Document recovered ESO lanes and recognize explicit invalid-token responses
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codex 2026-09-05 18:51:40 +02:00
parent 153223983f
commit 3759850cc4
6 changed files with 78 additions and 8 deletions

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@ -196,15 +196,18 @@ The GitOps contract uses:
`ClusterSecretStore/openbao` is limited to the `issue-core` namespace on
coulombcore.
**Railiance01 interim stores** (read coulombcore OpenBao at
`https://bao.coulomb.social` until Wave 7) are **not** managed by coulombcore
ArgoCD. Apply per workload:
**Railiance01 stores** use the private railiance01 OpenBao service and are
**not** managed by coulombcore ArgoCD. Apply per workload:
| Store | Bootstrap |
| --- | --- |
| `openbao-forgejo` | `railiance-apps` `make forgejo-openbao-eso-token-apply forgejo-openbao-store-deploy` |
| `openbao-forgejo` | Dedicated Kubernetes auth; `docs/eso-auth-recovery.md` |
| `openbao-activity-core` | `activity-core` `make openbao-eso-token-apply` + `kubectl apply -f …/openbao-activity-core.clustersecretstore.yaml` |
| `openbao-reuse` | `railiance-apps` `make reuse-openbao-eso-token-apply reuse-openbao-store-deploy` |
| `openbao-reuse` | Dedicated Kubernetes auth; `docs/eso-auth-recovery.md` |
| `openbao-target-revenue` | Dedicated Kubernetes auth; `docs/eso-auth-recovery.md` |
The three recovered stores no longer use the old `*-eso-token-apply` bootstrap
targets. Do not recreate static delivery tokens for them.
Manifests live under `argocd/platform-addons/openbao-secretstore/` but are
excluded from the coulombcore kustomization. Broaden or add stores only with

48
docs/eso-auth-recovery.md Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
# Three-lane ESO authentication recovery
RPF-WP-0037 repairs Forgejo SMTP, reuse-surface and target-revenue delivery.
All three consumers were active; their old static-token stores failed with 403.
Before resync, attended comparison proved existing OpenBao values identical to
deployed workload Secrets. This is an authentication migration, not an
application credential rotation.
| Store | Dedicated service account | OpenBao role |
| --- | --- | --- |
| openbao-forgejo | forgejo/forgejo-mailer-eso | forgejo-mailer-eso |
| openbao-reuse | reuse/reuse-surface-eso | reuse-surface-runtime-eso |
| openbao-target-revenue | target-revenue/target-revenue-eso | target-revenue-runtime-eso |
Source: `openbao/eso-auth-recovery/lanes.json`, `serviceaccounts.yaml`, the three
`*-eso.hcl` policies and existing ClusterSecretStore manifests under
`argocd/platform-addons/openbao-secretstore/`. These stores remain outside the
coulombcore kustomization. No broad RBAC is added; ESO's existing TokenRequest
authority is used with exact namespace/SA/audience OpenBao bindings.
Roles use audience `openbao`, 15-minute TTL/max/explicit max, no default policy,
and exact data reads. ESO also needs token lookup-self and revoke-self. No KV
metadata/list/write, token creation or sibling access is granted. Existing
caller-facing policies and application credentials remain in place.
Commit and push source before running the attended command:
```sh
warden access openbao-platform-admin-login --exec -- \
/usr/bin/python3 /home/worsch/railiance-platform/scripts/repair_eso_kubernetes_auth.py \
apply --kubeconfig /home/worsch/.kube/config-railiance01 \
--receipt /tmp/eso-auth-apply.json --confirm 'APPLY RPF-WP-0037'
```
The helper pins cluster identity, compares custody before mutation, refuses
scope drift, validates bounded positive and negative authentication, and patches
only each store's auth using a JSON Patch test of the observed spec. `verify`
forces another refresh and requires its timestamp to advance. `cleanup` performs
the same verification, proves the old token is unreferenced, revokes it or proves
invalidity, and deletes only its obsolete Secret with UID/resourceVersion
preconditions. All receipts are exclusively created mode 0600; values and tokens
stay in captured memory. Choose a fresh receipt path for each invocation.
On failure, inspect only the receipt and safe metadata. Completed store repairs
can be verified independently; retry apply only against matching reviewed source.
Do not roll back to rejected static credentials. Correct forward to the accepted
Kubernetes role; application Secrets are retained and no workload restart is
part of this procedure. Custody disagreement needs its own owner-led resolution.

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@ -242,11 +242,16 @@ are OpenBao-custodied and delivered to Railiance01 via External Secrets.
| Fields | `REUSE_SURFACE_TOKEN`, `REUSE_SURFACE_FORGEJO_WEBHOOK_SECRET` |
| Read policy | `workload-kv-read-reuse-surface-runtime` |
| Policy file | `openbao/policies/workload-kv-read-reuse-surface-runtime.hcl` |
| K8s auth role | `external-secrets-reuse-surface` (ESO delivery path) |
| K8s auth role | `reuse-surface-runtime-eso`, SA `reuse/reuse-surface-eso`, audience `openbao` |
| Primary consumer | ExternalSecret `reuse/reuse-surface-runtime` → Secret `reuse-surface-env` (Railiance01, 1h refresh) |
| Interim ClusterSecretStore | `openbao-reuse` (token auth to `https://bao.coulomb.social`, namespace `reuse`) |
| ClusterSecretStore | `openbao-reuse` (Kubernetes auth to private railiance01 OpenBao, namespace `reuse`) |
| ops-warden catalog | `reuse-surface-hub-write-token` |
RPF-WP-0037 replaced static ESO authentication without rotating workload values.
ESO uses the separate `workload-kv-read-reuse-surface-runtime-eso` policy: exact
data read and self-token lifecycle only. The caller-facing policy/catalog above
remains separate. See `docs/eso-auth-recovery.md`.
Fetch hub write token (do not log the value):
```bash

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@ -30,6 +30,13 @@ def check_role(actual, lane):
require(not actual.get('token_period') and not actual.get('bound_service_account_namespace_selector'), 'role_drift')
def invalid_token_lookup(result):
error = result.stderr.lower()
return (result.returncode != 0 and (b'400' in error or b'403' in error)
and (b'bad token' in error or b'invalid token' in error)
and b'permission denied' not in error)
def compare_custody(kube, lane):
es = data(command(kube + ['-n', lane['namespace'], 'get', 'externalsecret', lane['name'], '-o', 'json']))
require(es['spec']['secretStoreRef'] == {'kind': 'ClusterSecretStore', 'name': lane['store']}, 'external_secret_store_drift')
@ -153,7 +160,7 @@ def run(args, receipt):
revoke(old_token)
row['retired_token_revoked'] = True
else:
require(b'400' in lookup.stderr and (b'bad token' in lookup.stderr.lower() or b'invalid token' in lookup.stderr.lower()), 'retired_token_invalidity_unproven')
require(invalid_token_lookup(lookup), 'retired_token_invalidity_unproven')
row['retired_token_already_invalid'] = True
check = bao(['token', 'lookup', '-format=json'], token=old_token, allow_failure=True)
require(check.returncode != 0 and b'403' in check.stderr, 'retired_token_denial_unproven')

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@ -39,6 +39,12 @@ class EsoRecoveryTests(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertEqual(policy.count('path "'),3)
self.assertIn('path "'+lane['kv_path']+'"',policy)
def test_expired_token_response_is_distinct_from_authority_failure(self):
for code in [400,403]:
self.assertTrue(repair.invalid_token_lookup(SimpleNamespace(returncode=2,stderr=f'Code: {code}. Errors: bad token'.encode())))
for error in [b'Code: 403. permission denied',b'Code: 500. bad token',b'connection refused']:
self.assertFalse(repair.invalid_token_lookup(SimpleNamespace(returncode=2,stderr=error)))
if __name__=='__main__':
unittest.main()

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@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ class SigningLaneTests(unittest.TestCase):
import tempfile, yaml
ccr = copy.deepcopy(self.ccr)
ccr['status'] = 'approved'
ccr['access_frontdoor']['resolvable'] = False
ccr['openbao']['auth']['bound_claims_confirmed'] = True
ccr['openbao']['auth']['audience'] = 'kubernetes'
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp: