Finish RPF-WP-0019 apps-pg controls and recovery
This commit is contained in:
parent
272c1691c3
commit
cb321deeab
16 changed files with 517 additions and 68 deletions
88
docs/evidence/RPF-WP-0019-backup-restore-2026-08-20.md
Normal file
88
docs/evidence/RPF-WP-0019-backup-restore-2026-08-20.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
|
|||
# RPF-WP-0019 — apps-pg backup and restore evidence
|
||||
|
||||
Date: 2026-08-20
|
||||
|
||||
Live target: railiance01 (`kube-system` UID `a553c742-0115-43d4-99a4-a5ca56fe0786`)
|
||||
|
||||
PostgreSQL: 16, CloudNativePG 1.25.1
|
||||
|
||||
No credential value was read or recorded while producing this evidence.
|
||||
|
||||
## Controls rollout
|
||||
|
||||
The guarded reconcile changed `apps-pg-1` from BestEffort to Burstable QoS:
|
||||
|
||||
| Resource | Request | Limit |
|
||||
| --- | ---: | ---: |
|
||||
| CPU | 100m | 1 |
|
||||
| Memory | 256Mi | 1Gi |
|
||||
|
||||
PostgreSQL reported both `vergabe` and `coulomb_social` with connection limit
|
||||
20, `statement_timeout=15s`, and
|
||||
`idle_in_transaction_session_timeout=15s`. `max_connections=100` and the
|
||||
declared connection, lock-wait, slow-statement, and I/O timing logging settings
|
||||
were also live. The cluster returned to `Ready=True` after its single-instance
|
||||
restart.
|
||||
|
||||
## Archive-path correction
|
||||
|
||||
The first WAL attempt against the reviewed sibling prefix `apps-pg/` failed
|
||||
with Scaleway `AccessDenied` on `PutObject`. This was expected behavior from
|
||||
the already-evidenced bucket policy, which permits this identity only beneath
|
||||
`platform-pg/*`; the manifest and policy had drifted.
|
||||
|
||||
The live and source destination was corrected to the distinct governed
|
||||
sub-prefix:
|
||||
|
||||
`s3://railiance-platform-pg-backup/platform-pg/apps-pg/`
|
||||
|
||||
After reconcile, the Cluster condition changed to
|
||||
`ContinuousArchiving=True` / `ContinuousArchivingSuccess` at
|
||||
2026-08-20T20:41:40Z.
|
||||
|
||||
## Base backup
|
||||
|
||||
| Field | Value |
|
||||
| --- | --- |
|
||||
| ScheduledBackup | `apps-pg-daily` (02:15 UTC, immediate first run) |
|
||||
| Backup | `apps-pg-daily-20260820204148` |
|
||||
| Backup ID | `20260820T204148` |
|
||||
| Started | 2026-08-20T20:41:48Z |
|
||||
| Completed | 2026-08-20T20:41:56Z (8 seconds) |
|
||||
| WAL | `000000010000000000000032` through the same segment |
|
||||
| Result | `phase=completed`; Cluster `LastBackupSucceeded=True` |
|
||||
|
||||
## Scratch restore
|
||||
|
||||
A separate Cluster named `apps-pg-restore-20260820` was created in namespace
|
||||
`apps-pg-restore-20260820`; production was never recovered in place. The
|
||||
governed Secret was copied namespace-to-namespace without printing its values.
|
||||
|
||||
| Event | UTC |
|
||||
| --- | --- |
|
||||
| Restore applied | 2026-08-20T20:43:45Z |
|
||||
| Scratch `Ready=True` | 2026-08-20T20:44:41Z |
|
||||
| Measured restore time | 56 seconds |
|
||||
|
||||
Production and scratch matched exactly for the four production databases and
|
||||
their sizes: `apps_meta` 7,830,551 bytes, `coulomb_social_db` 8,985,623 bytes,
|
||||
`postgres` 7,830,551 bytes, and `vergabe_db` 7,830,551 bytes. `vergabe_db` was
|
||||
empty on both sides. All 13 user tables in `coulomb_social_db` matched by name
|
||||
and exact row count, including 36 permissions, 20 migrations, 23 sessions, one
|
||||
member, one user, and one space.
|
||||
|
||||
Both restored consumer roles also retained the 20-connection and two
|
||||
15-second settings. The scratch catalog additionally contained an empty
|
||||
7,912,471-byte `app` database that was not present in the live catalog at
|
||||
verification time. It is recorded as recovered historical state, not silently
|
||||
described as a current production database.
|
||||
|
||||
Production remained `Ready=True`. The scratch namespace was deleted after
|
||||
these comparisons were captured.
|
||||
|
||||
## Claim
|
||||
|
||||
This proves a completed off-cluster base backup and a full instance restore of
|
||||
both `apps-pg` consumer databases. It does not prove point-in-time recovery,
|
||||
single-consumer physical restore, HA, node-loss recovery, or isolation; those
|
||||
claims need their own artifacts.
|
||||
65
docs/evidence/RPF-WP-0019-isolation-2026-08-20.md
Normal file
65
docs/evidence/RPF-WP-0019-isolation-2026-08-20.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
|
|||
# RPF-WP-0019 — apps-pg isolation evidence
|
||||
|
||||
Date: 2026-08-20
|
||||
|
||||
Live target: railiance01 / `databases/apps-pg`
|
||||
|
||||
Harness: `make apps-pg-isolation-probe`
|
||||
|
||||
The repeatable harness creates a labeled temporary namespace, projects the two
|
||||
existing consumer Secrets into isolated probe pods without printing their
|
||||
values, exercises the real consumer credentials over the service endpoint,
|
||||
and deletes the namespace on exit.
|
||||
|
||||
## Finding before the passing run
|
||||
|
||||
The first privilege preflight found that `apps_meta`, `vergabe_db`, and
|
||||
`coulomb_social_db` retained PostgreSQL's default `PUBLIC` `CONNECT` and
|
||||
`TEMPORARY` privileges. A database-per-consumer declaration was therefore not
|
||||
yet a database connection boundary. The controlled SQL now revokes both
|
||||
privileges from `PUBLIC` on all three databases and grants them only to each
|
||||
database's owner. The passing run occurred after that correction; the failed
|
||||
precondition is not counted as a pass.
|
||||
|
||||
## Consumer boundary
|
||||
|
||||
All eleven assertions passed:
|
||||
|
||||
- each role connected to its own database through the live RW Service;
|
||||
- each role was denied connection to the peer database;
|
||||
- `coulomb_social` was denied connection to `apps_meta`;
|
||||
- a consumer could not alter the peer role;
|
||||
- an own-database table remained readable;
|
||||
- the real credential observed both 15-second timeouts and connection limit
|
||||
20; and
|
||||
- a 20-second statement was terminated by `statement_timeout`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Noisy-neighbour run
|
||||
|
||||
The harness measured five sequential `vergabe` queries, filled every available
|
||||
`coulomb_social` role slot with client-side-idle sessions, verified 20 live
|
||||
connections, and attempted one more connection.
|
||||
|
||||
| Observation | Result |
|
||||
| --- | --- |
|
||||
| `vergabe` baseline, five queries | 5,285 ms |
|
||||
| `coulomb_social` at ceiling | 20 connections |
|
||||
| excess `coulomb_social` connection | denied |
|
||||
| `vergabe` during saturation, five queries | 8,146 ms |
|
||||
| measured wall-time increase | 54.1% |
|
||||
| victim availability | 5/5 queries succeeded |
|
||||
|
||||
The timings include five separate API/exec/process startups, so they are an
|
||||
operator-path comparison rather than an application latency benchmark. Both
|
||||
co-residents declare `interactive`, but neither declares a numeric database
|
||||
latency objective. The result therefore supports the P1 consumer-boundary and
|
||||
availability claim: one consumer exhausted its own allowance, the control
|
||||
bound, and the peer retained service. It does **not** establish a latency SLO,
|
||||
CPU fairness, memory fairness, tenant isolation within either consumer, HA, or
|
||||
P2 placement.
|
||||
|
||||
## Result
|
||||
|
||||
`14 passed, 0 failed`. Production `apps-pg` remained Ready with continuous
|
||||
archiving and the last backup healthy; `deployment/coulomb-social` remained
|
||||
1/1 Ready. The temporary probe namespace was deleted.
|
||||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue