Establish scoped KeyCape factor custody and verified automatic renewal

Assistant: codex Assistant-Model: gpt-6-astra Assistant-Session: 01a092fe-13b1-7f12-ac74-7d258af4d79c
2026-09-13 16:25:33 +02:00 · 2026-09-13 16:25:33 +02:00 · 2e2c31d237
commit 2e2c31d237
parent b75729b799
22 changed files with 1169 additions and 1 deletions
--- a/.forgejo/workflows/keycape-factor-acceptance.yaml
+++ b/.forgejo/workflows/keycape-factor-acceptance.yaml
@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+name: KeyCape factor custody acceptance
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: [main]
+    paths: ["scripts/keycape_factor_*.py", "tests/test_keycape_factor_*.py", "openbao/policies/*keycape-factor*.hcl", "manifests/keycape-factor-custody.yaml", ".forgejo/workflows/keycape-factor-acceptance.yaml"]
+  workflow_dispatch:
+jobs:
+  acceptance:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    container:
+      image: python:3.12-slim@sha256:d764629ce0ddd8c71fd371e9901efb324a95789d2315a47db7e4d27e78f1b0e9
+    steps:
+      - name: Test exact source revision
+        run: |
+          set -eu
+          python3 - <<'PYCODE'
+          import os,tarfile,tempfile,urllib.request
+          from pathlib import Path
+          root=Path('/tmp/factor-acceptance');root.mkdir()
+          url='https://forgejo.coulomb.social/'+os.environ['GITHUB_REPOSITORY']+'/archive/'+os.environ['GITHUB_SHA']+'.tar.gz'
+          with urllib.request.urlopen(url,timeout=30) as response,tempfile.TemporaryFile() as archive:
+              archive.write(response.read());archive.seek(0)
+              with tarfile.open(fileobj=archive,mode='r:gz') as tar:tar.extractall(root,filter='data')
+          PYCODE
+          cd /tmp/factor-acceptance/*
+          PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -p 'test_keycape_factor_*.py'
--- a/8
+++ b/8
@ -574,3 +574,11 @@ assurance-capture: ## Capture selected status metadata from the pinned railiance

 assurance-check: ## Classify freshness/failure; nonzero means incomplete or invalid evidence
 	python3 scripts/service_assurance.py evaluate "$(ASSURANCE_OBSERVATION)"
+
+.PHONY: keycape-factor-tests
+keycape-factor-tests: ## Validate factor custody, scope, renewal and config preservation offline
+	PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -p 'test_keycape_factor_*.py'
+
+.PHONY: keycape-factor-live-acceptance
+keycape-factor-live-acceptance: ## Verify native scope and rotation (creates bounded proof/renewal Jobs)
+	PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 python3 scripts/keycape_factor_acceptance.py
--- a/credential-change-requests/CCR-2026-0023-keycape-factor-read.yaml
+++ b/credential-change-requests/CCR-2026-0023-keycape-factor-read.yaml
@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+id: CCR-2026-0023
+kind: credential-change-request
+schema_version: 1
+request_type: workload-kv-read
+title: KeyCape realm-scoped factor credential delivery
+status: active
+created: '2026-09-13'
+updated: '2026-09-13'
+requester:
+  agent: codex
+  reason: User authorized establishing provider credential custody and delivery for
+    platform P05; RPF-WP-0040 and KEY-WP-0035.
+review:
+  required: true
+  required_approvers:
+  - platform-operator
+  comments:
+  - at: '2026-09-13T00:00:00+00:00'
+    reviewer: user (platform operator)
+    decision: approved
+    comment: User offered administrative authentication and replied "ok, lets do that"
+      to establishing credential storage and delivery. Exact dedicated path, least-privilege
+      workload binding and secret-free attended execution implement that authorized
+      scope. Provider recovery and policy acceptance remain separate gates.
+target:
+  domain: infotech
+  tenant: platform
+  workload: key-cape
+  environment: production
+  purpose: Deliver only a provider-issued coulomb factor-read JWT to KeyCape, separating
+    it from issuer credentials and signing keys.
+openbao:
+  mount: platform
+  kv_path: platform/workloads/net-kingdom/keycape-factor-read
+  fields:
+  - TOKEN
+  - EXPIRES_AT
+  policy_name: workload-kv-read-keycape-factor-read
+  policy_file: openbao/policies/workload-kv-read-keycape-factor-read.hcl
+  metadata_read: true
+  token_self_lifecycle: true
+  auth:
+    method: kubernetes
+    mount: kubernetes
+    role: keycape-factor-workload-kv-read
+    bound_claims:
+      service_account_names:
+      - keycape-factor-eso
+      service_account_namespaces:
+      - sso
+    bound_claims_confirmed: true
+    policies:
+    - workload-kv-read-keycape-factor-read
+    ttl: 15m
+access_frontdoor:
+  type: external-secrets
+  catalog_id: keycape-factor-read
+  readiness: ready
+  resolvable: true
+delivery:
+  surface: external-secrets
+  target: Namespace-restricted ClusterSecretStore openbao-keycape-factor-read -> sso/keycape-factor-read
+    Secret admin-token. Mount only the JWT in KeyCape; provider password remains in
+    separate custody.
+risk:
+  classification: high
+  notes:
+  - JWT can list factors only in coulomb; enforce provider policy before activation.
+  - OpenBao TTL does not renew or revoke the privacyIDEA JWT.
+  - No personal admin credentials delivered to the issuer.
+verification:
+  positive:
+  - Exact metadata readback and correct-SA Kubernetes login.
+  - Provider-issued JWT accepted and projected file reread after renewal.
+  negative:
+  - Sibling KV paths and writes denied; wrong SA or namespace cannot authenticate.
+  - Provider mutation permission denied and expired credential fails closed.
+  activation_conditions:
+  - Attended metadata apply and exact readback.
+  - Dedicated provider identity with verified rights/expiry and separate renewable
+    custody.
+  - Native delivery and positive/negative factor lookup evidence.
+  evidence:
+  - docs/evidence/2026-09-13-keycape-factor-custody.md
+lifecycle:
+  deactivate: Detach reader role, stop renewal and revoke/expire provider token; preserve
+    custody history.
+  rotate: Issue replacement before expiry, CAS update exact KV, verify ESO projection
+    and consumer acceptance; retain no plaintext artifacts.
+  compromised: Disable the dedicated provider principal and reconcile JWT revocation
+    or expiry before recovery.
+state_hub:
+  workplan_id: RPF-WP-0040
+  task_id: RPF-WP-0040-T01
--- a/docs/evidence/2026-09-13-keycape-factor-custody.md
+++ b/docs/evidence/2026-09-13-keycape-factor-custody.md
@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+# KeyCape factor credential custody — 2026-09-13
+
+User-authorized attended setup is live under RPF-WP-0040 / CCR-2026-0023.
+The operator authenticated through the contained OpenBao login lane. No
+credential value was included in source, receipts, chat or ordinary logs.
+
+Dedicated privacyIDEA identity `keycape-factor-reader` has `tokenlist` permission
+for `coulomb`. Its password is in a separate OpenBao issuer path; KeyCape
+receives only a provider-issued, expiring JWT via External Secrets. Explicit
+fallback policy preserves existing administrators' prior rights and excludes
+this service identity. The service cannot read provider administration policy.
+
+Live checks passed:
+
+- Exact OpenBao policy/role readback, audience and service-account bindings.
+- Provider-issued credential, cross-user factor visibility, and the actual
+  KeyCape `user` + `realm` + `active=True` lookup shape.
+- Wrong service account rejected; issuer password and sibling KV reads denied.
+- ExternalSecret `sso/keycape-factor-read`: Ready=True / SecretSynced.
+- Initial renewal Job published KV version 2 and revoked its OpenBao session.
+  A second Job published version 3; the existing mounted file received the
+  replacement and provider lookup accepted it without a pod restart.
+- KeyCape config activation passed server dry-run and UID/resource-version CAS;
+  readback confirmed all other Secret data and configuration bytes preserved.
+  Deployment rolled out successfully with the existing image
+  `sha256:c9eb584d60efecfe00e1745a7e8cd3ebb4ae0f94faa715ef9594cd58a5dcebb6`.
+- Fourteen offline tests cover identity/expiry/status rejection, scope boundaries,
+  failed-provider preservation, CAS failure, session-cleanup failure, retry,
+  ambiguous config rejection and byte-preserving activation.
+
+Runtime source: `manifests/keycape-factor-custody.yaml`; renewal every ten minutes,
+ESO refresh every minute. Renewal runs as non-root with an immutable ConfigMap,
+digest-pinned image, dedicated service account and restricted network policy.
+The reader has no issuer-password permission; the renewer cannot write that
+password. OpenBao sessions last at most fifteen minutes (ESO) or five minutes
+(renewer). Successful renewal workers revoke their sessions explicitly.
+
+Repeat: `make keycape-factor-tests` and `make keycape-factor-live-acceptance`.
+Exact-commit CI is `.forgejo/workflows/keycape-factor-acceptance.yaml`.
+The first proof Job was `keycape-factor-delivery-acceptance`; its short-lived
+reader session expires by its fifteen-minute maximum TTL. The final reusable
+proof also revokes its session; its result is recorded below after execution.
+
+Limits: this establishes credential custody, renewal and native delivery.
+Genuine provider JWT expiry/revocation drills remain RPF-WP-0040-T04; renewing a
+JWT does not revoke its predecessor. Optional-after-enrollment policy remains
+unchanged. OTP onboarding, lost-factor recovery and their complete platform-admin
+browser journeys remain KEY-WP-0035 / USER-WP-0030. Historical resolver incident
+NK-WP-0033 is not closed by this new service lane.
+
+Final reusable proof passed: `keycape-factor-proof-0c4a6929`. All eight checks
+were true: wrong-SA rejection, issuer-password denial, sibling-secret denial,
+mounted-token/custody equality, KeyCape per-user lookup, provider administration
+denial, renewed projection acceptance, and explicit reader-session revocation.
+KeyCape remained Ready 1/1 at deployment generation 46. CCR validation passed.
--- a/docs/net-kingdom-credential-custody-contract.md
+++ b/docs/net-kingdom-credential-custody-contract.md
@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 # NetKingdom credential custody contract

-Status: **draft / blocked pending OpenBao owner confirmation**
+Historical resolver lanes: **draft / blocked**.
+KeyCape factor service lane: **active**, established and verified 2026-09-13 (below).
 Incident: `KEYCAPE-EXPOSURE-20260823-01`
 Consumer procedure: NetKingdom `NK-WP-0033`, resolver reconciliation revision
 `eec7007` / checkout `f2e578c`
@ -43,3 +44,75 @@ The routing lane is registered but remains `resolvable: false`. No
 `warden access --fetch`, proxy execution, resolver retry, or predecessor
 restoration is authorized until the OpenBao owner publishes the missing
 metadata and the attended handoff is approved.
+
+## KeyCape factor service lane — authorized setup, 2026-09-13
+
+RPF-WP-0040 / CCR-2026-0023 establish a new dedicated service lane. The user,
+acting as platform operator, authorized establishing storage/delivery and performed
+attended OpenBao authentication. This is separate from the historical resolver
+repair lanes above; their incident receipts are not retroactively completed.
+
+| Purpose | KV v2 CLI path | Fields | Consumer |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| Scoped provider JWT | platform/workloads/net-kingdom/keycape-factor-read | TOKEN, EXPIRES_AT, REQUEST | KeyCape via namespace-scoped ESO and adminTokenFile |
+| Renewable service login | platform/workloads/net-kingdom/keycape-factor-issuer | USERNAME, PASSWORD, REQUEST | Owner bootstrap, then dedicated renewal worker; never KeyCape |
+
+Provider identity: keycape-factor-reader (local privacyIDEA service admin).
+Effective permission: tokenlist for realm coulomb only. Preserve the existing
+no-admin-policy baseline for other administrators using an explicit fallback
+that excludes this service identity. Only the two reviewed named policies may
+be introduced; unexpected existing admin policies abort setup.
+
+Generate the service password in owner-process memory and persist with KV CAS=0
+before provider creation, allowing interrupted setup to resume. The attended
+worker passes values through stdin/captured pipes only, never argv or receipts.
+Only explicit KV absence permits creation. Existing request provenance and
+policy definitions must match; retries do not rotate an existing identity.
+
+Reader policy: workload-kv-read-keycape-factor-read, role
+keycape-factor-workload-kv-read, bound sso/keycape-factor-eso, audience openbao,
+15-minute maximum OpenBao session, no default policy. Metadata apply/readback
+passed via the attended owner envelope. Provider issuance, native ESO delivery,
+KeyCape mounted-file activation, per-user lookup and rotation without restart
+passed. The reader can inspect and revoke only its own OpenBao session in
+addition to reading the exact JWT data/metadata paths. See the acceptance record
+`docs/evidence/2026-09-13-keycape-factor-custody.md`.
+
+Provider JWTs expire independently of OpenBao sessions. Require 5 minutes to
+2 hours remaining lifetime at issuance; renew well before expiry. Disable the
+service's tokenlist policy (while retaining fallback exclusion) to withdraw its
+factor access; do not rotate privacyIDEA's global signing key as routine renewal.
+Verify expiry/permission refusal separately from OpenBao self-revocation.
+
+Renewal: `sso/keycape-factor-renewer` runs every ten minutes under its own
+service account, with a five-minute maximum OpenBao session. Its separate policy
+reads the issuer password and reads/writes only the delivered JWT path. The
+worker verifies provider identity, expiry, factor lookup and denied policy
+administration before a CAS write and readback, then revokes its session.
+ESO refreshes once per minute. KeyCape mounts only `admin-token`, mode 0440,
+through fsGroup 65534; the issuer password never enters its namespace Secret.
+
+Operations: `make keycape-factor-tests` runs offline failure/retry and config
+preservation tests. `make keycape-factor-live-acceptance` creates bounded Jobs
+that verify native delivery scope and a second renewal reaching the mounted
+file. The runner emits booleans and resource identifiers only. CronJob failures
+and ExternalSecret Ready=False are the native degraded-state signals. A failed
+renewal leaves the last verified token in custody; expiry causes authentication
+to fail closed. Restore provider/custody connectivity and launch a renewal Job
+from the CronJob; verify SecretSynced and repeat live acceptance.
+
+Attended setup is reproducible through `openbao-attended-exec.py` with
+`keycape_factor_metadata.py --apply --receipt <new-file>`,
+`keycape_factor_bootstrap.py --receipt <new-file>` and
+`keycape_factor_renewal_metadata.py --receipt <new-file>` in that order, followed
+by the custody manifest and guarded `keycape_factor_activate.py --apply`.
+Use unique receipt paths. Existing mismatched policies/roles/provenance fail
+closed; never replace an unknown owner credential. The separate
+`keycape_factor_eso_metadata.py` records the migration from initial read-only
+metadata to ESO's self-session permissions; fresh setup uses the final policy.
+
+Outstanding acceptance is explicit in RPF-WP-0040-T04: genuine provider JWT
+expiry and provider-policy revocation/recovery drills. A newly issued JWT does
+not itself revoke its predecessor. Native mounted rotation has passed, but it
+is not evidence of predecessor revocation. Optional MFA rollout and lost-factor
+recovery remain KEY-WP-0035 / USER-WP-0030, not completed by this service lane.
--- a/manifests/keycape-factor-custody.yaml
+++ b/manifests/keycape-factor-custody.yaml
@ -0,0 +1,267 @@
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: ServiceAccount
+metadata:
+  name: keycape-factor-eso
+  namespace: sso
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/part-of: net-kingdom-sso-mfa
+automountServiceAccountToken: false
+---
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: ServiceAccount
+metadata:
+  name: keycape-factor-renewer
+  namespace: sso
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/part-of: net-kingdom-sso-mfa
+automountServiceAccountToken: false
+---
+apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
+kind: ClusterSecretStore
+metadata:
+  name: openbao-keycape-factor-read
+spec:
+  conditions:
+  - namespaces:
+    - sso
+  provider:
+    vault:
+      server: http://openbao.openbao.svc.cluster.local:8200
+      path: platform
+      version: v2
+      auth:
+        kubernetes:
+          mountPath: kubernetes
+          role: keycape-factor-workload-kv-read
+          serviceAccountRef:
+            name: keycape-factor-eso
+            namespace: sso
+            audiences:
+            - openbao
+---
+apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
+kind: ExternalSecret
+metadata:
+  name: keycape-factor-read
+  namespace: sso
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/part-of: net-kingdom-sso-mfa
+spec:
+  refreshInterval: 1m
+  secretStoreRef:
+    kind: ClusterSecretStore
+    name: openbao-keycape-factor-read
+  target:
+    name: keycape-factor-read
+    creationPolicy: Owner
+  data:
+  - secretKey: admin-token
+    remoteRef:
+      key: workloads/net-kingdom/keycape-factor-read
+      property: TOKEN
+  - secretKey: expires-at
+    remoteRef:
+      key: workloads/net-kingdom/keycape-factor-read
+      property: EXPIRES_AT
+---
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: ConfigMap
+metadata:
+  name: keycape-factor-renewer-2cf770000e
+  namespace: sso
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/part-of: net-kingdom-sso-mfa
+immutable: true
+data:
+  renew.py: "\"\"\"Dedicated Kubernetes renewal worker. Only sanitized outcome metadata\
+    \ is emitted.\"\"\"\nimport base64,json,sys,time,urllib.request,urllib.error,urllib.parse\n\
+    from pathlib import Path\nBAO=\"http://openbao.openbao.svc.cluster.local:8200/v1\"\
+    \nPI=\"http://privacyidea.mfa.svc.cluster.local:8080\"\nISSUER=\"platform/data/workloads/net-kingdom/keycape-factor-issuer\"\
+    \nTARGET=\"platform/data/workloads/net-kingdom/keycape-factor-read\"\nUSER=\"\
+    keycape-factor-reader\"\nPROVENANCE=\"RPF-WP-0040\"\nclass Failure(Exception):pass\n\
+    class NoRedirect(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler):\n def redirect_request(self,*args,**kwargs):return\
+    \ None\n\ndef http(url,body=None,headers=None,method=None,form=False):\n data=None\n\
+    \ headers=dict(headers or {})\n if body is not None:\n  data=(urllib.parse.urlencode(body)\
+    \ if form else json.dumps(body)).encode()\n  headers[\"Content-Type\"]=\"application/x-www-form-urlencoded\"\
+    \ if form else \"application/json\"\n req=urllib.request.Request(url,data=data,headers=headers,method=method)\n\
+    \ try:\n  with urllib.request.build_opener(NoRedirect()).open(req,timeout=15)\
+    \ as r:\n   raw=r.read(1048577)\n   if len(raw)>1048576:raise Failure()\n   return\
+    \ r.status,json.loads(raw) if raw else {}\n except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:return\
+    \ e.code,{}\n\ndef success(code,data):\n if code!=200 or not data.get(\"result\"\
+    ,{}).get(\"status\"):raise Failure()\n return data[\"result\"][\"value\"]\n\n\
+    def run():\n session=None;receipt={\"success\":False,\"phase\":\"workload_login\"\
+    }\n try:\n  jwt=Path(\"/var/run/keycape-factor/token\").read_text().strip()\n\
+    \  code,body=http(BAO+\"/auth/kubernetes/login\",{\"role\":\"keycape-factor-renewer\"\
+    ,\"jwt\":jwt})\n  if code!=200:raise Failure()\n  session=body[\"auth\"][\"client_token\"\
+    ];headers={\"X-Vault-Token\":session}\n  receipt[\"phase\"]=\"issuer_custody\"\
+    \n  code,body=http(BAO+\"/\"+ISSUER,headers=headers)\n  if code!=200:raise Failure()\n\
+    \  issuer=body[\"data\"][\"data\"]\n  if issuer.get(\"REQUEST\")!=PROVENANCE or\
+    \ issuer.get(\"USERNAME\")!=USER:raise Failure()\n  receipt[\"phase\"]=\"provider_authentication\"\
+    \n  value=success(*http(PI+\"/auth\",{\"username\":USER,\"password\":issuer[\"\
+    PASSWORD\"]},form=True))\n  if value.get(\"role\")!=\"admin\" or value.get(\"\
+    username\")!=USER:raise Failure()\n  token=value[\"token\"];claims=json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(token.split('.')[1]+'==='));expiry=int(claims[\"\
+    exp\"])\n  if not 300<expiry-time.time()<=7200:raise Failure()\n  receipt[\"phase\"\
+    ]=\"provider_scope\"\n  provider_headers={\"Authorization\":token}\n  listing=success(*http(PI+\"\
+    /token/?tokenrealm=coulomb&active=True&pagesize=1\",headers=provider_headers))\n\
+    \  if not isinstance(listing.get(\"tokens\"),list) or not isinstance(listing.get(\"\
+    count\"),int):raise Failure()\n  code,_=http(PI+\"/policy/\",headers=provider_headers)\n\
+    \  if code not in (401,403):raise Failure()\n  receipt[\"phase\"]=\"publish\"\n\
+    \  code,body=http(BAO+\"/\"+TARGET,headers=headers)\n  if code!=200 or body[\"\
+    data\"][\"data\"].get(\"REQUEST\")!=PROVENANCE:raise Failure()\n  version=body[\"\
+    data\"][\"metadata\"][\"version\"]\n  code,_=http(BAO+\"/\"+TARGET,{\"options\"\
+    :{\"cas\":version},\"data\":{\"TOKEN\":token,\"EXPIRES_AT\":expiry,\"REQUEST\"\
+    :PROVENANCE}},headers=headers)\n  if code!=200:raise Failure()\n  code,body=http(BAO+\"\
+    /\"+TARGET,headers=headers)\n  if code!=200 or body[\"data\"][\"data\"][\"TOKEN\"\
+    ]!=token:raise Failure()\n  receipt.update(success=True,phase=\"complete\",expires_at=expiry,kv_version=body[\"\
+    data\"][\"metadata\"][\"version\"],cross_user_factor_visible=listing[\"count\"\
+    ]>0)\n except Exception:pass\n finally:\n  if session:\n   try:\n    code,_=http(BAO+\"\
+    /auth/token/revoke-self\",headers={\"X-Vault-Token\":session},method=\"POST\"\
+    )\n    receipt[\"session_revoked\"]=code in (200,204)\n   except Exception:receipt[\"\
+    session_revoked\"]=False\n   if not receipt[\"session_revoked\"]:receipt[\"success\"\
+    ]=False;receipt[\"phase\"]=\"session_cleanup\"\n return receipt\nif __name__==\"\
+    __main__\":\n receipt=run();print(json.dumps(receipt));raise SystemExit(0 if receipt[\"\
+    success\"] else 1)\n"
+---
+apiVersion: batch/v1
+kind: CronJob
+metadata:
+  name: keycape-factor-renewer
+  namespace: sso
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/part-of: net-kingdom-sso-mfa
+spec:
+  schedule: '*/10 * * * *'
+  suspend: false
+  concurrencyPolicy: Forbid
+  startingDeadlineSeconds: 120
+  successfulJobsHistoryLimit: 2
+  failedJobsHistoryLimit: 3
+  jobTemplate:
+    spec:
+      activeDeadlineSeconds: 120
+      backoffLimit: 1
+      ttlSecondsAfterFinished: 3600
+      template:
+        metadata:
+          labels:
+            app.kubernetes.io/name: keycape-factor-renewer
+        spec:
+          serviceAccountName: keycape-factor-renewer
+          automountServiceAccountToken: false
+          restartPolicy: Never
+          securityContext:
+            runAsNonRoot: true
+            runAsUser: 65534
+            runAsGroup: 65534
+            fsGroup: 65534
+            seccompProfile:
+              type: RuntimeDefault
+          containers:
+          - name: renew
+            image: python:3.12-slim@sha256:d764629ce0ddd8c71fd371e9901efb324a95789d2315a47db7e4d27e78f1b0e9
+            command:
+            - python3
+            - /worker/renew.py
+            env:
+            - name: PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE
+              value: '1'
+            securityContext:
+              allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+              readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
+              capabilities:
+                drop:
+                - ALL
+            resources:
+              requests:
+                cpu: 10m
+                memory: 24Mi
+              limits:
+                cpu: 100m
+                memory: 64Mi
+            volumeMounts:
+            - name: worker
+              mountPath: /worker
+              readOnly: true
+            - name: identity
+              mountPath: /var/run/keycape-factor
+              readOnly: true
+          volumes:
+          - name: worker
+            configMap:
+              name: keycape-factor-renewer-2cf770000e
+          - name: identity
+            projected:
+              defaultMode: 288
+              sources:
+              - serviceAccountToken:
+                  path: token
+                  audience: openbao
+                  expirationSeconds: 600
+---
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: NetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: keycape-factor-renewer
+  namespace: sso
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/part-of: net-kingdom-sso-mfa
+spec:
+  podSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: keycape-factor-renewer
+  policyTypes:
+  - Ingress
+  - Egress
+  ingress: []
+  egress:
+  - to:
+    - namespaceSelector:
+        matchLabels:
+          kubernetes.io/metadata.name: openbao
+    ports:
+    - port: 8200
+      protocol: TCP
+  - to:
+    - namespaceSelector:
+        matchLabels:
+          kubernetes.io/metadata.name: mfa
+      podSelector:
+        matchLabels:
+          app.kubernetes.io/name: privacyidea
+    ports:
+    - port: 8080
+      protocol: TCP
+  - to:
+    - namespaceSelector:
+        matchLabels:
+          kubernetes.io/metadata.name: kube-system
+    ports:
+    - port: 53
+      protocol: UDP
+    - port: 53
+      protocol: TCP
+---
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: NetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: allow-keycape-factor-renewal
+  namespace: mfa
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/part-of: net-kingdom-sso-mfa
+spec:
+  podSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: privacyidea
+  policyTypes:
+  - Ingress
+  ingress:
+  - from:
+    - namespaceSelector:
+        matchLabels:
+          kubernetes.io/metadata.name: sso
+      podSelector:
+        matchLabels:
+          app.kubernetes.io/name: keycape-factor-renewer
+    ports:
+    - port: 8080
+      protocol: TCP
--- a/openbao/policies/keycape-factor-renewer.hcl
+++ b/openbao/policies/keycape-factor-renewer.hcl
@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+# Dedicated renewable service password read and JWT-only publish.
+path "platform/data/workloads/net-kingdom/keycape-factor-issuer" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}
+path "platform/data/workloads/net-kingdom/keycape-factor-read" {
+  capabilities = ["read", "create", "update"]
+}
+
+path "auth/token/revoke-self" {
+  capabilities = ["update"]
+}
--- a/openbao/policies/workload-kv-read-keycape-factor-read.hcl
+++ b/openbao/policies/workload-kv-read-keycape-factor-read.hcl
@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# Exact-path JWT delivery; no issuer password or sibling paths.
+path "platform/data/workloads/net-kingdom/keycape-factor-read" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}
+path "platform/metadata/workloads/net-kingdom/keycape-factor-read" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}
+
+# ESO validates its own short-lived workload session.
+path "auth/token/lookup-self" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}
+
+path "auth/token/revoke-self" {
+  capabilities = ["update"]
+}
--- a/scripts/keycape_factor_acceptance.py
+++ b/scripts/keycape_factor_acceptance.py
@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+"""Run native delivery/scope/rotation acceptance; no attended admin or secret output."""
+import copy,json,subprocess,time,uuid
+from pathlib import Path
+from keycape_factor_activate import CLUSTER,kubectl
+ROOT=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+def run():
+ if kubectl("get","ns","kube-system","-o","json")["metadata"]["uid"]!=CLUSTER:raise ValueError()
+ cron=kubectl("-n","sso","get","cronjob","keycape-factor-renewer","-o","json")
+ spec=copy.deepcopy(cron["spec"]["jobTemplate"]["spec"])
+ spec.update(activeDeadlineSeconds=300,backoffLimit=0)
+ p=spec["template"]["spec"];p["serviceAccountName"]="keycape-factor-eso"
+ p["containers"][0]["command"]=["python3","-c",(ROOT/"scripts/keycape_factor_delivery_probe.py").read_text()]
+ p["volumes"].append({"name":"factor","secret":{"secretName":"keycape-factor-read","defaultMode":288}})
+ p["containers"][0]["volumeMounts"].append({"name":"factor","mountPath":"/factor","readOnly":True})
+ suffix=uuid.uuid4().hex[:8];name="keycape-factor-proof-"+suffix
+ kubectl("create","-f","-","-o","json",payload={"apiVersion":"batch/v1","kind":"Job","metadata":{"name":name,"namespace":"sso"},"spec":spec})
+ deadline=time.monotonic()+310;rotating=False
+ while time.monotonic()<deadline:
+  r=subprocess.run(["kubectl","-n","sso","logs","job/"+name],capture_output=True,text=True,timeout=15)
+  results=[]
+  if r.returncode==0:
+   for line in r.stdout.splitlines():
+    try:results.append(json.loads(line))
+    except ValueError:pass
+  if results and not rotating:
+   if results[0].get("phase")!="awaiting_rotation":raise ValueError()
+   renewal={"apiVersion":"batch/v1","kind":"Job","metadata":{"name":"keycape-factor-rotate-"+suffix,"namespace":"sso"},"spec":cron["spec"]["jobTemplate"]["spec"]}
+   kubectl("create","-f","-","-o","json",payload=renewal);rotating=True
+   print(json.dumps({"phase":"waiting_for_mounted_rotation","job":name}),flush=True)
+  if results and "phase" not in results[-1]:
+   result={k:v for k,v in results[-1].items() if isinstance(v,bool)}
+   result["job"]=name
+   return result
+  time.sleep(5)
+ raise TimeoutError()
+if __name__=="__main__":
+ try:result=run()
+ except Exception:result={"success":False,"failure":"native acceptance failed or timed out"}
+ print(json.dumps(result),flush=True);raise SystemExit(0 if result.get("success") else 1)
--- a/scripts/keycape_factor_activate.py
+++ b/scripts/keycape_factor_activate.py
@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+"""Guarded activation; credentials remain in memory and subprocess stdin."""
+import argparse,base64,copy,json,re,subprocess,time
+CLUSTER="a553c742-0115-43d4-99a4-a5ca56fe0786"
+DEPLOYMENT="99ddd83c-cb3f-4847-bcf8-35f1aa87627f"
+IMAGE="forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/key-cape@sha256:c9eb584d60efecfe00e1745a7e8cd3ebb4ae0f94faa715ef9594cd58a5dcebb6"
+MOUNT={"name":"factor-token","mountPath":"/etc/keycape-factor","readOnly":True}
+VOLUME={"name":"factor-token","secret":{"secretName":"keycape-factor-read","defaultMode":288,"items":[{"key":"admin-token","path":"admin-token"}]}}
+def kubectl(*args,payload=None):
+ r=subprocess.run(["kubectl",*args],input=json.dumps(payload).encode() if payload is not None else None,stdout=subprocess.PIPE,stderr=subprocess.PIPE,timeout=40)
+ if r.returncode:raise RuntimeError("Kubernetes operation failed")
+ return json.loads(r.stdout) if r.stdout else {}
+def rewrite_config(raw):
+ text=raw.decode();match=re.search(r"(?m)^privacyidea:[^\n]*\n(?:(?:[ \t]+[^\n]*|)[\n]|[ \t]+[^\n]*$)*",text)
+ if not match:raise ValueError("privacyidea section missing")
+ section=match.group()
+ if re.search(r"(?m)^  adminTokenFile:",section):
+  if not re.search(r"(?m)^  adminTokenFile: /etc/keycape-factor/admin-token$",section) or re.search(r"(?m)^  adminToken:",section):raise ValueError("unexpected credential configuration")
+  return raw
+ section,n=re.subn(r"(?m)^  adminToken:[^\n]*$","  adminTokenFile: /etc/keycape-factor/admin-token",section)
+ if n!=1:raise ValueError("expected exactly one inline token")
+ return (text[:match.start()]+section+text[match.end():]).encode()
+def deployment_patch(obj):
+ if obj["metadata"]["uid"]!=DEPLOYMENT:raise ValueError("deployment identity mismatch")
+ spec=obj["spec"]["template"]["spec"];containers=spec["containers"]
+ i=next(i for i,c in enumerate(containers) if c["name"]=="keycape")
+ if containers[i]["image"]!=IMAGE:raise ValueError("deployment image mismatch")
+ mounts=copy.deepcopy(containers[i].get("volumeMounts",[]));volumes=copy.deepcopy(spec.get("volumes",[]))
+ for entries,expected in ((mounts,MOUNT),(volumes,VOLUME)):
+  existing=[x for x in entries if x["name"]==expected["name"]]
+  if existing and existing!=[expected]:raise ValueError("existing factor mount differs")
+  if not existing:entries.append(expected)
+ return [{"op":"test","path":"/metadata/uid","value":DEPLOYMENT},{"op":"test","path":"/metadata/resourceVersion","value":obj["metadata"]["resourceVersion"]},{"op":"add","path":f"/spec/template/spec/containers/{i}/volumeMounts","value":mounts},{"op":"add","path":"/spec/template/spec/volumes","value":volumes}]
+def run(apply):
+ if kubectl("get","ns","kube-system","-o","json")["metadata"]["uid"]!=CLUSTER:raise ValueError("cluster identity mismatch")
+ es=kubectl("-n","sso","get","externalsecret","keycape-factor-read","-o","json")
+ if not any(x["type"]=="Ready" and x["status"]=="True" for x in es.get("status",{}).get("conditions",[])):raise ValueError("delivery not ready")
+ delivered=kubectl("-n","sso","get","secret","keycape-factor-read","-o","json")
+ expiry=int(base64.b64decode(delivered["data"]["expires-at"]))
+ if expiry-time.time()<600:raise ValueError("delivered token too near expiry")
+ secret=kubectl("-n","sso","get","secret","keycape-config","-o","json")
+ old=secret["data"]["config.yaml"];new=base64.b64encode(rewrite_config(base64.b64decode(old))).decode()
+ patch=[{"op":"test","path":"/metadata/uid","value":secret["metadata"]["uid"]},{"op":"test","path":"/metadata/resourceVersion","value":secret["metadata"]["resourceVersion"]},{"op":"replace","path":"/data/config.yaml","value":new}]
+ deployment=kubectl("-n","sso","get","deployment","keycape","-o","json");dp=deployment_patch(deployment)
+ for kind,name,ops in (("secret","keycape-config",patch),("deployment","keycape",dp)):
+  kubectl("-n","sso","patch",kind,name,"--type=json","--patch-file=/dev/stdin","--dry-run=server","-o","json",payload=ops)
+ if apply:
+  kubectl("-n","sso","patch","secret","keycape-config","--type=json","--patch-file=/dev/stdin","-o","json",payload=patch)
+  kubectl("-n","sso","patch","deployment","keycape","--type=json","--patch-file=/dev/stdin","-o","json",payload=dp)
+  current=kubectl("-n","sso","get","secret","keycape-config","-o","json")
+  expected=dict(secret["data"],**{"config.yaml":new})
+  if current["data"]!=expected:raise ValueError("config readback mismatch")
+ return {"success":True,"applied":apply,"unrelated_config_preserved":True,"credential_source":"mounted_file","expires_at":expiry}
+if __name__=="__main__":
+ p=argparse.ArgumentParser();p.add_argument("--apply",action="store_true");a=p.parse_args()
+ try:result=run(a.apply)
+ except Exception:result={"success":False,"failure":"activation failed; inspect sanitized resource status"}
+ print(json.dumps(result));raise SystemExit(0 if result["success"] else 1)
--- a/scripts/keycape_factor_bootstrap.py
+++ b/scripts/keycape_factor_bootstrap.py
@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Silent attended custody and dedicated provider bootstrap; no personal passwords."""
+import argparse,json,os,secrets,subprocess,time,re
+from pathlib import Path
+from keycape_factor_metadata import call
+ROOT=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+ISSUER="platform/data/workloads/net-kingdom/keycape-factor-issuer"
+TOKEN="platform/data/workloads/net-kingdom/keycape-factor-read"
+REQUEST="RPF-WP-0040"
+USER="keycape-factor-reader"
+
+def read_optional(path):
+ p=subprocess.run(["bao","read","-format=json",path],capture_output=True,text=True,timeout=25)
+ if p.returncode:
+  # Only explicit 404 permits creation. Permission or transport failures never mean absent.
+  if "Code: 404" in p.stderr or "No value found" in p.stderr:return None
+  raise RuntimeError("custody read failed")
+ return json.loads(p.stdout)["data"]
+
+def execute():
+ cluster=json.loads(subprocess.check_output(["kubectl","get","ns","kube-system","-o","json"]))
+ if cluster["metadata"]["uid"]!="a553c742-0115-43d4-99a4-a5ca56fe0786":raise RuntimeError("wrong cluster")
+ issuer=read_optional(ISSUER)
+ if issuer is None:
+  secret={"USERNAME":USER,"PASSWORD":secrets.token_urlsafe(48),"REQUEST":REQUEST}
+  call("write","-format=json",ISSUER,"-",payload={"options":{"cas":0},"data":secret})
+  issuer=read_optional(ISSUER)
+ secret=issuer["data"]
+ if set(secret)!={"USERNAME","PASSWORD","REQUEST"} or secret["USERNAME"]!=USER or secret["REQUEST"]!=REQUEST:raise RuntimeError("issuer custody mismatch")
+ source=(ROOT/"scripts/keycape_factor_provider.py").read_text()
+ p=subprocess.run(["kubectl","-n","mfa","exec","-i","deployment/privacyidea","-c","privacyidea","--","python3","-c",source],input=json.dumps({"operation":"bootstrap","username":USER,"password":secret["PASSWORD"]}),text=True,capture_output=True,timeout=60)
+ if p.returncode:
+  failure=json.loads(p.stdout)
+  permitted={"admin policy baseline changed","existing managed policy differs","service name already belongs to another setup","service authentication failed","unsupported service token lifetime","factor lookup failed","service has unexpected administration rights","provider response too large"}
+  reason=failure.get("failure")
+  raise RuntimeError(reason if reason in permitted or (isinstance(reason,str) and re.fullmatch(r"factor lookup failed [0-9]{3} (True|False) (True|False) (True|False)",reason)) else "provider setup failed without secret-bearing detail")
+ result=json.loads(p.stdout)
+ if not result.get("policy_read_denied") or result["expires_at"]<=time.time()+300:raise RuntimeError("provider verification incomplete")
+ current=read_optional(TOKEN)
+ if current and current["data"].get("REQUEST")!=REQUEST:raise RuntimeError("token custody belongs to another request")
+ cas=current["metadata"]["version"] if current else 0
+ call("write","-format=json",TOKEN,"-",payload={"options":{"cas":cas},"data":{"TOKEN":result["token"],"EXPIRES_AT":result["expires_at"],"REQUEST":REQUEST}})
+ stored=read_optional(TOKEN)
+ if stored["data"]["TOKEN"]!=result["token"]:raise RuntimeError("token custody readback failed")
+ return {"issuer_path":ISSUER,"token_path":TOKEN,"token_version":stored["metadata"]["version"],"expires_at":result["expires_at"],"provider_policy_read_denied":True,"cross_user_factor_visible":result["cross_user_factor_visible"],"values_emitted":False}
+
+def main():
+ p=argparse.ArgumentParser();p.add_argument("--receipt",type=Path,required=True);args=p.parse_args()
+ if any(os.environ.get(k) for k in ["OPENBAO_TOKEN","BAO_TOKEN","VAULT_TOKEN"]):return 2
+ fd=os.open(args.receipt,os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREAT|os.O_EXCL,0o600);result={"success":False}
+ try:result.update(execute());result["success"]=True;return 0
+ except RuntimeError as e:result["failure"]=str(e);return 1
+ except Exception as e:result["failure_type"]=type(e).__name__;return 1
+ finally:os.write(fd,json.dumps(result,indent=2).encode());os.close(fd)
+if __name__=="__main__":raise SystemExit(main())
--- a/scripts/keycape_factor_delivery_probe.py
+++ b/scripts/keycape_factor_delivery_probe.py
@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+"""Native proof job: only boolean scope and projection observations leave the pod."""
+import json,time,sys,urllib.parse
+from pathlib import Path
+sys.path.insert(0,"/worker")
+from renew import http,BAO,PI,TARGET,ISSUER,success
+result={"success":False};session=None
+try:
+ jwt=Path("/var/run/keycape-factor/token").read_text().strip()
+ code,body=http(BAO+"/auth/kubernetes/login",{"role":"keycape-factor-renewer","jwt":jwt})
+ result["wrong_service_account_denied"]=code in (400,403)
+ code,body=http(BAO+"/auth/kubernetes/login",{"role":"keycape-factor-workload-kv-read","jwt":jwt})
+ if code!=200:raise ValueError()
+ session=body["auth"]["client_token"];headers={"X-Vault-Token":session}
+ code,_=http(BAO+"/"+ISSUER,headers=headers);result["issuer_password_denied"]=code==403
+ code,_=http(BAO+"/platform/data/workloads/net-kingdom/unrelated",headers=headers);result["sibling_secret_denied"]=code==403
+ code,data=http(BAO+"/"+TARGET,headers=headers)
+ if code!=200:raise ValueError()
+ initial=Path("/factor/admin-token").read_text().strip()
+ result["mounted_token_matches_custody"]=initial==data["data"]["data"]["TOKEN"]
+ listing=success(*http(PI+"/token/?tokenrealm=coulomb&active=True&pagesize=1",headers={"Authorization":initial}))
+ user=listing["tokens"][0]["username"]
+ query=urllib.parse.urlencode({"user":user,"realm":"coulomb","active":"True"})
+ listing=success(*http(PI+"/token/?"+query,headers={"Authorization":initial}))
+ result["keycape_user_lookup_accepted"]=listing["count"]>0 and any(x.get("active") is True for x in listing["tokens"])
+ code,_=http(PI+"/policy/",headers={"Authorization":initial});result["provider_administration_denied"]=code in (401,403)
+ print(json.dumps({"phase":"awaiting_rotation",**result}),flush=True)
+ for _ in range(48):
+  time.sleep(5)
+  current=Path("/factor/admin-token").read_text().strip()
+  if current!=initial:
+   listing=success(*http(PI+"/token/?"+query,headers={"Authorization":current}))
+   result["rotated_projection_accepted"]=listing["count"]>0
+   break
+ result["success"]=all(v for k,v in result.items() if k!="success") and result.get("rotated_projection_accepted",False)
+except Exception:pass
+finally:
+ if session:
+  try:
+   code,_=http(BAO+"/auth/token/revoke-self",headers={"X-Vault-Token":session},method="POST")
+   result["session_revoked"]=code in (200,204)
+  except Exception:result["session_revoked"]=False
+  if not result["session_revoked"]:result["success"]=False
+print(json.dumps(result),flush=True)
+raise SystemExit(0 if result["success"] else 1)
--- a/scripts/keycape_factor_eso_metadata.py
+++ b/scripts/keycape_factor_eso_metadata.py
@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+import json,os,sys
+from pathlib import Path
+from keycape_factor_metadata import call,normalized,policy_text
+NAME="workload-kv-read-keycape-factor-read"
+OLD='# Exact-path JWT delivery; no issuer password or sibling paths.\npath "platform/data/workloads/net-kingdom/keycape-factor-read" {\n  capabilities = ["read"]\n}\npath "platform/metadata/workloads/net-kingdom/keycape-factor-read" {\n  capabilities = ["read"]\n}\n\n# ESO validates its own short-lived workload session.\npath "auth/token/lookup-self" {\n  capabilities = ["read"]\n}\n'
+NEW=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1].joinpath("openbao/policies/"+NAME+".hcl").read_text()
+fd=os.open(sys.argv[1],os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREAT|os.O_EXCL,0o600)
+result={"success":False}
+try:
+ current=policy_text(call("policy","read","-format=json",NAME))
+ if normalized(current) not in (normalized(OLD),normalized(NEW)):raise RuntimeError()
+ call("write","-format=json","sys/policies/acl/"+NAME,"-",payload={"policy":NEW})
+ if normalized(policy_text(call("policy","read","-format=json",NAME)))!=normalized(NEW):raise RuntimeError()
+ result={"success":True,"change":"ESO self-session lookup and revocation only","secret_values_read":False}
+finally:
+ os.write(fd,json.dumps(result).encode());os.close(fd)
--- a/scripts/keycape_factor_metadata.py
+++ b/scripts/keycape_factor_metadata.py
@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Reviewed silent metadata apply inside the attended OpenBao envelope."""
+import argparse,json,os,subprocess
+from pathlib import Path
+ROOT=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+POLICY="workload-kv-read-keycape-factor-read"
+ROLE="keycape-factor-workload-kv-read"
+ROLE_PATH="auth/kubernetes/role/"+ROLE
+POLICY_PATH="sys/policies/acl/"+POLICY
+KV="platform/workloads/net-kingdom/keycape-factor-read"
+ROLE_CONFIG={"bound_service_account_names":["keycape-factor-eso"],"bound_service_account_namespaces":["sso"],"audience":"openbao","token_policies":[POLICY],"token_ttl":900,"token_max_ttl":900,"token_no_default_policy":True}
+
+def call(*args,payload=None):
+ p=subprocess.run(["bao",*args],input=json.dumps(payload) if payload is not None else None,capture_output=True,text=True,timeout=25)
+ if p.returncode:raise RuntimeError("OpenBao metadata command rejected: "+args[0]+" "+args[1])
+ return json.loads(p.stdout) if p.stdout.strip() else {}
+
+def normalized(value):return "".join(value.split())
+
+def policy_text(value):return value.get("data",value).get("policy","")
+
+def verify_role(data):
+ return all(data.get(k)==v for k,v in ROLE_CONFIG.items())
+
+def execute(apply=False):
+ mounts=call("secrets","list","-format=json")
+ if mounts.get("platform/",{}).get("type")!="kv" or str(mounts["platform/"].get("options",{}).get("version"))!="2":raise RuntimeError("Expected existing KV v2 mount")
+ auth=call("auth","list","-format=json")
+ if auth.get("kubernetes/",{}).get("type")!="kubernetes":raise RuntimeError("Expected existing Kubernetes auth")
+ # Capability checks are individual: the CLI interprets multiple arguments as TOKEN PATH.
+ capabilities={p:call("token","capabilities","-format=json",p) for p in [POLICY_PATH,ROLE_PATH]}
+ if any(not {"create","update"}.issubset(set(c)) and "root" not in c for c in capabilities.values()):raise RuntimeError("Missing metadata administration capabilities")
+ policy=(ROOT/"openbao/policies"/(POLICY+".hcl")).read_text()
+ if apply:
+  # New dedicated names only. Existing objects must match; never overwrite foreign metadata.
+  policies=call("policy","list","-format=json")
+  if POLICY in policies:
+   current=call("policy","read","-format=json",POLICY)
+   if normalized(current.get("data",current).get("policy",""))!=normalized(policy):raise RuntimeError("Existing policy differs")
+  else:call("write","-format=json",POLICY_PATH,"-",payload={"policy":policy})
+  roles=call("list","-format=json","auth/kubernetes/role")
+  role_names=roles if isinstance(roles,list) else roles.get("data",{}).get("keys",[])
+  if ROLE in role_names:
+   if not verify_role(call("read","-format=json",ROLE_PATH).get("data",{})):raise RuntimeError("Existing role differs")
+  else:call("write","-format=json",ROLE_PATH,"-",payload=ROLE_CONFIG)
+  if not verify_role(call("read","-format=json",ROLE_PATH).get("data",{})):raise RuntimeError("Role readback differs")
+  if normalized(policy_text(call("policy","read","-format=json",POLICY)))!=normalized(policy):raise RuntimeError("Policy readback differs")
+ return {"operation":"apply" if apply else "preflight","policy":POLICY,"role":ROLE_PATH,"kv_path":KV,"field":"TOKEN","metadata_verified":apply,"secret_values_read":False,"secret_values_written":False}
+
+def main():
+ parser=argparse.ArgumentParser();parser.add_argument("--apply",action="store_true");parser.add_argument("--receipt",type=Path,required=True);args=parser.parse_args()
+ if any(os.environ.get(k) for k in ["OPENBAO_TOKEN","BAO_TOKEN","VAULT_TOKEN"]):return 2
+ fd=os.open(args.receipt,os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREAT|os.O_EXCL,0o600)
+ result={"success":False,"phase":"metadata"}
+ try:
+  result.update(execute(args.apply));result["success"]=True;return 0
+ except RuntimeError as exc:
+  result["failure"]=str(exc);return 1
+ except Exception as exc:
+  result["failure_type"]=type(exc).__name__;return 1
+ finally:
+  os.write(fd,json.dumps(result,indent=2).encode());os.close(fd)
+if __name__=="__main__":raise SystemExit(main())
--- a/scripts/keycape_factor_provider.py
+++ b/scripts/keycape_factor_provider.py
@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+"""Run only inside the provider; secret-bearing stdin/stdout stay in owner pipes."""
+import contextlib,io,json,logging,sys,time,base64,urllib.request,urllib.error,urllib.parse
+USER="keycape-factor-reader"
+BASELINE="keycape-preserve-existing-admins"
+READER="keycape-factor-reader-coulomb"
+REALM="coulomb"
+
+class NoRedirect(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler):
+ def redirect_request(self,*args,**kwargs):return None
+
+def request(path,payload=None,token=None):
+ headers={}
+ if token:headers["Authorization"]=token
+ data=urllib.parse.urlencode(payload).encode() if payload is not None else None
+ req=urllib.request.Request("http://127.0.0.1:8080"+path,data=data,headers=headers)
+ try:
+  with urllib.request.build_opener(NoRedirect()).open(req,timeout=15) as r:
+   raw=r.read(1048577)
+   if len(raw)>1048576:raise RuntimeError("provider response too large")
+   return r.status,json.loads(raw)
+ except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:return e.code,{}
+
+def token_result(password):
+ code,auth=request("/auth",{"username":USER,"password":password})
+ value=auth.get("result",{}).get("value",{})
+ if code!=200 or not auth.get("result",{}).get("status") or value.get("role")!="admin" or value.get("username")!=USER:raise RuntimeError("service authentication failed")
+ token=value.get("token","")
+ claims=json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(token.split('.')[1]+'==='))
+ expiry=int(claims['exp'])
+ if not 300<expiry-time.time()<=7200:raise RuntimeError("unsupported service token lifetime")
+ code,listing=request("/token/?tokenrealm=coulomb&active=True&page=1&pagesize=1",token=token)
+ lv=listing.get("result",{}).get("value",{})
+ if code!=200 or not listing.get("result",{}).get("status") or not isinstance(lv.get("tokens"),list) or not isinstance(lv.get("count"),int):raise RuntimeError("factor lookup failed "+str(code)+" "+str(bool(listing.get("result",{}).get("status")))+" "+str(isinstance(lv.get("tokens"),list))+" "+str(isinstance(lv.get("count"),int)))
+ code,_=request("/policy/",token=token)
+ if code not in (401,403):raise RuntimeError("service has unexpected administration rights")
+ return {"token":token,"expires_at":expiry,"cross_user_factor_visible":lv["count"]>0,"policy_read_denied":True}
+
+def bootstrap(password):
+ logging.disable(logging.CRITICAL)
+ from privacyidea.app import create_app
+ from privacyidea.lib.policy import PolicyClass,set_policy
+ from privacyidea.lib.auth import get_db_admins,create_db_admin
+ app=create_app(config_name="production")
+ with app.app_context():
+  policies=PolicyClass().list_policies(scope="admin",active=True)
+  # Source preflight found no policies. Retry accepts only our exact two policies.
+  if any(p['name'] not in [BASELINE,READER] for p in policies):raise RuntimeError("admin policy baseline changed")
+  for p in policies:
+   expected=({"adminuser":["*","!"+USER],"realm":[],"action":{"*":True}} if p['name']==BASELINE else {"adminuser":[USER],"realm":[REALM],"action":{"tokenlist":True}})
+   if any(p.get(k)!=v for k,v in expected.items()):raise RuntimeError("existing managed policy differs")
+  existing={a.username for a in get_db_admins()}
+  if USER in existing and not policies:raise RuntimeError("service name already belongs to another setup")
+  if BASELINE not in {p['name'] for p in policies}:
+   set_policy(name=BASELINE,scope="admin",action="*",adminuser=["*","!"+USER],description="Preserve default rights for existing administrative identities; exclude factor reader")
+  if READER not in {p['name'] for p in policies}:
+   set_policy(name=READER,scope="admin",action="tokenlist",adminuser=USER,realm=REALM,description="KeyCape factor listing in coulomb only")
+  if USER not in existing:create_db_admin(USER,password=password)
+ return token_result(password)
+
+def main():
+ data=json.load(sys.stdin)
+ if data.get('username')!=USER or not isinstance(data.get('password'),str) or len(data['password'])<32:return 2
+ with contextlib.redirect_stdout(io.StringIO()),contextlib.redirect_stderr(io.StringIO()):
+  result=bootstrap(data['password']) if data.get('operation')=='bootstrap' else token_result(data['password'])
+ sys.stdout.write(json.dumps(result));return 0
+if __name__=='__main__':
+ try:code=main()
+ except RuntimeError as exc:
+  sys.stdout.write(json.dumps({"failure":str(exc)}));code=1
+ except Exception as exc:
+  sys.stdout.write(json.dumps({"failure_type":type(exc).__name__}));code=1
+ raise SystemExit(code)
--- a/scripts/keycape_factor_renew.py
+++ b/scripts/keycape_factor_renew.py
@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+"""Dedicated Kubernetes renewal worker. Only sanitized outcome metadata is emitted."""
+import base64,json,sys,time,urllib.request,urllib.error,urllib.parse
+from pathlib import Path
+BAO="http://openbao.openbao.svc.cluster.local:8200/v1"
+PI="http://privacyidea.mfa.svc.cluster.local:8080"
+ISSUER="platform/data/workloads/net-kingdom/keycape-factor-issuer"
+TARGET="platform/data/workloads/net-kingdom/keycape-factor-read"
+USER="keycape-factor-reader"
+PROVENANCE="RPF-WP-0040"
+class Failure(Exception):pass
+class NoRedirect(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler):
+ def redirect_request(self,*args,**kwargs):return None
+
+def http(url,body=None,headers=None,method=None,form=False):
+ data=None
+ headers=dict(headers or {})
+ if body is not None:
+  data=(urllib.parse.urlencode(body) if form else json.dumps(body)).encode()
+  headers["Content-Type"]="application/x-www-form-urlencoded" if form else "application/json"
+ req=urllib.request.Request(url,data=data,headers=headers,method=method)
+ try:
+  with urllib.request.build_opener(NoRedirect()).open(req,timeout=15) as r:
+   raw=r.read(1048577)
+   if len(raw)>1048576:raise Failure()
+   return r.status,json.loads(raw) if raw else {}
+ except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:return e.code,{}
+
+def success(code,data):
+ if code!=200 or not data.get("result",{}).get("status"):raise Failure()
+ return data["result"]["value"]
+
+def run():
+ session=None;receipt={"success":False,"phase":"workload_login"}
+ try:
+  jwt=Path("/var/run/keycape-factor/token").read_text().strip()
+  code,body=http(BAO+"/auth/kubernetes/login",{"role":"keycape-factor-renewer","jwt":jwt})
+  if code!=200:raise Failure()
+  session=body["auth"]["client_token"];headers={"X-Vault-Token":session}
+  receipt["phase"]="issuer_custody"
+  code,body=http(BAO+"/"+ISSUER,headers=headers)
+  if code!=200:raise Failure()
+  issuer=body["data"]["data"]
+  if issuer.get("REQUEST")!=PROVENANCE or issuer.get("USERNAME")!=USER:raise Failure()
+  receipt["phase"]="provider_authentication"
+  value=success(*http(PI+"/auth",{"username":USER,"password":issuer["PASSWORD"]},form=True))
+  if value.get("role")!="admin" or value.get("username")!=USER:raise Failure()
+  token=value["token"];claims=json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(token.split('.')[1]+'==='));expiry=int(claims["exp"])
+  if not 300<expiry-time.time()<=7200:raise Failure()
+  receipt["phase"]="provider_scope"
+  provider_headers={"Authorization":token}
+  listing=success(*http(PI+"/token/?tokenrealm=coulomb&active=True&pagesize=1",headers=provider_headers))
+  if not isinstance(listing.get("tokens"),list) or not isinstance(listing.get("count"),int):raise Failure()
+  code,_=http(PI+"/policy/",headers=provider_headers)
+  if code not in (401,403):raise Failure()
+  receipt["phase"]="publish"
+  code,body=http(BAO+"/"+TARGET,headers=headers)
+  if code!=200 or body["data"]["data"].get("REQUEST")!=PROVENANCE:raise Failure()
+  version=body["data"]["metadata"]["version"]
+  code,_=http(BAO+"/"+TARGET,{"options":{"cas":version},"data":{"TOKEN":token,"EXPIRES_AT":expiry,"REQUEST":PROVENANCE}},headers=headers)
+  if code!=200:raise Failure()
+  code,body=http(BAO+"/"+TARGET,headers=headers)
+  if code!=200 or body["data"]["data"]["TOKEN"]!=token:raise Failure()
+  receipt.update(success=True,phase="complete",expires_at=expiry,kv_version=body["data"]["metadata"]["version"],cross_user_factor_visible=listing["count"]>0)
+ except Exception:pass
+ finally:
+  if session:
+   try:
+    code,_=http(BAO+"/auth/token/revoke-self",headers={"X-Vault-Token":session},method="POST")
+    receipt["session_revoked"]=code in (200,204)
+   except Exception:receipt["session_revoked"]=False
+   if not receipt["session_revoked"]:receipt["success"]=False;receipt["phase"]="session_cleanup"
+ return receipt
+if __name__=="__main__":
+ receipt=run();print(json.dumps(receipt));raise SystemExit(0 if receipt["success"] else 1)
--- a/scripts/keycape_factor_renewal_metadata.py
+++ b/scripts/keycape_factor_renewal_metadata.py
@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Exact reviewed renewal metadata; owner-admin operation, not generic KV-read delegation."""
+import argparse,json,os
+from pathlib import Path
+from keycape_factor_metadata import call,normalized,policy_text
+ROOT=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+NAME="keycape-factor-renewer"
+ROLE={"bound_service_account_names":[NAME],"bound_service_account_namespaces":["sso"],"audience":"openbao","token_policies":[NAME],"token_ttl":300,"token_max_ttl":300,"token_no_default_policy":True}
+def execute():
+ policy=(ROOT/"openbao/policies"/(NAME+".hcl")).read_text()
+ existing=call("policy","list","-format=json")
+ if NAME in existing:
+  if normalized(policy_text(call("policy","read","-format=json",NAME)))!=normalized(policy):raise RuntimeError("existing renewal policy differs")
+ else:call("write","-format=json","sys/policies/acl/"+NAME,"-",payload={"policy":policy})
+ roles=call("list","-format=json","auth/kubernetes/role")
+ names=roles if isinstance(roles,list) else roles.get("data",{}).get("keys",[])
+ path="auth/kubernetes/role/"+NAME
+ if NAME in names:
+  data=call("read","-format=json",path)["data"]
+  if any(data.get(k)!=v for k,v in ROLE.items()):raise RuntimeError("existing renewal role differs")
+ else:call("write","-format=json",path,"-",payload=ROLE)
+ data=call("read","-format=json",path)["data"]
+ if any(data.get(k)!=v for k,v in ROLE.items()):raise RuntimeError("renewal role readback failed")
+ if normalized(policy_text(call("policy","read","-format=json",NAME)))!=normalized(policy):raise RuntimeError("renewal policy readback failed")
+ return {"success":True,"policy":NAME,"role":path,"token_max_ttl":300,"secret_values_read":False,"secret_values_written":False}
+def main():
+ p=argparse.ArgumentParser();p.add_argument("--receipt",type=Path,required=True);a=p.parse_args()
+ if any(os.environ.get(k) for k in ["VAULT_TOKEN","BAO_TOKEN","OPENBAO_TOKEN"]):return 2
+ fd=os.open(a.receipt,os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREAT|os.O_EXCL,0o600);result={"success":False}
+ try:result=execute();return 0
+ except RuntimeError as e:result["failure"]=str(e);return 1
+ except Exception as e:result["failure_type"]=type(e).__name__;return 1
+ finally:os.write(fd,json.dumps(result,indent=2).encode());os.close(fd)
+if __name__=="__main__":raise SystemExit(main())
--- a/tests/test_keycape_factor_activation.py
+++ b/tests/test_keycape_factor_activation.py
@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+import importlib.util,unittest
+from pathlib import Path
+spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("activation",Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]/"scripts/keycape_factor_activate.py")
+m=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(m)
+class ActivationTests(unittest.TestCase):
+ def test_preserves_other_bytes_and_is_idempotent(self):
+  old=b"other: secret\nprivacyidea:\n  baseURL: http://provider\n  adminToken: expired\n  realm: coulomb\n  requireForAll: true\nclients:\n  - secret: unchanged\n"
+  new=m.rewrite_config(old)
+  self.assertEqual(old.replace(b"adminToken: expired",b"adminTokenFile: /etc/keycape-factor/admin-token"),new)
+  self.assertEqual(new,m.rewrite_config(new))
+ def test_rejects_ambiguous_source(self):
+  for text in (b"other: value\n",b"privacyidea:\n  adminToken: one\n  adminToken: two\n",b"privacyidea:\n  adminTokenFile: /unexpected\n"):
+   with self.assertRaises(ValueError):m.rewrite_config(text)
+ def test_refuses_unexpected_deployment(self):
+  with self.assertRaises(ValueError):m.deployment_patch({"metadata":{"uid":"replacement"}})
--- a/tests/test_keycape_factor_metadata.py
+++ b/tests/test_keycape_factor_metadata.py
@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+import importlib.util,unittest
+from pathlib import Path
+from unittest.mock import patch
+spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("factor_metadata",Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]/"scripts/keycape_factor_metadata.py")
+m=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(m)
+class FactorMetadataTests(unittest.TestCase):
+ def test_exact_role_and_policy_scope(self):
+  self.assertEqual(["keycape-factor-eso"],m.ROLE_CONFIG["bound_service_account_names"])
+  self.assertEqual(["sso"],m.ROLE_CONFIG["bound_service_account_namespaces"])
+  self.assertTrue(m.ROLE_CONFIG["token_no_default_policy"])
+  self.assertEqual(900,m.ROLE_CONFIG["token_max_ttl"])
+  policy=(m.ROOT/"openbao/policies"/(m.POLICY+".hcl")).read_text()
+  self.assertNotIn("*",policy);self.assertNotIn("issuer",policy.splitlines()[1:])
+  self.assertEqual(3,policy.count('capabilities = ["read"]'))
+ def test_denied_capabilities_prevent_writes(self):
+  calls=[]
+  def fake(*args,**kwargs):
+   calls.append(args)
+   if args[:2]==("secrets","list"):return {"platform/":{"type":"kv","options":{"version":"2"}}}
+   if args[:2]==("auth","list"):return {"kubernetes/":{"type":"kubernetes"}}
+   return ["deny"]
+  with patch.object(m,"call",side_effect=fake):
+   with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError):m.execute(True)
+  self.assertFalse(any(c[0]=="write" for c in calls))
+ def test_mismatched_role_fails_readback(self):
+  self.assertTrue(m.verify_role(dict(m.ROLE_CONFIG)))
+  self.assertFalse(m.verify_role(dict(m.ROLE_CONFIG,token_policies=["root"])))
+
+ def test_policy_readback_accepts_cli_and_api_shapes(self):
+  self.assertEqual("expected",m.policy_text({"policy":"expected"}))
+  self.assertEqual("expected",m.policy_text({"data":{"policy":"expected"}}))
--- a/tests/test_keycape_factor_provider.py
+++ b/tests/test_keycape_factor_provider.py
@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+import base64,importlib.util,json,time,unittest
+from pathlib import Path
+from unittest.mock import patch
+spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("factor_provider",Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]/"scripts/keycape_factor_provider.py")
+m=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(m)
+class FactorProviderTests(unittest.TestCase):
+ def check(self,role="admin",auth_status=True,expiry=3600,policy_status=403,listing_status=True):
+  token="synthetic."+base64.urlsafe_b64encode(json.dumps({"exp":int(time.time())+expiry}).encode()).decode().rstrip("=")+".signature"
+  def request(path,payload=None,token=None):
+   if path=="/auth":return 200,{"result":{"status":auth_status,"value":{"role":role,"username":m.USER,"token":self.token}}}
+   if path=="/policy/":return policy_status,{}
+   return 200,{"result":{"status":listing_status,"value":{"tokens":[{}],"count":1}}}
+  self.token=token
+  with patch.object(m,"request",side_effect=request):return m.token_result("synthetic-password-not-a-real-secret")
+ def test_success_requires_scoped_admin_and_expiry(self):
+  r=self.check();self.assertTrue(r["policy_read_denied"]);self.assertTrue(r["cross_user_factor_visible"])
+ def test_rejects_user_token_expiry_and_privilege_leak(self):
+  for kwargs in [dict(role="user"),dict(auth_status=False),dict(expiry=-1),dict(expiry=9000),dict(policy_status=200),dict(policy_status=500),dict(listing_status=False)]:
+   with self.subTest(kwargs=kwargs):
+    with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError):self.check(**kwargs)
+ def test_no_redirect_forwarding(self):self.assertIsNone(m.NoRedirect().redirect_request(None,None,None,None,None,None))
--- a/tests/test_keycape_factor_renewal.py
+++ b/tests/test_keycape_factor_renewal.py
@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+import base64,importlib.util,json,time,unittest
+from pathlib import Path
+from unittest.mock import patch
+spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("factor_renew",Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]/"scripts/keycape_factor_renew.py")
+m=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(m)
+class FactorRenewalTests(unittest.TestCase):
+ def drive(self,provider_failure=False,publish_failure=False,revoke_failure=False):
+  self.published=False;token="synthetic."+base64.urlsafe_b64encode(json.dumps({"exp":int(time.time())+3600}).encode()).decode()+".sig"
+  def http(url,body=None,headers=None,method=None,form=False):
+   if url.endswith('/auth/kubernetes/login'):return 200,{"auth":{"client_token":"synthetic-bao-session"}}
+   if url.endswith('/auth/token/revoke-self'):return (403 if revoke_failure else 204),{}
+   if url.endswith(m.ISSUER):return 200,{"data":{"data":{"REQUEST":m.PROVENANCE,"USERNAME":m.USER,"PASSWORD":"synthetic-service-password"}}}
+   if url.endswith('/auth'):
+    return (401,{}) if provider_failure else (200,{"result":{"status":True,"value":{"role":"admin","username":m.USER,"token":token}}})
+   if '/token/?' in url:return 200,{"result":{"status":True,"value":{"tokens":[{}],"count":1}}}
+   if url.endswith('/policy/'):return 403,{}
+   if url.endswith(m.TARGET):
+    if body:
+     if publish_failure:return 400,{}
+     self.assertEqual(1,body['options']['cas']);self.assertNotIn('PASSWORD',body['data']);self.published=True;return 200,{}
+    return 200,{"data":{"data":{"REQUEST":m.PROVENANCE,"TOKEN":token if self.published else "synthetic-old"},"metadata":{"version":2 if self.published else 1}}}
+   raise AssertionError('Unexpected endpoint')
+  with patch.object(m,'http',side_effect=http),patch.object(Path,'read_text',return_value='synthetic-kubernetes-jwt'):return m.run()
+ def test_renewal_publishes_verified_token_and_revokes_session(self):
+  r=self.drive();self.assertTrue(r['success']);self.assertEqual(2,r['kv_version']);self.assertTrue(r['session_revoked'])
+  self.assertNotIn('synthetic',json.dumps(r))
+ def test_rejected_provider_retains_current_token(self):
+  r=self.drive(provider_failure=True);self.assertFalse(r['success']);self.assertFalse(self.published);self.assertTrue(r['session_revoked'])
+  self.assertTrue(self.drive()['success'])
+ def test_cas_failure_is_not_success(self):
+  r=self.drive(publish_failure=True);self.assertFalse(r['success']);self.assertFalse(self.published);self.assertEqual('publish',r['phase'])
+ def test_cleanup_failure_is_reported(self):
+  r=self.drive(revoke_failure=True);self.assertFalse(r['success']);self.assertEqual('session_cleanup',r['phase'])
--- a/workplans/RPF-WP-0040-keycape-factor-credential-custody.md
+++ b/workplans/RPF-WP-0040-keycape-factor-credential-custody.md
@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+---
+id: RPF-WP-0040
+type: workplan
+title: "Establish KeyCape factor credential custody and renewal"
+domain: financials
+repo: railiance-platform
+status: active
+owner: codex
+topic_slug: financials
+created: "2026-09-13"
+updated: "2026-09-13"
+---
+
+User authorized establishing custody/delivery on 2026-09-13 and offered attended administrative authentication. Supports USER-WP-0030-T03 and KEY-WP-0035-T02. Existing incident lanes are not silently repurposed.
+
+## Establish exact-path custody and workload delivery metadata
+
+```task
+id: RPF-WP-0040-T01
+status: done
+priority: high
+```
+
+New KV v2 path platform/workloads/net-kingdom/keycape-factor-read, field TOKEN, provider expiry metadata. Reader role binds only sso/keycape-factor-eso, audience openbao, exact-path read policy and fifteen-minute OpenBao tokens. Attended admin metadata apply, exact readback and capability checks. No wildcard secret access or secret value in output.
+
+## Provision a bounded provider identity and renewable credential
+
+```task
+id: RPF-WP-0040-T02
+status: done
+priority: high
+```
+
+Create dedicated privacyIDEA keycape-factor-reader with coulomb tokenlist permission. Preserve existing admin rights; baseline has no admin policies. Store renewable issuer credential separately from the delivered JWT. Use protected stdin and in-memory handling, provider-issued JWT with expiry, positive cross-user scope and negative admin policy-read checks. No personal admin password in runtime.
+
+## Activate and verify renewal and consumer delivery
+
+```task
+id: RPF-WP-0040-T03
+status: done
+priority: high
+```
+
+Deliver via namespace-scoped ESO, activate KeyCape adminTokenFile with byte-preserving config CAS, schedule renewal before expiry and verify mounted reload and native scope. Predecessor expiry/revocation and recovery drills remain T04. Verify effective scope and real factor acceptance before optional client policy. Preserve existing incident residuals in NK-WP-0033.
+
+Live implementation and evidence: docs/evidence/2026-09-13-keycape-factor-custody.md.
+Fourteen offline tests pass; native renewal, exact-path ESO delivery, negative
+scope checks, provider per-user lookup and mounted rotation passed. KeyCape
+rolled out Ready 1/1 without changing MFA policy or signing/client secrets.
+
+## Verify provider expiry and revocation recovery
+
+```task
+id: RPF-WP-0040-T04
+status: todo
+priority: high
+```
+
+Exercise genuine JWT expiry, provider-side permission withdrawal and recovery
+with an isolated fixture, preserving real users' factors and admin access.
+Verify rejected predecessor handling independently of OpenBao token revocation.
+Include provider interruption/retry evidence and maintain visible failed-Job /
+ExternalSecret failure signals. This is remaining acceptance, not another owner
+handoff. Historical resolver incident NK-WP-0033 remains separately open.