Separate signer runtime storage review from GitOps ownership
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Assistant: codex
Assistant-Model: gpt-6-astra
Assistant-Session: 01a140c4-354a-7823-8f0d-8f717397f786
This commit is contained in:
codex 2026-10-16 20:26:28 +02:00
parent a3e8eb64ba
commit 84c529f239
6 changed files with 79 additions and 15 deletions

View file

@ -185,3 +185,21 @@ refresh after OIDC, reinterpret expiry as start-only, widen120seconds, skip
reviews or start a general window-grant service. An alternative authority/window
contract would itself require separate owner/founder design and is not supplied
by R2. Current native admission remains unapproved.
## R3 precise owner review boundary
The native review slot is now `cluster-runtime-storage-owner`, held by
railiance-cluster for runtime/storage/headroom only. The previous
`cluster-gitops-owner` slot conflated separate authorities and is rejected;
no historic review is reinterpreted as a combined assent. Platform's existing
review covers its custody/read lane and existing GitOps Applications/freeze
integration. Access retains workload/release/Helm-values and signer/outbox
ownership. Enablement review is needed only when the action actually changes
ArgoCD installation/controller configuration; this action does not authorize
that. Changed scope requires a separate exact revision and any affected owner.
This is a source-schema correction, not a new approval. Existing R1/R2 source
reviews and P1/P2 packets remain frozen. A successor packet must pin the new
executor/source-bundle/plan/CCR hashes and collect five exact fresh dispositions
under the corrected role set. Admission-file digest approval and CCR
approved/binding-confirmed status/native checks remain unchanged.

View file

@ -67,11 +67,11 @@
"Verify deployment spec replicas0, observed generation caught up, no live or terminating owned ReplicaSet/pods, no matching signer-SA pods and no HPA targeting deployment.",
"Reject a differing/previously existing KV entry at bootstrap. Hold exclusive owner action receipt lock and recheck fence immediately before CAS."
],
"after_cas": "Keep consumers/signer stopped until independent public admission and exact ESO/readback/source/image verification. Recreate1 is Access-owned; any drift or uncertain outcome keeps fence closed. Access reports current outbox lacks OS process lock, byte ceiling and bounded startup/compaction; Recreate1 alone is not bounded durable acceptance. Keep protected acceptance closed until reviewed source hardening or explicit bounded attended fixture disposition.",
"concurrency": "Single attended owner window/exclusive receipt; GitOps/Helm autosync/other writers must be paused by Access/cluster owner under distinct reviewed action. Plan is not a Kubernetes atomic fence or same-UID isolation."
"after_cas": "Keep consumers/signer stopped until independent public admission and exact ESO/readback/source/image verification. Access published source Git revision 84c78e072c8f3daf2bc3b90f8efc8fbeb16c3cf0 with OS process lock,64MiB capacity/startup bounds and ordinary CI402 success, immutable OCI reference forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/flex-auth@sha256:09a83b273740133518cc7e7915fb211381e06545d347d2dd1974042525ac981f. This supplies reviewed-source/publication evidence, not native mounted-runtime/durable-record acceptance. Access owns Recreate1 activation; actual stopped fence, single writer, PV retention and protected consumer acceptance remain open.",
"concurrency": "Single attended owner window/exclusive receipt; Access owns workload/Helm release and freeze of competing workload writers; Platform owns existing GitOps Applications and sync/freeze integration; cluster owner reviews runtime/storage/headroom only. Enablement reviews actual ArgoCD installation/controller configuration changes only, which this action excludes. Actual competing creator IDs/revisions and stopped signer fence need separately reviewed authenticated observations. Plan is not a Kubernetes atomic fence or same-UID isolation."
},
"protected_adapter": {
"state": "implementation/independent tests still required before executable approval; fixture code must never be promoted by removing its dev-process check",
"state": "Native adapter bootstrap/phase-aware read-only recovery source implemented and tested at published Platform a3e8eb64bae110393ba0aeab043de03a92b8421a; owner-boundary source R3/R4 is a successor exact review revision, not a native execution approval. Exact source/CCR, distinct owner/founder dispositions, entity/window/expiry and actual backend/fence remain mandatory. Fixture dev-process gate remains preserved.",
"reuse": [
"scripts/state_hub_preflight_lane.py attended silent child/cluster/platform-admin/fencing patterns",
"scripts/flex_auth_signer_custody.py protected Ed25519 CAS/readback and receipt state machine",
@ -115,9 +115,9 @@
"requested_scope": {
"read_lane": "Exact CCR0050 policy/role/delivery source only after separate founder review. No extra ESO RBAC permitted.",
"custody_writer": "One attended exact-target CAS0 plus fixed KV metadata setup/readback; no standing writer grant or broker role. This authority is separate from read CCR.",
"kubernetes": "Metadata-only fence observations by child; Access/cluster separately approve stop/restart/delivery manifests and sync control.",
"kubernetes": "Metadata-only fence observations by child; Access separately reviews workload/Helm stop/restart/delivery; Platform owns GitOps Application sync/freeze integration; cluster owner reviews runtime/storage/headroom/PV retention; no ArgoCD installation/controller configuration mutation included.",
"new_infrastructure_spend_eur": 0,
"new_resources": "Platform creates no storage resources. Access reports zero flex-auth PVCs; Access proposes separate exact new flex-auth-secrets-engine-outbox1Gi local-path Helmkeep. Provisioning, PV reclaim/Delete/WaitForFirstConsumer retention and runtime log bounds require separate founder/cluster/Access review; no durable outbox acceptance yet.",
"new_resources": "Platform creates no storage resources. Access proposes separate exact new flex-auth-secrets-engine-outbox1Gi local-path Helmkeep. Actual provisioning/PV identity, StorageClass Delete/WaitForFirstConsumer to reviewed PV Retain disposition and native bounded-runtime evidence remain open. Source lock/64MiB/startup bounds are published in candidate84, not evidence of native mounted-runtime acceptance.",
"risk_bound": "Controlled loss of retained PDP availability during explicit attended fence; seed compromise can forge lifecycle decisions until independent public trust withdrawal; founder must approve this concrete high-risk scope."
},
"reviews_required": [
@ -134,7 +134,7 @@
"disposition": "pending exact source/artifact review; no approval recorded"
},
{
"role": "cluster-gitops-owner",
"role": "cluster-runtime-storage-owner",
"disposition": "pending exact source/artifact review; no approval recorded"
},
{
@ -147,6 +147,12 @@
"supersedes_unadmitted_R3_role": "external-secrets-flex-auth-envelope-signing replaces flex-auth-envelope-signing-eso to fit existing delegated-applier role convention; dedicated SA unchanged",
"read_ccr_field_projection": "Only ED25519_PRIVATE_KEY is delivered; public sibling fields remain visible to dedicated document-reader identity but never become consumer trust discovery",
"projection_source": "docs/credential-lane-designs/flex-auth-envelope-signing-native-projection.yaml.proposed",
"managed_declaration": "Missing rapp declaration remains migration debt; retain actual Access919ce25 workload identity, do not create package tuple"
"managed_declaration": "Canonical local rapp-flex-auth-secrets-engine declaration committed d52f811ed5ec0be27c9c367e71d476125b3228be, exact13file tree d4fbad71bdc8ef870603526ccd1f53195d0322af; tuple rapp-flex-auth-secrets-engine/flex-auth-secrets-engine/flex-auth-secrets-engine resolves locally as draft. Frozen source2b/current05a package baseline does not adopt candidate84/signing. Remote publication/placement and actual runtime/package join remain open. No missing-declaration claim or migration-debt waiver is applicable to the established local declaration."
},
"owner_review_scope": {
"railiance-platform-owner": "OpenBao custody/read lane; existing GitOps Applications and their sync/freeze/controller ownership; covers explicitly identified workload/Helm competing-writer integration with Access, not Access workload semantic ownership.",
"access-engine-owner": "Retained workload/release source, Helm values, candidate image, signer delivery/mount and process/outbox fencing/rollback.",
"cluster-runtime-storage-owner": "railiance-cluster: cluster identity/runtime/storage/headroom, local-path provisioning and actual PV retention; excludes workload and GitOps Application ownership.",
"enablement_condition": "railiance-enablement additional exact review required only if proposed action changes ArgoCD installation/controller configuration; this fixed custody action authorizes no such change. Changed scope needs a separately reviewed exact revision rather than blanket extra reviewer."
}
}