Bind isolated restore to fetched artifact and document archive integrity gates
All checks were successful
CI Smoke / host-smoke (push) Successful in 0s
CI Smoke / container-smoke (push) Successful in 1s

Assistant: codex
Assistant-Model: gpt-6-astra
Assistant-Session: 01a06ecb-456a-71c2-b41e-0755d336e883
This commit is contained in:
codex 2026-09-05 22:21:54 +02:00
parent 0cca68da96
commit 480d181549
4 changed files with 41 additions and 3 deletions

View file

@ -98,3 +98,29 @@ a cleanup failure after CAS can occur after credentials have already changed.
Refresh `actcore-backup-offsite`, verify delivery by contained comparison, and
restart its three environment consumers (`actcore-api`, `actcore-event-router`,
`actcore-worker`). Record their readiness and loaded-value comparisons.
## Real archive acceptance
`capture_forgejo_archive.py` requires the exact producer's successful exit marker,
checks every transferred chunk's length and the complete SHA-256 against the
producer, then validates ZIP structure and member CRCs before encryption. The
2026-09-05 recovery attempt exposed a truncated September 4 encrypted archive;
successful age decryption and upload alone cannot certify backup completeness.
`verify_nextcloud_offsite_restore.py` streams a real encrypted archive through
the current upload lane and downloads it separately through owner recovery
custody. It emits a hash-bound transfer receipt. Run this silent helper through
the attended Warden envelope, with fresh private staging and receipt paths.
`restore_forgejo_offsite_locally.py` requires both that receipt and the fetched
archive. Its disposable local Docker network is internal, exposes no host ports,
and uses an independent database password/configuration. Production app.ini is
never activated. It checks database import, application health, repository API
and clone/fsck, and package blob integrity; cleanup removes its named containers,
anonymous volumes, network and extracted staging. Remaining fetched plaintext
must be removed after the acceptance receipt is preserved.
This bounded application-data recovery does not test replacement runners or
prove that every restored package can be installed or every image pulled.
Package-consumer acceptance and broader disaster-recovery guarantees remain
with their owning assurance tasks. Full backups share the account's 10 GiB
quota; a newly measured archive size must inform the separate retention decision.

View file

@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ import zipfile
def validate_archive(path):
with zipfile.ZipFile(path) as archive:
if sum(i.file_size for i in archive.infolist()) > 20*1024**3:
raise ValueError('archive exceeds recovery size bound')
names = set(archive.namelist())
if 'forgejo-db.sql' not in names or not any(n.startswith('repos/') for n in names):
raise ValueError('required archive content missing')
@ -48,7 +50,8 @@ def capture(namespace, pod, destination):
piece = call(['dd','if='+remote+'.zip','bs='+str(chunk),'skip='+str(index),'count=1'])
if len(piece) != min(chunk,size-index*chunk): raise ValueError('short archive chunk')
out.write(piece)
actual = hashlib.file_digest(destination.open('rb'),'sha256').hexdigest()
with destination.open('rb') as source:
actual = hashlib.file_digest(source,'sha256').hexdigest()
if actual != expected: raise ValueError('archive transfer mismatch')
validate_archive(destination)
finally:

View file

@ -154,9 +154,18 @@ LEVEL = Error
def main():
p=argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
p.add_argument('--archive',required=True,type=Path);p.add_argument('--receipt',required=True)
p.add_argument('--transfer-receipt',required=True,type=Path)
a=p.parse_args();receipt={'schema':'platform.forgejo-isolated-restore.v1','status':'failed','images':[FORGE,POSTGRES]}
fd=os.open(a.receipt,os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREAT|os.O_EXCL,0o600)
try: run(a.archive,receipt)
try:
transfer=json.loads(a.transfer_receipt.read_text())
if (transfer.get('status') != 'offsite_fetched_pending_isolated_restore'
or transfer.get('download_http_status') != 200
or transfer.get('plaintext_sha256') != file_digest(a.archive)):
raise ValueError('verified_offsite_provenance_required')
receipt['offsite_artifact']=transfer['artifact']
receipt['ciphertext_sha256']=transfer['ciphertext_sha256']
run(a.archive,receipt)
except Exception: receipt['error']='isolated_restore_failed'
finally:
with os.fdopen(fd,'w') as f: json.dump(receipt,f,indent=2)

View file

@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ def run(source, directory, receipt):
result = subprocess.run(['age','-d','-i','/dev/stdin',str(encrypted)],
input=(values['AGE_PRIVATE_KEY'].strip()+'\n').encode(), stdout=output, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, timeout=1200)
require(result.returncode == 0, 'offsite_decryption_failed')
receipt.update(decrypted=True, quota_after=quota(auth), status='offsite_fetched_pending_isolated_restore')
receipt.update(decrypted=True, plaintext_sha256=sha(plain), quota_after=quota(auth), status='offsite_fetched_pending_isolated_restore')
def main():