From 3aa1f64eb0d652fda35f3ca0c29fead543301bc4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: codex <codex@local>
Date: Sat, 5 Sep 2026 20:47:48 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] docs: register Glas Anthropic credential request

Assistant: codex
Assistant-Model: gpt-6-astra
Assistant-Session: 01a0726e-5232-73f2-aaca-2c05ceb62efb
---
 .../CCR-2026-0016-glas-claude-anthropic.yaml  | 79 +++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 79 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 credential-change-requests/CCR-2026-0016-glas-claude-anthropic.yaml

diff --git a/credential-change-requests/CCR-2026-0016-glas-claude-anthropic.yaml b/credential-change-requests/CCR-2026-0016-glas-claude-anthropic.yaml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3b75d33
--- /dev/null
+++ b/credential-change-requests/CCR-2026-0016-glas-claude-anthropic.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+id: CCR-2026-0016
+kind: credential-change-request
+schema_version: 1
+request_type: workload-kv-read
+title: Glas local Claude workload Anthropic API key
+status: in_flight
+created: '2026-09-05'
+updated: '2026-09-05'
+in_flight:
+  missing_fields:
+  - openbao.policy_file
+  - openbao.auth
+  blocking_reason: Anthropic organization and workspace budget await user input; the sandbox owner machine identity and protected delivery path have not been verified. No live grant or key exists from this request.
+  owner: railiance-platform
+requester:
+  agent: codex
+  reason: User selected a dedicated Anthropic workload API key for GLAS-WP-0012 and SAND-WP-0015. Establish custody and owner delivery before the real local Claude proof.
+review:
+  required: true
+  required_approvers:
+  - platform-operator
+  - sand-boxer-owner
+  comments:
+  - at: '2026-09-05'
+    reviewer: user via chat
+    decision: authentication_model_selected
+    comment: User requested establishment of an Anthropic workload API key. This records the chosen authentication model; final machine bindings are not yet known.
+target:
+  domain: infotech
+  tenant: glas-harness
+  workload: sand-boxer-claude-agent-dev
+  environment: production
+  purpose: Dedicated Claude Code inference for the Glas local agent-dev profile, delivered by the sandbox owner.
+openbao:
+  mount: platform
+  kv_path: platform/workloads/glas-harness/claude-agent-dev
+  fields:
+  - ANTHROPIC_API_KEY
+  metadata_read: false
+  policy_name: workload-kv-read-glas-claude-agent-dev
+access_frontdoor:
+  type: sandbox-owner
+  catalog_id: glas-claude-agent-dev-anthropic
+  selector: Glas local Claude Anthropic workload API key
+  readiness: pending-review
+  resolvable: false
+delivery:
+  surface: owner-exec
+  target: Sand-boxer delivers ANTHROPIC_API_KEY only to the selected Claude workload; neither the Glas caller nor the runtime receives an OpenBao token.
+risk:
+  classification: high
+  notes:
+  - Proposed KV coordinates and catalog selector are reserved design names, not surveyed live objects.
+  - Provider credential can incur API charges; use a dedicated workspace and user-selected budget.
+  - Use a workspace-scoped service account key; organization administration is outside the workload grant.
+  - OpenBao token expiration does not expire the provider key. Provider revocation is required for compromise.
+  - Owner environment injection can expose the key to descendants within that workload; it is not per-process secrecy against workload code.
+verification:
+  positive:
+  - Confirm provider organization, workspace, service account, key identifier and expiration using metadata only.
+  - Exact authenticated sandbox owner can read only the intended data entry and deliver the field without logging it.
+  - Bounded real Claude proof succeeds through enforced provider egress and removes private state on teardown.
+  negative:
+  - Wrong owner identity, sibling KV path, metadata read, parent listing and workload writes are denied.
+  - Generic coding-agent identity cannot retrieve the credential directly.
+  - No credential or OpenBao token appears in execution replies, artifacts, source tree or State Hub.
+  - A revoked predecessor provider key fails authentication after controlled rotation.
+  activation_conditions:
+  - User confirms Anthropic organization and workspace budget; provider service account and key are created through attended Console custody.
+  - Confirm actual sandbox host service identity and auth binding; review exact read policy and separate protected custody writer before apply.
+  - Seed KV with compare-and-set zero through attended custody; never enter values in chat or command arguments.
+  - Positive and negative access, owner delivery and provider authentication evidence pass before route activation.
+lifecycle:
+  deactivate: Disable the owner route and provider key; revoke outstanding OpenBao reader tokens. Preserve KV history under platform retention rules.
+  rotate: Create a replacement provider key, write with expected-version CAS, stop old runs, verify new delivery and inference, then revoke the predecessor at Anthropic and prove its denial.
+  compromised: Disable the provider key immediately, stop affected runs and owner route, revoke Bao leases, replace forward through protected custody and record non-secret incident evidence.
+state_hub:
+  workplan_id: GLAS-WP-0012
+  task_id: GLAS-WP-0012-T02