# OpenBao - Platform Secrets Service

**Chart:** `openbao/openbao`
**Chart version:** `0.28.2`
**App version:** `v2.5.4` (image tag in `helm/openbao-values.yaml`)
**Namespace:** `openbao`
**Managed by:** `railiance-platform` (S3)
**Workplan:** `RAIL-PL-WP-0002`
**Initial target:** Railiance01 (`92.205.62.239`)

---

Ownership note: the deployable OpenBao package surface now has a wave-1 home in
`rapp-openbao`. Platform custody, policy, credential lanes, delegated
automation, and root-of-trust handling remain `railiance-platform`
responsibilities. Use `docs/rapp-openbao-compatibility-handoff.md` for the
migration-window split between package-owned deploy/smoke surfaces and retained
S3 bootstrap/governance work.

---

## Architecture

```
S5 workloads / operators
  -> openbao.openbao.svc.cluster.local:8200
       -> openbao-0
            -> integrated Raft storage on local-path PVC
            -> audit storage PVC mounted at /openbao/audit

Platform operators with approved admin identity
  -> bridge up openbao-ui-railiance01
       -> http://127.0.0.1:18200
       -> SSH local forward to the ClusterIP
       -> openbao-ui service
       -> OpenBao UI/API
       -> KeyCape OIDC at https://kc.coulomb.social for login
```

- OpenBao is the canonical Railiance S3 secrets service.
- SOPS/age remains the Git-at-rest bootstrap mechanism.
- The first Railiance01 deployment is single-replica Raft, not true HA.
- Browser UI exposure is operator-only through the named
  `openbao-ui-railiance01` tunnel.
  Operators authenticate through KeyCape/OIDC with MFA and the
  `platform-admin` role. Do not use the root token through the browser UI.
- `kubectl exec` and port-forwarding remain valid break-glass/operator paths
  for maintenance and non-browser verification.
- TLS is disabled inside the pod listener for this internal-only bootstrap. Add
  cert-manager-backed internal TLS before relying on cluster-internal traffic
  from untrusted namespaces.

## Deployment

The official OpenBao project recommends the Helm chart for Kubernetes
deployments and warns to run Helm with `--dry-run` before install or upgrade.

From a host with kubeconfig access:

```bash
make openbao-dry-run
make openbao-deploy
make openbao-status
```

`make openbao-deploy` upgrades the OpenBao Helm release, then applies the
KeyCape login overlay gateway (`helm/openbao-ui-overlay-k8s.yaml`) as a
ClusterIP-only surface. The chart ingress stays disabled. Public-listener
retraction and rollback are separate guarded commands documented in
`docs/openbao-public-listener-transition.md`.

On Railiance01 directly:

```bash
cd ~/railiance-platform
sudo env KUBECONFIG=/etc/rancher/k3s/k3s.yaml make openbao-dry-run
sudo env KUBECONFIG=/etc/rancher/k3s/k3s.yaml make openbao-deploy
sudo env KUBECONFIG=/etc/rancher/k3s/k3s.yaml make openbao-status
```

If the repo is not present on Railiance01 yet, copy only the non-secret values
and middleware files, then run Helm directly:

```bash
scp helm/openbao-values.yaml tegwick@92.205.62.239:/tmp/openbao-values.yaml
scp helm/openbao-middleware.yaml tegwick@92.205.62.239:/tmp/openbao-middleware.yaml
ssh tegwick@92.205.62.239 \
  'sudo env KUBECONFIG=/etc/rancher/k3s/k3s.yaml kubectl apply -f /tmp/openbao-middleware.yaml'
ssh tegwick@92.205.62.239 \
  'sudo env KUBECONFIG=/etc/rancher/k3s/k3s.yaml helm upgrade --install openbao openbao/openbao \
     --version 0.28.2 \
     --namespace openbao \
     --create-namespace \
     -f /tmp/openbao-values.yaml \
     --dry-run'
```

Repeat without `--dry-run` to deploy.

## Verification

```bash
kubectl get pods,svc,pvc -n openbao -o wide
kubectl exec -n openbao openbao-0 -- bao status
```

Expected immediately after install:

- `openbao-0` is Running.
- `openbao`, `openbao-active`, `openbao-internal`, and `openbao-ui` services
  exist as cluster-internal services.
- With `openbao-ui-railiance01` healthy,
  `http://127.0.0.1:18200` serves the operator UI.
- data and audit PVCs are Bound.
- `bao status` reports `Initialized: false` and `Sealed: true`.

That state is intentional until the bootstrap ceremony is completed.
`bao status` may return exit code `2` while sealed; this is expected for the
pre-init state and does not by itself indicate a deployment failure.

## Bootstrap Ceremony

Do not initialize OpenBao in a casual shell session. Initialization emits the
unseal keys and initial root token. Treat this as a break-glass event.

### Setup Operator And King Credential

The initial accountable setup operator/contact is `tegwick`
(`bernd.worsch@gmail.com`), with Forgejo identity `tegwick`. This identity can
assemble early infrastructure, receive notifications, and operate day-to-day
Git/Forgejo workflows, but it is not the desired long-term platform root of
trust.

The actual platform-root target is a separate king credential created through
the NetKingdom bootstrap path before OpenBao becomes live secret custody. Email
may receive notifications, but Forgejo, Git, State Hub, chat, tickets, shell
history, and email must not store or transfer OpenBao unseal keys, root tokens,
private keys, OTP seeds, recovery codes, or screenshots of secret output.

The canonical custody policy is in
`net-kingdom/docs/platform-root-custody.md`. The preferred production posture
is independent two-of-three custody. Temporary single-operator king custody is
feasible for pre-production bootstrap only when second-factor protection,
offline recovery storage, and a low-friction upgrade path to additional
custodians are in place.

Pre-flight checks:

```bash
make openbao-status
make openbao-verify
```

Proceed only when:

- `openbao-0` is Running.
- data and audit PVCs are Bound.
- `bao status` reports `Initialized: false` and `Sealed: true`.
- Railiance01 host/cluster backup posture is understood for this maintenance
  window.
- the guided NetKingdom bootstrap path exists for creating or importing the
  king credential.
- the OpenBao custody mode is recorded: preferred independent custody, or an
  explicit temporary single-custodian king bootstrap exception.

Recommended ceremony:

1. Confirm the Railiance01 backup posture first.
2. Prepare the king credential and approved escrow holders or offline
   single-custody locations.
3. Run initialization once:

   ```bash
   kubectl exec -n openbao openbao-0 -- \
     bao operator init -key-shares=3 -key-threshold=2
   ```

4. Give each unseal share to its escrow owner or approved king-custody location
   through an out-of-band channel.
5. Unseal with two shares:

   ```bash
   kubectl exec -n openbao openbao-0 -- bao operator unseal
   ```

6. Log in with the initial root token only long enough to create durable admin
   auth, enable audit, and prepare policies.
7. Revoke or tightly escrow the initial root token.

Do not paste unseal keys, root tokens, screenshots, or command output into Git,
State Hub, chat, shell history, or issue trackers. Each unseal share goes to one
escrow owner through an out-of-band channel. The initial root token is either
revoked after a non-root platform-admin token exists or stored as offline
break-glass material with the same handling as unseal shares.

## Break-glass: OpenBao with SSO down

Use this when KeyCape or Authelia is down and an OpenBao action can't wait. It
belongs to NetKingdom NK-WP-0055-T13 and is drilled against an isolated restored
OpenBao only (RPF-WP-0064-T10). Never drill it on production. The drill runs as
`scripts/openbao-isolated-restore/run-isolated-restore.sh --break-glass-drill` with its own signed
admission; the founder runbook is in the RPF-WP-0064 workplan, T10.

**What fails with SSO down.** Operator OIDC logins through `auth/netkingdom`
fail, and so does the warden lane. ops-warden SSH certificates fail too,
because the warden backend is OpenBao. The OpenBao UI tunnel
`openbao-ui-railiance01` is only usable if its SSH credential does not come
from warden.

**What still works.** Cluster access uses the static-key tunnel
`k3s-api-railiance01` (as `tegwick`) plus the admin kubeconfig client
certificate. Both are founder-workstation material, with an age-sealed copy on
the Storage Share (net-kingdom crisis list items 4 and 9). Through that path
you can use `kubectl exec` into `openbao-0` and
`kubectl -n openbao port-forward pod/openbao-0 8200:8200`.

**Custody facts.** The mechanism is manual Shamir unseal: 3 shares, threshold
2. The founder (platform-root) holds all three shares in the replicated browser
password safe, under the `kingpath.credentials` entry (crisis list item 3). The
founder also holds the initial root token offline. Its validity is unconfirmed.

**Rules for every step.**

- Enter values only at hidden prompts: `read -rs` or OpenBao's own
  `(will be hidden)` prompt.
- Never put a share, token or OTP in argv, an exported environment variable,
  a file, shell history, chat, State Hub or Git.
- Keep these values in unexported shell variables in one terminal and `unset`
  them at the end.
- Clear the clipboard after each paste from the password safe.
- Run with `set +o history` (or a leading space with
  `HISTCONTROL=ignorespace`) as defence in depth.
- Output is reduced with `jq` to fields that are not secret. Never print a
  token, `accessor`, `encoded_token`, `otp` or share.

### 1. Reach and unseal

```bash
kubectl --context railiance01 -n openbao get pod openbao-0
kubectl -n openbao exec openbao-0 -- bao status -format=json | jq '{initialized, sealed, t, n, progress}'
```

If `sealed` is `true`, enter two shares. Each one goes into OpenBao's hidden
prompt, which needs a TTY (`-ti`):

```bash
kubectl -n openbao exec -ti openbao-0 -- bao operator unseal   # share 1 at "Unseal Key (will be hidden):"
kubectl -n openbao exec -ti openbao-0 -- bao operator unseal   # share 2
kubectl -n openbao exec openbao-0 -- bao status -format=json | jq '{sealed, progress}'
```

Do not pass a share as an argument (`bao operator unseal <key>`). That puts it
in argv on the workstation and in the pod.

### 2. API session in one terminal

```bash
set +o history
kubectl -n openbao port-forward pod/openbao-0 8200:8200 >/dev/null & PF_PID=$!
ADDR=http://127.0.0.1:8200
bao_api() {  # bao_api METHOD PATH [TOKEN_VAR [curl args...]]; JSON body on stdin (</dev/null for none)
  local m=$1 p=$2 tv=${3:-}; shift $(( $# < 3 ? $# : 3 ))
  if [ -n "$tv" ]; then
    curl -sS -X "$m" -H @<(printf 'X-Vault-Token: %s\n' "${!tv}") \
      -H 'Content-Type: application/json' --data-binary @- "$@" "$ADDR/v1/$p"
  else
    curl -sS -X "$m" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' --data-binary @- "$@" "$ADDR/v1/$p"
  fi
}
```

`printf` is a shell builtin and the header reaches `curl` through a process
substitution (`/dev/fd/N`), so no token appears in argv. `curl -H @file` needs
curl 7.55 or later. The body is always read from stdin.

### 3. Value-free validity check of a held token

This works for the held initial root token, or any token you have in hand.

```bash
read -rsp 'Token (hidden): ' T; echo
bao_api GET auth/token/lookup-self T </dev/null \
  | jq '{valid: (.data != null), policies: .data.policies, ttl: .data.ttl,
         expire_time: .data.expire_time, orphan: .data.orphan, errors}'
```

- **A valid initial root token** shows `policies: ["root"]`, `ttl: 0` and
  `expire_time: null`.
- **A revoked or unknown token** shows `valid: false` and
  `errors: ["permission denied"]`.
- **Recording.** Record only that output. Never record `id`, `accessor` or
  `display_name`.

A held root token that is still valid is a standing root credential. Once
generate-root has been drilled successfully, the founder decides whether to
revoke it on production with the step 6 commands.

To use a valid held token, skip step 4 and use it the way step 5 uses `ROOT`
(with `T` in place of `ROOT`). Do not run `revoke-self` on the held token unless
you have decided to retire it. Run `unset T` at the end.

### 4. `generate-root` ceremony

**Prerequisite: the listener must allow unauthenticated generate-root.**
OpenBao 2.x (production runs 2.5.4) disables unauthenticated generate-root by
default. The production listener in `rapp-openbao/helm/openbao-values.yaml`
does not set `disable_unauthed_generate_root_endpoints = false`. So without a
valid token this ceremony is **not available on production today**. The
isolated restore adapter enables it on its loopback-only listener, which is
why the drill passes there.

There are two ways to close the gap. Option (b) is the owner decision for
rapp-openbao and is recorded in RPF-WP-0064-T10.

- **(a) At incident time.**
  1. Add a second listener to the OpenBao config ConfigMap with
     `kubectl -n openbao edit configmap openbao-config` (confirm the name with
     `kubectl -n openbao get cm`):
     `listener "tcp" { address = "127.0.0.1:8210" tls_disable = 1 disable_unauthed_generate_root_endpoints = false }`
  2. Delete `openbao-0`, unseal again (step 1), and port-forward `8210`.
  3. Afterwards, revert the ConfigMap and restart.
  4. If ArgoCD manages the release, it may revert the edit. Suspend sync for
     the window first.
- **(b) Standing.** Declare that loopback-only listener in the rapp-openbao
  values. It is reachable only through `kubectl port-forward` or `exec`, which
  already require cluster-admin. Even then, an attempt still needs two shares.

Run the ceremony against the listener that allows it (set `ADDR`
accordingly). The CLI forms are:

- `bao operator generate-root -status`
- `bao operator generate-root -init`: OpenBao generates and prints the OTP.
- `bao operator generate-root -init -otp=<otp>` and
  `bao operator generate-root -generate-otp`: these put the OTP in argv.
- `bao operator generate-root -nonce=<nonce>`: prompts for a share, hidden.
- `bao operator generate-root -decode=<encoded> -otp=<otp>`: puts both values
  in argv and prints the token.
- `bao operator generate-root -cancel`
- PGP mode: `-init -pgp-key=keybase:<user>|<file>`, then
  `gpg --decrypt` of the base64-decoded `encoded_token`.

Because `-decode` exposes the encoded token and OTP in argv and prints the
token, run the equivalent through the API with the OTP kept in memory:

```bash
bao_api GET sys/generate-root/attempt </dev/null | jq '{started, progress, required}'
# started must be false; otherwise cancel a stale attempt:
#   bao_api DELETE sys/generate-root/attempt </dev/null
INIT=$(echo '{}' | bao_api PUT sys/generate-root/attempt)          # server generates the OTP
NONCE=$(jq -r .nonce <<<"$INIT"); OTP=$(jq -r .otp <<<"$INIT"); unset INIT
for i in 1 2; do
  read -rsp "Unseal share $i (hidden): " K; echo
  R=$(printf '{"key":"%s","nonce":"%s"}' "$K" "$NONCE" | bao_api PUT sys/generate-root/update)
  unset K
  jq '{progress, required, complete, errors}' <<<"$R"
done
ENC=$(jq -r .encoded_token <<<"$R"); unset R
ROOT=$(printf '%s\n%s\n' "$ENC" "$OTP" | python3 -c 'import sys,base64
e,o=sys.stdin.read().split(); r=base64.b64decode(e+"="*(-len(e)%4))
assert len(r)==len(o); sys.stdout.write(bytes(a^b for a,b in zip(r,o.encode())).decode())')
unset ENC OTP NONCE
bao_api GET auth/token/lookup-self ROOT </dev/null | jq '{policies: .data.policies, ttl: .data.ttl}'   # expect ["root"], 0
```

The share reaches `curl` only on stdin through the `printf` builtin; do not
build the body with an external command such as `jq --arg`, which puts it in
argv. The decode is the XOR used by
`scripts/openbao-isolated-restore/restore_adapter.py` (`generate_credential`),
which was proven against OpenBao 2.5.4 in RPF-WP-0064-T07.

### 5. Minimal action

Do only the one action the incident needs, with `ROOT` in the header. For
example:

```bash
bao_api PUT <path> ROOT </path/to/reviewed-body.json | jq '{errors, warnings}'
```

The body file must hold no secret value. Do not log in to the UI with the
root token.

**Example: fix the operator OIDC path.** To repair
`auth/netkingdom/role/platform-admin`, use the rollback body written by
`scripts/openbao-platform-admin-aal2.sh rollback-body`. For a workload secret
value, read it at a hidden prompt and pipe a `printf`-built body, as in step 4.

### 6. Revoke and verify

```bash
bao_api POST auth/token/revoke-self ROOT -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' </dev/null   # expect 204
bao_api GET auth/token/lookup-self ROOT </dev/null | jq '{revoked: (.errors == ["permission denied"])}'  # expect true
unset ROOT T; kill "$PF_PID"; set -o history
```

The CLI equivalent of the revoke is `bao token revoke -self`, run with the
token in the CLI's token helper, so prefer the API form. If the attempt was
abandoned, cancel it with `bao_api DELETE sys/generate-root/attempt </dev/null`
and confirm that `started` is `false`. If option (a) was used, revert the
listener now.

### 7. Post-event review record

Within 24 hours, write a value-free record to
`docs/evidence/<date>-openbao-break-glass.json` (or the drill receipt for a
drill) and send NetKingdom a State Hub message. Fields:

- **What:**
  - each action and API path, with the reviewed body's sha256
  - whether the pod was unsealed
  - the token check result from step 3
  - whether generate-root completed
  - the HTTP status of `revoke-self`
  - `revoked: true`
- **Why:** the triggering outage and why the OIDC path could not be used.
- **Who:** the operator and any witness, by role (`platform-root`, `tegwick`).
- **When:** UTC start and end, and the audit-log window. The audit device
  records HMAC'd tokens only.
- **Follow-ups:**
  - generate a new root token (no standing root)
  - a decision on the held initial root token
  - re-sealing of material on the Storage Share if anything moved

The record never contains a share, token, accessor, OTP, nonce or encoded
token.


### Production entry: revoke the held initial root token (NK-WP-0055-T16)

The king-path drill (RPF-WP-0064-T10, 2026-10-28) found the founder's held initial root token valid as of the
2026-10-14 snapshot: `root`, orphan, no TTL. By founder decision it stays escrowed during builder mode and is
revoked **at production entry**, once the loopback `generate-root` listener (RAPP-OPENBAO-WP-0003) is the
break-glass path. `scripts/openbao_revoke_initial_root_token.py` reads the token at a hidden prompt and refuses
to revoke unless the break-glass listener answers. It writes a value-free 0600 receipt
(tests: `tests/test_openbao_revoke_initial_root_token.py`).

```bash
export KUBECONFIG=~/.kube/config-railiance01
kubectl -n openbao port-forward pod/openbao-0 18210:8210 18201:8200 >/dev/null 2>&1 & PF=$!; sleep 3
R=~/.local/state/railiance/initial-root-token; mkdir -m 700 -p "$R"
# check any time (lookup-self only):
python3 scripts/openbao_revoke_initial_root_token.py check \
  --addr http://127.0.0.1:18201 --breakglass-addr http://127.0.0.1:18210 --receipt "$R/check-$(date -u +%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ).json"
# at production entry only, under the founder's production-entry decision id:
python3 scripts/openbao_revoke_initial_root_token.py revoke --decision <production-entry-decision-uuid> \
  --addr http://127.0.0.1:18201 --breakglass-addr http://127.0.0.1:18210 --receipt "$R/revoke-$(date -u +%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ).json"
kill "$PF"; unset KUBECONFIG
```

Expected: `checked`, and at production entry `revoked` (revoke-self 204, then lookup-self 403). After a
revoke, remove the token from the password safe and keep the receipt.

## Auto-Unseal via Transit Seal (optional, NET-WP-0020 T4)

`helm/openbao-values.yaml` carries a commented `seal "transit"` stanza inside
the server config. When an external transit OpenBao (or cloud KMS) is
available, enabling it lets pods unseal automatically after restart — no
manual share ceremony per restart. Shamir shares become **recovery keys** and
keep the same escrow handling as unseal shares.

Steps:

1. Provision the transit backend and unseal key; store the transit token in a
   Kubernetes secret referenced through `server.extraSecretEnvironmentVars`
   (`BAO_SEAL_TRANSIT_TOKEN`). The token never enters Git.
2. Uncomment the seal stanza, upgrade the release, and run the seal migration
   from the attended ceremony posture:
   `bao operator unseal -migrate` with threshold shares.
3. Prove auto-unseal: delete the pod, confirm it returns
   `initialized=true sealed=false` without shares.
4. In the net-kingdom bootstrap console, select the `auto-unseal-transit`
   custody model and set `openbao_transit_seal_configured` and
   `openbao_auto_unseal_verified` in the non-secret metadata.

## Initial Configuration After Unseal

File audit is configured declaratively in `helm/openbao-values.yaml` with a
server config `audit "file" "file"` stanza that writes to
`/openbao/audit/openbao-audit.log` on the audit PVC.

Enable the first KV v2 mount:

```bash
kubectl exec -n openbao openbao-0 -- \
  bao secrets enable -path=platform kv-v2
```

Kubernetes auth, database dynamic credentials, PKI, CSI, and External Secrets
integration are follow-up tasks in `RAIL-PL-WP-0002`. Do not migrate live
application secrets until those policies and restore drills are documented.

The repo now includes a non-secret helper for the first post-unseal
configuration:

```bash
make openbao-configure-initial
```

The target prompts for a token, verifies the declarative file audit device is
visible, enables the `platform/` KV v2 mount, enables Kubernetes auth,
configures Kubernetes auth from the in-pod service account, and loads:

- `openbao/policies/platform-admin.hcl`
- `openbao/policies/platform-readonly.hcl`

It does not print or store the token. You may also set
`OPENBAO_TOKEN_FILE=/path/to/token-file` for an operator-local, uncommitted
token file.

OpenBao audit is a production gate. If `bao audit list` does not show `file/`,
fix the declarative audit stanza or Helm rollout before moving production
secrets into OpenBao.

The helper is idempotent. Re-running it should report existing `platform/` and
`kubernetes/` paths as already enabled instead of failing the ceremony.

After the helper succeeds, create a non-root admin token:

```bash
kubectl exec -n openbao openbao-0 -- \
  bao token create -policy=platform-admin -period=24h -orphan
```

Store that token through the approved operator secret path, then revoke or
tightly escrow the initial root token. The root token should not become the
normal operator credential.

## SSH Secrets Engine (ops-warden)

After `openbao-configure-initial`, enable the SSH user CA used by `ops-warden`
(`warden sign` via `backend: vault`). This is **NET-WP-0020 T5** / **WP-0008 T2**
prerequisite.

Declarative artifacts:

- `openbao/ssh/roles-spec.yaml` — `adm-role`, `agt-role`, `atm-role` TTLs
- `openbao/policies/warden-sign.hcl` — least-privilege signing policy
- `scripts/openbao-apply-ssh-engine.sh` — idempotent apply via `kubectl exec`
- `scripts/openbao-verify-ssh-engine.sh` — non-mutating verification

Apply (requires `platform-admin` or equivalent token with `ssh/*` admin):

```bash
mkdir -p ~/.local/openbao
# Store platform-admin token locally (mode 600, never commit):
# echo '<token>' > ~/.local/openbao/platform-admin.token && chmod 600 ~/.local/openbao/platform-admin.token

OPENBAO_TOKEN_FILE=~/.local/openbao/platform-admin.token   OPENBAO_SSH_CA_PUBKEY_OUT=/tmp/openbao-ssh-ca.pub   make openbao-configure-ssh

OPENBAO_TOKEN_FILE=~/.local/openbao/platform-admin.token make openbao-verify-ssh
```

The apply script exports the CA public key to `OPENBAO_SSH_CA_PUBKEY_OUT` and
updates K8s secret `openbao/openbao-ssh-ca-pub` (non-secret pubkey only).

Create a dedicated warden signing token (do not use platform-admin daily):

```bash
kubectl exec -n openbao openbao-0 --   bao token create -policy=warden-sign -period=8h -orphan
```

Host trust and principals are **railiance-infra** scope:

```bash
cd ~/railiance-infra
make bootstrap-ssh-ca SSH_CA_PUBKEY=/tmp/openbao-ssh-ca.pub
```

Then on the workstation: `bao login` (or export `VAULT_TOKEN` from the
`warden-sign` token) and run `warden sign` per `ops-warden/wiki/OpenBaoSshEngineChecklist.md`.

## Auth And Workload Integration

Initial auth model:

| Actor | Method | Notes |
|-------|--------|-------|
| Setup operator/contact | Forgejo `tegwick` / `bernd.worsch@gmail.com` | low-trust assembly and notifications; not platform root of trust |
| King credential | NetKingdom custody record for dedicated platform-root identity | accountable bootstrap/recovery authority; not a Git or email secret store |
| Bootstrap operator | one-time root token | only for initial audit, mounts, auth, policies, and non-root token creation |
| Platform operator | token with `platform-admin` | temporary until NetKingdom OIDC/admin integration is ready |
| Read-only reviewer | token with `platform-readonly` | metadata and health visibility, no secret reads |
| Kubernetes workload | Kubernetes auth role | namespace/service-account bound, policy per workload |
| Human identity | NetKingdom IAM Profile/OIDC | target model; OpenBao is not the identity provider |
| Automation | Kubernetes auth or short-lived operator token | no root tokens in automation |

### Browser UI Login

The browser operator surface is the named local tunnel:

```text
http://127.0.0.1:18200
```

Run `bridge up openbao-ui-railiance01` first. Operators then see a streamlined
**Sign in with KeyCape** mask. The raw OpenBao fields (namespace, method, mount
path, role) are hidden presets applied by the UI overlay in
`helm/openbao-ui-overlay/`. The ClusterIP-only `openbao-ui-gateway` nginx proxy
injects overlay assets and forwards to the OpenBao service.

Hidden defaults (also in `helm/openbao-ui-overlay/presets.json`):

```text
method: OIDC
namespace: leave blank
mount path: netkingdom
role: platform-admin
```

Deploy or refresh the overlay:

```bash
make openbao-overlay-apply
make openbao-verify-login-overlay
make openbao-verify-login-overlay OPENBAO_VERIFY_LOGIN_OVERLAY_ARGS=--check-upstream-drift
```

After an OpenBao image or chart upgrade, follow
`helm/openbao-ui-overlay/README.md` to refresh overlay selectors and
`patches/<version>/manifest.sha256` fingerprints if upstream login markup
changed.

OIDC mounts must be visible to the unauthenticated UI listing or Ember falls
back to token auth (`?with=token`). Apply once per cluster:

```bash
OPENBAO_TOKEN_FILE=~/.local/openbao/platform-admin.token \
  scripts/openbao-tune-auth-listing.sh
```

The gateway serves a standalone KeyCape login page at `/ui/vault/auth` so Ember
never handles the bare auth route (avoids `?with=token` / `?with=netkingdom/`
bounce when OIDC mounts are hidden from the unauthenticated listing). Clicking
**Sign in with KeyCape** calls `auth_url` and redirects to KeyCape directly.
OIDC callbacks under `/ui/vault/auth/<mount>/oidc/callback` are handled by a
standalone page that exchanges the authorization code, stores the UI session
token, and redirects into the Ember app (no popup/`window.opener` flow).

The OpenBao UI redirects the browser to KeyCape at `kc.coulomb.social`, then
returns through the same local tunnel to:

```text
http://127.0.0.1:18200/ui/vault/auth/netkingdom/oidc/callback
```

The legacy `keycape` mount remains a compatibility alias for existing
operator notes and CLI experiments. The preferred browser mount is
`netkingdom`.

The browser callback URI must be present in both:

- KeyCape `openbao-admin` client redirect URIs; and
- OpenBao `auth/netkingdom/role/platform-admin` `allowed_redirect_uris`.

Declared state of the administrator login (verified live 2026-09-23,
`docs/evidence/2026-09-23-openbao-platform-admin-check.json`):

- role `auth/netkingdom/role/platform-admin`:
  `openbao/auth/netkingdom-platform-admin-role.json`. It is written by
  railiance-platform only. Since net-kingdom `a356f64`, its
  `configure-openbao-oidc.sh` no longer writes the role. The retired
  `bao.coulomb.social` callbacks were pruned on 2026-09-23
  (`docs/evidence/2026-09-24-platform-admin-callback-prune.json`).
- OIDC mount config: `openbao/auth/netkingdom-oidc-config.json` and
  `openbao/auth/keycape-oidc-config.json`, owned by railiance-platform. The
  compatibility `oidc_client_secret` is not declared.
- policies `openbao/policies/platform-admin.hcl` and
  `openbao/policies/operator-custody.hcl`, plus the built-in `default`
  (`token_no_default_policy: false`). `default` grants `auth/token/revoke-self`
  and `lookup-self`, so an attended session can always revoke itself.
- Re-check with the silent attended helper
  `scripts/openbao-platform-admin-check.sh --receipt <new-file>`. Run it through
  `scripts/openbao-attended-exec.py`. It only reads.

If the compatibility alias is kept enabled, also keep
`http://127.0.0.1:18200/ui/vault/auth/keycape/oidc/callback` in the
KeyCape client and `auth/keycape/role/platform-admin`.

Use the browser UI for metadata inspection and attended operator workflows.
Do not use the OpenBao root token through the browser UI. Do not copy secret
values, Inter-Hub keys, unseal shares, root tokens, OIDC client secrets, or
screenshots of secret values into Git, State Hub, chat, or workplans.

For `HF-WP-0001`, prefer metadata-only inspection of candidate paths such as:

```text
platform/
platform/operators/
platform/operators/inter-hub/
```

Workload delivery choice (see also `docs/argocd-gitops.md` for the GitOps
tenant contract):

- Prefer External Secrets Operator for values that should become Kubernetes
  Secrets consumed by ordinary Helm charts.
- Use CSI-mounted files for workloads that need file references, sharper
  mount-level boundaries, or secret refresh without rewriting application
  manifests.
- Do not use the OpenBao injector in the current deployment; the Helm values
  leave it disabled.
- Application repositories request paths and policies; `railiance-platform`
  owns platform mounts, policy shape, and delivery mechanisms.

Path convention:

```text
platform/workloads/<tenant-or-org>/<workload>/<secret-purpose>
platform/object-storage/<consumer>
platform/databases/<consumer>
platform/operators/<purpose>
```

The template policy for workload KV reads is
`openbao/policies/workload-kv-read-template.hcl`.

Concrete workload access lanes used by ops-warden and similar front doors are
tracked in `docs/workload-kv-access-lanes.md`. These docs carry non-secret
path, field, policy, auth-role, and verification pointers only.

## Backup, Restore, Audit, And Monitoring

Before any live application secrets move into OpenBao:

1. Confirm file audit is enabled and an audit file is written under
   `/openbao/audit/openbao-audit.log`.
2. Create an OpenBao Raft snapshot from the unsealed pod:

   ```bash
   kubectl exec -n openbao openbao-0 -- \
     bao operator raft snapshot save /tmp/openbao-raft.snap
   kubectl cp openbao/openbao-0:/tmp/openbao-raft.snap ./openbao-raft.snap
   ```

3. Encrypt the snapshot with age/SOPS-compatible custody before it leaves the
   operator machine.
4. Run an isolated restore drill before treating OpenBao as live secret
   custody. The drill must prove that a fresh OpenBao instance can restore the
   snapshot, unseal, and read a test secret.
   Record only non-secret evidence using
   `docs/openbao-restore-drill-evidence.example.json` as a template, replace
   every placeholder with real drill evidence, then validate it with:

   ```bash
   make openbao-validate-restore-evidence \
     OPENBAO_RESTORE_EVIDENCE=/path/to/evidence.json
   ```

5. Decide where audit logs are shipped durably. The audit PVC alone is not a
   durable audit sink. The interim `audit-core` mock file backend can prove API
   and setup wiring, but it writes to `/tmp` and is not production retention.
6. Run:

   ```bash
   make openbao-verify-post-unseal
   ```

Authenticated verification, after the KeyCape-backed `platform-admin` path or
another approved operator token is available:

```bash
make openbao-verify-authenticated
```

The target prompts for the token without echoing it, never puts the token on
the command line, and only runs non-mutating checks. It verifies that
`bao audit list` shows `file/`, `bao secrets list` shows `platform/`,
`bao auth list` shows `kubernetes/`, `netkingdom/`, and `keycape/`, and that
the file audit log is non-empty.

If a previous attended OIDC login stored a still-valid token in the pod token
helper, use:

```bash
make openbao-verify-authenticated OPENBAO_VERIFY_AUTH_ARGS=--use-token-helper
```

Current durable audit status: the file audit device writes to the audit PVC,
which is necessary but not enough for production trust. Before application
secrets move into OpenBao, choose and test a durable audit sink beyond that PVC
such as an encrypted platform backup/export path or the future centralized
logging stack. Do not treat non-secret hashes, screenshots, or State Hub notes
as substitutes for retained audit log custody.

Interim integration status: `/home/worsch/audit-core` provides a mock
Audit Core backend that writes JSONL records under
`/tmp/audit-core/audit-YYYYMMDDTHH.jsonl` and deletes files older than seven
days. Use it only to wire interfaces and setup validation before the durable
Audit Core archive exists.

Emergency seal/unseal drills are disruptive and must only run in an attended
window with threshold unseal shares available. Record non-secret drill evidence
using `docs/openbao-emergency-drill-evidence.example.json` as a template,
replace every placeholder with real drill evidence, then validate it with:

```bash
make openbao-validate-emergency-evidence \
  OPENBAO_EMERGENCY_EVIDENCE=/path/to/evidence.json
```

Monitoring baseline:

- pod readiness and liveness from Kubernetes probes
- `bao status` seal/init state
- PVC capacity for data and audit storage
- audit log write success
- future Prometheus scraping once the cluster monitoring stack exists

## Artifact-Store Object Storage Handoff

`artifact-store` is the consumer-facing artifact preservation service for
generated outputs, evidence packages, reports, logs, snapshots, exports, and
release artifacts. It already has an S3-compatible backend with `env:NAME` and
`file:/mounted/path` credential references, plus an
`artifactstore storage verify --backend s3` smoke path.

Railiance should avoid building a parallel object-storage client or credential
vending flow in OpenBao. The ownership split is:

- `railiance-platform` / OpenBao owns bootstrap secret custody, policy, audit,
  break-glass access, and workload secret delivery.
- `artifact-store` owns artifact package manifests, the S3 backend, storage
  verification, and whether temporary credentials require backend refresh
  support or a sidecar/controller.
- `net-kingdom` owns the identity issuer and role-claim model if object storage
  adopts STS with `AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity`.

Initial static-credential bridge, before STS is proven:

1. Create a scoped object-store access key limited to the artifact-store bucket
   and prefix. Do not use object-store root credentials.
2. Store the key pair in OpenBao under a platform-owned path such as
   `platform/object-storage/artifact-store`.
3. Deliver the values to the artifact-store pod through CSI or External Secrets
   as mounted files.
4. Configure artifact-store with file references:

   ```bash
   export ARTIFACTSTORE_S3_ACCESS_KEY_REF=file:/run/secrets/artifactstore/s3-access-key
   export ARTIFACTSTORE_S3_SECRET_KEY_REF=file:/run/secrets/artifactstore/s3-secret-key
   ```

5. Verify from artifact-store:

   ```bash
   artifactstore storage verify --backend s3
   ```

STS credential vending remains linked to
`ARTIFACT-STORE-WP-0007 - MinIO Compatibility, MaxIO Fork Assessment, And STS
Credential Vending`. If that workstream chooses MinIO-compatible
`AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity`, OpenBao should not become the identity provider by
default. Use the NetKingdom OIDC issuer for workload/user identity, map object
storage roles and policies there, and keep OpenBao responsible for bootstrap,
break-glass, audit, and delivery of any controller configuration.

Current artifact-store configuration exposes access key and secret key refs,
but no session-token ref. `ARTIFACT-STORE-WP-0007-T004` must either add
temporary-session-token support to the S3 backend or choose a sidecar/secret
controller pattern that keeps refreshed credentials available through the
existing env/file reference contract.

## Upgrade And Rollback

1. Read the OpenBao chart release notes.
2. Update `OPENBAO_CHART_VERSION` in `Makefile`.
3. Run `make openbao-dry-run`.
4. Confirm current backup and audit log posture.
5. Run `make openbao-deploy`.
6. Run `make openbao-status`.

For rollback, run `helm rollback openbao <REVISION> -n openbao` on Railiance01
and re-check `bao status`.

## Scaling To Three Nodes

When Railiance02 and Railiance03 join:

1. Move storage from `local-path` to distributed storage.
2. Set `server.affinity` back to anti-affinity.
3. Set `server.ha.replicas: 3`.
4. Re-enable a PodDisruptionBudget.
5. Run an unseal, failover, backup, and restore drill before migrating secrets.