Record operator approval of the two factory audit sender lanes
Assistant: codex Assistant-Model: gpt-6-astra Assistant-Session: 01a07ff8-19d0-7820-b4d0-1353833cb7fc
This commit is contained in:
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6 changed files with 155 additions and 106 deletions
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@ -3,29 +3,38 @@ kind: credential-change-request
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schema_version: 1
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request_type: workload-kv-read
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title: approval-engine load-bearing audit sender custody and delivery
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status: proposed
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status: approved
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created: '2026-09-11'
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updated: '2026-09-11'
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requester:
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agent: codex
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reason: AUDIT-WP-0009-T09 and HFACT-WP-0001-T03 require the existing exact sender declaration. This
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request supplies the missing platform custody and ESO delivery; receiver compatibility and service
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rollout remain explicit gates.
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reason: AUDIT-WP-0009-T09 and HFACT-WP-0001-T03 require the existing exact sender
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declaration. This request supplies the missing platform custody and ESO delivery;
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receiver compatibility and service rollout remain explicit gates.
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review:
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required: true
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required_approvers:
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- platform-operator
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- audit-core-owner
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- approval-engine-owner
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comments: []
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comments:
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- at: '2026-09-11T04:36:46+00:00'
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reviewer: user (platform-operator, audit-core-owner, approval-engine-owner)
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decision: approved
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comment: User replied "good, go on" on 2026-09-11 to the explicit approval question
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for CCR-2026-0021 and CCR-2026-0022 as platform operator and owner of Audit
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Core, Approval Engine, and Informed Decision. Record this as approval of the
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reviewed exact sender lane. Compatible receiver, namespace readiness, attended
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custody and native verification remain prerequisites; no factory execution or
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broader grant is admitted.
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target:
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domain: financials
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tenant: platform
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workload: approval-engine
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environment: production
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purpose: Provide only the approval-engine sender with source=approval-engine, tenants=[tenant:platform],
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may_write=true, may_read=false, evidence_kind=load-bearing, secret_policy=redact. Preserve the
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existing receiver registry and every other sender.
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may_write=true, may_read=false, evidence_kind=load-bearing, secret_policy=redact.
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Preserve the existing receiver registry and every other sender.
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openbao:
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mount: platform
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kv_path: platform/workloads/approval-engine/audit-sender
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@ -55,56 +64,64 @@ access_frontdoor:
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resolvable: false
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delivery:
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surface: external-secrets
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target: 'ClusterSecretStore openbao-approval-engine-audit restricted to namespace approval-engine;
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ExternalSecret and Secret approval-engine/approval-engine-audit, key audit-token. Source: manifests/factory-audit-senders.yaml.
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A missing namespace stays a workload-owner prerequisite; this packet creates none.'
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target: 'ClusterSecretStore openbao-approval-engine-audit restricted to namespace
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approval-engine; ExternalSecret and Secret approval-engine/approval-engine-audit,
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key audit-token. Source: manifests/factory-audit-senders.yaml. A missing namespace
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stays a workload-owner prerequisite; this packet creates none.'
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risk:
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classification: high
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notes:
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- A bearer permits append for its exact sender and tenant, never reading or changing stored evidence.
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- The registry update reads existing sender credentials inside the attended platform process only.
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No registry is delivered to a producer.
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- OpenBao login TTL limits the ESO reader session, not the audit bearer. Revocation must remove
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the sender token from the receiver registry and prove refusal.
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- New paths extend the existing coding-agent deny boundary. No existing high-risk grant is widened.
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- A bearer permits append for its exact sender and tenant, never reading or changing
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stored evidence.
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- The registry update reads existing sender credentials inside the attended platform
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process only. No registry is delivered to a producer.
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- OpenBao login TTL limits the ESO reader session, not the audit bearer. Revocation
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must remove the sender token from the receiver registry and prove refusal.
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- New paths extend the existing coding-agent deny boundary. No existing high-risk
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grant is widened.
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verification:
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positive:
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- Independent CAS=0 token creation and exact sender merge with registry-version compare-and-set;
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repeated runs preserve both tokens and other registry fields.
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- ESO delivers only AUDIT_TOKEN into approval-engine/approval-engine-audit:audit-token; source and
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receiver copies agree without displaying values.
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- Compatible deployed receiver accepts and deduplicates a declared synthetic event for the exact
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sender and tenant, retaining load-bearing/redact declarations.
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- Independent CAS=0 token creation and exact sender merge with registry-version
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compare-and-set; repeated runs preserve both tokens and other registry fields.
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- ESO delivers only AUDIT_TOKEN into approval-engine/approval-engine-audit:audit-token;
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source and receiver copies agree without displaying values.
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- Compatible deployed receiver accepts and deduplicates a declared synthetic event
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for the exact sender and tenant, retaining load-bearing/redact declarations.
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negative:
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- Sibling sender path, full registry and parent listing are denied to each workload reader. Wrong
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service account/namespace and disallowed store namespace fail.
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- Receiver denies sibling source, wrong tenant, every read route and revoked token. No existing
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sender is removed or re-scoped.
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- Proposed or altered CCR, legacy receiver, malformed/duplicate registry identity, token collision,
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stale registry version or partial/conflicting custody refuses without overwriting.
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- Sibling sender path, full registry and parent listing are denied to each workload
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reader. Wrong service account/namespace and disallowed store namespace fail.
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- Receiver denies sibling source, wrong tenant, every read route and revoked token.
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No existing sender is removed or re-scoped.
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- Proposed or altered CCR, legacy receiver, malformed/duplicate registry identity,
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token collision, stale registry version or partial/conflicting custody refuses
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without overwriting.
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activation_conditions:
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- All three named owner reviews are approved before any native credential mutation.
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- A current image supporting evidence_kind is published/admitted by audit-core and deployed with
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its source scope and network policy; current c2fe39a image fails compatibility.
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- Use the Warden attended platform-admin login envelope; preserve independent receipt and revoke
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the session on exit.
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- Apply reviewed policy/auth metadata and ESO projection only after receiver compatibility and namespace
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readiness. An interrupted seed resumes from durable KV values, never blindly rotates or deletes.
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- Record native positive/negative evidence before declaring verified or active. Custody alone does
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not admit UI, human approval or factory execution.
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- A current image supporting evidence_kind is published/admitted by audit-core and
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deployed with its source scope and network policy; current c2fe39a image fails
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compatibility.
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- Use the Warden attended platform-admin login envelope; preserve independent receipt
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and revoke the session on exit.
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- Apply reviewed policy/auth metadata and ESO projection only after receiver compatibility
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and namespace readiness. An interrupted seed resumes from durable KV values, never
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blindly rotates or deletes.
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- Record native positive/negative evidence before declaring verified or active.
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Custody alone does not admit UI, human approval or factory execution.
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lifecycle:
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deactivate: Stop the exact producer; remove only its admitted token from the registry using CAS
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and reload/verify receiver refusal. Then detach its reader policy and remove its ExternalSecret/projection,
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retaining KV versions for investigation. Do not delete audit events or other sender entries.
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rotate: 'Reviewed overlap-first rotation: append a replacement to this sender only, deliver it,
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prove acceptance, then remove the predecessor and prove refusal. The first-provision helper refuses
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rotation and unexpected existing values.'
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compromised: Stop affected producer and revoke the exact receiver token first; inspect affected
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source/tenant events, rotate through a separate reviewed action, and preserve the independent
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audit trail.
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deactivate: Stop the exact producer; remove only its admitted token from the registry
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using CAS and reload/verify receiver refusal. Then detach its reader policy and
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remove its ExternalSecret/projection, retaining KV versions for investigation.
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Do not delete audit events or other sender entries.
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rotate: 'Reviewed overlap-first rotation: append a replacement to this sender only,
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deliver it, prove acceptance, then remove the predecessor and prove refusal. The
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first-provision helper refuses rotation and unexpected existing values.'
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compromised: Stop affected producer and revoke the exact receiver token first; inspect
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affected source/tenant events, rotate through a separate reviewed action, and
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preserve the independent audit trail.
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state_hub:
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workplan_id: RPF-WP-0035
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task_id: RPF-WP-0035-T08
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related_workplan: AUDIT-WP-0009-T09
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decision_id: 2c9fe9f0-034a-41d7-9d49-b99df488fdc8
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decision_api_url: http://127.0.0.1:8000/decisions/2c9fe9f0-034a-41d7-9d49-b99df488fdc8
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decision_resolved_at: '2026-09-11T04:36:46.312720Z'
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@ -3,29 +3,39 @@ kind: credential-change-request
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schema_version: 1
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request_type: workload-kv-read
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title: informed-decision load-bearing audit sender custody and delivery
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status: proposed
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status: approved
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created: '2026-09-11'
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updated: '2026-09-11'
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requester:
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agent: codex
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reason: AUDIT-WP-0009-T11 and HFACT-WP-0001-T03 require the existing exact sender declaration. This
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request supplies the missing platform custody and ESO delivery; receiver compatibility and service
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rollout remain explicit gates.
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reason: AUDIT-WP-0009-T11 and HFACT-WP-0001-T03 require the existing exact sender
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declaration. This request supplies the missing platform custody and ESO delivery;
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receiver compatibility and service rollout remain explicit gates.
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review:
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required: true
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required_approvers:
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- platform-operator
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- audit-core-owner
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- informed-decision-owner
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comments: []
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comments:
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- at: '2026-09-11T04:36:46+00:00'
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reviewer: user (platform-operator, audit-core-owner, informed-decision-owner)
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decision: approved
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comment: User replied "good, go on" on 2026-09-11 to the explicit approval question
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for CCR-2026-0021 and CCR-2026-0022 as platform operator and owner of Audit
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Core, Approval Engine, and Informed Decision. Record this as approval of the
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reviewed exact sender lane. Compatible receiver, namespace readiness, attended
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custody and native verification remain prerequisites; no factory execution or
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broader grant is admitted.
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target:
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domain: financials
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tenant: platform
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workload: informed-decision
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environment: production
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purpose: Provide only the informed-decision sender with source=informed-decision, tenants=[tenant:platform],
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may_write=true, may_read=false, evidence_kind=load-bearing, secret_policy=redact. Preserve the
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existing receiver registry and every other sender.
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purpose: Provide only the informed-decision sender with source=informed-decision,
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tenants=[tenant:platform], may_write=true, may_read=false, evidence_kind=load-bearing,
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secret_policy=redact. Preserve the existing receiver registry and every other
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sender.
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openbao:
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mount: platform
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kv_path: platform/workloads/informed-decision/audit-sender
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@ -55,56 +65,64 @@ access_frontdoor:
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resolvable: false
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delivery:
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surface: external-secrets
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target: 'ClusterSecretStore openbao-informed-decision-audit restricted to namespace informed-decision;
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ExternalSecret and Secret informed-decision/informed-decision-audit, key token. Source: manifests/factory-audit-senders.yaml.
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A missing namespace stays a workload-owner prerequisite; this packet creates none.'
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target: 'ClusterSecretStore openbao-informed-decision-audit restricted to namespace
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informed-decision; ExternalSecret and Secret informed-decision/informed-decision-audit,
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key token. Source: manifests/factory-audit-senders.yaml. A missing namespace stays
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a workload-owner prerequisite; this packet creates none.'
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risk:
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classification: high
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notes:
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- A bearer permits append for its exact sender and tenant, never reading or changing stored evidence.
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- The registry update reads existing sender credentials inside the attended platform process only.
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No registry is delivered to a producer.
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- OpenBao login TTL limits the ESO reader session, not the audit bearer. Revocation must remove
|
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the sender token from the receiver registry and prove refusal.
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- New paths extend the existing coding-agent deny boundary. No existing high-risk grant is widened.
|
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- A bearer permits append for its exact sender and tenant, never reading or changing
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stored evidence.
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- The registry update reads existing sender credentials inside the attended platform
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process only. No registry is delivered to a producer.
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- OpenBao login TTL limits the ESO reader session, not the audit bearer. Revocation
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must remove the sender token from the receiver registry and prove refusal.
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- New paths extend the existing coding-agent deny boundary. No existing high-risk
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grant is widened.
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verification:
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positive:
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- Independent CAS=0 token creation and exact sender merge with registry-version compare-and-set;
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repeated runs preserve both tokens and other registry fields.
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- ESO delivers only AUDIT_TOKEN into informed-decision/informed-decision-audit:token; source and
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receiver copies agree without displaying values.
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- Compatible deployed receiver accepts and deduplicates a declared synthetic event for the exact
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sender and tenant, retaining load-bearing/redact declarations.
|
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- Independent CAS=0 token creation and exact sender merge with registry-version
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compare-and-set; repeated runs preserve both tokens and other registry fields.
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- ESO delivers only AUDIT_TOKEN into informed-decision/informed-decision-audit:token;
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source and receiver copies agree without displaying values.
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- Compatible deployed receiver accepts and deduplicates a declared synthetic event
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for the exact sender and tenant, retaining load-bearing/redact declarations.
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negative:
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- Sibling sender path, full registry and parent listing are denied to each workload reader. Wrong
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service account/namespace and disallowed store namespace fail.
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- Receiver denies sibling source, wrong tenant, every read route and revoked token. No existing
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sender is removed or re-scoped.
|
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- Proposed or altered CCR, legacy receiver, malformed/duplicate registry identity, token collision,
|
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stale registry version or partial/conflicting custody refuses without overwriting.
|
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- Sibling sender path, full registry and parent listing are denied to each workload
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reader. Wrong service account/namespace and disallowed store namespace fail.
|
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- Receiver denies sibling source, wrong tenant, every read route and revoked token.
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No existing sender is removed or re-scoped.
|
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- Proposed or altered CCR, legacy receiver, malformed/duplicate registry identity,
|
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token collision, stale registry version or partial/conflicting custody refuses
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without overwriting.
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activation_conditions:
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- All three named owner reviews are approved before any native credential mutation.
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- A current image supporting evidence_kind is published/admitted by audit-core and deployed with
|
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its source scope and network policy; current c2fe39a image fails compatibility.
|
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- Use the Warden attended platform-admin login envelope; preserve independent receipt and revoke
|
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the session on exit.
|
||||
- Apply reviewed policy/auth metadata and ESO projection only after receiver compatibility and namespace
|
||||
readiness. An interrupted seed resumes from durable KV values, never blindly rotates or deletes.
|
||||
- Record native positive/negative evidence before declaring verified or active. Custody alone does
|
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not admit UI, human approval or factory execution.
|
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- A current image supporting evidence_kind is published/admitted by audit-core and
|
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deployed with its source scope and network policy; current c2fe39a image fails
|
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compatibility.
|
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- Use the Warden attended platform-admin login envelope; preserve independent receipt
|
||||
and revoke the session on exit.
|
||||
- Apply reviewed policy/auth metadata and ESO projection only after receiver compatibility
|
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and namespace readiness. An interrupted seed resumes from durable KV values, never
|
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blindly rotates or deletes.
|
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- Record native positive/negative evidence before declaring verified or active.
|
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Custody alone does not admit UI, human approval or factory execution.
|
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lifecycle:
|
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deactivate: Stop the exact producer; remove only its admitted token from the registry using CAS
|
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and reload/verify receiver refusal. Then detach its reader policy and remove its ExternalSecret/projection,
|
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retaining KV versions for investigation. Do not delete audit events or other sender entries.
|
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rotate: 'Reviewed overlap-first rotation: append a replacement to this sender only, deliver it,
|
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prove acceptance, then remove the predecessor and prove refusal. The first-provision helper refuses
|
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rotation and unexpected existing values.'
|
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compromised: Stop affected producer and revoke the exact receiver token first; inspect affected
|
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source/tenant events, rotate through a separate reviewed action, and preserve the independent
|
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audit trail.
|
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deactivate: Stop the exact producer; remove only its admitted token from the registry
|
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using CAS and reload/verify receiver refusal. Then detach its reader policy and
|
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remove its ExternalSecret/projection, retaining KV versions for investigation.
|
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Do not delete audit events or other sender entries.
|
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rotate: 'Reviewed overlap-first rotation: append a replacement to this sender only,
|
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deliver it, prove acceptance, then remove the predecessor and prove refusal. The
|
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first-provision helper refuses rotation and unexpected existing values.'
|
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compromised: Stop affected producer and revoke the exact receiver token first; inspect
|
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affected source/tenant events, rotate through a separate reviewed action, and
|
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preserve the independent audit trail.
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state_hub:
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workplan_id: RPF-WP-0035
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task_id: RPF-WP-0035-T08
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related_workplan: AUDIT-WP-0009-T11
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decision_id: ee4ff001-256a-4406-9cb8-51be2cd5d31b
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decision_api_url: http://127.0.0.1:8000/decisions/ee4ff001-256a-4406-9cb8-51be2cd5d31b
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decision_resolved_at: '2026-09-11T04:36:46.480026Z'
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@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
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# Factory audit senders: concrete custody review
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CCR-2026-0021 and CCR-2026-0022 are **proposed**. RPF-WP-0035-T08 owns the
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platform work; AUDIT-WP-0009-T09/T11 retain receiver admission. This packet
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requires the named platform operator, Audit Core owner and each producer owner
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to approve its request before native credential mutation.
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CCR-2026-0021 and CCR-2026-0022 are **approved** by the user on 2026-09-11,
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replying "good, go on" to the explicit question naming the platform operator,
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Audit Core owner, and each producer owner. The source review comments and the
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two existing State Hub decisions record that approval. RPF-WP-0035-T08 owns
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platform execution; AUDIT-WP-0009-T09/T11 retain receiver admission. Approval
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alone does not mark custody delivered or either producer admitted.
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## Scope to approve
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## Approved scope
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| Request | Producer / exact source | OpenBao path | Producer Secret / key |
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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
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@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ log in to the reader role (15-minute session). Neither producer can read the
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full sender registry or its sibling's token. The coding-agent boundary gains
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exact denies on the two new data/metadata paths; existing rules are preserved.
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The approved first-provision operation would generate two independent values
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The approved first-provision operation generates two independent values
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in the attended platform process, store them with CAS=0, and append the exact
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identities to `platform/workloads/audit-core/senders` with compare-and-set on
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its observed KV version. That process necessarily reads the existing registry
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@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
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# CCR-2026-0021/0022. Review only; no credentials or namespaces.
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# CCR-2026-0021/0022 approved 2026-09-11; no credentials or namespaces.
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apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
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kind: ClusterSecretStore
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metadata:
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name: openbao-approval-engine-audit
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annotations:
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railiance.io/credential-change: CCR-2026-0021
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railiance.io/admission: proposed
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railiance.io/admission: approved
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spec:
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provider:
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vault:
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@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ metadata:
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namespace: approval-engine
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annotations:
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railiance.io/credential-change: CCR-2026-0021
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railiance.io/admission: proposed
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railiance.io/admission: approved
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spec:
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refreshInterval: 5m
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secretStoreRef:
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@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ metadata:
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name: openbao-informed-decision-audit
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annotations:
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railiance.io/credential-change: CCR-2026-0022
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railiance.io/admission: proposed
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railiance.io/admission: approved
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spec:
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provider:
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vault:
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@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ metadata:
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namespace: informed-decision
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annotations:
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railiance.io/credential-change: CCR-2026-0022
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railiance.io/admission: proposed
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railiance.io/admission: approved
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spec:
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refreshInterval: 5m
|
||||
secretStoreRef:
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -22,7 +22,11 @@ import factory_audit_custody as lane
|
|||
class Contracts(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_proposed_requests_cannot_seed(self):
|
||||
self.assertEqual(len(lane.contracts()),2)
|
||||
with patch.object(lane,'bao',side_effect=AssertionError('must not contact Bao')):
|
||||
module=lane.credential_module(); original=module.validate_ccr
|
||||
def proposed(path):
|
||||
c,errors,warnings=original(path); c=copy.deepcopy(c); c['status']='proposed'
|
||||
return c,errors,warnings
|
||||
with patch.object(module,'validate_ccr',side_effect=proposed), patch.object(lane,'credential_module',return_value=module), patch.object(lane,'bao',side_effect=AssertionError('must not contact Bao')):
|
||||
with self.assertRaisesRegex(lane.LaneError,'approved_ccrs_required'):
|
||||
lane.contracts(approved=True)
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -407,11 +407,11 @@ state_hub_task_id: "0ef52c26-2669-5cd1-8149-b1f6fcdda6cb"
|
|||
|
||||
Consume AUDIT-WP-0009-T09/T11's exact declarations for approval-engine and
|
||||
informed-decision: tenant:platform, write-only, load-bearing, redact. Source
|
||||
preparation supplies two proposed CCRs, independent exact-path policies/ESO
|
||||
preparation supplies two approved CCRs, independent exact-path policies/ESO
|
||||
projections, and the attended `factory_audit_custody.py` first-provision helper.
|
||||
Its CAS and request-provenance checks preserve unrelated senders and recover
|
||||
interrupted writes without generating replacements. Native reviews and
|
||||
provision/delivery/receiver-ingestion acceptance remain open.
|
||||
interrupted writes without generating replacements. The user approved all named review roles on 2026-09-11. Native
|
||||
provision/delivery/receiver-ingestion acceptance remains open.
|
||||
|
||||
The 2026-09-11 native read-only check found an additional deployment dependency:
|
||||
receiver image c2fe39a is 1/1 Ready but does not support evidence_kind. The
|
||||
|
|
@ -473,3 +473,11 @@ T05 remains wait: both CCRs are still proposed, the actual upstream ID-token
|
|||
issuer precondition remains open, and no verifier-side credential is provisioned.
|
||||
Client-side retrieval and audit-sender custody are still separate owner returns.
|
||||
The capability receipt is not a review approval or service readiness proof.
|
||||
|
||||
### Sender approval recorded — 2026-09-11
|
||||
|
||||
The user replied "good, go on" to the explicit CCR-2026-0021/0022 question naming
|
||||
platform-operator, audit-core-owner and both producer owners. Both exact requests
|
||||
are approved; their existing State Hub decisions are resolved. This clears the
|
||||
review request only. Receiver rollout, namespace readiness, attended custody and
|
||||
positive/negative native evidence remain the execution gates.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue