Record KeyCape exposure owner receipts
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Assistant: codex
Assistant-Model: gpt-5.6-sol
Assistant-Session: 01a02e56-e4ad-71a2-b3e2-b6193e0d8093
This commit is contained in:
codex 2026-08-23 14:37:36 +02:00
parent d18649fc6e
commit 7ce3bc8380
2 changed files with 23 additions and 6 deletions

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@ -62,6 +62,19 @@ Recheck these fields before a window using metadata-only columns and public
OIDC endpoints. A changed UID, resource version, source revision, image, or
JWKS digest invalidates the prepared approval receipt and requires review.
## Owner receipt update (2026-08-23)
KeyCape reports that its emergency signing-key rotation completed with
deliberate JWT invalidation; consumers must refresh JWKS/re-authenticate. The
receipt contains no secret values, but it does not yet identify the reviewed
non-secret client-config revision or the post-rotation public JWKS digest.
NetKingdom published the value-safe dependency and provider sequence at
`c24d67b`, noting that the LLDAP admin account is persistent and that the
privacyIDEA admin token is an expiring session JWT without individual
revocation. Use expiry-based predecessor denial unless a separate global
signing-secret invalidation is explicitly approved. These acknowledgements do
not constitute a live GO; the approval template remains pending.
## Ownership
| Boundary | Owner | Required contribution |
@ -174,4 +187,3 @@ provider access, unsafe helper output, an unverified cleanup trap, or no exact
human GO. Abort forward after mutation on failed readiness, missing negative
proof, an unexpected JWKS result, any captured value, or elapsed window. The
abort operator may stop the sequence at any time.