Prepare tenant-zero OpenBao roles and review platform essentials

Assistant: codex
Assistant-Model: gpt-6-astra
Assistant-Session: 01a0e324-abce-7e51-bb2b-496f097afdb0

docs/credential-lane-designs/secrets-engine-service-jwt.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # Secrets-engine service JWT login
 
-Status: proposed, not provisioned. Owner: railiance-platform, RPF-WP-0032.
+Status: proposed, not provisioned. Owner: railiance-platform, RPF-WP-0035-T02 (design origin RPF-WP-0032).
 Demand: State Hub message `38b47122-07eb-4a7f-a5df-13a38f50e110`.
 
 ## Contract and ownership
@@ -20,11 +20,11 @@ or the coding-agent mount to introduce this service.
 
 | Setting | Proposed value / evidence required |
 | --- | --- |
-| Verification | RS256 only; exact HTTPS issuer and approved discovery/JWKS URL, both pending KeyCape owner confirmation |
+| Verification | RS256 only; issuer `https://kc.coulomb.social`, JWKS `https://kc.coulomb.social/jwks`; public discovery rechecked 2026-09-27; live registration remains unverified |
 | Role type / user claim | `jwt` / `sub` |
 | Audience | `secrets-engine-openbao` |
 | Subject | `service:secrets-engine` |
-| Bound claims, string matching | `principal_type=service`, `tenant=tenant:coulomb`, required `roles=secrets-engine`, `scope=openbao:login` |
+| Bound claims, string matching | `principal_type=service`, `tenant=tenant:platform`, required `roles=secrets-engine`, `scope=openbao:login` |
 | Token policy | `secrets-engine-login-self` only; no default policy |
 | Token bounds | service token, TTL/max/explicit max `5m`, 8 uses, no periodic token; budget must include cleanup |
 | Logging | verbose OIDC logging disabled; no JWT claim dump or token/accessor in receipts |
@@ -96,3 +96,27 @@ OpenBao's [JWT documentation](https://openbao.org/docs/auth/jwt/) describes
 signature verification and claim binding; its [role API](https://openbao.org/docs/2.4.x/api/auth/jwt/)
 defines token TTL/use limits and the explicit maximum. These are mechanism
 references, not evidence of this cluster's installed configuration.
+
+## Prepared source return — 2026-09-27
+
+The exact proposed bundle is `openbao/auth/keycape-services-config.json`,
+`openbao/auth/secrets-engine-jwt-role.json` and
+`openbao/policies/secrets-engine-login-self.hcl`. These files are non-secret
+inputs for the existing attended platform procedure, not an applied receipt.
+The discovery document advertises `/token` and `client_credentials`.
+
+The operator clarified that platform infrastructure belongs to tenant zero,
+`tenant:platform`. Coulomb is a workload tenant; its DNS domain is not ownership.
+The former `tenant:coulomb` service registration and consumer preflight were
+consistent but incorrectly scoped. The corrected source uses `tenant:platform`
+for both OpenBao infrastructure clients and the existing approval clients.
+
+Before writing: survey mounts/roles, confirm exact live client registration and
+protected client-side custody, review this bundle and obtain the scoped attended
+window via `warden access openbao-platform-admin-login --exec -- <reviewed-command>`.
+Do not execute a placeholder command. The reviewed child must install only this
+isolated mount/config, self policy and role, compare effective policy metadata,
+then perform the positive/negative/expiry/use-limit/revocation checks above.
+Do not print login responses. Publish the consumer contract only after those
+checks pass. A conflicting existing mount/role requires review, not overwrite.
+No service-client secret is created, moved or requested by this source return.

docs/platform-tenant-essentials-review.md

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+# Platform essentials tenant review — 2026-09-27
+
+Operator requirement: `tenant:platform` is tenant zero for platform infrastructure.
+`tenant:coulomb` is a workload/product tenant. The shared `coulomb.social` DNS
+suffix does not establish tenant ownership. Provider ownership, caller identity,
+resource tenant and enforcement capability are separate facts.
+
+| Essential / boundary | Source reviewed | Result and action |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| OpenBao custody/provider | `tenancy.yaml`, `docs/tenancy-posture.md`, `openbao/auth/` | Platform-owned. Correct both infrastructure JWT roles to platform; retain exact audience/subject/scope and bounded policies. |
+| Platform coding agent | KeyCape service registration; `coding-agent-jwt-role.json` | Incorrect Coulomb claim corrected in both source owners. Existing workload read policy remains explicit; changing identity tenant grants no additional data access. |
+| Secrets Engine service login | KeyCape registration; consumer `service_auth.py`; proposed service role | Incorrect Coulomb claim corrected together to platform. Login-only self policy; no lane mutation privilege. |
+| Approval / informed decision / policy checks | KeyCape registrations; Secrets Engine approval and authorization profiles | Already platform-bound. Keep exact tenant comparison, distinct audiences/scopes and human controls. |
+| Audit senders | `docs/credential-lane-designs/factory-audit-senders-review.md`; Audit Core tenancy declaration | Factory senders already restricted to platform. Provider ownership does not relabel historical events or consumer tenants. |
+| KeyCape human directory fallback | KeyCape `token.go`, tenant claim contract | Still legacy `tenant:coulomb` when directory tenant is missing. Do not change the default to platform: that would implicitly elevate unclassified users. Explicit platform registration/directory binding remains necessary. |
+| Shared PostgreSQL / Forgejo database | `tenancy.yaml`, `docs/tenancy-posture.md`, rapp-postgres declarations | Platform provider ownership; consumers retain their databases and workload isolation. No tenant claim is implemented at the substrate by these declarations. |
+| OpenBao package | rapp-openbao YAML/JSON source review | No runtime tenant claim found in package declarations; package ownership and the auth role bindings above must not be inferred from ingress DNS. Absence of a claim is not live verification. |
+| Warden / Forgejo | Warden tenancy declaration; Forgejo YAML/JSON source review | Infrastructure belongs to platform. SSH, package and workload grants retain their explicit identities; do not replace Coulomb organization or KV path components with platform. |
+
+This is a bounded source review of the existing credential-chain dependencies,
+not a claim that every platform deployment has been audited. No live tenant
+migration, token issuance, value read or workload relocation was performed.
+The existing RPF-WP-0035-T02 owns the coordinated service-login return; existing
+KEY-WP-0009 contract and SECRETS-WP-0008-T06 carry provider/consumer changes.
+No new work item is opened.
+
+## Deployment and acceptance
+
+1. Inventory exact live KeyCape registrations and OpenBao mount/roles using
+   metadata-only, attended authority. Source files are not live-state receipts.
+2. Compare issuer, audience, subject, tenant, policies and aliases. Preserve
+   workload grants; do not introduce a tenant alias or accept both tenants.
+3. Coordinate issuance and verifier/consumer deployment. Old Coulomb-bound
+   platform JWTs must fail; new platform-bound JWTs must succeed. Rollback is
+   an explicit coordinated restoration, never a fallback to another identity.
+4. Already-issued OpenBao tokens do not change tenant/policies when a JWT role
+   changes. Revoke affected tokens under owner custody and verify denial. Bound
+   the remaining JWT and token lifetimes; retain only non-secret results.
+5. Prove wrong-tenant/audience/subject/scope refusal, exact effective policies,
+   expiry/use limits and self-revocation before publishing the consumer contract.
+
+Tenant ownership does not raise the historical I/A/E/R/V posture scores. The
+posture records describe demonstrated isolation/recovery, not the owner tenant.

docs/tenancy-posture.md

@@ -256,3 +256,12 @@ renumbered.
 Six months, or on any of: a service moving placement level, a backup target
 becoming available, or the framework reaching `accepted`. Next review due
 **2027-02-17**.
+
+## Platform ownership clarification — 2026-09-27
+
+All infrastructure providers in this declaration belong to `tenant:platform`
+(tenant zero), including OpenBao, shared PostgreSQL and Forgejo's database.
+Coulomb is a workload tenant; DNS under `coulomb.social` does not assign these
+providers to it. Provider ownership is separate from the measured tenancy
+posture axes and from each credential or database consumer's resource tenant.
+See [the source review and migration requirements](platform-tenant-essentials-review.md).

openbao/auth/coding-agent-jwt-role.json

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
   "bound_claims": {
     "sub": "service:codex:railiance-platform",
     "principal_type": "service",
-    "tenant": "tenant:coulomb",
+    "tenant": "tenant:platform",
     "roles": "coding-agent"
   },
   "token_policies": [

openbao/auth/keycape-services-config.json

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+{
+  "jwks_url": "https://kc.coulomb.social/jwks",
+  "bound_issuer": "https://kc.coulomb.social",
+  "jwt_supported_algs": [
+    "RS256"
+  ]
+}

openbao/auth/secrets-engine-jwt-role.json

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+{
+  "role_type": "jwt",
+  "user_claim": "sub",
+  "bound_audiences": [
+    "secrets-engine-openbao"
+  ],
+  "bound_subject": "service:secrets-engine",
+  "bound_claims_type": "string",
+  "bound_claims": {
+    "principal_type": "service",
+    "tenant": "tenant:platform",
+    "roles": "secrets-engine",
+    "scope": "openbao:login"
+  },
+  "token_policies": [
+    "secrets-engine-login-self"
+  ],
+  "token_no_default_policy": true,
+  "token_type": "service",
+  "token_ttl": "5m",
+  "token_max_ttl": "5m",
+  "token_explicit_max_ttl": "5m",
+  "token_num_uses": 8,
+  "verbose_oidc_logging": false
+}

openbao/policies/secrets-engine-login-self.hcl

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# RPF-WP-0035-T02: proposed login-only service policy; not a lane applier.
+path "auth/token/lookup-self" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}
+path "sys/capabilities-self" {
+  capabilities = ["update"]
+}
+path "auth/token/revoke-self" {
+  capabilities = ["update"]
+}

tests/test_credential_change.py

@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ class CredentialChangeTests(unittest.TestCase):
             {
                 "sub": "service:codex:railiance-platform",
                 "principal_type": "service",
-                "tenant": "tenant:coulomb",
+                "tenant": "tenant:platform",
                 "roles": "coding-agent",
             },
         )

tests/test_secrets_engine_jwt_contract.py

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+"""Source safety bounds; live JWT verification remains attended acceptance."""
+import json
+import re
+import unittest
+from pathlib import Path
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+
+class ServiceJWTContract(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_platform_identity_is_exact_and_cannot_be_an_applier(self):
+        role = json.loads((ROOT / "openbao/auth/secrets-engine-jwt-role.json").read_text())
+        self.assertEqual(role["bound_audiences"], ["secrets-engine-openbao"])
+        self.assertEqual(role["bound_subject"], "service:secrets-engine")
+        self.assertEqual(role["bound_claims"], dict(principal_type="service", tenant="tenant:platform", roles="secrets-engine", scope="openbao:login"))
+        self.assertEqual(role["bound_claims_type"], "string")
+        self.assertEqual(role["token_policies"], ["secrets-engine-login-self"])
+        self.assertTrue(role["token_no_default_policy"])
+        self.assertFalse(role["verbose_oidc_logging"])
+        self.assertEqual(role["token_type"], "service")
+        self.assertEqual(role["token_num_uses"], 8)
+        for key in ("token_ttl", "token_max_ttl", "token_explicit_max_ttl"):
+            self.assertEqual(role[key], "5m")
+        self.assertNotIn("token_period", role)
+
+    def test_only_self_endpoints_and_pinned_signature_verifier(self):
+        policy = (ROOT / "openbao/policies/secrets-engine-login-self.hcl").read_text()
+        grants = re.findall(r'path "([^"]+)"\s*{\s*capabilities = \["([^"]+)"\]', policy)
+        self.assertEqual(grants, [("auth/token/lookup-self", "read"), ("sys/capabilities-self", "update"), ("auth/token/revoke-self", "update")])
+        self.assertNotIn("*", policy)
+        config = json.loads((ROOT / "openbao/auth/keycape-services-config.json").read_text())
+        self.assertEqual(config, dict(jwks_url="https://kc.coulomb.social/jwks", bound_issuer="https://kc.coulomb.social", jwt_supported_algs=["RS256"]))

workplans/RPF-WP-0035-credential-lane-implementation.md

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ status: blocked
 flavor: implementation
 owner: codex
 created: "2026-09-05"
-updated: "2026-09-15"
+updated: "2026-09-27"
 related:
   - RPF-WP-0032
   - RPF-WP-0033
@@ -56,8 +56,9 @@ and a metadata-only custody receipt. KeyCape owns issuer/JWKS and service
 registration (KEY-WP-0009); secrets-engine owns service authentication and
 authority consumption (SECRETS-WP-0008-T06, SECRETS-WP-0007-T04).
 
-**Unblock:** confirmed HTTPS issuer/JWKS, exact claims and audience, consumer
+**Unblock:** live registration and protected client custody, reviewed exact source
-readiness, approved source and attended apply authority. A service login does
+and attended apply authority. Issuer/JWKS and consumer source claims now agree;
+see the 2026-09-27 return below. A service login does
 not grant lane mutation authority. Do not build another identity provider or
 lifecycle engine here.
 
@@ -276,15 +277,16 @@ governed lane is the live consumer. Do not wrap `secret/coulomb/whynot-design/np
 in a CCR. Value remains unread. Platform will ask secrets-engine which path
 publish actually reads before any attended destroy.
 
-**Unblock:** secrets-engine confirms which location their publish actually reads
+**Unblock:** admit the governed exact-path AppRole policy and coordinated catalog
-and whether the two hold the same value; the owner of the legacy path is
+path/field migration under SECRETS-WP-0006-T06; prove native delivery from the
-identified; and a metadata-or-field-name read of the legacy path is admitted so
+governed lane before the attended legacy destroy. secrets-engine confirmed the
-the duplicate can be characterised without reading its value.
+legacy source path on 2026-09-21 (message `355424d4-17ab-435e-9e1d-6921775cb4a2`).
+No comparison of values, fingerprints, lengths or shapes is needed or authorized.
 
 **Done when:** the legacy path's provenance and consumer are established, the
 governed lane is confirmed as the one in use or the consumer is moved to it as a
-reviewed lane change, the duplicate is destroyed or brought under a CCR with an
+reviewed lane change, the duplicate is destroyed under the September 15 operator decision and the
-owner, and the disposition is recorded. If the value proves to be live and
+disposition is recorded. Do not bring the legacy duplicate under a CCR. If the value proves to be live and
 ungoverned, treat it as an exposure with the same custody rules as RPF-WP-0027:
 never record the value, fingerprint, length or shape.
 
@@ -679,3 +681,18 @@ verify and exec using scoped attended authority, and capture native denial,
 revocation, workload health and key-check evidence. No OpenRouter credential has
 been read and no inference or spend was performed. T03 remains waiting; this
 entry supersedes earlier statements that requester or group admission is missing.
+
+### 2026-09-27 T02/T07 source follow-up
+
+T02 now has the exact proposed RS256 configuration, bounded JWT role and
+self-only policy in `openbao/`. Operator correction: platform infrastructure
+belongs to `tenant:platform`; KeyCape registration and consumer preflight are
+corrected together. Existing live registrations must be migrated and verified.
+Public discovery confirms issuer/JWKS/token endpoint. Registration/custody,
+attended provisioning and live rejection/cleanup evidence remain required;
+T02 stays wait. No service credential or backend entitlement was issued.
+
+T07 consumed the confirmed legacy consumer return. The stale value-comparison
+ask is removed. WARDEN-WP-0037-T03's no-rotation hold stays in force until the
+governed native migration is evidenced. Legacy destruction follows migration;
+neither source reconciliation nor the historical pilot is that evidence.