Implement attended Railiance Clock host key delivery
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Assistant: codex
Assistant-Model: gpt-6-astra
Assistant-Session: 01a09cbb-87c6-7900-a145-4ce53ba9f1a6
This commit is contained in:
codex 2026-09-15 23:00:20 +02:00
parent 3b11773469
commit e70ef2f32a
7 changed files with 284 additions and 49 deletions

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@ -1,14 +1,15 @@
id: CCR-2026-0028
kind: credential-change-request
schema_version: 1
request_type: workload-kv-read
request_type: attended-host-key-delivery
title: Railiance Clock authority signing key custody and host delivery
status: approved
created: '2026-09-15'
updated: '2026-09-15'
requester:
agent: codex
reason: User requested production admission of the Railiance Clock authority after the host time baseline and disposable native acceptance passed.
reason: User requested production admission of the Railiance Clock authority after
the host time baseline and disposable native acceptance passed.
review:
required: true
required_approvers:
@ -22,71 +23,83 @@ review:
- at: '2026-09-15'
reviewer: User (railiance-clock-owner)
decision: approved
comment: User explicitly approved CCR-2026-0028 for the railiance-clock-owner role.
comment: User explicitly approved CCR-2026-0028 for the railiance-clock-owner
role.
- at: '2026-09-15'
reviewer: User (platform-operator and railiance-clock-owner)
decision: approved_host_delivery
comment: User accepted the corrected systemd host-file design and instructed then
lets go; existing two-role approval retained.
target:
domain: infotech
tenant: platform
workload: railiance-clock
environment: production
purpose: Hold one ES256 authority private signing key in OpenBao and deliver it only to the private railiance01 Railiance Clock service; no public listener or consumer-wide distribution.
purpose: Hold one ES256 authority private signing key in OpenBao and deliver it
only to the private railiance01 Railiance Clock service; no public listener or
consumer-wide distribution.
openbao:
mount: platform
kv_path: platform/workloads/railiance-clock/authority-signing
fields:
- PRIVATE_KEY_PEM
- KEY_ID
metadata_read: false
token_self_lifecycle: true
policy_name: workload-kv-read-railiance-clock-authority-signing
policy_file: openbao/policies/workload-kv-read-railiance-clock-authority-signing.hcl
auth:
method: kubernetes
mount: kubernetes
role: external-secrets-railiance-clock-authority
bound_claims:
service_account_names:
- railiance-clock
service_account_namespaces:
- railiance-clock
bound_claims_confirmed: false
policies:
- workload-kv-read-railiance-clock-authority-signing
ttl: 15m
audience: openbao
token_max_ttl: 15m
token_explicit_max_ttl: 15m
token_no_default_policy: true
method: attended-oidc
mount: netkingdom
role: platform-admin
runtime_access: false
initial_cas: 0
access_frontdoor:
type: host-file-delivery
catalog_id: railiance-clock-authority-signing
selector: Private Railiance Clock authority key on railiance01
readiness: pending-review
type: attended-host-file
catalog_id: openbao-platform-admin-login
readiness: approved-pending-apply
resolvable: false
delivery:
surface: attended-host-file
target: railiance01:/etc/railiance-clock/authority-key.pem, owner railiance-clock, mode 0600; key material must be generated and delivered through the governed OpenBao platform-admin lane and never appear in Git, argv, logs, or chat.
bootstrap_command: See the attended platform custody runbook to be added with this CCR; configure the service only after key admission, public-key metadata readback, and exact artifact hash verification.
host: 92.205.62.239
ssh_user: tegwick
target: /var/lib/railiance-clock/signing.pem
owner: railiance-clock
mode: '0600'
directory_mode: '0700'
procedure: scripts/railiance_clock_custody.py
risk:
classification: high
notes:
- Compromise permits forging Railiance Clock samples until the key is revoked and every consumer trust file is replaced.
- The authority remains loopback-only on railiance01; no workstation-wide or public endpoint is admitted.
- Key generation, OpenBao write, host delivery, and rotation require an attended platform operator and railiance-clock owner review.
- Compromise permits forging Railiance Clock samples until the key is revoked and
every consumer trust file is replaced.
- The authority remains loopback-only on railiance01; no workstation-wide or public
endpoint is admitted.
- Key generation, OpenBao write, host delivery, and rotation require an attended
platform operator and railiance-clock owner review.
verification:
positive:
- Exact service identity reads only PRIVATE_KEY_PEM and KEY_ID; authority readiness and signed sample verification pass.
- Host file ownership and mode are exact; private key value is absent from all command output and logs.
- Attended platform-admin identity and OpenBao audit enabled; initial key stored
with CAS zero.
- Host account, private directory, exact key ownership and permissions verified;
public key matches custody.
- Authority readiness and independent signed sample verification pass.
negative:
- Other service accounts, namespaces, sibling paths, metadata/listing, and public listeners are denied.
- Wrong key id, wrong authority/environment/epoch, expired trust, rollback, and stale health fail closed.
- Existing key is never overwritten during initial admission; interrupted delivery
resumes only with the admitted custody version.
- Wrong key id, authority, environment, epoch, stale health and expired trust are
refused.
- No new workload role, policy or token; no public authority listener.
activation_conditions:
- CCR approved by platform-operator and railiance-clock-owner.
- Dedicated OpenBao policy, Kubernetes role, and host delivery path are applied and read back without secret disclosure.
- Fresh public-key metadata, artifact SHA-256, /readyz, and colocated sample verification are recorded.
- Existing two-role approval covers attended host delivery.
- Ansible prepares the service account and private directory before custody.
- Reviewed helper runs through warden access openbao-platform-admin-login --exec;
host key verification is required.
- Fresh public key, artifact SHA256, readiness and signed sample acceptance are
recorded.
evidence: []
lifecycle:
deactivate: Stop the authority, remove the host key, revoke the workload policy/role, and replace consumer trust files.
rotate: Stop authority and consumers, generate a new key under attended custody, deliver mode 0600, then replace trust files and verify old signatures fail.
compromised: Stop the authority immediately, revoke the policy and key version, replace all trust files, and restart only after fresh verification.
deactivate: Stop authority and withdraw consumer trust. Retain custody and host
key until owner retention decision.
rotate: Stop authority, perform separately versioned attended CAS rotation and atomic
host replacement, then admit new public key and epoch for consumers.
compromised: Stop authority immediately and withdraw all consumer trust; replace
key forward under attended custody before restarting.
state_hub:
workplan_id: RCLK-WP-0005