credential-change-requests/CCR-2026-0016-glas-claude-anthropic.yaml

@@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
-id: CCR-2026-0016
-kind: credential-change-request
-schema_version: 1
-request_type: workload-kv-read
-title: Glas local Claude workload Anthropic API key
-status: in_flight
-created: '2026-09-05'
-updated: '2026-09-05'
-in_flight:
-  missing_fields:
-  - openbao.policy_file
-  - openbao.auth
-  blocking_reason: Anthropic organization and workspace budget await user input; the sandbox owner machine identity and protected delivery path have not been verified. No live grant or key exists from this request.
-  owner: railiance-platform
-requester:
-  agent: codex
-  reason: User selected a dedicated Anthropic workload API key for GLAS-WP-0012 and SAND-WP-0015. Establish custody and owner delivery before the real local Claude proof.
-review:
-  required: true
-  required_approvers:
-  - platform-operator
-  - sand-boxer-owner
-  comments:
-  - at: '2026-09-05'
-    reviewer: user via chat
-    decision: authentication_model_selected
-    comment: User requested establishment of an Anthropic workload API key. This records the chosen authentication model; final machine bindings are not yet known.
-target:
-  domain: infotech
-  tenant: glas-harness
-  workload: sand-boxer-claude-agent-dev
-  environment: production
-  purpose: Dedicated Claude Code inference for the Glas local agent-dev profile, delivered by the sandbox owner.
-openbao:
-  mount: platform
-  kv_path: platform/workloads/glas-harness/claude-agent-dev
-  fields:
-  - ANTHROPIC_API_KEY
-  metadata_read: false
-  policy_name: workload-kv-read-glas-claude-agent-dev
-access_frontdoor:
-  type: sandbox-owner
-  catalog_id: glas-claude-agent-dev-anthropic
-  selector: Glas local Claude Anthropic workload API key
-  readiness: pending-review
-  resolvable: false
-delivery:
-  surface: owner-exec
-  target: Sand-boxer delivers ANTHROPIC_API_KEY only to the selected Claude workload; neither the Glas caller nor the runtime receives an OpenBao token.
-risk:
-  classification: high
-  notes:
-  - Proposed KV coordinates and catalog selector are reserved design names, not surveyed live objects.
-  - Provider credential can incur API charges; use a dedicated workspace and user-selected budget.
-  - Use a workspace-scoped service account key; organization administration is outside the workload grant.
-  - OpenBao token expiration does not expire the provider key. Provider revocation is required for compromise.
-  - Owner environment injection can expose the key to descendants within that workload; it is not per-process secrecy against workload code.
-verification:
-  positive:
-  - Confirm provider organization, workspace, service account, key identifier and expiration using metadata only.
-  - Exact authenticated sandbox owner can read only the intended data entry and deliver the field without logging it.
-  - Bounded real Claude proof succeeds through enforced provider egress and removes private state on teardown.
-  negative:
-  - Wrong owner identity, sibling KV path, metadata read, parent listing and workload writes are denied.
-  - Generic coding-agent identity cannot retrieve the credential directly.
-  - No credential or OpenBao token appears in execution replies, artifacts, source tree or State Hub.
-  - A revoked predecessor provider key fails authentication after controlled rotation.
-  activation_conditions:
-  - User confirms Anthropic organization and workspace budget; provider service account and key are created through attended Console custody.
-  - Confirm actual sandbox host service identity and auth binding; review exact read policy and separate protected custody writer before apply.
-  - Seed KV with compare-and-set zero through attended custody; never enter values in chat or command arguments.
-  - Positive and negative access, owner delivery and provider authentication evidence pass before route activation.
-lifecycle:
-  deactivate: Disable the owner route and provider key; revoke outstanding OpenBao reader tokens. Preserve KV history under platform retention rules.
-  rotate: Create a replacement provider key, write with expected-version CAS, stop old runs, verify new delivery and inference, then revoke the predecessor at Anthropic and prove its denial.
-  compromised: Disable the provider key immediately, stop affected runs and owner route, revoke Bao leases, replace forward through protected custody and record non-secret incident evidence.
-state_hub:
-  workplan_id: GLAS-WP-0012
-  task_id: GLAS-WP-0012-T02

scripts/migrate_nextcloud_backup_account.py

@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ def run(args, receipt):
     for method in ['GET', 'DELETE']:
         code, _ = request(upload_root + fixture_path, method, auth=(token, ''))
         receipt['runtime_' + method.lower() + '_http_status'] = code
-        require(code in (401, 403, 404, 405), 'upload_grant_exceeds_create_only')
+        require(code in (401, 403, 404), 'upload_grant_exceeds_create_only')
     code, present = request(owner_root + fixture_path, auth=auth)
     require(code == 200 and present == encrypted, 'fixture_not_preserved_by_negative_check')
     receipt.update(encrypted_upload=True, owner_download=True, escrow_decryption=True,