access.md |
+| task | RPF-WP-0025-T02 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0025-openbao-operator-only-access.md |
+| task | RPF-WP-0025-T03 | wait | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0025-openbao-operator-only-access.md |
+| task | RPF-WP-0026-T01 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0026-flex-auth-credential-grant-integration.md |
+| task | RPF-WP-0026-T02 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0026-flex-auth-credential-grant-integration.md |
+| task | RPF-WP-0026-T03 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0026-flex-auth-credential-grant-integration.md |
+| task | RPF-WP-0027-T01 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0027-keycape-live-secret-exposure-recovery.md |
+| task | RPF-WP-0027-T02 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0027-keycape-live-secret-exposure-recovery.md |
+| task | RPF-WP-0027-T03 | progress | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0027-keycape-live-secret-exposure-recovery.md |
+| task | RPF-WP-0027-T04 | wait | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0027-keycape-live-secret-exposure-recovery.md |
+| task | RPF-WP-0027-T05 | wait | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0027-keycape-live-secret-exposure-recovery.md |
+| task | RPF-WP-0027-T06 | progress | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0027-keycape-live-secret-exposure-recovery.md |

docs/evidence/repo-review-2026-09-05.md

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+# Repository review — 2026-09-05
+
+Reviewed the working tree, fetched origin, scanned all local workplan statuses,
+and read/acknowledged the State Hub inbox. Existing WORK-RECORDS.md changes
+correct renumbered plans 0025–0027 and are retained.
+
+Open plans 0015, 0025 and 0027 retain their attended gates: approved exercise
+windows/abort operators, operator listener cutover, and exact recovery/custody
+receipts. No new qualifying receipts were in the unread inbox.
+
+New actionable source work is tracked by RPF-WP-0028 (durable image inventory)
+and RPF-WP-0029 (backup credential fallback). Their live completion gates remain
+explicit. No prune, reboot, lease revocation, or provider rotation was run.
+
+Other inbox demands requiring scoped design or owner inputs remain pending:
+
+- ops-mason fluid-telegram: tenant prefix and actual OIDC group claim remain
+  unconfirmed. Read/write policy requires reviewed CCR schema/validator support;
+  current read-only request shape must not be bypassed.
+- secrets-engine: native AppRole apply still requires serving canonical action
+  authorization, exact targets, attended authority and consumer health proof.
+  Its separate service JWT mount/role contract is not yet established here.
+- State Hub rename preflight: dedicated signing-secret lane remains to be
+  designed and approved; the rename is outside this session's scope.
+- Policy Nexus CCR-2026-0014 request is superseded by the repository's existing
+  activation commit 62423fd; no duplicate provisioning performed.
+- Activity-core OpenRouter recovery was reported complete and its intentional
+  reuse decision retained in RPF-WP-0004.
+
+No coordination messages were sent. Incoming requests are recorded here for
+follow-up rather than treated as permission to invent identities or credentials.
+
+Validation: unittest discovery passed 158 tests; full pytest discovery passed
+164 tests, including the function-based tests omitted by unittest. Bash syntax
+and git diff whitespace checks passed. The inventory and credential tests use synthetic
+inputs and mocked custody only.
+
+State Hub synchronization remains pending: `statehub fix-consistency` was
+attempted in the sandbox and once outside it. Both were interrupted after
+prolonged HTTP reads during the check phase, before a repair report was
+returned. No registrar skip was reported, so registrar authority was not
+assumed. Re-run `statehub fix-consistency` when these reads complete reliably
+to index the new workplans and refresh the generated records/brief. Progress
+was logged successfully as `7e317a96-eb7e-4b36-9d81-4efe49efa22c`.

docs/forgejo-backup.md

@@ -26,6 +26,13 @@ Preflight: `forgejo-db` pod must be Ready (`make forgejo-db-status`). A full dum
 with 13 org repos is ~670MiB — allow 10–20 minutes for stream + age on a typical
 workstation link.
 
+Uploads require the governed `CCR-2026-0004` OpenBao offsite lane or explicitly
+provided `RAILIANCE_BACKUP_NC_TOKEN` / `RAILIANCE_BACKUP_NC_WEBDAV_URL` inputs.
+There is no built-in credential fallback. Missing credentials stop execution
+before any cluster dump. Local encryption dry-runs skip upload authentication.
+Provider rotation and replacement upload/restore proof are tracked separately
+in `RPF-WP-0029`; removing the source default does not prove revocation.
+
 Decrypt: `~/.config/age/railiance-backup.key` (same key as other Railiance backups).
 
 ## Nextcloud layout
@@ -62,4 +69,4 @@ See `railiance-infra`:
 - `docs/forgejo-restore-drill-evidence.md`
 
 Download and decrypt a dump from Nextcloud, set `BACKUP_LOCAL` to the zip path,
-then run the drill script.
+then run the drill script.

docs/forgejo-package-prune.md

@@ -73,7 +73,38 @@ make forgejo-package-prune-dry-run   # list would-delete candidates
 make forgejo-package-prune           # delete beyond retention depth
 ```
 
-## Rollback
+## Durable multi-cluster image inventory
+
+The inventory belongs outside the platform checkout. On the production worker
+host, use `/home/tegwick/.local/state/railiance-platform/live-images/all.txt`.
+`make live-images-refresh LIVE_IMAGES_SOURCES="/path/railiance01.txt /path/coulombcore.txt"`
+merges complete, nonempty exports with the prior inventory under a writer lock,
+then atomically publishes sorted image references and a count/hash receipt.
+Set `LIVE_IMAGES_OUTPUT` when publishing for a different host user.
+Missing, empty, or malformed input fails without replacing the previous file.
+Refresh only adds protection: removal of obsolete tags requires a separate
+review of every production cluster and rollback requirement.
+
+Migration and rollout sequence:
+
+1. Seed from the restored `docs/evidence/live-images-all.txt` plus fresh exports
+   from railiance01 and coulombcore; retain the restored multi-cluster entries.
+2. Project the durable **directory** read-only into the activity-core worker
+   and configure its inventory argument to `all.txt` in that directory. Do not
+   mount the single file: atomic replacement must be visible to the worker.
+3. Verify the worker reads a nonempty inventory and retains the existing hard
+   refusal of apply when that file is missing or empty. Use only its dry-run
+   verification; do not manually trigger prune.
+4. After each cluster image rollout, export pod regular, init, and ephemeral
+   container images to a temporary file. Require successful kubectl exit and
+   nonempty output, then invoke this refresh target with that export. Keep
+   other clusters' prior entries during outages. Run the hook on the durable
+   host, or transfer the complete export there before invoking it.
+
+The publisher is implemented here; host migration and the activity-core mount
+and rollout-hook adoption are tracked in `RPF-WP-0028` until verified live.
+
+## Rollback procedure
 
 If a needed tag was removed, restore from the latest Nextcloud `forgejo-dump-*.zip.age`
 (`make forgejo-backup` evidence) using `railiance-infra/tools/forgejo-restore-drill.sh`,

lib/railiance-backup-common.sh

@@ -18,12 +18,12 @@ railiance_backup_load_openbao_lane() {
 
 railiance_backup_require_openbao_lane() {
   railiance_backup_load_openbao_lane
-  # Nextcloud *file drop* shares use /public.php/dav/filesdrop/<token>/ — not /public.php/webdav
-  : "${RAILIANCE_BACKUP_NC_WEBDAV_URL:=https://nx4069.your-storageshare.de/public.php/dav/filesdrop/${RAILIANCE_BACKUP_NC_TOKEN}}"
   if [[ -z "${RAILIANCE_BACKUP_NC_TOKEN:-}" ]]; then
-    echo "ERROR: set RAILIANCE_BACKUP_NC_TOKEN or run: bao login -method=oidc -path=netkingdom role=railiance-backup-workload-kv-read" >&2
+    echo "ERROR: governed backup credential unavailable (CCR-2026-0004)" >&2
-    exit 1
+    return 1
   fi
+  # Build a file-drop URL only after the required token is present.
+  : "${RAILIANCE_BACKUP_NC_WEBDAV_URL:=https://nx4069.your-storageshare.de/public.php/dav/filesdrop/${RAILIANCE_BACKUP_NC_TOKEN}}"
 }
 
 railiance_backup_require_tools() {

scripts/refresh_live_images.py

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Atomically accumulate non-secret image exports outside replaceable checkouts."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import fcntl
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import tempfile
+
+
+def read_images(path: Path) -> set[str]:
+    images = set()
+    for line in path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines():
+        image = line.strip()
+        if not image or image.startswith("#"):
+            continue
+        if any(c.isspace() for c in image) or "/" not in image:
+            raise ValueError("invalid image export")
+        images.add(image)
+    if not images:
+        raise ValueError("empty image export")
+    return images
+
+
+def refresh(output: Path, sources: list[Path]) -> dict:
+    # Read every required export before touching the last known good inventory.
+    images: set[str] = set()
+    for source in sources:
+        images.update(read_images(source))
+    if not images:
+        raise ValueError("at least one nonempty export is required")
+    output.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    with output.with_name(output.name + ".lock").open("a") as lock:
+        fcntl.flock(lock, fcntl.LOCK_EX)
+        if output.exists():
+            images.update(read_images(output))
+        data = ("\n".join(sorted(images)) + "\n").encode()
+        temporary = None
+        try:
+            with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(dir=output.parent, delete=False) as stream:
+                temporary = Path(stream.name)
+                stream.write(data)
+                stream.flush()
+                os.fchmod(stream.fileno(), 0o644)
+                os.fsync(stream.fileno())
+            os.replace(temporary, output)
+            directory = os.open(output.parent, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_DIRECTORY)
+            try:
+                os.fsync(directory)
+            finally:
+                os.close(directory)
+        finally:
+            if temporary is not None:
+                temporary.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+    return {"path": str(output), "images": len(images), "sha256": hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest()}
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
+    parser.add_argument("--output", type=Path, required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--source", type=Path, action="append", required=True)
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    try:
+        receipt = refresh(args.output, args.source)
+    except (OSError, ValueError):
+        parser.exit(1, "inventory refresh failed; no successful publication receipt\n")
+    print(json.dumps(receipt, sort_keys=True))
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

tests/test_backup_credentials.py

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import subprocess
+import unittest
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+
+
+class BackupCredentialTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    def run_shell(self, body):
+        env = {k: v for k, v in os.environ.items() if not k.startswith("RAILIANCE_BACKUP_")}
+        return subprocess.run(
+            ["bash", "-c", 'source lib/railiance-backup-common.sh\n' + body],
+            cwd=ROOT, env=env, text=True, capture_output=True,
+        )
+
+    def test_missing_credentials_fail_with_safe_error(self):
+        result = self.run_shell(
+            'bao() { return 1; }\nrailiance_backup_require_openbao_lane'
+        )
+        self.assertNotEqual(result.returncode, 0)
+        self.assertEqual(result.stdout, "")
+        self.assertIn("governed backup credential unavailable", result.stderr)
+        self.assertNotIn("unbound variable", result.stderr)
+
+    def test_explicit_governed_credentials_need_no_bao(self):
+        result = self.run_shell('''
+bao() { echo unexpected-bao >&2; return 1; }
+RAILIANCE_BACKUP_NC_TOKEN=test-only-placeholder
+RAILIANCE_BACKUP_NC_WEBDAV_URL=https://example.invalid/upload
+railiance_backup_require_openbao_lane
+''')
+        self.assertEqual(result.returncode, 0)
+        self.assertEqual(result.stdout + result.stderr, "")
+
+    def test_openbao_lane_supplies_missing_credentials(self):
+        result = self.run_shell('''
+bao() {
+  case "$*" in
+    "kv metadata get "*) return 0 ;;
+    "kv get -field=NC_WEBDAV_TOKEN "*) echo test-only-placeholder ;;
+    "kv get -field=NC_WEBDAV_URL "*) echo https://example.invalid/upload ;;
+    *) return 1 ;;
+  esac
+}
+railiance_backup_require_openbao_lane
+[[ "$RAILIANCE_BACKUP_NC_TOKEN" == test-only-placeholder ]]
+[[ "$RAILIANCE_BACKUP_NC_WEBDAV_URL" == https://example.invalid/upload ]]
+''')
+        self.assertEqual(result.returncode, 0)
+        self.assertEqual(result.stdout + result.stderr, "")

tests/test_live_images_inventory.py

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+import importlib.util
+from pathlib import Path
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+
+SPEC = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(
+    "refresh_live_images", Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / "scripts/refresh_live_images.py"
+)
+inventory = importlib.util.module_from_spec(SPEC)
+SPEC.loader.exec_module(inventory)
+
+
+class InventoryTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_refresh_preserves_other_clusters_and_previous_tags(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+            root = Path(tmp)
+            output = root / "durable" / "images.txt"
+            first, second = root / "first", root / "second"
+            first.write_text("forgejo.example/org/app:old\n")
+            second.write_text("forgejo.example/org/other:live\n")
+            inventory.refresh(output, [first, second])
+            first.write_text("forgejo.example/org/app:new\n")
+            receipt = inventory.refresh(output, [first])
+            self.assertEqual(receipt["images"], 3)
+            self.assertIn("forgejo.example/org/other:live", output.read_text())
+            self.assertIn("forgejo.example/org/app:old", output.read_text())
+            self.assertEqual(inventory.refresh(output, [first]), receipt)
+
+    def test_failed_export_preserves_inventory(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+            root = Path(tmp)
+            output, source = root / "images", root / "export"
+            output.write_text("forgejo.example/org/app:live\n")
+            before = output.read_bytes()
+            for content in ["", "# no images\n", "error fetching pods\n"]:
+                source.write_text(content)
+                with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+                    inventory.refresh(output, [source])
+                self.assertEqual(output.read_bytes(), before)
+            with self.assertRaises(OSError):
+                inventory.refresh(output, [root / "missing"])
+            self.assertEqual(output.read_bytes(), before)

tools/cmd/forgejo-backup

@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@
 #   RAILIANCE_BACKUP_DRY_RUN=1    skip upload and remote side effects
 set -euo pipefail
 
-: "${RAILIANCE_BACKUP_NC_TOKEN:=MfTBEjcJTGS8Ywo}"
 
 ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/../.." && pwd)"
 # shellcheck source=lib/railiance-print.sh
@@ -55,8 +54,10 @@ cleanup_plain() {
 }
 trap cleanup_plain EXIT
 
+if [[ "${DRY_RUN}" != "1" ]]; then
+  railiance_backup_require_openbao_lane
+fi
 railiance_backup_require_tools
-railiance_backup_require_openbao_lane
 
 FORGEJO_DB_POD="${FORGEJO_DB_POD:-$(kubectl_get_pod "${FORGEJO_DB_NAMESPACE}" \
   "cnpg.io/cluster=${FORGEJO_DB_CLUSTER}" || true)}"

workplans/RPF-WP-0004-llm-connect-openrouter-provider-key-lane.md

@@ -404,3 +404,14 @@ consumers, restart requirements, provider-side revocation for the OpenRouter
 key) plus the post-rotate verification contract. Front-door disable comes
 first in every action; audit evidence is never deleted; values stay in
 OpenBao/operator custody.
+
+
+## Recovery evidence reported 2026-09-04
+
+Activity-core message `dcc0d7cc-0046-4c47-ba1c-fb1e0046e18e` supersedes
+`c32901ff-2072-4b93-81cd-db93dddfa5f3`. Owner decision
+`914e0e04-fd17-4fba-b2d5-be38f7aca185` approved intentional reuse from the
+reins provider lane into the canonical activity-core lane. Activity-core reports
+KV version 2, ESO synchronization, rollout, health and completion HTTP 200.
+This is owner-reported evidence, not an independent platform live verification;
+no further replacement was requested.

workplans/RPF-WP-0028-durable-live-image-inventory.md

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+---
+id: RPF-WP-0028
+type: workplan
+title: "Make Forgejo image protection survive checkout replacement"
+domain: financials
+repo: railiance-platform
+status: blocked
+owner: codex
+created: "2026-09-05"
+updated: "2026-09-05"
+---
+
+# Make Forgejo image protection survive checkout replacement
+
+Source: State Hub message `868a2326-cdad-4256-be4c-7cd6c8ec4b5b`. Reviewed against current repository state
+on 2026-09-05. Repository implementation is complete; live closure remains pending.
+
+## Implement and verify durable publication
+
+```task
+id: RPF-WP-0028-T01
+status: done
+priority: high
+```
+
+Implemented scripts/refresh_live_images.py and make live-images-refresh. Publication validates exports before mutation, locks concurrent writers, retains all previous cluster entries, and fsyncs an atomic replacement. Offline tests prove repeatability, multi-cluster retention, and preservation on missing, empty, or malformed input.
+
+## Install production projection and rollout refresh
+
+```task
+id: RPF-WP-0028-T02
+status: wait
+priority: high
+```
+
+Requires the production host inventory, activity-core directory mount/configuration update, and cluster rollout hook adoption. Follow docs/forgejo-package-prune.md. Preserve the restored union and worker refusal on missing/empty inventory; do not manually trigger prune. No production migration or live verification occurred in this session.

workplans/RPF-WP-0029-backup-credential-default-removal.md

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+---
+id: RPF-WP-0029
+type: workplan
+title: "Remove backup credential default and verify governed replacement"
+domain: financials
+repo: railiance-platform
+status: blocked
+owner: codex
+created: "2026-09-05"
+updated: "2026-09-05"
+---
+
+# Remove backup credential default and verify governed replacement
+
+Source: State Hub message `ee702ac9-9118-4b9b-963a-01943052b65a`. Reviewed against current repository state
+on 2026-09-05. Repository implementation is complete; live closure remains pending.
+
+## Remove source fallback and verify fail-closed behavior
+
+```task
+id: RPF-WP-0029-T01
+status: done
+priority: high
+```
+
+Removed the literal upload credential default from tools/cmd/forgejo-backup. Missing governed input now fails before cluster operations with a value-free diagnostic; encryption dry-runs skip upload authentication. Offline tests prove missing-input denial, explicit input, and mocked OpenBao resolution.
+
+## Invalidate predecessor and prove replacement recovery
+
+```task
+id: RPF-WP-0029-T02
+status: wait
+priority: high
+```
+
+Provider-side invalidation and replacement custody need the attended provider owner and CCR-2026-0004 lifecycle procedure. Record only non-secret invalidation, encrypted upload and restore receipts. No provider authority or replacement receipt was available; source removal alone does not close the reported exposure. Never record the predecessor value, fingerprint, length, or shape.