diff --git a/scripts/application_recovery_drill.py b/scripts/application_recovery_drill.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f4de1b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/application_recovery_drill.py
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+"""Timed Coulomb recovery using only the provider kit, escrow and held API callers."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import re
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tarfile
+import time
+from datetime import UTC, datetime
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from application_recovery_access import retrieve
+from application_recovery_identities import (
+    Refused,
+    checkpoint,
+    private_directory,
+    private_json,
+)
+from application_recovery_kit import PROJECT, download
+from application_recovery_resources import API, s3, status
+
+
+def extract_verified(archive, destination):
+    if destination.exists() or destination.is_symlink():
+        raise Refused("fresh_kit_extraction_required")
+    with tarfile.open(archive, "r:") as bundle:
+        members = bundle.getmembers()
+        names = [m.name for m in members]
+        if (not 1 < len(members) < 10000 or len(set(names)) != len(names)
+                or any(not m.isfile() or m.sparse is not None or Path(m.name).is_absolute()
+                       or ".." in Path(m.name).parts for m in members)
+                or sum(m.size for m in members) > 5 * 1024**3):
+            raise Refused("bounded_regular_unique_kit_members_required")
+        metadata = bundle.getmember("manifest.json")
+        if not 0 < metadata.size <= 1024**2:
+            raise Refused("bounded_kit_manifest_required")
+        manifest = json.loads(bundle.extractfile(metadata).read())
+        if manifest.get("schema") != "platform.coulomb-recovery-kit-manifest.v1":
+            raise Refused("exact_kit_manifest_required")
+        files = manifest["files"]
+        if set(files) | {"manifest.json"} != set(names):
+            raise Refused("complete_manifest_members_required")
+        if manifest.get("private_identity_included") is not False or manifest.get("api_pairs_included") is not False:
+            raise Refused("separate_credential_custody_required")
+        for member in members:
+            if member.name == "manifest.json":
+                continue
+            expected = files[member.name]
+            if (member.size != expected["bytes"] or not re.fullmatch(r"[a-f0-9]{64}", expected["sha256"])):
+                raise Refused("kit_member_binding_differs")
+            with bundle.extractfile(member) as stream:
+                if hashlib.file_digest(stream, "sha256").hexdigest() != expected["sha256"]:
+                    raise Refused("kit_member_hash_differs")
+        # No executable or image is used until every member is verified.
+        destination.mkdir(mode=0o700)
+        for member in members:
+            target = destination / member.name
+            target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=0o700)
+            fd = os.open(target, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600)
+            with bundle.extractfile(member) as source, os.fdopen(fd, "wb") as output:
+                while block := source.read(8 * 1024**2):
+                    output.write(block)
+    return manifest
+
+
+class Drill:
+    def __init__(self, directory, destination, reference):
+        private_directory(directory)
+        private_directory(destination.parent)
+        if destination.exists() or destination.is_symlink():
+            raise Refused("fresh_private_drill_destination_required")
+        destination.mkdir(mode=0o700)
+        self.directory, self.root, self.reference = directory, destination, reference
+        self.stages = {}
+
+    def stage(self, name, call):
+        began = time.monotonic()
+        value = call()
+        self.stages[name] = round(time.monotonic() - began, 3)
+        checkpoint(self.root / "stage-receipt.json", {"stages": self.stages, "last_completed": name})
+        return value
+
+    def command(self, name, arguments):
+        result = subprocess.run(arguments, capture_output=True, timeout=300, check=False)
+        if result.returncode:
+            fd = os.open(self.root / (name + "-private-diagnostics.txt"),
+                         os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL, 0o600)
+            with os.fdopen(fd, "wb") as stream:
+                stream.write(result.stdout + result.stderr)
+            raise Refused("private_drill_child_refused")
+        return result.stdout
+
+    def run(self):
+        began, started = time.monotonic(), datetime.now(UTC).isoformat()
+        kit = self.root / "retrieved-kit.tar"
+        reader = s3(private_json(self.directory / "reader-pair.json"), PROJECT)
+        self.stage("provider_kit_retrieval", lambda: download(reader, self.reference, kit))
+        contents = self.root / "kit"
+        manifest = self.stage("all_kit_member_hashes_and_extraction", lambda: extract_verified(kit, contents))
+        contract = json.loads((contents / "tools/docs/credential-lane-designs/coulomb-recovery-api.json").read_text())
+        custodian = API(private_json(self.directory / "custodian-pair.json"))
+        identity = self.stage("provider_age_escrow_retrieval", lambda: retrieve(custodian, contract, "age"))
+        identity_path = self.root / "identity.agekey"
+        fd = os.open(identity_path, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL, 0o600)
+        with os.fdopen(fd, "wb") as stream:
+            stream.write(identity)
+        del identity
+        for kind in ("application", "postgres"):
+            self.stage(kind + "_image_load", lambda kind=kind: self.command(kind + "-image-load",
+                ["docker", "load", "-i", str(contents / (kind + "-image.tar"))]))
+            image_id = manifest["application_image_id" if kind == "application" else "postgres_image_id"]
+            actual = self.command(kind + "-image-inspect", ["docker", "image", "inspect", image_id,
+                                                           "--format", "{{.Id}}"])
+            if actual.decode().strip() != image_id:
+                raise Refused("retained_image_id_differs")
+        tools = contents / "tools"
+        pair = self.root / "pair"
+        unpacked = self.stage("decrypt_and_validate_pair", lambda: self.command("decrypt", [sys.executable,
+            str(tools / "recover-paired-backup.py"), "--execute", "--archive", str(contents / "packet.tar.age"),
+            "--transfer-receipt", str(contents / "primary-receipt.json"), "--identity", str(identity_path),
+            "--destination", str(pair)]))
+        unpacked = json.loads(unpacked)
+        restored = self.stage("isolated_database_content_restore", lambda: self.command("restore", [sys.executable,
+            str(tools / "restore-paired-snapshot.py"), str(pair), "--keep-instance", "--postgres-image", manifest["postgres_image_id"]]))
+        restored = json.loads(restored)
+        app = self.stage("packaged_app_views_and_permissions", lambda: self.command("application", [sys.executable,
+            str(tools / "verify-restored-application.py"), "--snapshot", str(pair), "--restore-receipt",
+            str(Path(restored["restored_directory"]) / "restore-receipt.json"), "--kit-manifest", str(contents / "manifest.json"),
+            "--output", str(self.root / "application-receipt.json")]))
+        app = json.loads(app)
+        baseline = json.loads((contents / "application-recovery.json").read_text())
+        for key in ("actual_pages_rendered_through_view", "same_tenant_ungranted_page_denials", "content_files_unchanged"):
+            if app.get(key) != baseline.get(key):
+                raise Refused("kit_application_baseline_differs")
+        if app["status"] != "isolated_application_recovery_verified":
+            raise Refused("actual_application_recovery_required")
+        result = {"schema": "platform.coulomb-provider-kit-recovery.v1", "status": "application_restored_verified",
+            "started_at": started, "completed_at": datetime.now(UTC).isoformat(), "stages_seconds": self.stages,
+            "recovery_seconds": round(time.monotonic() - began, 3), "protected_kit": self.reference,
+            "kit_members_verified": len(manifest["files"]) + 1, "application": "coulomb-social",
+            "captured_at": manifest["captured_at"], "application_restore_verified": True,
+            "all_data_images_and_tools_from_independent_provider_kit": True,
+            "age_identity_from_separate_provider_escrow": True, "original_node_or_plaintext_used": False,
+            "personal_session_used": False, "registry_pulls_performed": False, "fresh_docker_daemon": False,
+            "operator_account_recovery_time_included": False, "real_browser_journey_verified": False,
+            "unpack": unpacked, "restore": restored, "application_checks": app, "timers_activated": False}
+        checkpoint(self.root / "recovery-receipt.json", result)
+        return result
+
+
+def main():
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
+    parser.add_argument("--execute", action="store_true")
+    parser.add_argument("--directory", type=Path, default=Path.home() / ".config/railiance-platform/coulomb-social-recovery")
+    parser.add_argument("--kit-reference", type=Path, required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--destination", type=Path, required=True)
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    if not args.execute:
+        print(json.dumps({"status": "preview", "provider_contacted": False, "production_restore": False}))
+        return
+    result = Drill(args.directory, args.destination, private_json(args.kit_reference)).run()
+    print(json.dumps({k: result[k] for k in ("status", "recovery_seconds", "kit_members_verified", "stages_seconds")}))
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    try:
+        main()
+    except Exception as error:  # noqa: BLE001 -- child diagnostics stay owner-private
+        print(json.dumps({"status": "refused", "failure_type": type(error).__name__, "native_status": status(error),
+                          "reason": str(error) if isinstance(error, Refused) else "private_review_required"}))
+        sys.exit(1)
diff --git a/tests/test_application_recovery_drill.py b/tests/test_application_recovery_drill.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9c3cb83
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/test_application_recovery_drill.py
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+"""Kit integrity failures must refuse before extracting executable material."""
+import hashlib
+import io
+import json
+import sys
+import tarfile
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / "scripts"))
+import application_recovery_drill as drill
+
+
+def kit(path, mutation=None):
+    payload = b"synthetic recovery code"
+    manifest = {"schema": "platform.coulomb-recovery-kit-manifest.v1",
+                "private_identity_included": False, "api_pairs_included": False,
+                "files": {"tools/recover.py": {"bytes": len(payload),
+                          "sha256": hashlib.sha256(payload).hexdigest()}}}
+    name = "../escape" if mutation == "traversal" else "tools/recover.py"
+    if mutation == "credential":
+        manifest["private_identity_included"] = True
+    with tarfile.open(path, "w") as archive:
+        data = json.dumps(manifest).encode()
+        meta = tarfile.TarInfo("manifest.json")
+        meta.size = len(data)
+        archive.addfile(meta, io.BytesIO(data))
+        item = tarfile.TarInfo(name)
+        item.size = len(payload)
+        if mutation == "link":
+            item.type, item.linkname, item.size = tarfile.SYMTYPE, "/etc/passwd", 0
+        actual = b"X" * len(payload) if mutation == "hash" else payload
+        archive.addfile(item, io.BytesIO(actual))
+        if mutation == "duplicate":
+            archive.addfile(item, io.BytesIO(actual))
+
+
+def test_every_member_is_verified_before_extraction(tmp_path):
+    source = tmp_path / "kit.tar"
+    kit(source)
+    result = drill.extract_verified(source, tmp_path / "extracted")
+    assert (tmp_path / "extracted/tools/recover.py").read_bytes() == b"synthetic recovery code"
+    assert result["api_pairs_included"] is False
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("mutation", ["traversal", "link", "duplicate", "hash", "credential"])
+def test_unsafe_or_corrupt_kit_never_extracts_code(tmp_path, mutation):
+    source = tmp_path / "kit.tar"
+    kit(source, mutation)
+    output = tmp_path / "extracted"
+    with pytest.raises(drill.Refused):
+        drill.extract_verified(source, output)
+    assert not output.exists()
+
+
+def test_existing_extraction_is_preserved(tmp_path):
+    source = tmp_path / "kit.tar"
+    kit(source)
+    output = tmp_path / "existing"
+    output.mkdir()
+    (output / "keep").write_text("keep")
+    with pytest.raises(drill.Refused):
+        drill.extract_verified(source, output)
+    assert (output / "keep").read_text() == "keep"