diff --git a/credential-change-requests/CCR-2026-0050-flex-auth-envelope-signing.yaml b/credential-change-requests/CCR-2026-0050-flex-auth-envelope-signing.yaml
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@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+id: CCR-2026-0050
+kind: credential-change-request
+schema_version: 1
+request_type: workload-kv-read
+title: Retained flex-auth lifecycle PDP Ed25519 seed ESO read lane
+status: proposed
+created: '2026-10-16'
+updated: '2026-10-16'
+requester:
+  agent: railiance-platform
+  reason: CUST-WP-0080 / RPF-WP-0035-T12 / FLEX-WP-0024-T06 source proposal. Exact
+    new custody/read scope requires founder review; no approval or native binding
+    is inferred.
+review:
+  required: true
+  required_approvers:
+  - founder
+  - railiance-platform-owner
+  - access-engine-owner
+  - secrets-engine-owner
+  - cluster-gitops-owner
+  comments: []
+target:
+  domain: infotech
+  tenant: platform
+  workload: flex-auth-secrets-engine
+  environment: production
+  purpose: Deliver the Ed25519 seed only to the retained lifecycle PDP startup file.
+    No taskpilot enablement, caller policy changes or private consumer trust discovery.
+openbao:
+  mount: platform
+  kv_path: platform/workloads/flex-auth/envelope-signing
+  fields:
+  - ED25519_PRIVATE_KEY
+  metadata_read: false
+  token_self_lifecycle: true
+  policy_name: workload-kv-read-flex-auth-envelope-signing
+  policy_file: openbao/policies/workload-kv-read-flex-auth-envelope-signing.hcl
+  auth:
+    method: kubernetes
+    mount: kubernetes
+    role: external-secrets-flex-auth-envelope-signing
+    bound_claims:
+      service_account_names:
+      - flex-auth-envelope-signing-eso
+      service_account_namespaces:
+      - flex-auth
+    bound_claims_confirmed: false
+    policies:
+    - workload-kv-read-flex-auth-envelope-signing
+    ttl: 15m
+    audience: openbao
+    token_max_ttl: 15m
+    token_explicit_max_ttl: 15m
+    token_no_default_policy: true
+access_frontdoor:
+  type: external-secrets
+  catalog_id: flex-auth-decision-envelope-signing-key
+  selector: Retained flex-auth/flex-auth-secrets-engine signer only
+  readiness: pending-review
+  resolvable: false
+delivery:
+  surface: external-secrets
+  target: Namespace flex-auth; dedicated SA flex-auth-envelope-signing-eso; SecretStore
+    openbao-flex-auth-envelope-signing; ExternalSecret/Secret flex-auth-secrets-engine-envelope-signing;
+    seed property only -> startup file /var/run/secrets/decision-envelope-signing/seed0440,
+    readOnly uid/gid/fsGroup65532; no envFrom
+  bootstrap_command: Attended writer is a distinct exact-source action proposal in
+    docs/credential-lane-designs/flex-auth-envelope-signing-native-plan.json; this
+    read CCR authorizes neither seed writes nor any execution by itself.
+risk:
+  classification: high
+  notes:
+  - Possession of seed can forge lifecycle PDP envelopes; independent consumer public
+    trust admission and fixed policy pins remain required.
+  - 'KV read is document-granular: dedicated ESO identity can read all three fields;
+    only private field is projected. Signer and Secrets consumer have no KV read role.'
+  - No parent/list/metadata/write/delete capability on ESO role. No token/Secret read
+    or ExternalSecret mutation granted to signer/consumer.
+  - Dedicated role is new scope; founder approval required. No workload rapp tuple
+    invented; absent managed package declaration remains explicit migration debt.
+  - Controlled outage fence stops every signer pod and disables autoscaling before
+    creation/rotation. Recreate single writer and retained PVC remain Access-owned
+    review gates.
+  - fields declares only projected ED25519_PRIVATE_KEY. The same KV document also
+    has public key/kid, and OpenBao data-read is not field-filtered; do not claim
+    field-level authorization.
+verification:
+  positive:
+  - Exact SA/namespace/audience login; native exact data read; ESO Ready/SecretSynced;
+    safe metadata resourceVersion and admitted KV version correspondence.
+  - All retained signer replicas restart with admitted kid/source/image and seed/public
+    correspondence; signed non-effect lifecycle allow/deny with durable originals
+    and independent consumer signature verification.
+  negative:
+  - Wrong SA/namespace/audience login refused; sibling/list/metadata/write/delete
+    denied; signer/consumer TokenRequest and Secret/ExternalSecret mutation denied.
+  - Unknown/old kid, wrong policy, tamper, expired/unsigned envelope, wrong caller
+    and missing seed refuse; no taskpilot activation.
+  - Receipt write failure/lost backend response retained unknown; no blind retry/remint;
+    stale CAS cannot overwrite version.
+  activation_conditions:
+  - All five required approvers independently dispose the exact CCR and native writer/fence
+    proposal; founder exact new custody scope approved.
+  - Current retained identity919ce25, immutable published producer image and explicit
+    new flex-auth-secrets-engine-outbox PVC1Gi/local-path, retention/reclaim and bounded-runtime
+    plan reviewed by Access; missing managed package migration debt explicitly accepted
+    for this retained workload only.
+  - Exact native bound claims verified without printing JWT/Secret; read grant policy
+    and role native readback match source.
+  - Protected child source pinned, silent attended OIDC context verified, target cluster/backend
+    pinned, fence verified and durable receipt custody installed.
+  - Consumer independently admits owner-authenticated public receipt and exact policy/image/trust
+    pins before protected acceptance.
+  evidence: []
+lifecycle:
+  deactivate: Fence all retained signer processes, stop consumers, disable delivery
+    role/ESO and online trust; retain private KV and audit receipts under explicit
+    owner retention until reviewed destruction.
+  rotate: Pre-admit successor public receipt offline; fence consumers/all signer replicas/no
+    HPA; CAS exact version with new in-memory seed; wait exact ESO version, restart
+    single writer, verify native allow/deny and old-key refusal before reopening.
+  compromised: Immediately remove old online trust and stop all signer processes;
+    forward-only CAS recovery with independently approved successor. Never restore
+    compromised seed; archive historical public keys for offline audit only.
+state_hub:
+  workplan_id: RPF-WP-0035
+  task_id: RPF-WP-0035-T12
diff --git a/docs/credential-lane-designs/flex-auth-envelope-signing-native-adapter.md b/docs/credential-lane-designs/flex-auth-envelope-signing-native-adapter.md
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+# Attended native signer custody adapter source
+
+RPF-WP-0035-T12 / CUST-WP-0080. This source implements the protected native
+adapter described by the separate frozen native-preparation R1. It does not
+admit an execution. Its CLI is silent and intended only as the exact reviewed
+child of `warden access openbao-platform-admin-login --exec` in the founder's
+attended OIDC envelope. The existing Warden owner contains the token helper,
+checks child output and revokes/removes the session on exit. No new service,
+credential broker, standing grant, API or key-returning interface is created.
+
+## Current routing blocker
+
+During preparation the required `warden plan` query for attended OpenBao
+platform administration of signer CAS0/metadata selected `openbao-structure-survey`
+with an approve ceremony, rather than `openbao-platform-admin-login` with
+`oidc_login`. The installed CLI reports wheel-bundled catalog0.1.2 fallback.
+This is preserved as a live refusal, not routed around. Exact `route show` names
+the existing active attended login, but that pointer does not cure dispatch.
+The adapter requires an independently retained routing receipt selecting the
+correct lane/verdict/identity act. No founder execution step is ready until the
+routing defect and all other native approvals are resolved by their owners.
+
+## Independent input and authority boundary
+
+The CLI requires an absolute owner-private admission file, its independently
+approved exact SHA256, the exact private receipt directory selected in the
+reviewed native proposal, and an original receipt only for recovery. No default
+image/package/caller trust, founder identity, approval, route or source pin is
+usable. The admission schema is closed in `validate_admission`; it includes the
+immutable published producer image, retained caller, deployment projection,
+selected consumer trust baseline, exact native plan/CCR/source bundle, fresh
+UTC authority expiry (5..120seconds), founder entity and five distinct externally
+reviewed owner dispositions. Each disposition binds the same approval-free
+scope digest. An admission shape, local digest or review string never approves
+itself: the founder and owners must independently review the exact supplied
+command/file hash through existing governance before attended invocation.
+
+The trust hash selects the independently reviewed consumer verifier/policy/trust
+baseline for this custody action. It is not a claim that the newly generated
+public key is already online: generation happens later, and independent delivery
+and successor trust installation are required after the public receipt. The
+writer never reads consumer private credentials or discovers trust from KV.
+All successful custody states remain pending independent public admission.
+
+`checked_sources` verifies the actual selected native action plan, exact proposed
+kid, read CCR hash/status/binding, generated policy source, and source bundle.
+The read CCR must independently be approved/binding-confirmed; the canonical
+proposed CCR remains unapproved, so ordinary source checkout refuses. Source
+bundle pins execution modules, not arbitrary request-selected code. The native
+image/caller/seed projection is compared to the actual stopped Deployment.
+The lifecycle policy digest/version stays unchanged; execute-ccr probes must
+prove no ALLOW/effect. Current generic runtime guard can return HTTP503 before
+the lifecycle evaluator, so signed unknown_action is not promised.
+
+## Actual checks and effects
+
+Before private work, the child checks OpenBao cluster ID, unsealed state, exact
+non-root platform-admin OIDC entity, enabled audit, actual exact read-policy HCL
+and role bindings/15m limits. The selected fixed loopback transport is the existing
+owner-admin bridge; Kubernetes reads use fixed strict-host SSH to railiance01.
+The OpenBao token lookup-self identifier stays only in the contained custody
+process to authenticate fixed HTTP calls; it never reaches the agent, a receipt,
+argv or another token file. This is a native protected-process implementation,
+not evidence that agent runtime isolation has been promoted or granted.
+
+The fence checks the pinned kube-system UID, stopped Deployment generation and
+replica status, exact immutable image/caller/seed mount/kid projection, zero owned
+ReplicaSet replicas, no live or terminating signer-SA/owned/seed-mount pods, and
+no targeting HPA. It rechecks before metadata setup and immediately before CAS.
+A private filesystem lock excludes a second local custody window. The lock and
+observations do not provide atomic Kubernetes fencing: the independently reviewed
+exclusive window must keep GitOps/Helm/other creators stopped. No rollout or
+cluster mutation is performed by this adapter, and no concurrency guarantee is
+inferred from source alone. Access/cluster owners retain that admission.
+
+Bootstrap requires the exact OpenBao empty-errors HTTP404 metadata absence. A
+durable private intent precedes exact CAS-required/max_versions2/no-auto-delete
+metadata setup, followed by exact native readback. Only then does the shared
+Ed25519 primitive generate one in-memory seed and CAS0 the fixed three-field
+KV document. Independent version1 private readback and final metadata verification
+precede the durable success receipt. The seed is never put in argv/env/local
+files or output. The receipt carries public key, ASCII-base64url fingerprint,
+version, bindings and closed phases only. The old fixture's live-dev-process gate
+is preserved; its shared receipt initialization was extracted without weakening
+that gate. Python cannot promise seed zeroization.
+
+Every backend/body/close and tool call has a two-second absolute budget and
+1MiB combined output bound. The complete operation is bounded by the supplied
+fresh expiry. CLI validation and runtime failures remain silent. Existing0600/
+0700 no-follow/ownership checks, exclusive creation, fsync/atomic replacement and
+directory fsync retain evidence. Same-UID hostile code is not isolated by modes;
+Warden's contained home, trusted runtime and independently reviewed custody
+location are required, not inferred from approval frequency or shell prefixes.
+
+## Process loss and independent read-only recovery
+
+Any failed/ambiguous metadata/write/readback/final receipt outcome remains
+unconfirmed. A success receipt is withheld until final metadata verification.
+A child death immediately after the real native CAS leaves the earlier public
+intent with its derived public key and no private value. A fresh `recover`
+admission must bind that exact original receipt SHA and the same immutable scope.
+It reserves a new durable recovery intent before private reads, verifies current
+version1 metadata and exact private seed/public/kid correspondence, and records
+separate public reconciliation. It never creates a writer, generates a seed,
+POSTs metadata/data, restores a seed, consumes approval or dispatches business
+operations. Original unknown evidence is never rewritten. Changed versions,
+damaged/typed-invalid receipts, missing fresh reviews and denied reads refuse;
+replaying a recovery ID cannot repeat even the private backend read.
+
+This source implements bootstrap and read-only version1 reconciliation only.
+Rotation needs a separately reviewed exact-version native action; the disposable
+primitive's CAS1 test is not a native rotation grant. No automatic retry, remint,
+rollback or general recovery API exists. Metadata-only setup uncertainty without
+a public seed intent requires separate attended reconciliation, not this path.
+
+Access observed zero PVCs in flex-auth. Its proposed new1Gi/local-path outbox,
+PV Retain/reclaim disposition and runtime process-lock/capacity/startup bounds
+remain separate reviews. This writer grants no PVC, audit egress, policy role,
+SecretStore/Secret or producer/consumer deployment admission.
+
+## R2 phase-aware recovery and source lineage
+
+Frozen R1's metadata-only crash counterexample remains valid historical evidence.
+R2 accepts a strict original metadata-setup receipt with no public key, or a
+seed-cas receipt with a canonical derived public key. Fresh recovery reserves
+durable evidence before target reads. Exact current metadata absence AND exact
+version1 data absence yields `current-custody-absent`. Exact configured metadata
+with current_version0 AND exact version1 data absence yields
+`metadata-only-confirmed`. Both results have no public key/fingerprint/KV version,
+key_custody_verified=false, historical_effect=unresolved, original_unknown_preserved,
+and an explicit fresh independently reviewed action requirement. A locally
+generated but unstored seed's public key is not promoted into public admission.
+Neither observation means the original attempt historically made no effects.
+
+Denied/malformed/misleading404 metadata or data, timeout, changed configuration,
+unexpected versions, or version1 after a metadata-only/no-public phase keep the
+new recovery attempt unconfirmed. They never grant generation, write, retry,
+remint, consume or business authority. A subsequent metadata-only bootstrap is
+not silently enabled: existing metadata still refuses CAS0 bootstrap admission.
+A distinct exact reviewed action/source revision must choose any cleanup/reuse
+or generation step. The original receipt remains byte-for-byte unchanged.
+
+Native plan bootstrap.source_primitive_sha256 now equals the actual shared
+primitive in the admitted source bundle and writer receipt; checked_sources
+enforces the join. The prior8ed pin is explicitly historical. The plan pins the
+shared primitive, not itself or the complete native executor, so no self-hash
+cycle exists. The exact native executor is independently pinned by source_bundle
+and its digest in bindings. A recover admission must additionally supply
+original_execution (original receipt bindings, writer SHA and CCR SHA). Fresh
+owner reviews bind both original and current lineages. This can describe an older
+executed source/proposal without labeling it current. Image/deployment/policy/
+consumer trust bindings must still match; recovery cannot change that authority.
+
+## Exact120-second expiry and attended scheduling assessment
+
+The unchanged validate_admission rule requires an absolute UTC expires_at with
+5 < expires_at-now <=120seconds, and the entire child runs beneath that fixed
+remaining absolute/monotonic budget. The five external reviews cover the scope
+digest including expires_at. No deadline is generated, refreshed or widened by
+the child; rechecking cannot extend it.
+
+Existing ops-warden proxy.proxy_attended_login_exec runs the OIDC client before the child.
+Its _contained_run captures output through subprocess.run without a timeout.
+Therefore neither OIDC/MFA nor five external reviews have a demonstrated bound
+that fits120seconds from preparing an admission. Creating a now+120seconds
+admission before unbounded review/login is not a reliable operational ceremony.
+Source success tests start from synthetic ready identities; they prove no human
+OIDC/review timing SLO.
+
+A coherent ceremony under the current rule is to pre-review one exact future
+absolute expiry/window, including all artifact/source/image/trust/identity and
+review references, then arrange attended login so the child starts within its
+implicit [expires_at-120seconds, expires_at-5seconds) interval. Review may occur
+before that interval; it does not change runtime authority. The founder must aim
+for the beginning of the interval, not its last five seconds. The fixed path has
+26 bounded native/tool requests before success (52seconds at their2second caps),
+plus key/source/receipt work. Its expiry still wins if those operations cannot
+finish; no completion or filesystem timing guarantee is inferred.
+
+If login completes too early/late, a review changes any bytes, or adequate time
+remains uncertain, refuse this revision. A new expires_at changes the approved
+scope digest and needs explicit dispositions for the new revision; existing
+source-only reviews cannot be copied into native approval. Do not silently
+refresh after OIDC, reinterpret expiry as start-only, widen120seconds, skip
+reviews or start a general window-grant service. An alternative authority/window
+contract would itself require separate owner/founder design and is not supplied
+by R2. Current native admission remains unapproved.
diff --git a/docs/credential-lane-designs/flex-auth-envelope-signing-native-plan.json b/docs/credential-lane-designs/flex-auth-envelope-signing-native-plan.json
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+++ b/docs/credential-lane-designs/flex-auth-envelope-signing-native-plan.json
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+{
+  "schema": "railiance-platform.signer-native-action-proposal.v1",
+  "proposal_id": "RPF35-PDP-SIGNER-NATIVE-20261016-R1",
+  "status": "prepared-unapproved",
+  "read_ccr": "CCR-2026-0050",
+  "proposal_scope": "attended bootstrap of retained lifecycle PDP seed; no taskpilot enablement, rotation requires a new exact-version action revision",
+  "actor": "founder attended OIDC via warden openbao-platform-admin-login; reviewed silent Platform custody child",
+  "executor_ownership": "railiance-platform; founder executes exact child; agent receives closed metadata only",
+  "abort_owner": "founder; Platform preserves unknown custody/evidence, Access keeps signer/consumers fenced",
+  "target": {
+    "cluster": "primary/railiance01",
+    "kube_system_uid": "a553c742-0115-43d4-99a4-a5ca56fe0786",
+    "openbao_cluster_id": "fd28df5d-98ec-57dd-42ec-9b3e4f4e53bf",
+    "openbao_origin": "http://127.0.0.1:18200",
+    "namespace": "flex-auth",
+    "deployment": "flex-auth-secrets-engine",
+    "signer_sa": "flex-auth-secrets-engine"
+  },
+  "credential_route": "openbao-platform-admin-login; flex-auth-decision-envelope-signing-key remains draft/nonresolvable; route is not a seed vending service",
+  "bootstrap": {
+    "action": "CAS0 fresh in-memory Ed25519 seed",
+    "kid": "flex-auth-lifecycle-20261016-r1",
+    "expected_version": 0,
+    "data_path": "platform/data/workloads/flex-auth/envelope-signing",
+    "document_fields": [
+      "ED25519_PRIVATE_KEY",
+      "ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY",
+      "kid"
+    ],
+    "metadata_path": "platform/metadata/workloads/flex-auth/envelope-signing",
+    "metadata_contract": {
+      "cas_required": true,
+      "max_versions": 2,
+      "delete_version_after": "0s"
+    },
+    "allowed_native_methods": [
+      {
+        "method": "POST",
+        "path": "platform/metadata/workloads/flex-auth/envelope-signing",
+        "purpose": "CAS-required/version-retention configuration after absence/no-drift validation"
+      },
+      {
+        "method": "GET",
+        "path": "platform/metadata/workloads/flex-auth/envelope-signing",
+        "purpose": "exact metadata readback, no private value output"
+      },
+      {
+        "method": "POST",
+        "path": "platform/data/workloads/flex-auth/envelope-signing",
+        "purpose": "single CAS0 seed document write"
+      },
+      {
+        "method": "GET",
+        "path": "platform/data/workloads/flex-auth/envelope-signing?version=1",
+        "purpose": "exact private readback in custody, closed public receipt only"
+      }
+    ],
+    "source_primitive_sha256": "sha256:f169ad12f90d729b647085c3bed2c0d8d005db23a2341b6d3d5f1793bcfd110c",
+    "historical_source_primitive_sha256": "sha256:8ed281a49c1f1cdb23772efe3593e75c62572a12b8d7a6a4c574f27b38722e75",
+    "source_lineage_rule": "source_primitive_sha256 must equal current admitted source_bundle[scripts/flex_auth_signer_custody.py] and exact writer receipt; historical_source_primitive_sha256 is non-authoritative R1 evidence only"
+  },
+  "fencing": {
+    "before_key_generation": [
+      "Verify cluster/backend IDs, exact current source/CCR and founder disposition hashes.",
+      "Read exact deployment/ReplicaSets/pods by ownerReference and SA; refuse a second workload/pod using signer SA or selecting signer Secret.",
+      "Access stops protected consumers and scales retained deployment0 through its reviewed release path; this child does not mutate replicas.",
+      "Verify deployment spec replicas0, observed generation caught up, no live or terminating owned ReplicaSet/pods, no matching signer-SA pods and no HPA targeting deployment.",
+      "Reject a differing/previously existing KV entry at bootstrap. Hold exclusive owner action receipt lock and recheck fence immediately before CAS."
+    ],
+    "after_cas": "Keep consumers/signer stopped until independent public admission and exact ESO/readback/source/image verification. Recreate1 is Access-owned; any drift or uncertain outcome keeps fence closed. Access reports current outbox lacks OS process lock, byte ceiling and bounded startup/compaction; Recreate1 alone is not bounded durable acceptance. Keep protected acceptance closed until reviewed source hardening or explicit bounded attended fixture disposition.",
+    "concurrency": "Single attended owner window/exclusive receipt; GitOps/Helm autosync/other writers must be paused by Access/cluster owner under distinct reviewed action. Plan is not a Kubernetes atomic fence or same-UID isolation."
+  },
+  "protected_adapter": {
+    "state": "implementation/independent tests still required before executable approval; fixture code must never be promoted by removing its dev-process check",
+    "reuse": [
+      "scripts/state_hub_preflight_lane.py attended silent child/cluster/platform-admin/fencing patterns",
+      "scripts/flex_auth_signer_custody.py protected Ed25519 CAS/readback and receipt state machine",
+      "scripts/task_execution_native_fixture.py absolute main-thread2s I/O budget",
+      "scripts/task_execution_recovery.py strict bounded JSON/no-follow/private custody patterns"
+    ],
+    "requirements": [
+      "New fixed native adapter consumes exact approved CCR/source/native-action digest; cannot accept arbitrary URL/path/command/payload/seed.",
+      "Read OIDC token only within warden child from attended context; require platform-admin and reject root; never print/store bearer. No credential comes back to agent.",
+      "Pin exact kube-system/OpenBao cluster IDs before private calls, refuse ambient address override; enforce2s absolute reads and1MiB cap; no redirect/shell/tracing.",
+      "Verify metadata absence/exact admitted values before CAS-required change; any differing existing object refuses. Exact response contracts and duplicate/nonfinite JSON rejection.",
+      "Private seed is generated once, never imported or persisted outside OpenBao; no subprocess argv/env seed; readback compares exact version/fields and derived public correspondence.",
+      "Receipt intent is durable before native effect; final success requires exact KV/metadata correspondence and receipt fsync. Process loss/error remains unknown without remint/retry."
+    ]
+  },
+  "receipts": {
+    "directory": "/home/worsch/.local/state/railiance-platform/flex-auth-envelope-signing",
+    "mode_directory": "0700",
+    "mode_file": "0600",
+    "native_execution_location": "founder workstation inside reviewed warden child; no agent-owned shared /tmp custody",
+    "basename": "RPF35-PDP-SIGNER-NATIVE-20261016-R1.json",
+    "maximum_bytes": 65536,
+    "atomic": "exclusive initial receipt, fsync-before-effect, atomic replacement and directory fsync, no-follow/owner/mode/nlink validation",
+    "public_fields": [
+      "proposal/executed source/CCR/identity/cluster/image/policy/trust digests",
+      "actor/time",
+      "closed phase/status",
+      "exact KV path/version/kid",
+      "public key and explicitly encoded fingerprint",
+      "fence/metadata/readback checks",
+      "rollback or unknown recovery disposition"
+    ],
+    "fingerprint": "sha256: lowercase SHA256 of canonical unpadded base64url public-key ASCII, exactly43bytes; independent Secrets owner agreement before admission",
+    "delivery": "Founder/Platform separately authenticate metadata receipt to Secrets owner; public receipt shape/file does not create consumer trust; raw private receipt directory is not a shared agent intake"
+  },
+  "rollback": {
+    "before_cas": "Abort without private write; retain receipt/fence; restore prior Access image/values only via reviewed Access action.",
+    "after_cas_unknown": "Retain unknown and fence; independently attended owner reconciles exact metadata/version/public correspondence. Never rerun CAS0 or restore prior seed automatically.",
+    "compromise": "Remove online old public key immediately; stop signer, independent new reviewed forward-only action; old private seed never restored."
+  },
+  "requested_scope": {
+    "read_lane": "Exact CCR0050 policy/role/delivery source only after separate founder review. No extra ESO RBAC permitted.",
+    "custody_writer": "One attended exact-target CAS0 plus fixed KV metadata setup/readback; no standing writer grant or broker role. This authority is separate from read CCR.",
+    "kubernetes": "Metadata-only fence observations by child; Access/cluster separately approve stop/restart/delivery manifests and sync control.",
+    "new_infrastructure_spend_eur": 0,
+    "new_resources": "Platform creates no storage resources. Access reports zero flex-auth PVCs; Access proposes separate exact new flex-auth-secrets-engine-outbox1Gi local-path Helmkeep. Provisioning, PV reclaim/Delete/WaitForFirstConsumer retention and runtime log bounds require separate founder/cluster/Access review; no durable outbox acceptance yet.",
+    "risk_bound": "Controlled loss of retained PDP availability during explicit attended fence; seed compromise can forge lifecycle decisions until independent public trust withdrawal; founder must approve this concrete high-risk scope."
+  },
+  "reviews_required": [
+    {
+      "role": "railiance-platform-owner",
+      "disposition": "pending exact source/artifact review; no approval recorded"
+    },
+    {
+      "role": "access-engine-owner",
+      "disposition": "pending exact source/artifact review; no approval recorded"
+    },
+    {
+      "role": "secrets-engine-owner",
+      "disposition": "pending exact source/artifact review; no approval recorded"
+    },
+    {
+      "role": "cluster-gitops-owner",
+      "disposition": "pending exact source/artifact review; no approval recorded"
+    },
+    {
+      "role": "founder",
+      "disposition": "pending exact source/artifact review; no approval recorded"
+    }
+  ],
+  "authority_granted": false,
+  "candidate_delivery_amendments": {
+    "supersedes_unadmitted_R3_role": "external-secrets-flex-auth-envelope-signing replaces flex-auth-envelope-signing-eso to fit existing delegated-applier role convention; dedicated SA unchanged",
+    "read_ccr_field_projection": "Only ED25519_PRIVATE_KEY is delivered; public sibling fields remain visible to dedicated document-reader identity but never become consumer trust discovery",
+    "projection_source": "docs/credential-lane-designs/flex-auth-envelope-signing-native-projection.yaml.proposed",
+    "managed_declaration": "Missing rapp declaration remains migration debt; retain actual Access919ce25 workload identity, do not create package tuple"
+  }
+}
diff --git a/docs/credential-lane-designs/flex-auth-envelope-signing-native-plan.md b/docs/credential-lane-designs/flex-auth-envelope-signing-native-plan.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..01853bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/credential-lane-designs/flex-auth-envelope-signing-native-plan.md
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+# Native signer action preparation
+
+CCR-2026-0050 is a schema-valid proposed ESO read grant. It does not authorize
+secret writes. The separate exact native-action JSON requests one attended CAS0
+and fixed metadata setup/readback; founder disposition is still pending. No
+standing writer/broker grant, private consumer lookup, rapp declaration or policy
+change is introduced. Native private custody remains in the founder's reviewed
+warden child, not an agent prompt or temporary file.
+
+The JSON fixes the target/cluster/backend, new kid, CAS version, exact native
+methods, retention/CAS metadata, existing custody machinery, signer fence,
+receipt location/encoding, abort owner and forward-only recovery. It separately
+identifies Access/cluster-owned stop/restart/ESO/PVC and Secrets-owned independent
+public admission. These owners must review their exact inputs; Platform cannot
+sign their dispositions. The program that enforces this native contract still
+requires source implementation and independent tests before executable approval.
+The existing fixture adapter must not be promoted by deleting its process check.
+
+Source preparation validated the real credential-change schema and generated
+HCL. The expected unconfirmed-bound-claims warning and proposed status preserve
+apply refusal. No live observation/identity confirmation, credential read, CAS,
+policy write, role, Kubernetes or route mutation occurred. Missing managed
+package declaration remains explicit migration debt for the retained workload.
+
+The native candidate explicitly amends two unadmitted R3 read-lane choices:
+role `external-secrets-flex-auth-envelope-signing` follows the existing delegated
+applier convention; read CCR fields names the projected ED25519_PRIVATE_KEY only.
+The same document has public sibling fields; document-granular read means ESO
+can read those too, so this is not field-level authorization. The sibling native
+projection proposal and CCR agree on the new role. Historical R3 is not mutated.
+
+Access metadata observation found zero PVCs in flex-auth. Its exact proposed
+new outbox PVC1Gi/local-path is a separate resource/retention scope, with Delete/
+WaitForFirstConsumer PV behavior needing explicit treatment. Existing outbox code
+lacks process locking/byte ceiling/bounded startup and compaction. Neither
+Recreate1 nor Helmkeep supplies these guarantees; production durable acceptance
+remains closed until Access-owned hardening and cluster/storage review.
diff --git a/docs/credential-lane-designs/flex-auth-envelope-signing-native-projection.yaml.proposed b/docs/credential-lane-designs/flex-auth-envelope-signing-native-projection.yaml.proposed
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..589a7ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/credential-lane-designs/flex-auth-envelope-signing-native-projection.yaml.proposed
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+# SOURCE PROPOSAL ONLY: no CCR admission, no apply, no plaintext key.
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: ServiceAccount
+metadata:
+  name: flex-auth-envelope-signing-eso
+  namespace: flex-auth
+automountServiceAccountToken: false
+---
+apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
+kind: SecretStore
+metadata:
+  name: openbao-flex-auth-envelope-signing
+  namespace: flex-auth
+spec:
+  provider:
+    vault:
+      server: http://openbao.openbao.svc:8200
+      path: platform
+      version: v2
+      auth:
+        kubernetes:
+          mountPath: kubernetes
+          role: external-secrets-flex-auth-envelope-signing
+          serviceAccountRef:
+            name: flex-auth-envelope-signing-eso
+            audiences: [openbao]
+---
+apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
+kind: ExternalSecret
+metadata:
+  name: flex-auth-secrets-engine-envelope-signing
+  namespace: flex-auth
+spec:
+  refreshInterval: 5m
+  secretStoreRef:
+    kind: SecretStore
+    name: openbao-flex-auth-envelope-signing
+  target:
+    name: flex-auth-secrets-engine-envelope-signing
+    creationPolicy: Owner
+    deletionPolicy: Retain
+    template:
+      metadata:
+        annotations:
+          railiance.io/custody-proposal: RPF35-PDP-SIGNER-NATIVE-20261016-R1
+  data:
+  - secretKey: seed
+    remoteRef:
+      key: workloads/flex-auth/envelope-signing
+      property: ED25519_PRIVATE_KEY
diff --git a/openbao/policies/workload-kv-read-flex-auth-envelope-signing.hcl b/openbao/policies/workload-kv-read-flex-auth-envelope-signing.hcl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..57425e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbao/policies/workload-kv-read-flex-auth-envelope-signing.hcl
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+path "platform/data/workloads/flex-auth/envelope-signing" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}
+
+path "auth/token/lookup-self" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}
+
+path "auth/token/revoke-self" {
+  capabilities = ["update"]
+}
diff --git a/scripts/flex_auth_signer_custody.py b/scripts/flex_auth_signer_custody.py
index 1783a6f..1fd1197 100644
--- a/scripts/flex_auth_signer_custody.py
+++ b/scripts/flex_auth_signer_custody.py
@@ -58,6 +58,10 @@ class SignerWriter:
                 or '-dev' not in process.args or '-dev-no-store-token' not in process.args
                 or '-dev-listen-address=127.0.0.1:'+str(admission.port) not in process.args):
             raise Refused('live owner-spawned disposable dev process required')
+        self.admission=admission
+        self._initialize_receipt(directory,operation_id,kid=kid,expected_version=expected_version,bindings=bindings)
+
+    def _initialize_receipt(self,directory,operation_id,*,kid,expected_version,bindings):
         if (type(operation_id) is not str or not re.fullmatch(r'[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,80}',operation_id)
                 or type(kid) is not str or not re.fullmatch(r'[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,80}',kid)
                 or type(expected_version) is not int or not 0<=expected_version<2**31
@@ -66,7 +70,7 @@ class SignerWriter:
             raise Refused('exact signer operation contract required')
         if directory.absolute()!=directory.resolve() or directory.is_symlink():raise Refused('indirect receipt custody refused')
         Journal._private(directory.stat(),directory=True)
-        self.admission=admission;self.directory=directory;self.path=directory/(operation_id+'.json')
+        self.directory=directory;self.path=directory/(operation_id+'.json')
         self.expected_version=expected_version;self.kid=kid;self.attempted=False
         self.receipt={'schema':'railiance-platform.signer-cas-receipt.v1','operation_id':operation_id,
             'bindings':dict(bindings),'writer_sha256':'sha256:'+hashlib.sha256(Path(__file__).read_bytes()).hexdigest(),
diff --git a/scripts/flex_auth_signer_native.py b/scripts/flex_auth_signer_native.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c8cf934
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/flex_auth_signer_native.py
@@ -0,0 +1,417 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Silent attended retained-lifecycle signer custody; never a credential front door.
+
+Invoke only through the reviewed warden platform-admin envelope. The externally
+reviewed admission SHA is an exact-command input, not approval by JSON shape.
+No private value crosses stdout/stderr, argv, receipt or persistent local storage.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+import argparse
+import base64
+from datetime import datetime,timezone
+import fcntl
+import hashlib
+import hmac
+import http.client
+import importlib.util
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import selectors
+import shlex
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import time
+
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PrivateKey
+from flex_auth_signer_custody import SignerWriter,PATH,FIELDS,BINDINGS,encoded,b64
+from task_execution_journal import Journal,Refused
+from task_execution_native_fixture import _absolute_budget
+from task_execution_recovery import _json_unique,_invalid_constant,_policy_absent,_same_policy
+
+ROOT=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+META='platform/metadata/workloads/flex-auth/envelope-signing'
+CCR='credential-change-requests/CCR-2026-0050-flex-auth-envelope-signing.yaml'
+PLAN='docs/credential-lane-designs/flex-auth-envelope-signing-native-plan.json'
+CLUSTER='a553c742-0115-43d4-99a4-a5ca56fe0786'
+BAO_CLUSTER='fd28df5d-98ec-57dd-42ec-9b3e4f4e53bf'
+NAME='flex-auth-secrets-engine'
+SECRET='flex-auth-secrets-engine-envelope-signing'
+ROLE='external-secrets-flex-auth-envelope-signing'
+LIFECYCLE='sha256:bd11c5fe77ce6439c65fea225ad6b71d2110efc5e7b5bc9b499c59cd0a53b8b4'
+REVIEWS={'founder','railiance-platform-owner','access-engine-owner','secrets-engine-owner','cluster-gitops-owner'}
+SOURCE_FILES={'scripts/flex_auth_signer_native.py','scripts/flex_auth_signer_custody.py','scripts/task_execution_native_fixture.py','scripts/task_execution_journal.py','scripts/task_execution_recovery.py','scripts/credential-change.py'}
+
+
+def require(ok,reason):
+    if not ok:raise Refused(reason)
+
+
+def digest(raw):return 'sha256:'+hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()
+def is_digest(value):return type(value) is str and re.fullmatch(r'sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}',value) is not None
+
+def private_read(path,limit=65536):
+    path=Path(path)
+    require(path.is_absolute() and path.absolute()==path.resolve() and not path.is_symlink(),'indirect private input')
+    Journal._private(path.parent.stat(),directory=True)
+    fd=os.open(path,os.O_RDONLY|os.O_NOFOLLOW|os.O_NONBLOCK)
+    try:
+        before=os.fstat(fd);Journal._private(before)
+        raw=os.read(fd,limit+1);after=os.fstat(fd)
+        require((before.st_dev,before.st_ino,before.st_size,before.st_mtime_ns,before.st_ctime_ns)==
+                (after.st_dev,after.st_ino,after.st_size,after.st_mtime_ns,after.st_ctime_ns)
+                and len(raw)==before.st_size and len(raw)<=limit,'private input changed or oversized')
+        return raw
+    finally:os.close(fd)
+
+
+def parsed(raw):
+    try:return json.loads(raw,object_pairs_hook=_json_unique,parse_constant=_invalid_constant)
+    except Exception:raise Refused('invalid closed JSON input') from None
+
+
+def validate_admission(value):
+    fields={'schema','action','operation_id','kid','expires_at','founder_entity_id','ccr_sha256','source_bundle','bindings',
+            'producer_image','caller_binding','deployment_projection_sha256','authority','routing','owner_reviews',
+            'exclusive_window_sha256','consumer_trust_sha256','original_receipt_sha256','original_execution'}
+    require(type(value) is dict and set(value)==fields,'exact admission schema required')
+    require(value['schema']=='railiance-platform.signer-native-admission.v1' and value['action'] in {'bootstrap','recover'},'native admission action refused')
+    require(type(value['operation_id']) is str and re.fullmatch(r'[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,80}',value['operation_id']) and
+            type(value['kid']) is str and re.fullmatch(r'[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,80}',value['kid']),'native operation identity required')
+    require(type(value['founder_entity_id']) is str and re.fullmatch(r'[a-f0-9-]{36}',value['founder_entity_id']),'explicit attended identity required')
+    require(all(is_digest(value[x]) for x in ['ccr_sha256','deployment_projection_sha256','exclusive_window_sha256','consumer_trust_sha256']),'explicit custody/image/trust selections required')
+    require(type(value['producer_image']) is str and re.fullmatch(r'forgejo\.coulomb\.social/coulomb/flex-auth@sha256:[a-f0-9]{64}',value['producer_image']),'immutable producer image required')
+    require(value['caller_binding']=='secrets-engine=system:serviceaccount:secrets-engine:secrets-engine','retained caller binding required')
+    require(value['authority']=='founder-attended-exact-source-scope; no standing grant','independent attended authority required')
+    route=value['routing'];require(type(route) is dict and set(route)=={'lane_id','verdict','founder_act','receipt_sha256'} and
+        route['lane_id']=='openbao-platform-admin-login' and route['verdict']=='founder_required' and route['founder_act']=='oidc_login' and is_digest(route['receipt_sha256']),'routing mismatch refused')
+    reviews=value['owner_reviews'];require(type(reviews) is dict and set(reviews)==REVIEWS,'distinct owner reviews required')
+    for role,review in reviews.items():
+        require(type(review) is dict and set(review)=={'approved_admission_sha256','approval_ref'} and
+            is_digest(review['approved_admission_sha256']) and type(review['approval_ref']) is str and
+            0<len(review['approval_ref'])<=200,'exact external review required')
+    # Dispositions bind a claim-free scope digest, avoiding self-referential JSON.
+    scope={k:v for k,v in value.items() if k!='owner_reviews'};scope_digest=digest(encoded(scope))
+    require(all(x['approved_admission_sha256']==scope_digest for x in reviews.values()),'owner review scope mismatch')
+    require(type(value['source_bundle']) is dict and set(value['source_bundle'])==SOURCE_FILES and
+            all(is_digest(x) for x in value['source_bundle'].values()),'exact execution source bundle required')
+    require(type(value['bindings']) is dict and set(value['bindings'])==BINDINGS and all(is_digest(x) for x in value['bindings'].values()),'exact execution bindings required')
+    require(value['bindings']['policy_sha256']==LIFECYCLE and value['bindings']['image_sha256']=='sha256:'+value['producer_image'].rsplit('sha256:',1)[1]
+            and value['bindings']['trust_sha256']==value['consumer_trust_sha256']
+            and value['bindings']['deployment_sha256']==value['deployment_projection_sha256']
+            and value['bindings']['executed_revision_sha256']==digest(encoded(value['source_bundle'])),'immutable lifecycle/image/trust/source mismatch')
+    require((value['action']=='bootstrap' and value['original_receipt_sha256'] is None) or
+            (value['action']=='recover' and is_digest(value['original_receipt_sha256'])),'separate recovery disposition required')
+    original=value['original_execution']
+    if value['action']=='bootstrap':require(original is None,'bootstrap cannot import execution lineage')
+    else:
+        require(type(original) is dict and set(original)=={'bindings','writer_sha256','source_ccr_sha256'} and
+                is_digest(original['writer_sha256']) and is_digest(original['source_ccr_sha256']) and
+                type(original['bindings']) is dict and set(original['bindings'])==BINDINGS and
+                all(is_digest(x) for x in original['bindings'].values()),'independently reviewed original execution lineage required')
+        require(all(original['bindings'][key]==value['bindings'][key] for key in BINDINGS-{'proposal_sha256','executed_revision_sha256'}),
+                'recovery cannot change original image/deployment/policy/trust authority')
+    try:expires=datetime.fromisoformat(value['expires_at'].replace('Z','+00:00'));remaining=(expires-datetime.now(timezone.utc)).total_seconds()
+    except Exception:raise Refused('invalid authority expiry') from None
+    require(expires.utcoffset().total_seconds()==0 and 5<remaining<=120,'bounded fresh attended window required')
+    return remaining
+
+
+class NativeIO:
+    """All tools capture/discard private bytes; fixed transport and no shell."""
+    def captured(self,argv,payload=None,*,allowed=(0,)):
+        env=os.environ.copy();env.update(BAO_ADDR='http://127.0.0.1:18200',VAULT_ADDR='http://127.0.0.1:18200')
+        for key in ('BAO_LOG_LEVEL','VAULT_LOG_LEVEL'):
+            require(env.get(key,'').lower() not in {'debug','trace'},'verbose custody environment refused')
+        # A hostile inherited CLI config is not an alternate identity/endpoint.
+        require(not env.get('BAO_NAMESPACE') and not env.get('VAULT_NAMESPACE') and not env.get('VAULT_SKIP_VERIFY'),'ambient backend override refused')
+        proc=subprocess.Popen(argv,stdin=subprocess.PIPE,stdout=subprocess.PIPE,stderr=subprocess.PIPE,env=env)
+        try:
+            if payload is not None:proc.stdin.write(encoded(payload));proc.stdin.flush()
+            proc.stdin.close()
+            sel=selectors.DefaultSelector();data={proc.stdout:bytearray(),proc.stderr:bytearray()}
+            try:
+                for stream in data:sel.register(stream,selectors.EVENT_READ)
+                deadline=time.monotonic()+2
+                while sel.get_map():
+                    remaining=deadline-time.monotonic();require(remaining>0,'absolute custody command timeout')
+                    for item,_ in sel.select(remaining):
+                        chunk=os.read(item.fileobj.fileno(),65536)
+                        if not chunk:sel.unregister(item.fileobj)
+                        else:
+                            data[item.fileobj].extend(chunk)
+                            require(sum(map(len,data.values()))<=1048576,'custody command output bound')
+                code=proc.wait(timeout=max(.001,deadline-time.monotonic()))
+                require(code in allowed,'custody command unconfirmed')
+                return code,bytes(data[proc.stdout])
+            finally:sel.close()
+        except BaseException:
+            proc.kill();proc.wait(timeout=2);raise Refused('custody command unconfirmed') from None
+        finally:
+            proc.stdout.close();proc.stderr.close()
+    def bao(self,args,payload=None,allowed=(0,)):
+        with _absolute_budget(2):
+            code,raw=self.captured(['bao',*args],payload,allowed=allowed)
+            return code,parsed(raw)
+    def kube(self,resource,name=None):
+        args=['kubectl','--request-timeout=2s']
+        if resource!='namespace':args+=['-n','flex-auth']
+        args+=['get',resource]
+        if name:args.append(name)
+        args+=['-o','json']
+        with _absolute_budget(2):
+            _,raw=self.captured(['ssh','-o','BatchMode=yes','-o','StrictHostKeyChecking=yes','-o','ConnectTimeout=2','railiance01',shlex.join(args)])
+            return parsed(raw)
+    def http(self,method,path,body=None):
+        require(method in {'GET','POST'} and path in {META,PATH,PATH+'?version=1'},'fixed custody path required')
+        require(type(getattr(self,'_token',None)) is str and self._token,'contained attended session required')
+        with _absolute_budget(2):
+            conn=http.client.HTTPConnection('127.0.0.1',18200,timeout=2)
+            try:
+                conn.request(method,'/v1/'+path,body=None if body is None else encoded(body),
+                             headers={'X-Vault-Token':self._token,'Content-Type':'application/json'})
+                response=conn.getresponse();raw=response.read(1048577)
+                require(len(raw)<=1048576,'custody response bound')
+                return response.status,parsed(raw) if raw else {}
+            finally:conn.close()
+
+
+def deployment_projection(deployment):
+    spec=deployment['spec']['template']['spec'];containers=spec.get('containers',[])
+    require(type(containers) is list and len(containers)==1 and not spec.get('initContainers'),'single fixed signer container required')
+    item=containers[0]
+    # Never hash arbitrary env values or an entire Secret/spec response.
+    return {'service_account':spec.get('serviceAccountName'),'image':item.get('image'),
+            'args':item.get('args'),'volume_mounts':item.get('volumeMounts',[]),
+            'volumes':spec.get('volumes',[]),'security_context':spec.get('securityContext')}
+
+
+def fence(io,contract):
+    namespace=io.kube('namespace','kube-system')
+    require(namespace.get('metadata',{}).get('uid')==CLUSTER,'wrong target cluster')
+    deployment=io.kube('deployment',NAME);spec=deployment.get('spec',{});meta=deployment.get('metadata',{})
+    require(type(spec.get('replicas')) is int and spec['replicas']==0 and
+            deployment.get('status',{}).get('observedGeneration',-1)==meta.get('generation') and
+            not deployment.get('status',{}).get('replicas',0),'all signer replicas must be stopped')
+    projection=deployment_projection(deployment)
+    require(digest(encoded(projection))==contract['deployment_projection_sha256'] and
+            projection['service_account']==NAME and projection['image']==contract['producer_image'],'fenced deployment source/image mismatch')
+    args=projection['args'];require(type(args) is list and all(type(x) is str for x in args),'exact signer args required')
+    def option(flag):
+        require(args.count(flag)==1 and args.index(flag)+1<len(args),'fixed signer flag required')
+        return args[args.index(flag)+1]
+    require(option('--caller-auth-mode')=='enforce' and option('--caller-audience')=='flex-auth' and
+            option('--caller-binding')==contract['caller_binding'],'retained caller guard required')
+    require(not any(x.startswith(flag+'=') for x in args for flag in ['--caller-auth-mode','--caller-binding','--caller-audience','--envelope-signing-key-file','--envelope-signing-kid']),'ambiguous protected args refused')
+    require(option('--envelope-signing-key-file')=='/var/run/secrets/decision-envelope-signing/seed' and
+            option('--envelope-signing-kid')==contract['kid'],'exact seed mount and startup kid required')
+    volumes=projection['volumes'];mounts=projection['volume_mounts']
+    matching=[x for x in volumes if x.get('name')=='flex-auth-envelope-signing']
+    require(len(matching)==1 and matching[0].get('secret')=={'secretName':SECRET,'defaultMode':288,'items':[{'key':'seed','path':'seed'}]},'exact seed volume required')
+    require(any(x=={'name':'flex-auth-envelope-signing','mountPath':'/var/run/secrets/decision-envelope-signing','readOnly':True} for x in mounts),'readonly seed mount required')
+    uid=meta.get('uid');require(type(uid) is str and uid,'deployment UID required')
+    sets=io.kube('replicasets').get('items');pods=io.kube('pods').get('items');hpas=io.kube('hpa').get('items')
+    require(type(sets) is list and type(pods) is list and type(hpas) is list,'complete fence observations required')
+    rsids=[]
+    for item in sets:
+        if any(x.get('uid')==uid for x in item.get('metadata',{}).get('ownerReferences',[])):
+            require(type(item.get('spec',{}).get('replicas')) is int and item['spec']['replicas']==0 and
+                    type(item.get('status',{}).get('replicas',0)) is int and not item.get('status',{}).get('replicas',0),'owned ReplicaSet still running')
+            rsids.append(item['metadata']['uid'])
+    for item in pods:
+        podspec=item.get('spec',{})
+        uses_secret=any(x.get('secret',{}).get('secretName')==SECRET for x in podspec.get('volumes',[]))
+        owned=any(x.get('uid') in [uid,*rsids] for x in item.get('metadata',{}).get('ownerReferences',[]))
+        require(not owned and podspec.get('serviceAccountName')!=NAME and not uses_secret,'live or terminating signer pod refused')
+    require(not any(x.get('spec',{}).get('scaleTargetRef',{}).get('name')==NAME for x in hpas),'signer autoscaler refused')
+    return True
+
+
+def checked_sources(contract):
+    for name,pin in contract['source_bundle'].items():
+        path=ROOT/name
+        require(path.resolve()==path.absolute() and not path.is_symlink() and path.stat().st_mode&0o022==0
+                and path.is_file() and path.stat().st_size<=1048576 and digest(path.read_bytes())==pin,'exact admitted execution source required')
+    planraw=(ROOT/PLAN).read_bytes();require(digest(planraw)==contract['bindings']['proposal_sha256'],'exact native action proposal required')
+    plan=parsed(planraw);require(plan.get('bootstrap',{}).get('source_primitive_sha256')==contract['source_bundle']['scripts/flex_auth_signer_custody.py'],'proposal executed primitive lineage mismatch')
+    require(plan.get('proposal_id')=='RPF35-PDP-SIGNER-NATIVE-20261016-R1' and plan.get('bootstrap',{}).get('kid')==contract['kid'],'exact proposed bootstrap kid required')
+    ccrraw=(ROOT/CCR).read_bytes();require(digest(ccrraw)==contract['ccr_sha256'],'reviewed read CCR source mismatch')
+    spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('native_signer_ccr',ROOT/'scripts/credential-change.py');module=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    ccr,errors,_=module.validate_ccr(ROOT/CCR)
+    require(not errors and ccr['status'] in {'approved','applied','verified','active'} and
+            ccr['openbao']['auth']['bound_claims_confirmed'] is True,'approved exact read CCR required')
+    scope=ccr['openbao'];require(scope['kv_path']=='platform/workloads/flex-auth/envelope-signing' and
+        scope['fields']==['ED25519_PRIVATE_KEY'] and scope['metadata_read'] is False and scope['policy_name']=='workload-kv-read-flex-auth-envelope-signing' and
+        scope['auth']['role']==ROLE and scope['auth']['bound_claims']=={'service_account_names':['flex-auth-envelope-signing-eso'],'service_account_namespaces':['flex-auth']},'read scope correspondence refused')
+    require((ROOT/scope['policy_file']).read_text()==module.generated_policy_hcl(ccr),'read policy source drift')
+
+
+def attended(io,contract):
+    _,status=io.bao(['status','-format=json']);require(status.get('cluster_id')==BAO_CLUSTER and status.get('sealed') is False,'backend cluster pin required')
+    _,lookup=io.bao(['token','lookup','-format=json']);who=lookup.get('data',{})
+    require('platform-admin' in who.get('policies',[]) and 'root' not in who.get('policies',[]) and
+        type(who.get('path')) is str and who['path'].startswith('auth/netkingdom/') and who.get('entity_id')==contract['founder_entity_id'],'exact attended non-root founder required')
+    _,audit=io.bao(['audit','list','-format=json']);require(type(audit) is dict and 0<len(audit)<=32,'enabled backend audit required')
+    # Token lookup-self is inside the contained warden child, never an agent
+    # retrieval. Its identifier stays in custody-process memory for fixed API I/O.
+    token=who.get('id');require(type(token) is str and 0<len(token)<=4096,'contained session handle unavailable')
+    io._token=token
+    _,policy=io.bao(['read','-format=json','sys/policies/acl/workload-kv-read-flex-auth-envelope-signing'])
+    expected_policy=(ROOT/'openbao/policies/workload-kv-read-flex-auth-envelope-signing.hcl').read_text()
+    require(_same_policy(policy.get('data',{}).get('policy'),expected_policy),'native reader policy drift')
+    _,role=io.bao(['read','-format=json','auth/kubernetes/role/'+ROLE]);role=role.get('data',{})
+    required={'bound_service_account_names':['flex-auth-envelope-signing-eso'],
+        'bound_service_account_namespaces':['flex-auth'],'bound_service_account_namespace_selector':'',
+        'audience':'openbao','token_policies':['workload-kv-read-flex-auth-envelope-signing'],
+        'token_ttl':900,'token_max_ttl':900,'token_explicit_max_ttl':900,'token_no_default_policy':True,
+        'token_period':0,'token_num_uses':0,'token_bound_cidrs':[]}
+    require(all(type(role.get(key)) is type(expected) and role.get(key)==expected for key,expected in required.items()),'native delivery role drift')
+
+
+class NativeWriter(SignerWriter):
+    def __init__(self,io,contract,directory):
+        self.io=io;self.contract=contract;self.final_ready=False
+        self._initialize_receipt(directory,contract['operation_id'],kid=contract['kid'],expected_version=0,bindings=contract['bindings'])
+    def _save(self,*,initial=False):
+        if not self.final_ready and self.receipt['status']=='custody-verified-pending-independent-public-admission':
+            self.receipt['status']='seed-verified-pending-metadata'
+        self.receipt.update(actor='founder-attended-platform-admin',native_custody=True,
+                            admission_sha256=digest(encoded(self.contract)),source_ccr_sha256=self.contract['ccr_sha256'])
+        return super()._save(initial=initial)
+    def _http(self,method,path,body=None):
+        if method=='POST':
+            validate_admission(self.contract);checked_sources(self.contract);fence(self.io,self.contract)
+        return self.io.http(method,path,body)
+
+
+def exact_metadata(status,value,*,created):
+    require(status==200 and type(value) is dict and 'errors' not in value and type(value.get('data')) is dict,'metadata readback unconfirmed')
+    data=value['data'];require(type(data.get('cas_required')) is bool and data['cas_required'] is True and
+        type(data.get('max_versions')) is int and data['max_versions']==2 and data.get('delete_version_after')=='0s' and
+        type(data.get('current_version')) is int and data['current_version']==(1 if created else 0),'metadata contract drift')
+
+
+def reconcile(io,contract,directory,original_path):
+    # A fresh independently approved recover action may read/reconcile only;
+    # original write receipt remains untouched and no writer/keygen is created.
+    raw=private_read(original_path);require(digest(raw)==contract['original_receipt_sha256'],'exact original receipt required')
+    receipt=parsed(raw)
+    receipt_fields={'schema','operation_id','bindings','writer_sha256','actor','created_at','path','expected_version','kid','status','production_admission','rollback','public_key','public_fingerprint','kv_version','exact_readback','native_custody','admission_sha256','source_ccr_sha256','phase'}
+    require(type(receipt) is dict and set(receipt)==receipt_fields and receipt.get('schema')=='railiance-platform.signer-cas-receipt.v1' and
+            receipt.get('status') in {'write-intent-unknown','seed-verified-pending-metadata'} and receipt.get('path')==PATH and
+            receipt.get('kid')==contract['kid'] and type(receipt.get('expected_version')) is int and receipt['expected_version']==0 and
+            (receipt.get('kv_version') is None or (type(receipt['kv_version']) is int and receipt['kv_version']==1)) and
+            type(receipt.get('exact_readback')) is bool and receipt.get('production_admission') is False and
+            receipt.get('source_ccr_sha256')==contract['original_execution']['source_ccr_sha256'] and receipt.get('writer_sha256')==contract['original_execution']['writer_sha256'] and
+            receipt.get('native_custody') is True and receipt.get('bindings')==contract['original_execution']['bindings'] and
+            receipt.get('phase') in {'metadata-setup','seed-cas'},'original custody receipt mismatch')
+    has_public=(type(receipt.get('public_key')) is str and re.fullmatch(r'[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}',receipt['public_key']) is not None
+                and receipt.get('public_fingerprint')==digest(receipt['public_key'].encode()))
+    no_public=(receipt.get('public_key') is None and receipt.get('public_fingerprint') is None)
+    require((receipt['phase']=='metadata-setup' and no_public and receipt['kv_version'] is None and receipt['exact_readback'] is False)
+            or (receipt['phase']=='seed-cas' and has_public),'original phase/public lineage mismatch')
+    # Reserve recovery evidence before private native reads. A crash or failure
+    # leaves this independent attempt unconfirmed and cannot replay its ID.
+    recovery={'schema':'railiance-platform.signer-cas-recovery.v1','operation_id':contract['operation_id'],
+              'original_receipt_sha256':digest(raw),'original_execution':contract['original_execution'],
+              'admission_sha256':digest(encoded(contract)),
+              'status':'recovery-read-intent-unconfirmed','original_phase':receipt['phase'],
+              'kid':contract['kid'],'kv_version':None,'public_key':None,'public_fingerprint':None,
+              'key_custody_verified':False,'historical_effect':'unresolved',
+              'next_action':'fresh independently reviewed exact action required; no generation/write/retry authority',
+              'no_write_or_remint':True,'original_unknown_preserved':True}
+    store=object.__new__(SignerWriter);store.directory=directory;store.path=directory/(contract['operation_id']+'.json');store.receipt=recovery
+    store._save(initial=True)
+    status,value=io.http('GET',META)
+    if _policy_absent(status,value):
+        absent=True
+    else:
+        require(status==200 and type(value) is dict and 'errors' not in value and type(value.get('data')) is dict,'recovery metadata unconfirmed')
+        current=value['data'].get('current_version')
+        require(type(current) is int and current in {0,1},'recovery metadata version ambiguous')
+        exact_metadata(status,value,created=current==1)
+        absent=False
+        if current==1:require(has_public and receipt['phase']=='seed-cas','unexpected key custody after metadata-only phase')
+    if absent or current==0:
+        status,value=io.http('GET',PATH+'?version=1')
+        require(_policy_absent(status,value),'recovery data absence unconfirmed')
+        store.receipt.update(status='current-custody-absent' if absent else 'metadata-only-confirmed')
+        store._save()
+        return dict(store.receipt)
+    status,value=io.http('GET',PATH+'?version=1');require(status==200 and type(value) is dict and 'errors' not in value,'recovery private readback unconfirmed')
+    data=value.get('data',{});document=data.get('data');metadata=data.get('metadata',{})
+    require(type(document) is dict and set(document)==FIELDS and all(type(x) is str for x in document.values()) and
+            type(metadata.get('version')) is int and metadata['version']==1 and document['kid']==contract['kid'],'recovery version/shape mismatch')
+    try:
+        seed=base64.urlsafe_b64decode(document['ED25519_PRIVATE_KEY']+'=')
+        require(len(seed)==32 and b64(seed)==document['ED25519_PRIVATE_KEY'],'noncanonical recovery seed')
+        public=b64(Ed25519PrivateKey.from_private_bytes(seed).public_key().public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.Raw,serialization.PublicFormat.Raw))
+    except Exception:raise Refused('recovery key correspondence unconfirmed') from None
+    require(hmac.compare_digest(public,document['ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY']) and hmac.compare_digest(public,receipt['public_key']) and
+            receipt.get('public_fingerprint')==digest(public.encode()),'recovery public correspondence unconfirmed')
+    store.receipt.update(status='custody-reconciled-pending-independent-public-admission',kv_version=1,public_key=public,public_fingerprint=digest(public.encode()),key_custody_verified=True)
+    store._save()
+    return dict(store.receipt)
+
+
+def execute(contract,directory,*,io=None,original_receipt=None):
+    remaining=validate_admission(contract);checked_sources(contract)
+    require(isinstance(directory,Path) and directory.absolute()==directory.resolve(),'exact private receipt directory required')
+    Journal._private(directory.stat(),directory=True)
+    plan=parsed((ROOT/PLAN).read_bytes())
+    require(str(directory)==plan['receipts']['directory'],'independently selected native receipt custody required')
+    if original_receipt is not None:require(Path(original_receipt).parent==directory,'original receipt custody mismatch')
+    # One native owner window; lock is custody concurrency only, not cluster CAS.
+    lock=os.open(directory/'.signer-window.lock',os.O_RDWR|os.O_CREAT|os.O_NOFOLLOW,0o600)
+    try:
+        Journal._private(os.fstat(lock));fcntl.flock(lock,fcntl.LOCK_EX|fcntl.LOCK_NB)
+        with _absolute_budget(remaining):
+            io=NativeIO() if io is None else io
+            attended(io,contract);fence(io,contract)
+            if contract['action']=='recover':
+                require(original_receipt is not None,'independent original receipt required')
+                return reconcile(io,contract,directory,original_receipt)
+            require(original_receipt is None,'bootstrap cannot import recovery/private values')
+            writer=NativeWriter(io,contract,directory)
+            status,value=io.http('GET',META)
+            require(_policy_absent(status,value),'bootstrap exact metadata absence required')
+            writer.receipt.update(status='write-intent-unknown',phase='metadata-setup');writer._save()
+            try:
+                validate_admission(contract);checked_sources(contract);fence(io,contract)
+                status,value=io.http('POST',META,{'cas_required':True,'max_versions':2,'delete_version_after':'0s'})
+                require(status in {200,204},'metadata write unconfirmed')
+                exact_metadata(*io.http('GET',META),created=False)
+                writer.receipt['phase']='seed-cas'
+                writer.write()
+                exact_metadata(*io.http('GET',META),created=True)
+                writer.final_ready=True
+                writer.receipt.update(status='custody-verified-pending-independent-public-admission',exact_readback=True)
+                writer._save()
+                return dict(writer.receipt)
+            except BaseException:
+                writer.receipt.update(status='write-intent-unknown',exact_readback=False);writer._save()
+                raise Refused('native custody outcome unconfirmed') from None
+    finally:os.close(lock)
+
+
+class SilentParser(argparse.ArgumentParser):
+    def error(self,message):raise Refused('invalid custody command arguments')
+
+
+def main(argv=None):
+    parser=SilentParser(description=__doc__,add_help=False)
+    parser.add_argument('--admission',required=True);parser.add_argument('--admission-sha256',required=True)
+    parser.add_argument('--receipt-directory',required=True);parser.add_argument('--original-receipt')
+    # argparse output is captured by warden; all execution exceptions are silent.
+    try:
+        require(not sys.flags.optimize,'optimized custody interpreter refused')
+        args=parser.parse_args(argv);raw=private_read(args.admission)
+        require(is_digest(args.admission_sha256) and digest(raw)==args.admission_sha256,'independently reviewed admission digest required')
+        execute(parsed(raw),Path(args.receipt_directory),original_receipt=args.original_receipt)
+        return 0
+    except BaseException:return 1
+
+
+if __name__=='__main__':sys.exit(main())
diff --git a/tests/test_flex_auth_signer_native.py b/tests/test_flex_auth_signer_native.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..da078e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/test_flex_auth_signer_native.py
@@ -0,0 +1,318 @@
+"""Actual disposable KV effects through native production state machine.
+
+Kubernetes, attended identity and owner dispositions are explicitly synthetic
+fixture inputs; no production authority/identity/custody claim follows.
+"""
+from copy import deepcopy
+from datetime import datetime,timedelta,timezone
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import shutil
+import sys
+import yaml
+import pytest
+sys.path.insert(0,str(Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]/'scripts'))
+from test_task_execution_native_fixture import bao_dev
+import flex_auth_signer_native as m
+from task_execution_journal import Refused
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def native(bao_dev,tmp_path,monkeypatch):
+    origin,token,call,process=bao_dev
+    assert call('POST','sys/mounts/platform',{'type':'kv','options':{'version':'2'}})[0] in {200,204}
+    source=tmp_path/'source';source.mkdir()
+    for name in [*m.SOURCE_FILES,m.CCR,m.PLAN,'openbao/policies/workload-kv-read-flex-auth-envelope-signing.hcl']:
+        p=source/name;p.parent.mkdir(parents=True,exist_ok=True);shutil.copyfile(m.ROOT/name,p)
+    ccr=yaml.safe_load((source/m.CCR).read_text());ccr['status']='approved';ccr['openbao']['auth']['bound_claims_confirmed']=True
+    (source/m.CCR).write_text(yaml.safe_dump(ccr,sort_keys=False))
+    plan=json.loads((source/m.PLAN).read_text());plan['bootstrap']['kid']='synthetic-native-kid';plan['receipts']['directory']=str(tmp_path/'private');(source/m.PLAN).write_text(json.dumps(plan))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(m,'ROOT',source)
+    directory=tmp_path/'private';directory.mkdir(mode=0o700)
+    image='forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/flex-auth@sha256:'+'1'*64
+    dep={'metadata':{'uid':'dep','generation':1},'spec':{'replicas':0,'template':{'spec':{'serviceAccountName':m.NAME,
+        'containers':[{'image':image,'args':['serve','--caller-auth-mode','enforce','--caller-audience','flex-auth','--caller-binding','secrets-engine=system:serviceaccount:secrets-engine:secrets-engine','--envelope-signing-key-file','/var/run/secrets/decision-envelope-signing/seed','--envelope-signing-kid','synthetic-native-kid'],
+        'volumeMounts':[{'name':'flex-auth-envelope-signing','mountPath':'/var/run/secrets/decision-envelope-signing','readOnly':True}]}],
+        'volumes':[{'name':'flex-auth-envelope-signing','secret':{'secretName':m.SECRET,'defaultMode':288,'items':[{'key':'seed','path':'seed'}]}}]}}},'status':{'observedGeneration':1,'replicas':0}}
+    class IO:
+        def __init__(self):
+            self.calls=[];self.dep=deepcopy(dep);self.pods=[];self.hpas=[];self.rs=[];self.cluster=m.CLUSTER
+            self.entity='11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111';self.backend=m.BAO_CLUSTER;self.root=False;self.role_drift=False;self.lost=False;self.denied=False;self.pod_on_recheck=False;self.fences=0
+        def bao(self,args,payload=None,allowed=(0,)):
+            self.calls.append(('bao',tuple(args)))
+            if args[0]=='status':return 0,{'cluster_id':self.backend,'sealed':False}
+            if args[:2]==['token','lookup']:return 0,{'data':{'policies':['root'] if self.root else ['platform-admin'],'path':'auth/netkingdom/login/x','entity_id':self.entity,'id':token}}
+            if args[0]=='audit':return 0,{'file/':{}}
+            if args[-1].startswith('sys/policies/acl/'):
+                return 0,{'data':{'policy':(source/'openbao/policies/workload-kv-read-flex-auth-envelope-signing.hcl').read_text()}}
+            if args[-1].startswith('auth/kubernetes/role/'):
+                return 0,{'data':{'bound_service_account_names':['foreign'] if self.role_drift else ['flex-auth-envelope-signing-eso'],'bound_service_account_namespaces':['flex-auth'],'bound_service_account_namespace_selector':'','audience':'openbao','token_policies':['workload-kv-read-flex-auth-envelope-signing'],'token_ttl':900,'token_max_ttl':900,'token_explicit_max_ttl':900,'token_no_default_policy':True,'token_period':0,'token_num_uses':0,'token_bound_cidrs':[]}}
+            raise AssertionError('unexpected fixed API')
+        def kube(self,resource,name=None):
+            self.calls.append(('kube',resource,name))
+            if resource=='namespace':return {'metadata':{'uid':self.cluster}}
+            if resource=='deployment':
+                self.fences+=1
+                if self.pod_on_recheck and self.fences>=3:self.pods=[{'spec':{'serviceAccountName':m.NAME}}]
+                return deepcopy(self.dep)
+            return {'items':deepcopy({'pods':self.pods,'hpa':self.hpas,'replicasets':self.rs}[resource])}
+        def http(self,method,path,body=None):
+            self.calls.append(('http',method,path))
+            if self.denied and path in {m.PATH,m.PATH+'?version=1'} and method=='GET':return 403,{'errors':['secret backend detail']}
+            result=call(method,path,body)
+            if self.lost and method=='POST' and path==m.PATH:raise OSError('secret response lost')
+            return result
+    io=IO()
+    c={'schema':'railiance-platform.signer-native-admission.v1','action':'bootstrap','operation_id':'synthetic-native-operation','kid':'synthetic-native-kid',
+        'expires_at':(datetime.now(timezone.utc)+timedelta(seconds=100)).isoformat(),'founder_entity_id':io.entity,
+        'ccr_sha256':m.digest((source/m.CCR).read_bytes()),'source_bundle':{n:m.digest((source/n).read_bytes()) for n in m.SOURCE_FILES},
+        'bindings':{k:'sha256:'+'2'*64 for k in m.BINDINGS},'producer_image':image,'caller_binding':'secrets-engine=system:serviceaccount:secrets-engine:secrets-engine',
+        'deployment_projection_sha256':m.digest(m.encoded(m.deployment_projection(dep))),
+        'authority':'founder-attended-exact-source-scope; no standing grant',
+        'routing':{'lane_id':'openbao-platform-admin-login','verdict':'founder_required','founder_act':'oidc_login','receipt_sha256':'sha256:'+'3'*64},
+        'owner_reviews':{},'exclusive_window_sha256':'sha256:'+'4'*64,'consumer_trust_sha256':'sha256:'+'5'*64,'original_receipt_sha256':None,'original_execution':None}
+    c['bindings'].update(proposal_sha256=m.digest((source/m.PLAN).read_bytes()),policy_sha256=m.LIFECYCLE,image_sha256='sha256:'+'1'*64,trust_sha256=c['consumer_trust_sha256'],deployment_sha256=c['deployment_projection_sha256'],executed_revision_sha256=m.digest(m.encoded(c['source_bundle'])))
+    def approve(value):
+        if value['action']=='recover' and value['original_execution'] is None:
+            old=json.loads((directory/(c['operation_id']+'.json')).read_bytes())
+            value['original_execution']={key:deepcopy(old[key]) for key in ['bindings','writer_sha256','source_ccr_sha256']}
+        scope=m.digest(m.encoded({k:v for k,v in value.items() if k!='owner_reviews'}))
+        value['owner_reviews']={role:{'approved_admission_sha256':scope,'approval_ref':'synthetic-fixture-'+role} for role in m.REVIEWS}
+        return value
+    approve(c)
+    return c,io,directory,call,approve,source
+
+
+def test_actual_native_bootstrap_exact_readback_and_no_retry(native):
+    c,io,directory,call,approve,source=native
+    result=m.execute(c,directory,io=io)
+    assert result['status']=='custody-verified-pending-independent-public-admission' and result['exact_readback']
+    assert call('GET',m.META)[1]['data']['current_version']==1
+    assert [(x[1],x[2]) for x in io.calls if x[0]=='http' and x[1]=='POST']==[('POST',m.META),('POST',m.PATH)]
+    private=call('GET',m.PATH)[1]['data']['data']['ED25519_PRIVATE_KEY']
+    raw=(directory/(c['operation_id']+'.json')).read_bytes();assert private.encode() not in raw
+    before=len(io.calls)
+    with pytest.raises(FileExistsError):m.execute(c,directory,io=io)
+    assert not any(x[0]=='http' and x[1]=='POST' for x in io.calls[before:])
+
+
+def test_actual_process_loss_unknown_fresh_recovery_read_only(native):
+    c,io,directory,call,approve,source=native
+    child=os.fork()
+    if child==0:
+        original_http=io.http
+        def die_after_native_write(method,path,body=None):
+            result=original_http(method,path,body)
+            if method=='POST' and path==m.PATH:os._exit(73)
+            return result
+        io.http=die_after_native_write
+        try:m.execute(c,directory,io=io)
+        except BaseException:os._exit(74)
+        os._exit(75)
+    _,status=os.waitpid(child,0)
+    assert os.waitstatus_to_exitcode(status)==73
+    old=directory/(c['operation_id']+'.json');original=old.read_bytes();assert json.loads(original)['status']=='write-intent-unknown'
+    recovery=deepcopy(c);recovery.update(action='recover',operation_id='synthetic-independent-recovery',original_receipt_sha256=m.digest(original));approve(recovery)
+    io.lost=False;io.calls.clear()
+    result=m.execute(recovery,directory,io=io,original_receipt=old)
+    assert result['status']=='custody-reconciled-pending-independent-public-admission'
+    assert result['no_write_or_remint'] and old.read_bytes()==original
+    assert not any(x[0]=='http' and x[1]=='POST' for x in io.calls)
+    assert call('GET',m.META)[1]['data']['current_version']==1
+    assert (directory/(recovery['operation_id']+'.json')).stat().st_mode&0o777==0o600
+    io.calls.clear()
+    with pytest.raises(FileExistsError):m.execute(recovery,directory,io=io,original_receipt=old)
+    assert not any(x[0]=='http' for x in io.calls)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('case',['missing-image','missing-trust','mismatched-source','bad-review','bad-route','expired','wrong-entity','wrong-backend','wrong-cluster','root','pod','terminating-pod','hpa','replicas','image-drift','role-drift','pod-after-metadata'])
+def test_refusals_no_seed_effect(native,case):
+    c,io,directory,call,approve,source=native
+    if case=='missing-image':c['producer_image']=''
+    elif case=='missing-trust':c['consumer_trust_sha256']=''
+    elif case=='mismatched-source':(source/'scripts/flex_auth_signer_custody.py').write_text('changed source')
+    elif case=='bad-review':c['owner_reviews']['founder']['approved_admission_sha256']='sha256:'+'f'*64
+    elif case=='bad-route':c['routing']['lane_id']='openbao-structure-survey';approve(c)
+    elif case=='expired':c['expires_at']=(datetime.now(timezone.utc)-timedelta(seconds=1)).isoformat();approve(c)
+    elif case=='wrong-entity':io.entity='other'
+    elif case=='wrong-backend':io.backend='other'
+    elif case=='wrong-cluster':io.cluster='other'
+    elif case=='root':io.root=True
+    elif case=='pod':io.pods=[{'spec':{'serviceAccountName':m.NAME}}]
+    elif case=='terminating-pod':io.pods=[{'metadata':{'deletionTimestamp':'now'},'spec':{'volumes':[{'secret':{'secretName':m.SECRET}}]}}]
+    elif case=='hpa':io.hpas=[{'spec':{'scaleTargetRef':{'name':m.NAME}}}]
+    elif case=='replicas':io.dep['spec']['replicas']=1
+    elif case=='image-drift':io.dep['spec']['template']['spec']['containers'][0]['image']='unreviewed'
+    elif case=='role-drift':io.role_drift=True
+    elif case=='pod-after-metadata':io.pod_on_recheck=True
+    with pytest.raises(Refused):m.execute(c,directory,io=io)
+    assert not any(x[0]=='http' and x[1]=='POST' and x[2]==m.PATH for x in io.calls)
+    assert call('GET',m.PATH)[0]==404
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('case',['damaged-receipt','typed-damaged-receipt','changed-version','read-denied','no-fresh-review'])
+def test_recovery_refuses_without_new_effect(native,case):
+    c,io,directory,call,approve,source=native;io.lost=True
+    with pytest.raises(Refused):m.execute(c,directory,io=io)
+    old=directory/(c['operation_id']+'.json');recovery=deepcopy(c);recovery.update(action='recover',operation_id='recovery',original_receipt_sha256=m.digest(old.read_bytes()));approve(recovery)
+    if case=='damaged-receipt':old.write_text('{}')
+    elif case=='typed-damaged-receipt':
+        damaged=json.loads(old.read_text());damaged['expected_version']=False;old.write_text(json.dumps(damaged));recovery['original_receipt_sha256']=m.digest(old.read_bytes());approve(recovery)
+    elif case=='changed-version':
+        doc=call('GET',m.PATH)[1]['data']['data'];assert call('POST',m.PATH,{'options':{'cas':1},'data':doc})[0]==200
+    elif case=='read-denied':io.denied=True
+    elif case=='no-fresh-review':recovery['owner_reviews']['founder']['approved_admission_sha256']='sha256:'+'f'*64
+    io.calls.clear();io.lost=False
+    with pytest.raises(Refused):m.execute(recovery,directory,io=io,original_receipt=old)
+    assert not any(x[0]=='http' and x[1]=='POST' for x in io.calls)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('bad_args',[False,True])
+def test_main_missing_approval_silent_and_no_io(tmp_path,capsys,bad_args):
+    if bad_args:
+        assert m.main(['--unrecognized'])==1
+        output=capsys.readouterr();assert output.out==output.err==''
+        return
+    assert m.main(['--admission',str(tmp_path/'missing'),'--admission-sha256','sha256:'+'0'*64,'--receipt-directory',str(tmp_path)])==1
+    output=capsys.readouterr();assert output.out==output.err==''
+
+
+def test_native_command_byte_and_elapsed_bounds_no_output(capsys):
+    io=m.NativeIO()
+    with pytest.raises(Refused):io.captured([sys.executable,'-c',"import sys;sys.stdout.write('x'*1048577)"])
+    import time
+    started=time.monotonic()
+    with pytest.raises(Refused):io.captured([sys.executable,'-c',"import time;time.sleep(10)"])
+    assert time.monotonic()-started<3
+    output=capsys.readouterr();assert output.out==output.err==''
+
+
+def test_exclusive_native_window_refuses_second_writer(native):
+    import fcntl
+    c,io,directory,call,approve,source=native
+    fd=os.open(directory/'.signer-window.lock',os.O_RDWR|os.O_CREAT,0o600)
+    try:
+        fcntl.flock(fd,fcntl.LOCK_EX|fcntl.LOCK_NB)
+        with pytest.raises(BlockingIOError):m.execute(c,directory,io=io)
+        assert io.calls==[]
+    finally:os.close(fd)
+
+
+def test_native_fixed_http_transport_against_disposable_backend(bao_dev,monkeypatch,capsys):
+    origin,token,call,process=bao_dev
+    assert call('POST','sys/mounts/platform',{'type':'kv','options':{'version':'2'}})[0] in {200,204}
+    factory=m.http.client.HTTPConnection;port=int(origin.rsplit(':',1)[1]);destinations=[]
+    def fixture_socket(host,requested_port,*args,**kwargs):
+        destinations.append((host,requested_port))
+        return factory(host,port if requested_port==18200 else requested_port,*args,**kwargs)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(m.http.client,'HTTPConnection',fixture_socket)
+    io=m.NativeIO();io._token=token
+    assert io.http('GET',m.META)==(404,{'errors':[]})
+    assert io.http('POST',m.META,{'cas_required':True,'max_versions':2,'delete_version_after':'0s'})[0] in {200,204}
+    m.exact_metadata(*io.http('GET',m.META),created=False)
+    assert all(host=='127.0.0.1' and selected_port==18200 for host,selected_port in destinations)
+    with pytest.raises(Refused):io.http('GET','other/path')
+    output=capsys.readouterr();assert output.out==output.err==''
+
+
+def metadata_phase_crash(native,*,after):
+    c,io,directory,call,approve,source=native
+    child=os.fork()
+    if child==0:
+        original=io.http
+        def die(method,path,body=None):
+            if method=='POST' and path==m.META:
+                if after:original(method,path,body)
+                os._exit(73)
+            return original(method,path,body)
+        io.http=die
+        try:m.execute(c,directory,io=io)
+        except BaseException:os._exit(74)
+        os._exit(75)
+    _,status=os.waitpid(child,0);assert os.waitstatus_to_exitcode(status)==73
+    old=directory/(c['operation_id']+'.json');raw=old.read_bytes();receipt=json.loads(raw)
+    assert receipt['phase']=='metadata-setup' and receipt['status']=='write-intent-unknown'
+    assert receipt['public_key'] is None and receipt['kv_version'] is None
+    recovery=deepcopy(c);recovery.update(action='recover',operation_id='metadata-recovery',original_receipt_sha256=m.digest(raw));approve(recovery)
+    return old,raw,recovery
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('after',[False,True])
+def test_real_metadata_process_loss_read_only_phase_recovery(native,after):
+    c,io,directory,call,approve,source=native
+    old,raw,recovery=metadata_phase_crash(native,after=after)
+    io.calls.clear();result=m.execute(recovery,directory,io=io,original_receipt=old)
+    assert result['status']==('metadata-only-confirmed' if after else 'current-custody-absent')
+    assert result['public_key'] is result['public_fingerprint'] is result['kv_version'] is None
+    assert result['key_custody_verified'] is False and result['historical_effect']=='unresolved'
+    assert 'fresh independently reviewed exact action required' in result['next_action']
+    assert old.read_bytes()==raw and result['original_unknown_preserved']
+    assert not any(x[0]=='http' and x[1]=='POST' for x in io.calls)
+    assert call('GET',m.PATH+'?version=1')==(404,{'errors':[]})
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('case',['metadata-denied','metadata-misleading404','metadata-misleading200','metadata-malformed','metadata-timeout','data-denied','unexpected-version'])
+def test_metadata_recovery_ambiguous_or_denied_never_classifies_or_writes(native,case):
+    c,io,directory,call,approve,source=native
+    old,raw,recovery=metadata_phase_crash(native,after=True)
+    if case=='unexpected-version':
+        assert call('POST',m.PATH,{'options':{'cas':0},'data':{'ED25519_PRIVATE_KEY':'synthetic-unadmitted','ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY':'synthetic-unadmitted','kid':c['kid']}})[0]==200
+    original=io.http
+    def faulty(method,path,body=None):
+        if path==m.META:
+            if case=='metadata-denied':return 403,{'errors':['denied']}
+            if case=='metadata-misleading404':return 404,{'errors':['permission denied']}
+            if case=='metadata-misleading200':
+                result=original(method,path,body);result[1]['errors']=['denied'];return result
+            if case=='metadata-malformed':return 200,{'data':{'current_version':False}}
+            if case=='metadata-timeout':raise OSError('synthetic private backend detail')
+        if path==m.PATH+'?version=1' and case=='data-denied':return 404,{'errors':['denied']}
+        return original(method,path,body)
+    io.http=faulty;io.calls.clear()
+    with pytest.raises((Refused,OSError)):m.execute(recovery,directory,io=io,original_receipt=old)
+    evidence=json.loads((directory/(recovery['operation_id']+'.json')).read_bytes())
+    assert evidence['status']=='recovery-read-intent-unconfirmed' and evidence['key_custody_verified'] is False
+    assert old.read_bytes()==raw
+    assert not any(x[0]=='http' and x[1]=='POST' for x in io.calls)
+    if case=='unexpected-version':assert not any(x[0]=='http' and x[2]==m.PATH+'?version=1' for x in io.calls)
+
+
+def test_stale_current_primitive_lineage_refuses_before_native_io(native):
+    c,io,directory,call,approve,source=native
+    plan=json.loads((source/m.PLAN).read_bytes());plan['bootstrap']['source_primitive_sha256']='sha256:'+'8'*64
+    (source/m.PLAN).write_text(json.dumps(plan));c['bindings']['proposal_sha256']=m.digest((source/m.PLAN).read_bytes());approve(c)
+    with pytest.raises(Refused,match='primitive lineage'):m.execute(c,directory,io=io)
+    assert io.calls==[]
+
+
+def test_recovery_explicitly_binds_historical_execution_and_current_source(native):
+    c,io,directory,call,approve,source=native
+    old,raw,recovery=metadata_phase_crash(native,after=True)
+    # Model a separately retained older executed bundle/proposal. It must be
+    # explicitly selected in fresh recovery review, never treated as current.
+    original=json.loads(raw);original['bindings']['executed_revision_sha256']='sha256:'+'6'*64
+    original['bindings']['proposal_sha256']='sha256:'+'7'*64
+    old.write_text(json.dumps(original));recovery['original_receipt_sha256']=m.digest(old.read_bytes())
+    recovery['original_execution']={key:deepcopy(original[key]) for key in ['bindings','writer_sha256','source_ccr_sha256']};approve(recovery)
+    result=m.execute(recovery,directory,io=io,original_receipt=old)
+    assert result['status']=='metadata-only-confirmed'
+    assert result['original_execution']['bindings']['executed_revision_sha256']!=recovery['bindings']['executed_revision_sha256']
+    assert json.loads(old.read_text())==original
+
+
+def test_generated_but_unstored_seed_phase_recovers_without_public_admission(native):
+    c,io,directory,call,approve,source=native
+    io.pod_on_recheck=True
+    with pytest.raises(Refused):m.execute(c,directory,io=io)
+    old=directory/(c['operation_id']+'.json');raw=old.read_bytes();receipt=json.loads(raw)
+    assert receipt['phase']=='seed-cas' and receipt['public_key'] is not None
+    assert call('GET',m.PATH+'?version=1')==(404,{'errors':[]})
+    io.pod_on_recheck=False;io.pods=[];io.calls.clear()
+    recovery=deepcopy(c);recovery.update(action='recover',operation_id='unstored-seed-recovery',original_receipt_sha256=m.digest(raw));approve(recovery)
+    result=m.execute(recovery,directory,io=io,original_receipt=old)
+    assert result['status']=='metadata-only-confirmed' and result['key_custody_verified'] is False
+    assert result['public_key'] is None and result['public_fingerprint'] is None
+    assert old.read_bytes()==raw
+    assert not any(x[0]=='http' and x[1]=='POST' for x in io.calls)
diff --git a/tests/test_flex_auth_signer_native_preparation.py b/tests/test_flex_auth_signer_native_preparation.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bd1b357
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/test_flex_auth_signer_native_preparation.py
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+"""Real CCR schema/applier contract, no credentials or backend invocation."""
+from copy import deepcopy
+import importlib.util
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+import yaml
+ROOT=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('signer_ccr',ROOT/'scripts/credential-change.py')
+ccr_module=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(ccr_module)
+CCR=ROOT/'credential-change-requests/CCR-2026-0050-flex-auth-envelope-signing.yaml'
+
+
+def test_real_schema_and_apply_refusal():
+    ccr,errors,warnings=ccr_module.validate_ccr(CCR)
+    assert errors==[]
+    assert warnings==['OIDC/Kubernetes bound claim is not confirmed; apply is blocked']
+    blockers=ccr_module.applier_readiness_blockers(ccr)
+    assert len(blockers)==2
+    assert any('status, got proposed' in x for x in blockers)
+    assert any('confirmed OpenBao auth binding' in x for x in blockers)
+    assert ccr['review']['comments']==[] and ccr['access_frontdoor']['resolvable'] is False
+    # Pure synthetic candidate only: ensure admitted-pattern scope has no latent
+    # schema/applier role/field failures once the real owners eventually approve.
+    admitted=deepcopy(ccr);admitted['status']='approved';admitted['openbao']['auth']['bound_claims_confirmed']=True
+    assert ccr_module.applier_readiness_blockers(admitted)==[]
+
+
+def test_generated_read_scope_and_projection_join():
+    ccr,_,_=ccr_module.validate_ccr(CCR)
+    assert (ROOT/ccr['openbao']['policy_file']).read_text()==ccr_module.generated_policy_hcl(ccr)
+    hcl=ccr_module.generated_policy_hcl(ccr)
+    assert 'metadata/' not in hcl and 'list' not in hcl and 'create' not in hcl
+    assert ccr['openbao']['fields']==['ED25519_PRIVATE_KEY']
+    docs=list(yaml.safe_load_all((ROOT/'docs/credential-lane-designs/flex-auth-envelope-signing-native-projection.yaml.proposed').read_text()))
+    store=next(x for x in docs if x['kind']=='SecretStore')
+    assert store['spec']['provider']['vault']['auth']['kubernetes']['role']==ccr['openbao']['auth']['role']
+    external=next(x for x in docs if x['kind']=='ExternalSecret')
+    assert external['spec']['data']==[{'secretKey':'seed','remoteRef':{'key':'workloads/flex-auth/envelope-signing','property':'ED25519_PRIVATE_KEY'}}]
+
+
+def test_native_scope_separates_read_grant_and_unadmitted_execution():
+    plan=json.loads((ROOT/'docs/credential-lane-designs/flex-auth-envelope-signing-native-plan.json').read_text())
+    assert plan['authority_granted'] is False and plan['status']=='prepared-unapproved'
+    assert plan['bootstrap']['expected_version']==0
+    assert all(x['disposition'].startswith('pending ') for x in plan['reviews_required'])
+    assert 'implementation/independent tests still required' in plan['protected_adapter']['state']
+    assert plan['receipts']['maximum_bytes']==65536
+    assert all('platform/' in x['path'] for x in plan['bootstrap']['allowed_native_methods'])
+    assert 'zero flex-auth PVCs' in plan['requested_scope']['new_resources']
diff --git a/workplans/RPF-WP-0035-credential-lane-implementation.md b/workplans/RPF-WP-0035-credential-lane-implementation.md
index 0a89a2b..b675d08 100644
--- a/workplans/RPF-WP-0035-credential-lane-implementation.md
+++ b/workplans/RPF-WP-0035-credential-lane-implementation.md
@@ -1344,3 +1344,34 @@ admission; RPF-WP-0035-T12 remains progress.
 R3 source metadata correction aligns proposal IDs across JSON/docs/Secret
 annotation and documents existing base64url-ASCII public fingerprint hashing.
 Frozen R2 source/evidence is preserved; no writer behavior or admission changes.
+
+2026-10-16 T12 native signer preparation: proposed CCR-2026-0050 and generated
+read-only HCL pass real schema checks; current proposed status/unconfirmed claims
+keep apply refused. Native candidate uses existing external-secrets-* role
+convention with dedicated SA unchanged and projected private field only. Exact
+attended CAS0/metadata/fence/receipt/forward-recovery action plan is separate from
+read-grant authority; production adapter implementation/independent tests and
+founder plus distinct owner reviews remain necessary. Access observed zero PVCs;
+new outbox storage/retention/runtime bounds remain separate Access/cluster scope.
+No live credentials, grants, roles, key or deployment changed. T12 stays progress.
+
+2026-10-16 T12 native signer adapter source: silent fixed-scope attended child
+checks exact independent admission/source/CCR/image/caller/trust/identity inputs,
+actual backend/reader role/policy, signer fence and private exclusive receipt
+custody before fixed metadata/CAS0 effects. Separate fresh read-only recovery
+reconciles real process loss after native write without remint/retry/new effects.
+Disposable tests exercise actual KV while owner reviews/identity/fence facts are
+explicitly synthetic. Current warden plan dispatch selects structure-survey, not
+OIDC admin login; mismatch remains a live refusal. Canonical proposed CCR, native
+owner/founder approval and Access/cluster/outbox/PVC gates stay open; no live
+key, credential read, grant, role, storage or deployment action performed.
+
+2026-10-16 T12 native signer R2 source correction preserves R1 failures: exact
+phase-aware read-only recovery classifies current metadata-only/absent states,
+never admits a key or retry and preserves original uncertainty. Fresh recovery
+explicitly binds historical execution plus current source; current primitive
+plan/source/receipt join is enforced and old pin labeled historical. Real fork
+metadata-loss and denied/ambiguous tests added.120second expiry is unchanged;
+external reviews and unbounded OIDC require a pre-reviewed exact scheduled
+window, otherwise refuse/new explicit revision. No native or owner approval
+inferred; no live action.