Finish RPF-WP-0019 apps-pg controls and recovery
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codex 2026-08-20 22:58:45 +02:00
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@ -79,43 +79,40 @@ triggers. It is not the same role as the operator of the cluster.
| `user-engine` | `user-engine-pg` | P2 | `net-kingdom` | this repo | not assessed here |
| `target-revenue` | `target-revenue-pg` | P2 | `target-revenue` | this repo | not assessed here |
| `forgejo` | `forgejo-db` | P2 | this repo | — | single consumer |
| `vergabe` | `apps-pg` | P1 | `vergabe-teilnahme` | this repo | **absent** |
| `coulomb_social` | `apps-pg` | P1 | `coulomb-social` | this repo | **absent** |
| `vergabe` | `apps-pg` | P1 | `vergabe-teilnahme` | this repo | 14 live boundary/control probes |
| `coulomb_social` | `apps-pg` | P1 | `coulomb-social` | this repo | 14 live boundary/control probes |
### 3.1 Two of these P1 levels are asserted without evidence
### 3.1 The two apps-pg P1 levels are now evidenced
§13.1 claims a level only with its artifact present. The P1P4 artifact is
*"provisioning declaration plus the platform's isolation probes"*.
`platform-pg` has them — `rapp-postgres` runs 19 adversarial probes against the
consumer boundary. **`apps-pg` has none.** `scripts/capture-apps-pg-evidence.py`
captures *capacity* evidence for `resource-control`; it makes no isolation
assertion. So the P1 levels recorded above for `vergabe` and `coulomb_social`
are, as of 2026-08-17, **provisioning declarations without probes** — stated
here rather than quietly carried, because a table of levels that mixes
evidenced and unevidenced entries without saying which is which is the failure
§13.1 exists to prevent.
consumer boundary. Since 2026-08-20, `apps-pg` has a repeatable 14-assertion
live harness too. It uses both real consumer credentials, denies cross-database
and bootstrap connections, verifies the timeouts and role allowance, fills
one consumer's allowance, proves the next connection is rejected, and keeps
the peer available. Evidence:
`docs/evidence/RPF-WP-0019-isolation-2026-08-20.md`.
Recorded as owed by this repo. Until the probes exist, those two rows should be
read as *intended* placement, not *verified* placement.
### 3.2 `apps-pg` cannot produce the noisy-neighbour artifact at all
### 3.2 `apps-pg` noisy-neighbour artifact and its limit
Worth separating from the gap above, because it is not a matter of writing a
missing test. §13's P1P2 noisy-neighbour artifact requires a per-consumer
usage baseline, a saturation run, and **evidence that the governance controls
bind — that the greedy consumer is held at its limits.**
`apps-pg` has no per-consumer governance controls. Its connection pool is not
partitioned, there is no per-consumer connection allowance, no statement
timeout and no resource limit on the pod. There is nothing that could be shown
to bind, so a run against it could only demonstrate that a saturating consumer
degrades its co-residents — which §13.4 explicitly rejects as an artifact that
"can only fail, or that passes by being run gently enough".
RPF-WP-0019 supplied the missing 20-connection role allowances, 15-second
timeouts, database ACL boundary, and Burstable pod envelope before running the
artifact. Saturating `coulomb_social` bound at 20 and rejected an excess
connection while five `vergabe` queries remained available. Five-query
operator-path wall time rose from 5,285ms to 8,146ms (54.1%).
The honest sequence is therefore: **controls first, artifact second.** Writing
the probe before the limits exist would produce an overclaim wearing the
costume of evidence. Tracked as `RPF-WP-0019`.
Both consumers are `interactive`, but neither publishes a numeric database
latency objective, and the measurement includes five separate `kubectl exec`
and `psql` startups. The artifact therefore evidences P1 boundary and continued
availability, not a latency SLO or CPU/memory fairness. That limit is part of
the artifact rather than silently promoted into a stronger claim.
**The consuming repo is the placement owner; this repo co-signs.** The
consumer knows its latency requirement, its erasure horizon and its compliance