# Agent coding read-boundary for high-risk secret lanes (WARDEN-WP-0026 T04).
#
# Coding agents (Claude/Codex/Grok sessions, automated workers) MUST NOT hold
# raw data-read on high-risk recovery/upload/admin secrets. This policy is the
# allow-list they *may* carry for those paths: metadata + capabilities only.
# Operator OIDC roles keep the full workload-kv-read-* policies separately.
#
# High-risk set (must stay in sync with ops-warden catalog risk: high):
#   - railiance backup offsite (WebDAV upload + age recovery escrow)
#   - forgejo admin PAT
#   - openrouter LLM provider key (provider spend + prompt-adjacent)
#
# Apply live: `bao policy write agent-high-risk-boundary openbao/policies/agent-high-risk-boundary.hcl`
# Attach to agent AppRoles / tokens; never attach workload-kv-read-* for these paths
# to the same identity.

# --- railiance-backup-offsite-lane ---
path "platform/data/workloads/railiance/backup/offsite-lane" {
  capabilities = ["deny"]
}
path "platform/metadata/workloads/railiance/backup/offsite-lane" {
  capabilities = ["read"]
}

# --- forgejo-admin ---
path "platform/data/workloads/forgejo/forgejo-admin" {
  capabilities = ["deny"]
}
path "platform/metadata/workloads/forgejo/forgejo-admin" {
  capabilities = ["read"]
}

# --- openrouter-llm-connect ---
path "platform/data/workloads/activity-core/llm-connect/llm-connect-provider-secrets" {
  capabilities = ["deny"]
}
path "platform/metadata/workloads/activity-core/llm-connect/llm-connect-provider-secrets" {
  capabilities = ["read"]
}

# Capabilities introspection (no secret values)
path "sys/capabilities-self" {
  capabilities = ["update"]
}
path "auth/token/lookup-self" {
  capabilities = ["read"]
}