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1cbaac7a73 CCR-2026-0008 active: tenants/binky/qonto-api lane live
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Align path and fields (API_KEY, API_USER) with provisioned secret; policy and
OIDC role applied; agent-high-risk-boundary deny on data path. Front door ready.
2026-07-21 21:42:10 +02:00
9f452f25be CCR-2026-0008: Binky Qonto API tenant lane (approved, pending apply)
Policy + OIDC role for tenants/binky/qonto/api; agent-high-risk-boundary
deny on data path. Implements DEC-2026-004 / BINKY-WP-0005 custody; secret
values remain founder Red-lane.
2026-07-21 21:26:25 +02:00
4 changed files with 185 additions and 0 deletions

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id: CCR-2026-0008
kind: credential-change-request
schema_version: 1
request_type: workload-kv-read
title: Binky Qonto bank API credentials (tenant lane, read-only MCP)
status: active
created: '2026-07-21'
updated: '2026-07-21'
requester:
agent: grok
reason: Establish OpenBao custody for Binky Hedgehog GmbH / Operational Knowledge
GmbH Qonto API credentials used by the self-hosted qonto/qonto-mcp-server
(binky-control BINKY-WP-0005; DEC-2026-004 approved). Read-only use enforced at
harness tool allow-list; payments/transfers remain founder Red lane forever.
review:
required: true
required_approvers:
- platform-operator
comments:
- at: '2026-07-21T19:26:02+00:00'
reviewer: bernd.worsch
decision: approved
comment: 'Approved as platform implemention of DEC-2026-004 (founder 2026-07-19):
self-hosted qonto-mcp-server, tenants/binky/qonto-api custody, read-only harness.
Proceed with policy+OIDC role apply; secret values remain founder Red-lane only.'
target:
domain: financials
tenant: binky
workload: qonto
environment: production
purpose: Read-only Qonto MCP / API for balance/transactions/CostRunRate feeds
openbao:
mount: tenants
kv_path: tenants/binky/qonto-api
fields:
- API_KEY
- API_USER
policy_name: workload-kv-read-binky-qonto-api
policy_file: openbao/policies/workload-kv-read-binky-qonto-api.hcl
auth:
method: oidc
mount: netkingdom
role: binky-qonto-api-workload-kv-read
allowed_redirect_uris:
- https://bao.coulomb.social/ui/vault/auth/netkingdom/oidc/callback
- http://localhost:8250/oidc/callback
- http://127.0.0.1:8250/oidc/callback
oidc_scopes:
- openid
- profile
- email
- groups
user_claim: sub
groups_claim: groups
bound_claims:
groups:
- net-kingdom-admins
bound_claims_confirmed: true
policies:
- workload-kv-read-binky-qonto-api
ttl: 15m
access_frontdoor:
type: ops-warden
catalog_id: binky-qonto-api
selector: binky qonto api bank
command: warden access binky-qonto-api --out FILE
resolvable: true
readiness: ready
delivery:
surface: operator-workstation
target: 'Map API_KEY→QONTO_API_KEY and API_USER→QONTO_ORGANIZATION_ID for
qonto-mcp-server / thirdparty API; binky-control finance/ metadata-only evidence'
risk:
classification: high
notes:
- Full-scope bank API key (Qonto keys are not scope-limited server-side).
- Read-only is harness-enforced (tool allow-list); never allow payment/transfer tools.
- High-risk lane (WP-0026 T04) — agents must not stream raw values; use --out/--exec/--wrap.
- Values must not appear in Git, State Hub, chat, or workplans.
- ops-warden proxies as the caller and must not retain values.
- Live path is tenants/binky/qonto-api (not tenants/binky/qonto/api).
- Field names are API_KEY + API_USER (login:key Authorization header).
verification:
positive:
- Approved net-kingdom-admins identity can read the data path (capabilities include
read) without printing values.
negative:
- default-policy token denied on tenants/data/binky/qonto-api.
activation_conditions:
- tenants/ KV v2 mount enabled on bao.coulomb.social (already from CCR-2026-0007).
- Policy and OIDC role applied.
- Secret values provisioned by founder (Red lane) through approved custody.
- Positive and negative capabilities-safe verification recorded.
- ops-warden catalog promoted after verify + provision.
evidence:
- at: '2026-07-21T19:36:55+00:00'
actor: grok
kind: secret_provisioned
result: passed
details:
- 'Founder-provisioned secret at tenants/binky/qonto-api (version 1; fields
API_KEY, API_USER present — lengths only verified).'
- at: '2026-07-21T19:36:55+00:00'
actor: grok
kind: delegated_metadata_apply
result: passed
details:
- 'Policy metadata write: sys/policies/acl/workload-kv-read-binky-qonto-api
(path tenants/data|metadata/binky/qonto-api)'
- 'Auth role metadata write: auth/netkingdom/role/binky-qonto-api-workload-kv-read'
- 'agent-high-risk-boundary updated: deny data / read metadata on qonto-api'
- No secret values written by applier.
- at: '2026-07-21T19:36:55+00:00'
actor: grok
kind: capabilities_safe_verify
result: passed
details:
- 'lane-policy token → read on tenants/data/binky/qonto-api and metadata path'
- Field presence keys API_KEY + API_USER; no values printed
- at: '2026-07-21T19:36:55+00:00'
actor: grok
kind: frontdoor_activation
result: passed
details:
- catalog id binky-qonto-api status=active resolvable=true risk=high
- at: '2026-07-21T19:36:55+00:00'
actor: grok
kind: first_consumer_use
result: passed
details:
- 'BINKY-WP-0005-T05 first read-only pull via thirdparty API v2 (122 txs);
CostRunRate rows 1+4 updated; evidence finance/qonto-first-pull-2026-07-21.json'
lifecycle:
deactivate: Disable ops-warden catalog entry and detach OIDC role policy; revoke
API key in Qonto dashboard.
rotate: Mint a new API key in Qonto /settings/integrations; bao kv put
tenants/binky/qonto-api API_KEY=@file (and API_USER=@file if login changed);
revoke old key; verify capabilities-safe.
compromised: Deactivate front door, revoke key in Qonto, clear EXPOSED taint after
rotation, record blast-radius notes.
state_hub:
workplan_id: BINKY-WP-0005

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@ -397,6 +397,30 @@ warden access binky-company-email-imap --all --out /tmp/p # preferred
Onboarding playbook: `ops-warden/wiki/playbooks/tenant-secret-onboarding.md`.
### Binky Qonto bank API (`CCR-2026-0008`)
| Item | Value |
| --- | --- |
| ops-warden catalog id | `binky-qonto-api` |
| Tenant | `binky` |
| Mount | `tenants` |
| OpenBao CLI path | `tenants/binky/qonto-api` |
| Fields | `API_KEY`, `API_USER` (map to `QONTO_API_KEY` / `QONTO_ORGANIZATION_ID`) |
| Read policy | `workload-kv-read-binky-qonto-api` |
| Policy file | `openbao/policies/workload-kv-read-binky-qonto-api.hcl` |
| OIDC role | `binky-qonto-api-workload-kv-read` |
| Front-door readiness | active, resolvable=true (provisioned + first pull 2026-07-21) |
| Risk | high |
| Consumer | thirdparty API / self-hosted `qonto/qonto-mcp-server`; harness read-only |
```bash
bao login -method=oidc -path=netkingdom role=binky-qonto-api-workload-kv-read
warden access binky-qonto-api --all --out /tmp/k # primary field API_KEY
```
Design: `binky-control/integrations/qonto-mcp.md`.
Onboarding playbook: `ops-warden/wiki/playbooks/tenant-secret-onboarding.md`.
## agent-harness Forgejo deploy key
| Item | Value |

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@ -30,6 +30,12 @@ path "tenants/data/binky/company-email/imap" {
path "tenants/metadata/binky/company-email/imap" {
capabilities = ["read"]
}
path "tenants/data/binky/qonto-api" {
capabilities = ["deny"]
}
path "tenants/metadata/binky/qonto-api" {
capabilities = ["read"]
}
path "sys/capabilities-self" {
capabilities = ["update"]

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@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
# Least-privilege read policy for Binky Qonto bank API credentials.
# Tenant mount (WARDEN-WP-0028) — client commercial secrets, not platform workloads.
# Live path: tenants/binky/qonto-api (fields API_KEY, API_USER).
# Consumers map API_KEY→QONTO_API_KEY and API_USER→QONTO_ORGANIZATION_ID for
# qonto/qonto-mcp-server (BINKY-WP-0005); read-only at harness.
path "tenants/data/binky/qonto-api" {
capabilities = ["read"]
}
path "tenants/metadata/binky/qonto-api" {
capabilities = ["read"]
}