Admit KeyCape approval-engine client custody paths and delivery
Answers KEY-WP-0013-T02. Both proposed KV paths are confirmed unchanged; the field name is corrected to CLIENT_SECRET for the platform uppercase convention and the CCR validator. Kubernetes delivery references are confirmed against the live sso namespace. Attended authority is the governed openbao-platform-admin-login lane, and the rollout is one attended window ordered after the Authelia issuer precondition. Adds CCR-2026-0017/0018, two exact-path read policies, two namespace-limited ClusterSecretStores with Kubernetes auth, two ExternalSecrets, and RPF-WP-0035-T05. Nothing is applied and no value exists: both CCRs remain proposed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WLUjpv3ssxNRAEPPgLFnEB Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 1275505@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 97265baa-f08f-4032-b290-a1e2965a69c5
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id: CCR-2026-0017
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kind: credential-change-request
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schema_version: 1
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request_type: workload-kv-read
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title: KeyCape verifier custody for the secrets-engine-approval confidential client
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status: proposed
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created: '2026-09-08'
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updated: '2026-09-08'
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requester:
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agent: claude
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reason: >-
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KEY-WP-0013-T02 (State Hub message 278a3ebe-b529-49f6-bd1a-e3ebcf318260) asks
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railiance-platform to admit custody for two confidential client_credentials
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registrations. This CCR covers the first: client secrets-engine-approval,
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subject service:secrets-engine, audience approval-engine, tenant:platform per
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resolved decision 5ed3fb35-eca9-413a-82b9-95171ba85bf6, 15m token lifetime.
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KeyCape owns the registration and issuance; this request establishes only the
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custody path and the KeyCape-side delivery of the client secret it must verify
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presented credentials against. It does not admit the client-side lane by which
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secrets-engine would read its own copy — that is a separate request with a
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separate consumer gate.
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review:
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required: true
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required_approvers:
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- platform-operator
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- key-cape-owner
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comments:
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- at: '2026-09-08'
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reviewer: railiance-platform (codex/claude)
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decision: paths_confirmed_field_corrected
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comment: >-
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KV path platform/workloads/secrets-engine/approval-client is confirmed
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unchanged: it matches the platform/workloads/<workload>/<lane> convention
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enforced by scripts/credential-change.py and used by every admitted platform
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lane. The proposed field name client_secret is corrected to CLIENT_SECRET;
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KV field names are uppercase by convention (PROVISIONER_TOKEN,
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CORE_HUB_API_TOKEN) and lowercase names fail FIELD_NAME_RE validation. The
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Kubernetes Secret key client-secret and the KeyCape environment name are
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confirmed as proposed.
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target:
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domain: financials
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tenant: platform
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workload: secrets-engine
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environment: production
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purpose: >-
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Hold the secrets-engine-approval confidential client secret in platform custody
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and project it into the KeyCape runtime so KeyCape can verify presented
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client_credentials without the value living in Git, a chart value, or a
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hand-created Kubernetes Secret.
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openbao:
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mount: platform
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kv_path: platform/workloads/secrets-engine/approval-client
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fields:
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- CLIENT_SECRET
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policy_name: workload-kv-read-keycape-secrets-engine-approval
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policy_file: openbao/policies/workload-kv-read-keycape-secrets-engine-approval.hcl
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auth:
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method: kubernetes
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mount: kubernetes
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role: external-secrets-keycape-secrets-engine-approval
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bound_claims:
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service_account_names:
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- external-secrets
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service_account_namespaces:
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- external-secrets
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bound_claims_confirmed: true
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policies:
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- workload-kv-read-keycape-secrets-engine-approval
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ttl: 15m
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access_frontdoor:
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type: ops-warden
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catalog_id: keycape-secrets-engine-approval-client
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selector: KeyCape secrets-engine-approval confidential client secret
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command: warden access keycape-secrets-engine-approval-client --fetch CLIENT_SECRET
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resolvable: false
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readiness: pending-review
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delivery:
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surface: external-secrets
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target: >-
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ClusterSecretStore openbao-keycape-secrets-engine-approval, limited to
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namespace sso, to ExternalSecret sso/keycape-secrets-engine-approval-client and
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Secret sso/keycape-secrets-engine-approval-client with key client-secret.
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KeyCape resolves it as KEYCAPE_SECRETS_ENGINE_APPROVAL_CLIENT_SECRET through a
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secretKeyRef, matching the live KEYCAPE_RAPP_QONTO_CLIENT_SECRET shape observed
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on image main-153258b. Manifests:
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argocd/platform-addons/openbao-secretstore/openbao-keycape-approval-clients.clustersecretstore.yaml
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and keycape-approval-clients.externalsecrets.yaml.
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risk:
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classification: high
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notes:
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- >-
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This is a verifier-side copy. KeyCape holding the client secret lets it
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authenticate the client; it does not let KeyCape act as the client, but a leak
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of this value allows anyone to present as secrets-engine for approval:read and
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approval:consume until the registration is disabled.
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- >-
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Custody path is under the client's own workload prefix, not KeyCape's, because
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the credential belongs to the secrets-engine client identity. The reader
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admitted here is the External Secrets Operator on behalf of the sso namespace
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only; a future secrets-engine-side read is a separate lane and separate policy.
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- >-
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The existing keycape-rapp-qonto-client Secret is hand-created and not
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ESO-managed. Do not extend this store or ExternalSecret to adopt it; that is a
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distinct migration with its own owner.
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- >-
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The two approval clients are deliberately kept on separate policies, roles and
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stores so the operator client can be revoked without disturbing this one. Their
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scope sets differ; a shared policy would erase that boundary.
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- >-
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Compromise response is KeyCape disabling the client registration plus rotation
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of this KV version. An OpenBao token expiry does not invalidate an already
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issued client secret.
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verification:
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positive:
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- >-
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The ExternalSecret in namespace sso syncs CLIENT_SECRET to Secret key
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client-secret without printing the value.
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- >-
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The KeyCape build that reads KEYCAPE_SECRETS_ENGINE_APPROVAL_CLIENT_SECRET
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starts and issues a token for subject service:secrets-engine with audience
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approval-engine, tenant:platform, 15m lifetime, verified against live JWKS
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signature.
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- Exact claim bindings are asserted by KeyCape without any value or token logged.
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negative:
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- >-
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A namespace outside the approved ClusterSecretStore condition cannot use this
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store to read the path.
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- >-
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A service account outside external-secrets/external-secrets cannot authenticate
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through role external-secrets-keycape-secrets-engine-approval.
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- >-
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The role cannot read the sibling approval-engine operator-client path, any
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parent listing, or any other platform workload path.
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- >-
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The secrets-engine-approval client is denied scopes outside approval:read and
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approval:consume, and human identities are denied approval:consume.
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activation_conditions:
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- >-
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KeyCape and railiance-platform agree the single attended rollout window in
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docs/credential-lane-designs/keycape-approval-clients.md; the KeyCape image that
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reads both environment names is built and pinned but not yet deployed.
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- >-
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Attended first provision runs only through the governed
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openbao-platform-admin-login lane (founder_required, attended OIDC via
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netkingdom role=platform-admin), with a unique receipt path and no value in
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chat, command arguments or shell history.
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- >-
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Policy, Kubernetes auth role and ClusterSecretStore applied before the
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ExternalSecret; sync confirmed before the KeyCape image is rolled out.
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- >-
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Positive and negative results recorded with non-secret request ids or
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timestamps.
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evidence: []
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lifecycle:
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deactivate: >-
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KeyCape disables the secrets-engine-approval registration; platform detaches
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the policy from role external-secrets-keycape-secrets-engine-approval and
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removes the ExternalSecret. The KV version is retained until KeyCape confirms
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disablement.
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rotate: >-
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KeyCape mints a replacement client secret; platform writes the new KV version
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under the same attended authority; ESO refresh delivers it and KeyCape restarts
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or re-reads. Rotation is independent of the operator client.
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compromised: >-
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Disable the registration at KeyCape first (that is what stops token issuance),
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then rotate the KV version and confirm no other namespace consumed the store.
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state_hub:
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workplan_id: RPF-WP-0035
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task_id: RPF-WP-0035-T05
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related_message: 278a3ebe-b529-49f6-bd1a-e3ebcf318260
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related_decision: 5ed3fb35-eca9-413a-82b9-95171ba85bf6
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@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
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id: CCR-2026-0018
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kind: credential-change-request
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schema_version: 1
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request_type: workload-kv-read
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title: KeyCape verifier custody for the approval-engine-operator confidential client
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status: proposed
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created: '2026-09-08'
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updated: '2026-09-08'
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requester:
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agent: claude
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reason: >-
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Second of the two registrations in KEY-WP-0013-T02 (State Hub message
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278a3ebe-b529-49f6-bd1a-e3ebcf318260): client approval-engine-operator, subject
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service:approval-engine-operator, audience approval-engine, tenant:platform per
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resolved decision 5ed3fb35-eca9-413a-82b9-95171ba85bf6, 15m token lifetime.
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Scopes are approval:create, read, approve, revoke, supersede, observe and emit,
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explicitly without approval:consume. KeyCape owns registration and issuance;
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this request establishes only custody and the KeyCape-side delivery.
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review:
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required: true
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required_approvers:
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- platform-operator
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- key-cape-owner
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comments:
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- at: '2026-09-08'
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reviewer: railiance-platform (codex/claude)
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decision: paths_confirmed_field_corrected
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comment: >-
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KV path platform/workloads/approval-engine/operator-client is confirmed
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unchanged and conforms to the platform/workloads/<workload>/<lane>
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convention. Field client_secret is corrected to CLIENT_SECRET for the same
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uppercase convention and validator constraint as CCR-2026-0017. Kubernetes
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Secret sso/keycape-approval-engine-operator-client with key client-secret and
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the KeyCape environment name are confirmed as proposed.
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target:
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domain: financials
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tenant: platform
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workload: approval-engine
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environment: production
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purpose: >-
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Hold the approval-engine-operator confidential client secret in platform
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custody and project it into the KeyCape runtime so KeyCape can verify presented
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client_credentials for the operator client.
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openbao:
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mount: platform
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kv_path: platform/workloads/approval-engine/operator-client
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fields:
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- CLIENT_SECRET
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policy_name: workload-kv-read-keycape-approval-engine-operator
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policy_file: openbao/policies/workload-kv-read-keycape-approval-engine-operator.hcl
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auth:
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method: kubernetes
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mount: kubernetes
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role: external-secrets-keycape-approval-engine-operator
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bound_claims:
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service_account_names:
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- external-secrets
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service_account_namespaces:
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- external-secrets
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bound_claims_confirmed: true
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policies:
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- workload-kv-read-keycape-approval-engine-operator
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ttl: 15m
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access_frontdoor:
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type: ops-warden
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catalog_id: keycape-approval-engine-operator-client
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selector: KeyCape approval-engine-operator confidential client secret
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command: warden access keycape-approval-engine-operator-client --fetch CLIENT_SECRET
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resolvable: false
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readiness: pending-review
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delivery:
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surface: external-secrets
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target: >-
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ClusterSecretStore openbao-keycape-approval-engine-operator, limited to
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namespace sso, to ExternalSecret sso/keycape-approval-engine-operator-client and
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Secret sso/keycape-approval-engine-operator-client with key client-secret.
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KeyCape resolves it as KEYCAPE_APPROVAL_ENGINE_OPERATOR_CLIENT_SECRET through a
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secretKeyRef. Manifests:
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argocd/platform-addons/openbao-secretstore/openbao-keycape-approval-clients.clustersecretstore.yaml
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and keycape-approval-clients.externalsecrets.yaml.
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risk:
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classification: high
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notes:
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- >-
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This client carries the widest approval scope set in the pair — create,
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approve, revoke and supersede. A leak allows forging approval lifecycle actions,
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which is a stronger outcome than the read/consume client in CCR-2026-0017.
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- >-
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The absence of approval:consume is a deliberate separation of duties. Any later
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request to add consume to this client is a new lane decision, not a scope edit.
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- >-
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Kept on its own policy, role and store so it can be revoked independently of the
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secrets-engine-approval client.
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- >-
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Compromise response is KeyCape disabling the registration plus rotation of this
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KV version; approval actions already emitted are not retracted by rotation and
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need approval-engine's own audit review.
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verification:
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positive:
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- >-
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The ExternalSecret in namespace sso syncs CLIENT_SECRET to Secret key
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client-secret without printing the value.
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- >-
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The KeyCape build issues a token for subject service:approval-engine-operator
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with audience approval-engine, tenant:platform and 15m lifetime, verified
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against live JWKS signature.
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negative:
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- >-
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A namespace outside the approved ClusterSecretStore condition cannot use this
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store to read the path.
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- >-
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A service account outside external-secrets/external-secrets cannot authenticate
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through role external-secrets-keycape-approval-engine-operator.
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- >-
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The role cannot read the sibling secrets-engine approval-client path, any parent
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listing, or any other platform workload path.
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- >-
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The operator client is denied approval:consume, and denial is observed rather
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than assumed.
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activation_conditions:
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- >-
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Same single attended rollout window and prepared-but-undeployed KeyCape image as
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CCR-2026-0017; see docs/credential-lane-designs/keycape-approval-clients.md.
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- >-
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Attended first provision only through openbao-platform-admin-login
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(founder_required, attended OIDC via netkingdom role=platform-admin) with a
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unique receipt path.
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- >-
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Policy, Kubernetes auth role and ClusterSecretStore applied before the
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ExternalSecret; sync confirmed before the KeyCape rollout.
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- Positive and negative results recorded with non-secret request ids or timestamps.
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evidence: []
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lifecycle:
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deactivate: >-
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KeyCape disables the approval-engine-operator registration; platform detaches the
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policy from role external-secrets-keycape-approval-engine-operator and removes
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the ExternalSecret.
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rotate: >-
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KeyCape mints a replacement client secret; platform writes the new KV version
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under the same attended authority. Rotation is independent of CCR-2026-0017.
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compromised: >-
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Disable the registration at KeyCape, rotate the KV version, and refer emitted
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approval actions to approval-engine for audit review.
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state_hub:
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workplan_id: RPF-WP-0035
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task_id: RPF-WP-0035-T05
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related_message: 278a3ebe-b529-49f6-bd1a-e3ebcf318260
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related_decision: 5ed3fb35-eca9-413a-82b9-95171ba85bf6
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