RPF-WP-0054-T04: create-only broker grant keycape/client-secret-generate

- New CCR request type custody-generate-grant (scripts/broker_grant_lane.py):
  grant policy (create on keycape/+ data, read on metadata, deny on reserved
  entries, revoke-self; no update, data read, metadata write, list or
  delete), broker issuer policy and a 5m orphan non-renewable token role,
  with readback. Binds no identity, so the apply is inert until T01.
- CCR-2026-0040 (proposed), catalog grant (pilot, approval-required,
  exec-env only), generated policies, tests.
- T03 drops custom_metadata: a metadata write would also allow changing
  other entries' version settings.
- test_operator_matrix_lane follows CCR-2026-0039 now being applied.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 469992@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: e4b8e420-df0a-441d-83ae-7f19130594d9

credential-change-requests/CCR-2026-0040-keycape-client-secret-generate-grant.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+id: CCR-2026-0040
+kind: credential-change-request
+schema_version: 1
+request_type: custody-generate-grant
+title: Broker grant keycape/client-secret-generate (create-only, generate in custody)
+status: proposed
+created: '2026-10-09'
+updated: '2026-10-09'
+requester:
+  agent: railiance-platform
+  reason: RPF-WP-0054-T04. net-kingdom SecurityCaseType oidc-browser-relying-party step
+    mint-secret (lane keycape-client-secret-generate); ops-warden d9f889b1, ops-mason
+    789feb39. Founder chose the templated create-only grant 2026-10-09 (T02 option A).
+review:
+  required: true
+  required_approvers:
+  - platform-owner
+  - key-cape-owner
+  comments: []
+target:
+  domain: infotech
+  tenant: platform
+  workload: keycape
+  environment: production
+  purpose: Let the credential broker create a new KeyCape confidential-client secret at
+    platform/workloads/keycape/<client_id> once, without any value leaving custody.
+openbao:
+  grant_id: keycape/client-secret-generate
+  kv_prefix: platform/workloads/keycape
+  reserved_entries:
+  - secrets-engine-openbao
+  policy_name: keycape-client-secret-generate
+  policy_file: openbao/policies/keycape-client-secret-generate.hcl
+  issuer_policy: credential-broker-keycape-client-secret-generate-issuer
+  issuer_policy_file: openbao/policies/credential-broker-keycape-client-secret-generate-issuer.hcl
+  token_role: keycape-client-secret-generate
+  token_ttl: 5m
+founder_confirmation_items:
+- This apply writes two policies and one token role. It binds the issuer policy to no
+  identity, so nothing can mint the token until a separate review binds it to the
+  caller named in RPF-WP-0054-T01.
+- Create-only on keycape/+ means a token can create a new client entry once and can
+  never change an existing one. Its widest misuse is an unused entry for a client
+  that does not exist.
+access_frontdoor:
+  type: none
+  catalog_id: none
+risk:
+  level: medium
+  notes:
+  - No data read, no update, no metadata write, no list, no delete. Exact denies on
+    reserved entries take precedence over the + glob.
+  - The token lives at most 5m and only inside the broker process.
+verification:
+  positive:
+  - Readback after apply matches source for both policies and the token role (done by
+    applier-apply; prints nothing).
+  - Disposable probe (T05) creates probe-secret-generate-<date> at version 1.
+  negative:
+  - A second create on the probe path, a data read, update, delete and any path outside
+    keycape/ are denied for the grant token (sys/capabilities-self).
+  - The reserved entry keycape/secrets-engine-openbao reports deny on data and metadata.
+  activation_conditions:
+  - Founder approval (two reviews).
+  - Issuer binding reviewed after RPF-WP-0054-T01; probe passed (T05).
+  evidence: []
+lifecycle:
+  deactivate: Delete auth/token/roles/keycape-client-secret-generate, then both policies;
+    generated entries stay in custody with their cases.
+  rotate: Not applicable; rotation is a separate lane (RPF-WP-0054-T07).
+  compromised: Delete the token role and revoke outstanding tokens by accessor; review
+    metadata for entries without an accepted case.
+state_hub:
+  workplan: RPF-WP-0054
+  task: RPF-WP-0054-T04

credential-grants/catalog.yaml

@@ -104,6 +104,82 @@ grants:
     audit: {openbao_audit_required: true, state_hub_metadata_allowed: true, record_secret_values: false}
     revocation: {required: true, by_accessor: true, on_exec_exit: true, on_denied_request: false}
 
+  - id: keycape/client-secret-generate
+    title: KeyCape confidential-client secret generation in custody
+    status: pilot
+    grant_class: approval-required
+    credential_type: openbao-token
+    issuer: openbao
+    audience: railiance-platform-credential-broker
+    description: >
+      RPF-WP-0054 / CCR-2026-0040. Short-lived token the broker uses inside its
+      own process to create platform/workloads/keycape/<client_id> once (CAS 0)
+      for an accepted oidc-browser-relying-party case. Create-only: it cannot
+      update, read values, write metadata, list or delete. The generated value
+      never leaves the broker process and the bao child's stdin; the caller gets a
+      receipt only. Founder decision 2026-10-09 (RPF-WP-0054-T02 option A).
+    openbao:
+      namespace: openbao
+      token_role: keycape-client-secret-generate
+      issuer_policy: credential-broker-keycape-client-secret-generate-issuer
+      policies:
+        - keycape-client-secret-generate
+      disallowed_policies:
+        - root
+        - platform-admin
+      mount_paths:
+        - platform/data/workloads/keycape/+
+        - platform/metadata/workloads/keycape/+
+    ttl:
+      default: 5m
+      max: 5m
+      renewable: false
+      requires_human_above: 5m
+    actors:
+      allowed_types:
+        - approved-agent
+        - human-operator
+      required_subject_binding: keycape-or-kubernetes-service-account
+    authorization:
+      flex_auth_required: false
+      flex_auth_mode: optional-preflight
+      approval_required: true
+      purpose_required: true
+      allowed_purpose_examples:
+        - oidc-browser-relying-party-mint-secret
+    delivery:
+      allowed:
+        - exec-env
+      preferred: exec-env
+      denied:
+        - chat
+        - state-hub-body
+        - git
+        - command-line-token-argument
+        - llm-prompt
+      exec_env:
+        variable: VAULT_TOKEN
+        child_only: true
+        redact_logs: true
+    audit:
+      openbao_audit_required: true
+      state_hub_metadata_allowed: true
+      record_secret_values: false
+      metadata_fields:
+        - grant_id
+        - actor
+        - subject
+        - purpose
+        - case_ref
+        - client_id
+        - kv_version
+        - lease_accessor
+        - status
+    revocation:
+      required: true
+      by_accessor: true
+      on_exec_exit: true
+      on_denied_request: false
   - id: ops-warden/warden-sign
     title: Ops Warden OpenBao SSH signing smoke token
     status: pilot

openbao/policies/credential-broker-keycape-client-secret-generate-issuer.hcl

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# CCR-2026-0040 (RPF-WP-0054): the credential broker may mint keycape/client-secret-generate
+# tokens only through this token role. Bind to the reviewed caller identity only.
+path "auth/token/create/keycape-client-secret-generate" {
+  capabilities = ["create", "update"]
+}
+path "auth/token/lookup-accessor" {
+  capabilities = ["update"]
+}
+path "auth/token/revoke-accessor" {
+  capabilities = ["update"]
+}
+path "auth/token/lookup-self" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}
+path "sys/capabilities-self" {
+  capabilities = ["update"]
+}

openbao/policies/keycape-client-secret-generate.hcl

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# CCR-2026-0040 (RPF-WP-0054): grant keycape/client-secret-generate. Create-only: no update,
+# data read, metadata write, list or delete. Exact deny beats the + glob.
+path "platform/data/workloads/keycape/+" {
+  capabilities = ["create"]
+}
+path "platform/metadata/workloads/keycape/+" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}
+path "platform/data/workloads/keycape/secrets-engine-openbao" {
+  capabilities = ["deny"]
+}
+path "platform/metadata/workloads/keycape/secrets-engine-openbao" {
+  capabilities = ["deny"]
+}
+path "auth/token/revoke-self" {
+  capabilities = ["update"]
+}

scripts/broker_grant_lane.py

@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
+"""custody-generate-grant CCRs: a create-only KV grant the credential broker mints.
+
+RPF-WP-0054-T04. Loaded by scripts/credential-change.py for request_type
+custody-generate-grant. The lane writes three reviewed objects and nothing else:
+
+* the grant policy: ``create`` on ``<prefix>/+`` data, ``read`` on ``<prefix>/+``
+  metadata, explicit ``deny`` on reserved entries, ``revoke-self``. It has no
+  ``update`` anywhere (an existing entry can never be overwritten), no data
+  read, no metadata write (custom_metadata writes would also let the token
+  change ``delete_version_after``/``max_versions`` of other entries), no list
+  and no delete;
+* the broker issuer policy: create tokens only through this grant's token role;
+* the token role: exactly the grant policy, orphan, non-renewable, no default
+  policy, at most 15 minutes.
+
+Binding the issuer policy to the calling identity is a separate review once the
+caller is known (RPF-WP-0054-T01); until then nothing can mint the token, so
+the apply is inert. Nothing here reads, prints or accepts a secret value.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import importlib.util
+import re
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+import yaml
+
+REQUEST_TYPE = "custody-generate-grant"
+PREFIX_RE = re.compile(r"^platform/workloads/[a-z0-9-]+$")
+ENTRY_RE = re.compile(r"^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$")
+NAME_RE = re.compile(r"^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$")
+CATALOG = "credential-grants/catalog.yaml"
+MAX_TTL_SECONDS = 15 * 60
+# Same list scripts/openbao-apply-token-grants.py writes; default is excluded by
+# token_no_default_policy.
+DISALLOWED_POLICIES = ["root", "platform-admin"]
+
+
+def _service_jwt_lane():
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(
+        "service_jwt_lane", Path(__file__).resolve().parent / "service_jwt_lane.py"
+    )
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    return module
+
+
+_shared = _service_jwt_lane()
+ttl_seconds = _shared.ttl_seconds
+normalized = _shared.normalized
+BaoError = _shared.BaoError
+_run = _shared._run
+_read_json = _shared._read_json
+
+
+def _paths(prefix: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
+    mount, rest = prefix.split("/", 1)
+    return f"{mount}/data/{rest}", f"{mount}/metadata/{rest}"
+
+
+def generated_policy_hcl(ccr: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
+    openbao = ccr["openbao"]
+    data, meta = _paths(openbao["kv_prefix"])
+    lines = [
+        f"# {ccr['id']} (RPF-WP-0054): grant {openbao['grant_id']}. Create-only: no update,",
+        "# data read, metadata write, list or delete. Exact deny beats the + glob.",
+        f'path "{data}/+" {{', '  capabilities = ["create"]', "}",
+        f'path "{meta}/+" {{', '  capabilities = ["read"]', "}",
+    ]
+    for entry in openbao["reserved_entries"]:
+        for base in (data, meta):
+            lines += [f'path "{base}/{entry}" {{', '  capabilities = ["deny"]', "}"]
+    lines += ['path "auth/token/revoke-self" {', '  capabilities = ["update"]', "}"]
+    return "\n".join(lines) + "\n"
+
+
+def generated_issuer_hcl(ccr: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
+    openbao = ccr["openbao"]
+    lines = [
+        f"# {ccr['id']} (RPF-WP-0054): the credential broker may mint {openbao['grant_id']}",
+        "# tokens only through this token role. Bind to the reviewed caller identity only.",
+    ]
+    for path, caps in (
+        (f"auth/token/create/{openbao['token_role']}", '"create", "update"'),
+        ("auth/token/lookup-accessor", '"update"'),
+        ("auth/token/revoke-accessor", '"update"'),
+        ("auth/token/lookup-self", '"read"'),
+        ("sys/capabilities-self", '"update"'),
+    ):
+        lines += [f'path "{path}" {{', f"  capabilities = [{caps}]", "}"]
+    return "\n".join(lines) + "\n"
+
+
+def role_payload(ccr: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    openbao = ccr["openbao"]
+    return {
+        "allowed_policies": [openbao["policy_name"]],
+        "disallowed_policies": DISALLOWED_POLICIES,
+        "orphan": True,
+        "renewable": False,
+        "token_explicit_max_ttl": openbao["token_ttl"],
+        "token_no_default_policy": True,
+        "token_type": "service",
+    }
+
+
+def _catalog_grant(repo_dir: Path, grant_id: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+    catalog = yaml.safe_load((repo_dir / CATALOG).read_text(encoding="utf-8")) or {}
+    for grant in catalog.get("grants") or []:
+        if grant.get("id") == grant_id:
+            return grant
+    return None
+
+
+def _check_file(repo_dir: Path, rel: str, expected: str, field: str, errors: list[str]) -> None:
+    path = repo_dir / rel
+    if not path.exists():
+        errors.append(f"{field} does not exist: {rel}")
+    elif normalized(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")) != normalized(expected):
+        errors.append(f"{field} does not match the generated policy")
+
+
+def validate(ccr: dict[str, Any], repo_dir: Path) -> list[str]:
+    errors: list[str] = []
+    openbao = ccr.get("openbao")
+    if not isinstance(openbao, dict):
+        return ["openbao must be an object"]
+    if (ccr.get("target") or {}).get("environment") != "production":
+        errors.append("target.environment must be production")
+    review = ccr.get("review") or {}
+    if review.get("required") is not True or not review.get("required_approvers"):
+        errors.append("review.required must be true with required_approvers")
+    prefix = str(openbao.get("kv_prefix") or "")
+    if not PREFIX_RE.match(prefix):
+        errors.append("openbao.kv_prefix must be platform/workloads/<owner>")
+    reserved = openbao.get("reserved_entries")
+    if not isinstance(reserved, list) or not all(ENTRY_RE.match(str(e)) for e in reserved):
+        errors.append("openbao.reserved_entries must list exact entry names")
+    for key in ("policy_name", "issuer_policy", "token_role"):
+        if not NAME_RE.match(str(openbao.get(key) or "")):
+            errors.append(f"openbao.{key} contains unsafe characters")
+    seconds = ttl_seconds(openbao.get("token_ttl"))
+    if seconds is None or not 0 < seconds <= MAX_TTL_SECONDS:
+        errors.append("openbao.token_ttl must be set and at most 15m")
+    if errors:
+        return errors
+
+    for key, file_key, expected in (
+        ("policy_name", "policy_file", generated_policy_hcl(ccr)),
+        ("issuer_policy", "issuer_policy_file", generated_issuer_hcl(ccr)),
+    ):
+        rel = str(openbao.get(file_key) or "")
+        if rel != f"openbao/policies/{openbao[key]}.hcl":
+            errors.append(f"openbao.{file_key} must be openbao/policies/<{key}>.hcl")
+        else:
+            _check_file(repo_dir, rel, expected, f"openbao.{file_key}", errors)
+
+    grant = _catalog_grant(repo_dir, str(openbao.get("grant_id") or ""))
+    if grant is None:
+        errors.append(f"openbao.grant_id not in {CATALOG}")
+    else:
+        gb = grant.get("openbao") or {}
+        if gb.get("policies") != [openbao["policy_name"]]:
+            errors.append("catalog grant policies must be exactly [openbao.policy_name]")
+        if gb.get("token_role") != openbao["token_role"] or gb.get("issuer_policy") != openbao["issuer_policy"]:
+            errors.append("catalog grant token_role/issuer_policy must match the CCR")
+        if ttl_seconds((grant.get("ttl") or {}).get("max")) != seconds:
+            errors.append("catalog grant ttl.max must equal openbao.token_ttl")
+    return errors
+
+
+def readiness_blockers(ccr: dict[str, Any], repo_dir: Path, allowed_statuses: set[str]) -> list[str]:
+    blockers: list[str] = []
+    if ccr.get("status") not in allowed_statuses:
+        blockers.append(
+            "applier requires approved, applied, verified, or active CCR status, "
+            f"got {ccr.get('status')}"
+        )
+    blockers.extend(validate(ccr, repo_dir))
+    return blockers
+
+
+def dry_run_payload(ccr: dict[str, Any], repo_dir: Path, warnings: list[str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    openbao = ccr["openbao"]
+    return {
+        "id": ccr["id"],
+        "title": ccr["title"],
+        "status": ccr["status"],
+        "environment": ccr["target"]["environment"],
+        "warnings": warnings,
+        "source_artifacts": {},
+        "mutations": [
+            {"kind": "policy_write", "openbao_path": f"sys/policies/acl/{openbao['policy_name']}",
+             "policy_name": openbao["policy_name"], "source": openbao["policy_file"],
+             "body": generated_policy_hcl(ccr).rstrip()},
+            {"kind": "policy_write", "openbao_path": f"sys/policies/acl/{openbao['issuer_policy']}",
+             "policy_name": openbao["issuer_policy"], "source": openbao["issuer_policy_file"],
+             "body": generated_issuer_hcl(ccr).rstrip()},
+            {"kind": "token_role_write", "openbao_path": f"auth/token/roles/{openbao['token_role']}",
+             "payload": role_payload(ccr)},
+            {"kind": "readback_compare", "openbao_path": "both policies, token role",
+             "payload": {"prints": "booleans only"}},
+        ],
+        "out_of_scope": [
+            "secret value reads or writes",
+            "binding the issuer policy to any identity (separate review after RPF-WP-0054-T01)",
+            "token creation",
+            "changes to any other policy or role",
+        ],
+        "required_evidence": [
+            "CCR id and approval reference",
+            "readback equality for both policies and the token role",
+            "disposable probe (RPF-WP-0054-T05): create once, second create and data read denied",
+        ],
+    }
+
+
+def apply_details(ccr: dict[str, Any], actor: str) -> list[str]:
+    openbao = ccr["openbao"]
+    return [
+        f"Delegated metadata applier ran as {actor} using local bao CLI ambient authority.",
+        f"Policy metadata write: sys/policies/acl/{openbao['policy_name']}",
+        f"Issuer policy metadata write: sys/policies/acl/{openbao['issuer_policy']}",
+        f"Token role metadata write: auth/token/roles/{openbao['token_role']}",
+        "Readback matched source for both policies and the token role.",
+        "Issuer policy is not bound to any identity by this apply.",
+        "No secret values were read, written, printed, or accepted in argv.",
+    ]
+
+
+def readback_mismatches(ccr: dict[str, Any], repo_dir: Path, bao_bin: str) -> list[str]:
+    openbao = ccr["openbao"]
+    mismatches: list[str] = []
+    for name, expected in (
+        (openbao["policy_name"], generated_policy_hcl(ccr)),
+        (openbao["issuer_policy"], generated_issuer_hcl(ccr)),
+    ):
+        text = _run(bao_bin, ["policy", "read", name], repo_dir, quiet=True, capture=True)
+        if normalized(text) != normalized(expected):
+            mismatches.append(f"policy {name} differs from source")
+    role = _read_json(bao_bin, ["read", f"auth/token/roles/{openbao['token_role']}"], repo_dir).get("data", {})
+    for key, want in role_payload(ccr).items():
+        got = role.get(key)
+        if key == "token_explicit_max_ttl":
+            same = ttl_seconds(got) == ttl_seconds(want)
+        elif key == "disallowed_policies":
+            same = sorted(got or []) == sorted(want)
+        else:
+            same = got == want
+        if not same:
+            mismatches.append(f"token role {key} differs")
+    return mismatches
+
+
+def run_apply(ccr: dict[str, Any], repo_dir: Path, bao_bin: str, quiet: bool = False) -> None:
+    openbao = ccr["openbao"]
+    _run(bao_bin, ["policy", "write", openbao["policy_name"], openbao["policy_file"]], repo_dir, quiet)
+    _run(bao_bin, ["policy", "write", openbao["issuer_policy"], openbao["issuer_policy_file"]], repo_dir, quiet)
+    role = role_payload(ccr)
+    args = ["write", f"auth/token/roles/{openbao['token_role']}"]
+    for key, value in role.items():
+        rendered = ",".join(value) if isinstance(value, list) else str(value).lower() if isinstance(value, bool) else value
+        args.append(f"{key}={rendered}")
+    _run(bao_bin, args, repo_dir, quiet)
+    mismatches = readback_mismatches(ccr, repo_dir, bao_bin)
+    if mismatches:
+        raise BaoError("readback mismatch: " + "; ".join(mismatches))

scripts/credential-change.py

@@ -823,6 +823,7 @@ def is_service_jwt(ccr: dict[str, Any]) -> bool:
 LANE_MODULES = {
     "service-jwt-login": "service_jwt_lane",
     "workload-kv-operator-matrix": "operator_matrix_lane",
+    "custody-generate-grant": "broker_grant_lane",
 }
 
 

tests/test_broker_grant_lane.py

@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+"""RPF-WP-0054-T04: custody-generate-grant lane (CCR-2026-0040)."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import importlib.util
+import json
+import os
+import re
+import stat
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import yaml
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+CCR_PATH = ROOT / "credential-change-requests/CCR-2026-0040-keycape-client-secret-generate-grant.yaml"
+
+
+def load(name: str, rel: str):
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, ROOT / rel)
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    sys.modules[name] = module
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    return module
+
+
+lane = load("broker_grant_lane", "scripts/broker_grant_lane.py")
+cc = load("credential_change_cli_grant", "scripts/credential-change.py")
+
+
+def ccr() -> dict:
+    return yaml.safe_load(CCR_PATH.read_text())
+
+
+# Stateful fake: policies stored as text; token role key=value args stored the way
+# OpenBao returns them (lists, booleans, seconds).
+FAKE_BAO = r'''#!/usr/bin/env python3
+import json, os, sys
+path = os.environ["FAKE_BAO_STATE"]
+state = json.load(open(path))
+args = [a for a in sys.argv[1:] if a != "-format=json"]
+if args[:2] == ["policy", "write"]:
+    state["policies"][args[2]] = open(args[3]).read()
+elif args[:2] == ["policy", "read"]:
+    print(state["policies"][args[2]])
+elif args[0] == "write":
+    role = {}
+    for kv in args[2:]:
+        k, v = kv.split("=", 1)
+        if k.endswith("_policies"): role[k] = v.split(",")
+        elif v in ("true", "false"): role[k] = v == "true"
+        elif k.endswith("_ttl"): role[k] = int(v[:-1]) * 60
+        else: role[k] = v
+    if state.get("tamper"): role["renewable"] = True
+    state["roles"][args[1]] = role
+elif args[0] == "read":
+    print(json.dumps({"data": state["roles"][args[1]]}))
+json.dump(state, open(path, "w"))
+'''
+
+
+def stanzas(text: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    return dict(re.findall(r'path "([^"]+)"\s*{\s*capabilities = \[([^\]]*)\]', text))
+
+
+class BrokerGrantLaneTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_ccr_validates_and_waits_for_approval(self):
+        _ccr, errors, _w = cc.validate_ccr(CCR_PATH)
+        self.assertEqual(errors, [])
+        blockers = cc.applier_readiness_blockers(_ccr)
+        self.assertTrue(any("got proposed" in b for b in blockers), blockers)
+
+    def test_grant_policy_is_create_only(self):
+        policy = stanzas((ROOT / ccr()["openbao"]["policy_file"]).read_text())
+        self.assertEqual(policy["platform/data/workloads/keycape/+"], '"create"')
+        self.assertEqual(policy["platform/metadata/workloads/keycape/+"], '"read"')
+        for path in ("platform/data/workloads/keycape/secrets-engine-openbao",
+                     "platform/metadata/workloads/keycape/secrets-engine-openbao"):
+            self.assertEqual(policy[path], '"deny"')
+        granted = " ".join(c for p, c in policy.items() if p != "auth/token/revoke-self")
+        for word in ("update", "delete", "list", "patch", "sudo"):
+            self.assertNotIn(f'"{word}"', granted)
+        self.assertFalse(any("*" in p for p in policy))
+
+    def test_issuer_policy_mints_only_through_this_role(self):
+        issuer = stanzas((ROOT / ccr()["openbao"]["issuer_policy_file"]).read_text())
+        creates = [p for p in issuer if p.startswith("auth/token/create")]
+        self.assertEqual(creates, ["auth/token/create/keycape-client-secret-generate"])
+
+    def test_validator_rejects_drift(self):
+        cases = [
+            ("long ttl", lambda c: c["openbao"].update(token_ttl="1h")),
+            ("prefix wildcard", lambda c: c["openbao"].update(kv_prefix="platform/workloads/*")),
+            ("unknown grant", lambda c: c["openbao"].update(grant_id="keycape/other")),
+            ("reserved glob", lambda c: c["openbao"].update(reserved_entries=["*"])),
+            ("policy drift", lambda c: c["openbao"].update(reserved_entries=[])),
+        ]
+        for label, mutate in cases:
+            with self.subTest(label):
+                c = ccr()
+                mutate(c)
+                self.assertNotEqual(lane.validate(c, ROOT), [], label)
+
+    def _apply(self, tamper=False):
+        tmp = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp())
+        (tmp / "state.json").write_text(json.dumps({"policies": {}, "roles": {}, "tamper": tamper}))
+        bao = tmp / "bao"
+        bao.write_text(FAKE_BAO)
+        bao.chmod(bao.stat().st_mode | stat.S_IEXEC)
+        os.environ["FAKE_BAO_STATE"] = str(tmp / "state.json")
+        error = None
+        try:
+            lane.run_apply(ccr(), ROOT, str(bao), quiet=True)
+        except lane.BaoError as exc:
+            error = exc
+        return error, json.loads((tmp / "state.json").read_text())
+
+    def test_apply_writes_three_objects_and_reads_back(self):
+        error, state = self._apply()
+        self.assertIsNone(error)
+        self.assertEqual(sorted(state["policies"]), [
+            "credential-broker-keycape-client-secret-generate-issuer",
+            "keycape-client-secret-generate",
+        ])
+        role = state["roles"]["auth/token/roles/keycape-client-secret-generate"]
+        self.assertEqual(role["allowed_policies"], ["keycape-client-secret-generate"])
+        self.assertEqual(role["token_explicit_max_ttl"], 300)
+
+    def test_readback_detects_role_drift(self):
+        error, _state = self._apply(tamper=True)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(error)
+        self.assertIn("renewable", str(error))
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_operator_matrix_lane.py

@@ -60,12 +60,19 @@ LIVE_BOUNDARY = 'path "platform/data/workloads/forgejo/forgejo-admin" {\n  capab
 
 
 class OperatorMatrixLaneTests(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_ccr_validates_and_waits_for_approval_and_binding(self):
+    def test_ccr_validates_and_records_the_delegated_apply(self):
         _ccr, errors, _w = cc.validate_ccr(CCR_PATH)
         self.assertEqual(errors, [])
-        blockers = cc.applier_readiness_blockers(_ccr)
+        self.assertEqual(_ccr["status"], "applied")
-        self.assertIn("applier requires confirmed OpenBao auth binding", blockers)
+        self.assertEqual(cc.applier_readiness_blockers(_ccr), [])
-        self.assertTrue(any("got proposed" in b for b in blockers))
+        self.assertTrue(any(e["kind"] == "delegated_metadata_apply" and e["result"] == "passed"
+                            for e in _ccr["verification"]["evidence"]))
+
+    def test_unconfirmed_binding_blocks_the_applier(self):
+        c = ccr()
+        c["openbao"]["auth"]["bound_claims_confirmed"] = False
+        self.assertIn("applier requires confirmed OpenBao auth binding",
+                      cc.applier_readiness_blockers(c))
 
     def test_policy_is_the_exact_matrix_and_nothing_else(self):
         policy = (ROOT / ccr()["openbao"]["policy_file"]).read_text()