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feat: verify live KeyCape custody and preserve versions on resume
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codex 2026-09-09 02:18:12 +02:00
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docs/credential-lane-designs/keycape-approval-clients-review.md
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# KeyCape approval-client custody: review packet
# KeyCape approval-client custody: accepted verifier delivery
Prepared 2026-09-09 by the-custodian. Both requests are **approved** by the user as platform operator and KeyCape
owner, explicitly recorded on 2026-09-09. The admission receipt is
[here](../evidence/2026-09-09-keycape-approval-admission.json). This is the review record for
RPF-WP-0035-T05, consumed by HFACT-WP-0001-T03.
Both CCR-2026-0017 and CCR-2026-0018 have the user's explicit approval as platform
operator and KeyCape owner. Both are now **verified**. Their existing decision
IDs remain resolved; no renewed review is needed for this completed scope.
| Request | Secret path and field | Client authority | Resolved decision |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [CCR-2026-0017](../../credential-change-requests/CCR-2026-0017-keycape-secrets-engine-approval-client.yaml) | `platform/workloads/secrets-engine/approval-client`, `CLIENT_SECRET` | `approval:read`, `approval:consume` | `b533a271-b704-4c5c-98a2-9a5951aadfb6` |
| [CCR-2026-0018](../../credential-change-requests/CCR-2026-0018-keycape-approval-engine-operator-client.yaml) | `platform/workloads/approval-engine/operator-client`, `CLIENT_SECRET` | create/read/approve/revoke/supersede/observe/emit; no consume | `efa90517-0cae-4eb6-a68d-5b0489c84d65` |
[Combined live receipt](../evidence/2026-09-09-keycape-verifier-admission.json) records version-1 custody, both ESO
stores and Secrets, exact native scope/auth/namespace denials, reader revocation,
compatible pinned KeyCape deployment and both service-client verification runs.
The existing human OpenBao login passed before and after the rollout.
Both named **platform-operator and key-cape-owner** reviews are approved. Each has its own
exact-path policy, Kubernetes auth role and ClusterSecretStore, bound to
`external-secrets/external-secrets`, limited to `sso`. ESO owns the resulting
Secret; authentication tokens have a 15-minute TTL. Client secrets require
explicit rotation or registration disablement; token expiry does not revoke them.
The two Warden fetch selectors remain unresolved: these CCRs authorize verifier
copies only. Client-side reads, audit custody, natural JWT expiry, real predecessor
rotation and factory operating/spend admission remain with the existing owner
records. See [the owner sequence](keycape-approval-clients.md).
The approved requests authorize verifier-side custody only. Client-side
retrieval, audit sender/receiver custody, operator `approval:consume`, adoption
of the Qonto Secret and factory spending remain outside these two requests.
The exercised procedure is `scripts/keycape_approval_custody.py`: `activate` for
first provision, `resume-activate` only with a completed rollback receipt, and
`verify` for existing custody. The selected kubeconfig must identify railiance01;
on this workstation it is `/home/worsch/.kube/config-railiance01`. Use the
Warden attended wrapper, a unique metadata receipt and protected recovery file.
The pinned native verifier is extracted from image digest `7ff54c54e63e...` and
hash-checked; its child environment carries credentials only during execution.
No Kubernetes egress policy changes are needed.
Technical review completed: both CCRs validate, their generated policies match
the two source HCL files, and the delivery manifests map exactly to the declared
paths and fields. The signed upstream issuer is verified; NetKingdom's exact live
pin is independently read back at Secret revision `58713343`. The compatible
KeyCape image and rollout patch are prepared. These checks are evidence for the
review, not substitutes for either named approval.
Execution still follows the [owner rollout sequence](keycape-approval-clients.md)
through the founder-attended Warden/OpenBao envelope: policy/roles, CAS=0 initial
custody, Valid stores, SecretSynced delivery, compatible config/image replacement,
then positive and negative acceptance and metadata-only receipts. The contained owner command is now `scripts/keycape_approval_custody.py activate`.
It preflights both config and deployment changes, seeds with CAS=0, verifies native
and namespace boundaries, then calls NetKingdom's contained compatible rollout.
A failure restores the prior config/image pair before detaching verifier delivery;
initial KV versions remain in custody. The four new exact data/metadata deny
stanzas extend the coding-agent boundary without changing any grant.
Validation: six checks against a disposable local OpenBao, eight config/rollback
tests, and real HTTP signature/claim/scope acceptance against the pinned KeyCape
image with synthetic keys. Production in-pod CLI and existing-human-login checks
remain part of the live window. The image exercise omits the in-pod CLI explicitly.
Use a unique private receipt and protected owner recovery path; a fresh attended
login after the rollout establishes the existing human path on the new build.
Validation: eight local OpenBao checks, ten config/rollback/clock checks, 53
existing credential-change tests, plus a disposable pinned-image HTTPS exercise
that runs the exact native verifier with synthetic keys and client credentials.