Consolidate platform workplans and assess intent gaps
Assistant: codex Assistant-Model: gpt-6-astra Assistant-Session: 01a06ecb-456a-71c2-b41e-0755d336e883
This commit is contained in:
codex
parent
9d958f8e09
commit
9f83e426c7
40 changed files with 2985 additions and 295 deletions
|
|
@ -1,165 +0,0 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
id: RPF-WP-0013
|
||||
type: workplan
|
||||
title: "Close agent high-risk OpenBao boundary coverage"
|
||||
domain: financials
|
||||
repo: railiance-platform
|
||||
status: finished
|
||||
owner: codex
|
||||
topic_slug: railiance
|
||||
created: "2026-08-21"
|
||||
updated: "2026-08-22"
|
||||
related:
|
||||
- WARDEN-WP-0032
|
||||
- RISK-F-0009
|
||||
origin: routed
|
||||
origin_ref: "State Hub message 828e4903-30fe-4903-acfd-cd2ecdda437d"
|
||||
state_hub_workstream_id: "25c0b1c9-a1b7-5844-bd39-9db165fe196c"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# RPF-WP-0013 — Agent high-risk boundary coverage
|
||||
|
||||
## Goal
|
||||
|
||||
Make the OpenBao `agent-high-risk-boundary` deny every concrete high-risk KV
|
||||
data path in the ops-warden routing catalog, verify the deployed policy, and
|
||||
establish whether any agent identity actually carries the boundary.
|
||||
|
||||
## Boundaries
|
||||
|
||||
- Read policy documents, token-role metadata and capabilities only; never read
|
||||
a Secret value.
|
||||
- A deny is added only for a concrete catalog path graded `risk: high`.
|
||||
- Pattern-only and non-KV lanes are reported but do not produce invented paths.
|
||||
- Operator identities do not receive this boundary; it is for coding-agent
|
||||
identities where deny must override any coincident workload read policy.
|
||||
|
||||
## T01 — Reconcile catalog coverage
|
||||
|
||||
```task
|
||||
id: RPF-WP-0013-T01
|
||||
status: done
|
||||
priority: high
|
||||
state_hub_task_id: "35855316-3282-52d2-922e-43af1c4495c0"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Run the capabilities-only ops-warden audit against the policy. The initial
|
||||
2026-08-21 reconciliation found 17 high-risk lanes: six covered, six concrete
|
||||
uncovered, and five without a concrete KV address. The final generated input
|
||||
contains 19 high-risk lanes, 14 concrete entries, and five without an address.
|
||||
No credential value was read.
|
||||
|
||||
## T02 — Close the concrete deny gaps
|
||||
|
||||
```task
|
||||
id: RPF-WP-0013-T02
|
||||
status: done
|
||||
priority: high
|
||||
state_hub_task_id: "9f2a6ffc-5f48-5e45-b636-76dff7d41743"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Add deny-data/read-metadata pairs for the six catalog paths: whynot-design npm,
|
||||
rapp-qonto Keycape client, agent-harness Forgejo deploy key, audit-core senders,
|
||||
email-connect transactional, and Scaleway bootstrap. Add regression coverage
|
||||
for every concrete path currently emitted by the catalog audit.
|
||||
|
||||
Completed 2026-08-22. After ops-warden corrected two multi-field grades, the
|
||||
source policy covers all 13 unique concrete catalog paths plus the additional
|
||||
reviewed Core Hub path. The generated-input check reports all 14 concrete
|
||||
catalog entries covered with none uncovered.
|
||||
|
||||
## T03 — Apply and verify live
|
||||
|
||||
```task
|
||||
id: RPF-WP-0013-T03
|
||||
status: done
|
||||
priority: high
|
||||
state_hub_task_id: "92b4b531-986d-54b4-a18b-cd8785dca5ce"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Under attended platform authority, upload the reviewed policy, read it back,
|
||||
and rerun the catalog audit with `policy_source: server`. Inspect policy/token
|
||||
role metadata to determine whether an agent identity carries the boundary and
|
||||
whether any role combines it with a workload-read policy. Do not mint a token.
|
||||
|
||||
Completed initially on 2026-08-21 and reconciled again on 2026-08-22 under
|
||||
attended `platform-admin` OIDC. OpenBao accepted the policy; normalized
|
||||
readback matched source, and the final server-backed audit reported 19
|
||||
high-risk lanes, 14 covered entries, zero uncovered, and five pattern/non-KV
|
||||
lanes without a concrete address. No Secret value was read.
|
||||
|
||||
## T04 — Route the result
|
||||
|
||||
```task
|
||||
id: RPF-WP-0013-T04
|
||||
status: done
|
||||
priority: medium
|
||||
state_hub_task_id: "d394fcb7-1477-5dfe-9e4b-65bd14f08346"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Reply to ops-warden with the deployment evidence and remaining attachment
|
||||
finding. Request a generated, versioned concrete-deny artifact so future policy
|
||||
updates consume catalog output rather than relying on a hand-maintained list.
|
||||
|
||||
Completed 2026-08-21 via State Hub message
|
||||
`fe727451-163a-4e14-8ce3-187fea8ce5b3`, including live audit counts, the zero-
|
||||
attachment finding, the distinct-agent-identity blocker, and the requested
|
||||
versioned generated artifact shape.
|
||||
|
||||
Ops-warden delivered revision `55f0f47a021375b8b25c924953d1b49a24e002c5`
|
||||
on 2026-08-21. The platform now vendors it as a checked policy input and has a
|
||||
repeatable upstream-equality plus policy-coverage command.
|
||||
|
||||
## T05 — Establish a distinct coding-agent identity
|
||||
|
||||
```task
|
||||
id: RPF-WP-0013-T05
|
||||
status: done
|
||||
priority: high
|
||||
state_hub_task_id: "6805ef60-bd20-5549-b955-cee94eb69dad"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The policy is live but no role attaches it. Do not add the boundary to
|
||||
`platform-admin`: that is an attended human/operator role whose legitimate
|
||||
recovery work may require the protected values. The identity owner must define
|
||||
a distinct coding-agent issuance path, attach this boundary there, and prove
|
||||
deny-wins behavior when combined with an otherwise readable workload policy.
|
||||
Completed 2026-08-22. State Hub decision
|
||||
`f0955252-7b20-4c80-86e9-f8080ec60793` establishes the platform-owned AppRole
|
||||
`coding-agent-railiance-platform` as the operational machine identity. Its
|
||||
single-use SecretIDs expire after five minutes; its tokens last at most 15
|
||||
minutes, have eight uses, omit the default policy, and attach both
|
||||
`agent-high-risk-boundary` and the otherwise-readable issue-core workload
|
||||
policy. A live ephemeral login proved data capabilities resolve to `deny` and
|
||||
metadata to `read`; the token was revoked without reading the KV value.
|
||||
|
||||
The exact-bound KeyCape JWT role is also live as the issuer-backed migration
|
||||
target. KeyCape principal registration remains an identity hardening follow-up,
|
||||
not a blocker to the active AppRole boundary.
|
||||
|
||||
## T06 — Consume the generated catalog artifact
|
||||
|
||||
```task
|
||||
id: RPF-WP-0013-T06
|
||||
status: done
|
||||
priority: high
|
||||
state_hub_task_id: "1b0c4f03-0ec7-5fcc-908d-beed236e4865"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Consume ops-warden's versioned `high-risk-data-paths.yaml` as a policy-check
|
||||
input, add the two newly regraded issue-core and reuse-surface paths, and rerun
|
||||
source plus live coverage. The input remains ops-warden's risk statement, not
|
||||
the policy authority; railiance-platform continues to own every deny decision.
|
||||
|
||||
Completed 2026-08-22. The vendored input matches the clean upstream artifact,
|
||||
the repository check covers all 14 entries, and the server-backed audit reports
|
||||
zero uncovered. Evidence: `docs/evidence/agent-high-risk-boundary-2026-08-21.md`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Acceptance
|
||||
|
||||
- [x] Every concrete high-risk catalog path is denied in the source policy.
|
||||
- [x] The live policy matches source and the server-backed audit passes.
|
||||
- [x] A distinct AppRole attachment is established from live metadata.
|
||||
- [x] Result and generated-artifact follow-up are routed to ops-warden.
|
||||
- [x] A distinct coding-agent identity actually attaches the boundary.
|
||||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue