T01: docs/rapp-platform-service-pattern.md generalizes the ownership split
already drawn in the rapp-openbao and rapp-postgres boundary docs into a
reusable four-question test, a reference rapp.yaml for platform services, the
grouped-rapp member rule, and the credential-lane position. It deliberately
does not restate the four-axis model, which railiance-master owns.
T03/T04/T05: proposals routed to the repos that own the model rather than
authored here - reef-railiance (bound_rapps lists 1 of 3 live rapps, and should
be derived rather than hand-listed), railiance-master (rapp.schema.json plus a
family declaration validator, grouped-rapp members field, wave-2 candidate
refresh), the-custodian (canon promotion of the four-axis model, which also
closes the open C-31 multi-segment prefix failures).
T02 is held until the schema settles so the platform rapps and the schema do
not converge on different answers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Survey of the four-axis repo family model against the live cluster and all six
family repos found the concepts sound but unenforced: rapp.yaml has no schema
and has drifted three ways across the three existing rapps, the reef binding
registry lists 1 of 3 live rapps, the rapp population diverged from the
first-wave plan of record, and the model is not in custodian canon so
fix-consistency cannot check it.
Operator decisions recorded in the workplan: grouped-by-bounded-context rapp
granularity, S3 owns only its own rapps and routes schema/canon changes to the
repos that own them, canonize the model now, and build the missing wave-1
user-facing exemplar.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Five failures in full credential test discovery, none of them broker
regressions:
- CCR-2026-0009 referenced a policy file that was never added, and used a
schema-invalid access_frontdoor.readiness value. Add the least-privilege
workload-kv-read-qonto-assistant.hcl (read-only on tenants/binky/qonto-api)
and set readiness to pending-review. The lane stays proposed and
non-resolvable.
- Three refusal tests used the live CCR-2026-0002 file as their "unapproved
CCR" fixture. That lane is now approved, applied and active, so the gates
correctly permitted it and the tests failed; applier-apply then walked into
its interactive confirmation prompt and raised EOFError under a
non-interactive runner. Add an unapproved_ccr() helper that materializes a
normalized temp copy so approval state is no longer read off a mutable
production artifact.
- The approve/unconfirmed-claim test demoted an active CCR to approved while
leaving resolvable=true, tripping a correct validation rule. Build it from
the same helper.
No gate, blocker, validation rule, or grant semantic was changed. Verified:
credential discovery 52/52 and full discovery 61/61 pass non-interactively,
make credential-change-validate passes all nine CCRs, the grant catalog
validates, and both audit-core openbao-database-credential grants retain
exec-env-only delivery and revoke-on-exec-exit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Managed role coulomb_social with passwordSecret
coulomb-social-app-credentials; Database CR coulomb_social_db.
Activates when apps-pg cluster is deployed.
WP-0011: sync coulomb/target-revenue path k8s/railiance into namespace
target-revenue (revenue.coulomb.social). Requires image, OpenBao secrets,
and DNS before a healthy sync — see target-revenue docs/deployment.md.
Maintainer decision, 2026-07-29: adopts TRSL V1C1 as this repo's
preliminary governing license, per target-revenue's
workplans/TREV-WP-0008-governance-and-pilot-rollout.md T05. Full
specialist legal review is deferred until out of beta (target-revenue
SCOPE.md §1). No Phase is yet declared for this repo.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
QONTO-WP-0004-T06. Requests a second, workload-scoped access lane into
the existing tenants/binky/qonto-api credential (CCR-2026-0008 is
human/OIDC admin access only, not usable by a running pod). Mirrors
CCR-2026-0003's llm-connect pattern: External Secrets Operator reads
the KV path into a namespace-scoped Kubernetes Secret via a
ClusterSecretStore restricted to the new qonto-assistant namespace;
the pod never touches the OpenBao token directly.
Status: proposed, not approved -- requires platform-operator and
binky-tenant-owner sign-off before the auth role/policy are applied.
Draft ClusterSecretStore manifest included, following the same
"deployed separately, not via this kustomization" pattern as the
existing activity-core/forgejo/reuse stores. Validated against
schemas/credential-change-request.schema.yaml.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add cnpg-option-a-backup JSON runner, vendored static age, kubectl install
helper, and ESO policy path for offsite lane so railiance01 workers can
upload without workstation OIDC (RAILIANCE-WP-0016).
Extend external-secrets-activity-core policy notes with forgejo-admin
paths used by activity-core actcore-forgejo-admin ExternalSecret
(ACTIVITY-WP-0023-T05).
Align path and fields (API_KEY, API_USER) with provisioned secret; policy and
OIDC role applied; agent-high-risk-boundary deny on data path. Front door ready.
34 candidates, 0 errors, no live tag in would_delete. state-hub
main-1cf949b protected via railiance01 live-images export; helm-pinned
and cluster-scanned tags absent from candidates; activity-core's 19
candidates have no live registry consumer (prod runs a locally-imported
image). Token via forgejo-admin-api-token warden lane, no file drops.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
ACTIVITY-WP-0020-T07: the kubectl scan only sees the prune host's own
cluster. New repeatable --live-images-file merges image refs exported
from other production clusters; missing file surfaces as WARN (reduced
coverage), forgejo-registry tags protected, other registries ignored.
5/5 tests.
Evidence gathered 2026-07-18: activity-core on railiance01 runs a
locally-imported image (activity-core:railiance01-prod), not a forgejo
registry tag — the largest would_delete set has no live registry
consumer. Live forgejo tags: state-hub:main-1cf949b (railiance01),
issue-core:0.2.1 + state-hub:f2e042a + vergabe-teilnahme:064d295
(coulombcore cluster).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
WARDEN-WP-0028 added mount tenants/ for client secrets; platform-admin
only covered platform/* and secret/*, so UI operators could not see
binky paths. Add tenants/* CRUD+list.
Enable tenant commercial secrets: applier accepts mount tenants/, apply
policy and OIDC role for company-email IMAP (metadata only; values are
founder Red provision). Extend agent-high-risk-boundary for the path.
Record WP-0026 T07 promotion evidence (no secret values), mark the
offsite backup lane front door resolvable/ready, and add OpenBao policy
agent-high-risk-boundary for coding-agent metadata-only access.
Adds collect_live_cluster_versions() — enumerates pod container images via
kubectl and protects any forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/<name>:<tag>. Closes the
gap where CI-deployed apps (e.g. state-hub) pin a live tag absent from Helm
values. On by default (--no-protect-live to skip); emits protection_notes +
live_protection in the JSON summary so consumers can detect reduced coverage.
Verified against production: protects state-hub/vergabe/issue-core live tags.
ACTIVITY-WP-0020 T07 (partial — see workplan note re multi-cluster coverage).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Forgejo has no per-package /versions endpoint — the list endpoint returns one
entry per (name, version). build_delete_plans now groups list results by name
instead of calling a 404ing /versions sub-path. Removed dead list_versions/_paginate.
Added retry + longer timeout to _api_request for slow/large registry listings
(container list was timing out). Updated fixture test to the grouped model.
Dry-run now clean: 29 candidate deletions across 5 container packages, 0 errors
(was 53× HTTP 404). ACTIVITY-WP-0020 T02 fix; enable/apply still gated on
protection-coverage review (T05).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Establish proposed workload-kv-read custody for the Forgejo site-admin
PAT at platform/workloads/forgejo/forgejo-admin, sibling to forgejo-mailer.
OIDC workstation fetch mirrors the railiance-backup-offsite pattern.
