diff --git a/WORK-RECORDS.md b/WORK-RECORDS.md index 1dfa2b6..b553aac 100644 --- a/WORK-RECORDS.md +++ b/WORK-RECORDS.md @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ | workplan | RAILIANCE-WP-0016 | finished | — | workplans/RAILIANCE-WP-0016-apps-pg-resource-evidence.md | | workplan | RAILIANCE-WP-0016 | finished | — | workplans/RAILIANCE-WP-0016-architecture-cleanup-backlog.md | | workplan | RAILIANCE-WP-0017 | finished | — | workplans/RAILIANCE-WP-0017-consumption-mode-enforcement.md | -| workplan | RPF-WP-0018 | proposed | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0018-policy-surface-alignment.md | +| workplan | RPF-WP-0018 | active | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0018-policy-surface-alignment.md | | task | RAILIANCE-WP-0005-T01 | done | — | workplans/RAILIANCE-WP-0005-credential-request-and-lease-broker.md | | task | RAILIANCE-WP-0005-T02 | done | — | workplans/RAILIANCE-WP-0005-credential-request-and-lease-broker.md | | task | RAILIANCE-WP-0005-T03 | done | — | workplans/RAILIANCE-WP-0005-credential-request-and-lease-broker.md | @@ -81,10 +81,10 @@ | task | RAILIANCE-WP-0016-T04 | done | — | workplans/RAILIANCE-WP-0016-architecture-cleanup-backlog.md | | task | RAILIANCE-WP-0016-T05 | done | — | workplans/RAILIANCE-WP-0016-architecture-cleanup-backlog.md | | task | RAILIANCE-WP-0017-T01 | done | — | workplans/RAILIANCE-WP-0017-consumption-mode-enforcement.md | -| task | RPF-WP-0018-T01 | todo | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0018-policy-surface-alignment.md | -| task | RPF-WP-0018-T02 | todo | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0018-policy-surface-alignment.md | -| task | RPF-WP-0018-T03 | todo | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0018-policy-surface-alignment.md | -| task | RPF-WP-0018-T04 | todo | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0018-policy-surface-alignment.md | -| task | RPF-WP-0018-T05 | todo | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0018-policy-surface-alignment.md | -| task | RPF-WP-0018-T06 | todo | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0018-policy-surface-alignment.md | -| task | RPF-WP-0018-T07 | todo | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0018-policy-surface-alignment.md | +| task | RPF-WP-0018-T01 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0018-policy-surface-alignment.md | +| task | RPF-WP-0018-T02 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0018-policy-surface-alignment.md | +| task | RPF-WP-0018-T03 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0018-policy-surface-alignment.md | +| task | RPF-WP-0018-T04 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0018-policy-surface-alignment.md | +| task | RPF-WP-0018-T05 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0018-policy-surface-alignment.md | +| task | RPF-WP-0018-T06 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0018-policy-surface-alignment.md | +| task | RPF-WP-0018-T07 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0018-policy-surface-alignment.md | diff --git a/docs/placement-policy.md b/docs/placement-policy.md index b68b28e..a4e0208 100644 --- a/docs/placement-policy.md +++ b/docs/placement-policy.md @@ -70,15 +70,50 @@ has an answer that is not archaeology. The **placement owner** decides placement changes for that workload and is accountable for watching its triggers. It is not the same role as the operator of the cluster. -| Workload | Substrate | Provided level | Placement owner | Co-signer | -| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | -| `audit-core` | `platform-pg` | P1 | `audit-core` | this repo | -| `tenant-engine` | `platform-pg` | P1 | `tenant-engine` | this repo | -| `user-engine` | `user-engine-pg` | P2 | `net-kingdom` | this repo | -| `target-revenue` | `target-revenue-pg` | P2 | `target-revenue` | this repo | -| `forgejo` | `forgejo-db` | P2 | this repo | — | -| `vergabe` | `apps-pg` | P1 | `vergabe-teilnahme` | this repo | -| `coulomb_social` | `apps-pg` | P1 | `coulomb-social` | this repo | +| Workload | Substrate | Provided level | Placement owner | Co-signer | §13 evidence | +| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | +| `audit-core` | `platform-pg` | P1 | `audit-core` | this repo | probes exist | +| `tenant-engine` | `platform-pg` | P1 | `tenant-engine` | this repo | probes exist | +| `user-engine` | `user-engine-pg` | P2 | `net-kingdom` | this repo | not assessed here | +| `target-revenue` | `target-revenue-pg` | P2 | `target-revenue` | this repo | not assessed here | +| `forgejo` | `forgejo-db` | P2 | this repo | — | single consumer | +| `vergabe` | `apps-pg` | P1 | `vergabe-teilnahme` | this repo | **absent** | +| `coulomb_social` | `apps-pg` | P1 | `coulomb-social` | this repo | **absent** | + +### 3.1 Two of these P1 levels are asserted without evidence + +§13.1 claims a level only with its artifact present. The P1–P4 artifact is +*"provisioning declaration plus the platform's isolation probes"*. + +`platform-pg` has them — `rapp-postgres` runs 15 adversarial probes against the +consumer boundary. **`apps-pg` has none.** `scripts/capture-apps-pg-evidence.py` +captures *capacity* evidence for `resource-control`; it makes no isolation +assertion. So the P1 levels recorded above for `vergabe` and `coulomb_social` +are, as of 2026-08-17, **provisioning declarations without probes** — stated +here rather than quietly carried, because a table of levels that mixes +evidenced and unevidenced entries without saying which is which is the failure +§13.1 exists to prevent. + +Recorded as owed by this repo. Until the probes exist, those two rows should be +read as *intended* placement, not *verified* placement. + +### 3.2 `apps-pg` cannot produce the noisy-neighbour artifact at all + +Worth separating from the gap above, because it is not a matter of writing a +missing test. §13's P1–P2 noisy-neighbour artifact requires a per-consumer +usage baseline, a saturation run, and **evidence that the governance controls +bind — that the greedy consumer is held at its limits.** + +`apps-pg` has no per-consumer governance controls. Its connection pool is not +partitioned, there is no per-consumer connection allowance, no statement +timeout and no resource limit on the pod. There is nothing that could be shown +to bind, so a run against it could only demonstrate that a saturating consumer +degrades its co-residents — which §13.4 explicitly rejects as an artifact that +"can only fail, or that passes by being run gently enough". + +The honest sequence is therefore: **controls first, artifact second.** Writing +the probe before the limits exist would produce an overclaim wearing the +costume of evidence. Tracked as `RPF-WP-0019`. **The consuming repo is the placement owner; this repo co-signs.** The consumer knows its latency requirement, its erasure horizon and its compliance diff --git a/docs/tenancy-posture.md b/docs/tenancy-posture.md index 29fad61..df1db9e 100644 --- a/docs/tenancy-posture.md +++ b/docs/tenancy-posture.md @@ -14,6 +14,19 @@ levels below are `0`. None of them is an admission of weakness, and §6 is explicit that a declared low level is conformant while an unevidenced high level is not. +**Every level below carries what §13 requires of it.** §13.1: a level is +claimed only with its evidence artifact present. §13.1a: at or below the +"no control" rung, a declaration requires a **stated reason** instead, because +there is nothing to overclaim at the bottom of a ladder. Floor claims here +carry `reason:`; claims above the floor carry `evidence:`. A claim with +neither would be the overclaim §6 prohibits. + +Where `target` equals `current`, that is a **settled position, not a stalled +trajectory** — §6 permits a low level to be permanent by design, on the +`flex-auth` precedent (`I1` forever, because verifying its own inputs would +make it the identity provider its scope refuses to be). Those lines carry +`permanent: true` so §12's guard does not nag them. + ## Why this is a vector *set* and not a vector §5 asks a **service** for one level per axis. `railiance-platform` is an OAS @@ -84,28 +97,65 @@ tenancy: tenancy: service: openbao role: credential-provider - current: { I: 0, A: 2, E: 0, P: 0, R: 0 } - target: { I: 0, A: 2, E: 0, P: 0, R: 1 } + current: { I: 0, A: 0, E: 0, P: 0, R: 0 } + target: { I: 0, A: 0, E: 0, P: 0, R: 1 } + permanent: [I, A, E] service_class: latency-critical reviewed: "2026-08-17" + reason: + I: "No tenant concept. OpenBao authenticates workloads via Kubernetes + auth; it never receives, parses or validates a NetKingdom tenant + identifier. Permanent by design — a secrets engine that resolved + tenant identity would be duplicating tenant-engine." + A: "No tenant context is carried, so there is nothing to bind. Permanent + by design, on the §6 flex-auth precedent." + E: "No tenant-keyed data. OpenBao holds workload secrets, not tenant + records." + P: "One instance, every consumer shares it. Single-node rail; §17 + scaling demands apply." + R: "No retention position on audit device output or on KV version + history." gap: - R: "No retention position on audit device output or on KV version history. - R1 (platform default) is reachable cheaply and is not yet declared." - notes: - - "A2 is claimed on the consumer boundary, not a tenant boundary: policy - per workload path, bound once, centrally, in OpenBao's own policy - engine. It is NOT delegated to flex-auth, so A3 is not claimed and is - not currently a target — a PDP in the credential path would put - flex-auth on OpenBao's availability path and OpenBao on flex-auth's." - - "E is 0 on the TENANT axis and that number is misleading without this - sentence: consumer separation in OpenBao is structural — a workload - token's policy cannot address another workload's path at all, which is - E4-shaped machinery. It scores 0 because the axis measures the tenant - boundary and OpenBao has no tenant dimension. See the provider note." - - "P0 is accurate and deliberate: one instance, every consumer shares it. - Single-node rail; §17 scaling demands apply." + R: "R1 (platform default) is reachable cheaply and is not yet declared. + The only line here with a real trajectory." ``` +**Correction, 2026-08-17.** This vector first declared `A: 2`. That was +wrong twice over and both errors are worth recording rather than quietly +editing. + +*It was internally incoherent.* `E: 0` was justified on the ground that +OpenBao has no tenant dimension. §4.2's `A2` reads "a single local +authorization boundary; **tenant context** bound once, centrally" — the same +dimension. A declaration cannot invoke the absence of tenant context to claim +the floor on one axis and ignore it to claim a rung on the next. + +*It was unevidenced at the moment of claiming.* §13.1 requires the artifact to +be present when the level is claimed, and none was cited. §13.1a would not +have rescued it: the table defines an artifact from `A2` upward, so `A2` is +precisely the first rung where the exemption stops applying. + +The irony is the point. This repo routed a finding about unevidenced claims +in the same week it made one. + +**What the corrected zeros conceal, and why the provider note below exists.** +`A: 0` now reads as though OpenBao performs no authorization. It performs a +great deal, it is central, and it is mechanically evidenced — +`scripts/openbao-verify-token-grants.py` mints a scoped child token, asserts +it *can* sign with `ssh/sign/agt-role`, and asserts it *cannot* read policy +metadata, then revokes by accessor. That is exactly the shape §13 asks for at +`A2`: choke point identified, unbound request refused. It is pointed at the +**consumer** boundary, and none of the five axes has anywhere to put it. + +That evidence is therefore cited under the provider statement rather than +against a consumer axis. Consumer separation in OpenBao is structural — a +workload token's policy cannot address another workload's path at all, which +is `E4`-shaped machinery — and the framework's honest application scores it +`0`. + +`A3` is not a target: a PDP in the credential path would put `flex-auth` on +OpenBao's availability path and OpenBao on `flex-auth`'s. + ### `platform-pg` — policy relationship only Declared by `rapp-postgres`. This repo does not restate it. What this repo @@ -131,6 +181,18 @@ plus the provider statement is the accurate form. This is routed as a finding. **The five ladders describe a consumer of storage. They do not describe a provider of it.** +**Narrowed on re-reading, 2026-08-17.** An earlier version of this finding +claimed the framework had no way to say "this zero is structural, not weak". +That was wrong: §6 says exactly that, and §13.1a supplies the mechanism — +`target` equal to `current` with a stated reason is a settled position, on the +`flex-auth` `I1`-forever precedent. This declaration now uses it. Half of the +finding is withdrawn. + +What survives is the other half, and it is not expressible: a provider cannot +state **what level it makes reachable for the workloads it holds**, nor record +a control that is real, mechanically evidenced, and simply not on any of the +five consumer axes. + Every service above scores at or near zero on I, A and E, and in each case for the same structural reason rather than for a weakness: a storage or credential platform has no tenant dimension of its own. It is exactly as strong or weak as diff --git a/workplans/RPF-WP-0019-apps-pg-recoverability-and-controls.md b/workplans/RPF-WP-0019-apps-pg-recoverability-and-controls.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9e1fa14 --- /dev/null +++ b/workplans/RPF-WP-0019-apps-pg-recoverability-and-controls.md @@ -0,0 +1,130 @@ +--- +id: RPF-WP-0019 +type: workplan +title: "apps-pg: backup, per-consumer controls, and the isolation probes they make possible" +domain: financials +repo: railiance-platform +status: proposed +owner: codex +topic_slug: railiance +created: "2026-08-17" +updated: "2026-08-17" +related: + - RPF-WP-0018 +origin: residual +origin_ref: RPF-WP-0018 +--- + +# RPF-WP-0019 — apps-pg recoverability and per-consumer controls + +## Goal + +Close the three defects `RPF-WP-0018` surfaced in `apps-pg` by writing its +quota disclosure. Documentation found them; only this workplan fixes them. + +## Why this is separate from RPF-WP-0018 + +That workplan declared posture and policy. This one changes a live cluster. +Keeping them apart matters: a declaration workplan that quietly starts editing +production is how "we wrote it down" becomes indistinguishable from "we fixed +it". The declaration is published as-is, with the defects visible, and this is +the record of closing them. + +## The three defects + +**D1 — `apps-pg` has no backup.** No `barmanObjectStore`, no `retentionPolicy`, +nothing. This is not a short retention window; it is no recovery path at all, +on a cluster holding two S5 application databases. Its R level is `R0` and +`R0` here means unrecoverable, not merely un-erasable. + +**D2 — no per-consumer controls.** The connection pool is unpartitioned, so +one consumer can exhaust the cluster while staying politely inside its own +expectations. No `statement_timeout`, no `idle_in_transaction_session_timeout`, +no CPU or memory limits — the pod is BestEffort QoS and is the first thing +evicted under node pressure. + +**D3 — no isolation probes**, so the `P1` levels recorded for `vergabe` and +`coulomb_social` in `docs/placement-policy.md` §3.1 are provisioning +declarations without the §13 artifact. + +## Sequencing, and why it is not the obvious one + +**D1 first.** It is the only one whose failure is unrecoverable. A cluster +with no backup is one bad afternoon from data loss that no amount of isolation +evidence compensates for. + +**D2 before D3, necessarily.** Tenancy Posture §13.4: an artifact must assert +something achievable. The noisy-neighbour artifact requires showing the +governance controls *bind*. With no controls there is nothing to bind, so a +probe written now could only demonstrate degradation — an artifact that "can +only fail, or that passes by being run gently enough". Writing the probe first +would produce an overclaim wearing the costume of evidence. + +D1 also depends on a backup target, which is `resource-control`'s bucket and +the `platform-pg-backup-s3` credential lane — the same handoff +`make postgres-backup-deploy` waits on. Check whether that is now live before +assuming this is blocked. + +## Tasks + +```task +id: RPF-WP-0019-T01 +status: todo +priority: high +``` +**Establish a backup target for `apps-pg`.** Confirm the state of the +`resource-control` bucket and the `platform-pg-backup-s3` OpenBao Secret; if +live, configure `barmanObjectStore` and a `retentionPolicy` on the cluster. If +not live, record the dependency and say so — do not leave the absence +undocumented a second time. + +```task +id: RPF-WP-0019-T02 +status: todo +priority: high +``` +**Declare and enforce per-consumer controls.** Per-consumer connection +allowance, `statement_timeout`, `idle_in_transaction_session_timeout`, and +pod resource requests/limits to lift `apps-pg` off BestEffort QoS. Publish +every value in `docs/s3-consumer-interfaces.md` before it takes effect — +§10.2 is a disclosure rule, and applying a timeout consumers learn about by +hitting it would breach the rule while implementing it. + +```task +id: RPF-WP-0019-T03 +status: todo +priority: medium +``` +**Declare the ceiling and overflow target.** Owed under this repo's own +Rule P-4.1 before `apps-pg`'s third consumer; it is at two. Name the binding +resource per Rule P-4.2 — memory or connections — and a named overflow +substrate per P-4.3. + +```task +id: RPF-WP-0019-T04 +status: todo +priority: medium +``` +**Isolation probes, after T02.** Consumer-boundary probes on the +`rapp-postgres` model, then the §13 noisy-neighbour artifact: per-consumer +baseline, saturation run, evidence the controls bind, degradation measured and +judged against each consumer's declared service class. Update +`docs/placement-policy.md` §3.1 and `docs/tenancy-posture.md` when the P1 +claims become evidenced. + +## Boundaries + +- `apps-pg` only. `platform-pg`'s equivalents are `rapp-postgres`'s. +- No consumer is migrated. This changes the cluster, not who is on it. +- Values are published before they are enforced, never after. + +## Risks + +**Applying limits to a live cluster breaks a consumer that was relying on +their absence.** Most likely with `statement_timeout`. Mitigation is the +disclosure-first ordering in T02, which gives consumers a window to object. + +**T01 stays blocked on a handoff outside this repo and the cluster keeps no +backup meanwhile.** Mitigation is that T01 requires the dependency be recorded +explicitly rather than left as a silent absence — which is exactly how D1 +survived this long.