diff --git a/credential-change-requests/CCR-2026-0016-glas-claude-anthropic.yaml b/credential-change-requests/CCR-2026-0016-glas-claude-anthropic.yaml
index 3b75d33..97cdefe 100644
--- a/credential-change-requests/CCR-2026-0016-glas-claude-anthropic.yaml
+++ b/credential-change-requests/CCR-2026-0016-glas-claude-anthropic.yaml
@@ -10,11 +10,16 @@ in_flight:
   missing_fields:
   - openbao.policy_file
   - openbao.auth
-  blocking_reason: Anthropic organization and workspace budget await user input; the sandbox owner machine identity and protected delivery path have not been verified. No live grant or key exists from this request.
+  blocking_reason: Provider organization, key name and expiration supplied by user.
+    Empty-only KV seed authorized for operator UI handoff; live custody and the sandbox
+    owner machine identity/delivery remain unverified. Workspace scope and budget
+    are not confirmed.
   owner: railiance-platform
 requester:
   agent: codex
-  reason: User selected a dedicated Anthropic workload API key for GLAS-WP-0012 and SAND-WP-0015. Establish custody and owner delivery before the real local Claude proof.
+  reason: User selected a dedicated Anthropic workload API key for GLAS-WP-0012 and
+    SAND-WP-0015. Establish custody and owner delivery before the real local Claude
+    proof.
 review:
   required: true
   required_approvers:
@@ -24,13 +29,21 @@ review:
   - at: '2026-09-05'
     reviewer: user via chat
     decision: authentication_model_selected
-    comment: User requested establishment of an Anthropic workload API key. This records the chosen authentication model; final machine bindings are not yet known.
+    comment: User requested establishment of an Anthropic workload API key. This records
+      the chosen authentication model; final machine bindings are not yet known.
+  - at: '2026-09-05'
+    reviewer: user via chat
+    decision: empty_seed_authorized
+    comment: User authorized preparing the existing proposed location with an empty
+      version; user will create a version containing the secret through the OpenBao
+      UI. No runtime grant authorized by this seed.
 target:
   domain: infotech
   tenant: glas-harness
   workload: sand-boxer-claude-agent-dev
   environment: production
-  purpose: Dedicated Claude Code inference for the Glas local agent-dev profile, delivered by the sandbox owner.
+  purpose: Dedicated Claude Code inference for the Glas local agent-dev profile, delivered
+    by the sandbox owner.
 openbao:
   mount: platform
   kv_path: platform/workloads/glas-harness/claude-agent-dev
@@ -46,34 +59,71 @@ access_frontdoor:
   resolvable: false
 delivery:
   surface: owner-exec
-  target: Sand-boxer delivers ANTHROPIC_API_KEY only to the selected Claude workload; neither the Glas caller nor the runtime receives an OpenBao token.
+  target: Sand-boxer delivers ANTHROPIC_API_KEY only to the selected Claude workload;
+    neither the Glas caller nor the runtime receives an OpenBao token.
 risk:
   classification: high
   notes:
-  - Proposed KV coordinates and catalog selector are reserved design names, not surveyed live objects.
-  - Provider credential can incur API charges; use a dedicated workspace and user-selected budget.
-  - Use a workspace-scoped service account key; organization administration is outside the workload grant.
-  - OpenBao token expiration does not expire the provider key. Provider revocation is required for compromise.
-  - Owner environment injection can expose the key to descendants within that workload; it is not per-process secrecy against workload code.
+  - Proposed KV coordinates and catalog selector are reserved design names, not surveyed
+    live objects.
+  - Provider credential can incur API charges; use a dedicated workspace and user-selected
+    budget.
+  - Use a workspace-scoped service account key; organization administration is outside
+    the workload grant.
+  - OpenBao token expiration does not expire the provider key. Provider revocation
+    is required for compromise.
+  - Owner environment injection can expose the key to descendants within that workload;
+    it is not per-process secrecy against workload code.
 verification:
   positive:
-  - Confirm provider organization, workspace, service account, key identifier and expiration using metadata only.
-  - Exact authenticated sandbox owner can read only the intended data entry and deliver the field without logging it.
-  - Bounded real Claude proof succeeds through enforced provider egress and removes private state on teardown.
+  - Confirm provider organization, workspace, service account, key identifier and
+    expiration using metadata only.
+  - Exact authenticated sandbox owner can read only the intended data entry and deliver
+    the field without logging it.
+  - Bounded real Claude proof succeeds through enforced provider egress and removes
+    private state on teardown.
   negative:
-  - Wrong owner identity, sibling KV path, metadata read, parent listing and workload writes are denied.
+  - Wrong owner identity, sibling KV path, metadata read, parent listing and workload
+    writes are denied.
   - Generic coding-agent identity cannot retrieve the credential directly.
-  - No credential or OpenBao token appears in execution replies, artifacts, source tree or State Hub.
+  - No credential or OpenBao token appears in execution replies, artifacts, source
+    tree or State Hub.
   - A revoked predecessor provider key fails authentication after controlled rotation.
   activation_conditions:
-  - User confirms Anthropic organization and workspace budget; provider service account and key are created through attended Console custody.
-  - Confirm actual sandbox host service identity and auth binding; review exact read policy and separate protected custody writer before apply.
-  - Seed KV with compare-and-set zero through attended custody; never enter values in chat or command arguments.
-  - Positive and negative access, owner delivery and provider authentication evidence pass before route activation.
+  - User confirms Anthropic organization and workspace budget; provider service account
+    and key are created through attended Console custody.
+  - Confirm actual sandbox host service identity and auth binding; review exact read
+    policy and separate protected custody writer before apply.
+  - Seed KV with compare-and-set zero through attended custody; never enter values
+    in chat or command arguments.
+  - Positive and negative access, owner delivery and provider authentication evidence
+    pass before route activation.
+  evidence:
+  - at: '2026-09-05'
+    actor: codex
+    kind: empty_seed
+    result: passed
+    details:
+    - Empty ANTHROPIC_API_KEY version 1 created with CAS zero; user will create version
+      2 in UI.
+    - Request id 50cafc25-8d24-c1d6-5be8-1ade049e088b.
+    - Provider metadata recorded; metadata-only recovery completed after empty response
+      parsing fix; contained sessions revoked.
+    - No secret data read or real key handled; runtime lane remains inactive.
 lifecycle:
-  deactivate: Disable the owner route and provider key; revoke outstanding OpenBao reader tokens. Preserve KV history under platform retention rules.
-  rotate: Create a replacement provider key, write with expected-version CAS, stop old runs, verify new delivery and inference, then revoke the predecessor at Anthropic and prove its denial.
-  compromised: Disable the provider key immediately, stop affected runs and owner route, revoke Bao leases, replace forward through protected custody and record non-secret incident evidence.
+  deactivate: Disable the owner route and provider key; revoke outstanding OpenBao
+    reader tokens. Preserve KV history under platform retention rules.
+  rotate: Create a replacement provider key, write with expected-version CAS, stop
+    old runs, verify new delivery and inference, then revoke the predecessor at Anthropic
+    and prove its denial.
+  compromised: Disable the provider key immediately, stop affected runs and owner
+    route, revoke Bao leases, replace forward through protected custody and record
+    non-secret incident evidence.
 state_hub:
   workplan_id: GLAS-WP-0012
   task_id: GLAS-WP-0012-T02
+provider_metadata:
+  organization_id: e1a8f305-9e64-4639-a7fd-af48e34f37c7
+  key_name: claude_key_bernd.worsch
+  expires_at: '2027-01-31T21:00:00Z'
+  source: user supplied; provider identity and workspace scope not independently verified
diff --git a/scripts/prepare-glas-anthropic.py b/scripts/prepare-glas-anthropic.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..02afc48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/prepare-glas-anthropic.py
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""User-authorized empty KV seed for CCR-2026-0016; silent OIDC child."""
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+import subprocess
+import sys
+
+DATA_PATH = 'platform/data/workloads/glas-harness/claude-agent-dev'
+META_PATH = 'platform/metadata/workloads/glas-harness/claude-agent-dev'
+RECEIPT = Path('/tmp/glas-anthropic-empty-receipt.json')
+
+def bao(*args, payload=None):
+    r = subprocess.run(['bao', *args], input=None if payload is None else json.dumps(payload),
+                       text=True, capture_output=True, timeout=30)
+    if r.returncode:
+        raise RuntimeError('bao_operation_failed')
+    return json.loads(r.stdout) if r.stdout.strip() else {}
+
+def main():
+    if sys.argv[1:] == ['--complete-metadata']:
+        receipt = json.loads(RECEIPT.read_text())
+        if receipt.get('path') != DATA_PATH or receipt.get('version') != 1:
+            raise RuntimeError('invalid_receipt')
+        observed = bao('read', '-format=json', META_PATH)['data']
+        if observed.get('current_version', 0) < 1:
+            raise RuntimeError('missing_seed')
+    elif not sys.argv[1:]:
+        # CAS zero makes concurrent creation and existing versions refuse; no data GET.
+        result = bao('write', '-format=json', DATA_PATH, '-',
+                     payload={'options': {'cas': 0}, 'data': {'ANTHROPIC_API_KEY': ''}})
+        version = result['data']['version']
+        receipt = {'ccr': 'CCR-2026-0016', 'path': DATA_PATH, 'version': version,
+                   'empty_seed_created': True, 'metadata_written': False,
+                   'request_id': result.get('request_id')}
+        with RECEIPT.open('x') as f:
+            json.dump(receipt, f)
+    else:
+        raise RuntimeError('invalid_arguments')
+    # Only non-secret custom metadata. No secret expiry is enforced by KV metadata.
+    bao('write', '-format=json', META_PATH, '-', payload={'custom_metadata': {
+        'ccr': 'CCR-2026-0016', 'custody_owner': 'railiance-platform',
+        'provider': 'anthropic', 'organization_id': 'e1a8f305-9e64-4639-a7fd-af48e34f37c7',
+        'provider_key_name': 'claude_key_bernd.worsch',
+        'provider_expires_at': '2027-01-31T21:00:00Z',
+        'seed_version': '1', 'seed_contains_secret': 'false',
+        'handoff': 'operator creates next version in UI; runtime lane remains inactive'}})
+    receipt['metadata_written'] = True
+    RECEIPT.write_text(json.dumps(receipt))
+
+if __name__ == '__main__':
+    try:
+        main()
+    except Exception:
+        sys.exit(1)  # contained executor must never return provider/client output