railiance-platform/credential-change-requests/CCR-2026-0017-keycape-secrets-engine-approval-client.yaml
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feat: verify live KeyCape custody and preserve versions on resume
Assistant: codex
Assistant-Model: gpt-5.6-luna
Assistant-Session: 01a07ff8-19d0-7820-b4d0-1353833cb7fc
2026-09-09 02:18:12 +02:00

183 lines
9.9 KiB
YAML

id: CCR-2026-0017
kind: credential-change-request
schema_version: 1
request_type: workload-kv-read
title: KeyCape verifier custody for the secrets-engine-approval confidential client
status: verified
created: '2026-09-08'
updated: '2026-09-09'
requester:
agent: claude
reason: "KEY-WP-0013-T02 (State Hub message 278a3ebe-b529-49f6-bd1a-e3ebcf318260)\
\ asks railiance-platform to admit custody for two confidential client_credentials\
\ registrations. This CCR covers the first: client secrets-engine-approval, subject\
\ service:secrets-engine, audience approval-engine, tenant:platform per resolved\
\ decision 5ed3fb35-eca9-413a-82b9-95171ba85bf6, 15m token lifetime. KeyCape owns\
\ the registration and issuance; this request establishes only the custody path\
\ and the KeyCape-side delivery of the client secret it must verify presented\
\ credentials against. It does not admit the client-side lane by which secrets-engine\
\ would read its own copy \u2014 that is a separate request with a separate consumer\
\ gate."
review:
required: true
required_approvers:
- platform-operator
- key-cape-owner
comments:
- at: '2026-09-08'
reviewer: railiance-platform (codex/claude)
decision: paths_confirmed_field_corrected
comment: 'KV path platform/workloads/secrets-engine/approval-client is confirmed
unchanged: it matches the platform/workloads/<workload>/<lane> convention enforced
by scripts/credential-change.py and used by every admitted platform lane. The
proposed field name client_secret is corrected to CLIENT_SECRET; KV field names
are uppercase by convention (PROVISIONER_TOKEN, CORE_HUB_API_TOKEN) and lowercase
names fail FIELD_NAME_RE validation. The Kubernetes Secret key client-secret
and the KeyCape environment name are confirmed as proposed.'
- at: '2026-09-08T23:05:19+00:00'
reviewer: User (platform-operator; explicit session approval)
decision: approved
comment: User answered "I approve, go on." to the explicit two-CCR approval question
naming both required roles. Scope remains verifier-side custody and its attended
rollout, as reviewed in docs/credential-lane-designs/keycape-approval-clients-review.md.
No client-side read or factory spending grant.
- at: '2026-09-08T23:05:19+00:00'
reviewer: User (key-cape-owner; explicit session approval)
decision: approved
comment: User answered "I approve, go on." to the explicit two-CCR approval question
naming both required roles. Scope remains verifier-side custody and its attended
rollout, as reviewed in docs/credential-lane-designs/keycape-approval-clients-review.md.
No client-side read or factory spending grant.
target:
domain: financials
tenant: platform
workload: secrets-engine
environment: production
purpose: Hold the secrets-engine-approval confidential client secret in platform
custody and project it into the KeyCape runtime so KeyCape can verify presented
client_credentials without the value living in Git, a chart value, or a hand-created
Kubernetes Secret.
openbao:
mount: platform
kv_path: platform/workloads/secrets-engine/approval-client
fields:
- CLIENT_SECRET
policy_name: workload-kv-read-keycape-secrets-engine-approval
policy_file: openbao/policies/workload-kv-read-keycape-secrets-engine-approval.hcl
auth:
method: kubernetes
mount: kubernetes
role: external-secrets-keycape-secrets-engine-approval
bound_claims:
service_account_names:
- external-secrets
service_account_namespaces:
- external-secrets
bound_claims_confirmed: true
policies:
- workload-kv-read-keycape-secrets-engine-approval
ttl: 15m
access_frontdoor:
type: ops-warden
catalog_id: keycape-secrets-engine-approval-client
selector: KeyCape secrets-engine-approval confidential client secret
command: warden access keycape-secrets-engine-approval-client --fetch CLIENT_SECRET
resolvable: false
readiness: pending-review
delivery:
surface: external-secrets
target: 'ClusterSecretStore openbao-keycape-secrets-engine-approval, limited to
namespace sso, to ExternalSecret sso/keycape-secrets-engine-approval-client and
Secret sso/keycape-secrets-engine-approval-client with key client-secret. KeyCape
resolves it as KEYCAPE_SECRETS_ENGINE_APPROVAL_CLIENT_SECRET through a secretKeyRef,
matching the live KEYCAPE_RAPP_QONTO_CLIENT_SECRET shape observed on image main-153258b.
Manifests: argocd/platform-addons/openbao-secretstore/openbao-keycape-approval-clients.clustersecretstore.yaml
and keycape-approval-clients.externalsecrets.yaml.'
risk:
classification: high
notes:
- This is a verifier-side copy. KeyCape holding the client secret lets it authenticate
the client; it does not let KeyCape act as the client, but a leak of this value
allows anyone to present as secrets-engine for approval:read and approval:consume
until the registration is disabled.
- Custody path is under the client's own workload prefix, not KeyCape's, because
the credential belongs to the secrets-engine client identity. The reader admitted
here is the External Secrets Operator on behalf of the sso namespace only; a future
secrets-engine-side read is a separate lane and separate policy.
- The existing keycape-rapp-qonto-client Secret is hand-created and not ESO-managed.
Do not extend this store or ExternalSecret to adopt it; that is a distinct migration
with its own owner.
- The two approval clients are deliberately kept on separate policies, roles and
stores so the operator client can be revoked without disturbing this one. Their
scope sets differ; a shared policy would erase that boundary.
- Compromise response is KeyCape disabling the client registration plus rotation
of this KV version. An OpenBao token expiry does not invalidate an already issued
client secret.
verification:
positive:
- The ExternalSecret in namespace sso syncs CLIENT_SECRET to Secret key client-secret
without printing the value.
- The KeyCape build that reads KEYCAPE_SECRETS_ENGINE_APPROVAL_CLIENT_SECRET starts
and issues a token for subject service:secrets-engine with audience approval-engine,
tenant:platform, 15m lifetime, verified against live JWKS signature.
- Exact claim bindings are asserted by KeyCape without any value or token logged.
negative:
- A namespace outside the approved ClusterSecretStore condition cannot use this
store to read the path.
- A service account outside external-secrets/external-secrets cannot authenticate
through role external-secrets-keycape-secrets-engine-approval.
- The role cannot read the sibling approval-engine operator-client path, any parent
listing, or any other platform workload path.
- The secrets-engine-approval client is denied scopes outside approval:read and
approval:consume, and human identities are denied approval:consume.
activation_conditions:
- KeyCape and railiance-platform agree the single attended rollout window in docs/credential-lane-designs/keycape-approval-clients.md;
the KeyCape image that reads both environment names is built and pinned but not
yet deployed.
- Attended first provision runs only through the governed openbao-platform-admin-login
lane (founder_required, attended OIDC via netkingdom role=platform-admin), with
a unique receipt path and no value in chat, command arguments or shell history.
- Policy, Kubernetes auth role and ClusterSecretStore applied before the ExternalSecret;
sync confirmed before the KeyCape image is rolled out.
- Positive and negative results recorded with non-secret request ids or timestamps.
evidence:
- at: '2026-09-09T00:14:27+00:00'
actor: the-custodian (codex)
kind: verifier_custody_and_rollout
result: passed
details:
- Named user approval recorded for platform-operator and key-cape-owner on 2026-09-09.
- Initial CAS=0 custody created version 1. Verified rollback/resume retained the
same values and versions.
- Both stores Valid and ExternalSecrets SecretSynced; exact native read, sibling/listing
and wrong service account/namespace/store-use denials passed; reader revocation
and coding-agent deny precedence passed.
- Pinned image 7ff54c54e63e has one ready replica; protected previous config/image
retained and signing key unchanged.
- Both clients passed live JWKS and exact audience/subject/tenant/role/scope/900-second
lifetime checks, excess-scope and wrong-secret denials; human client consume
denied.
- Native verifier from pinned image ran in the attended owner process with memory-only
credentials. Pod network policy remains unchanged. Future iat bound is the existing
30-second contract; expiry has zero leeway.
- Fresh post-rollout OpenBao OIDC login succeeded and self-revoked. No client-side
fetch front door or factory spending was admitted.
- 'Receipt: docs/evidence/2026-09-09-keycape-verifier-admission.json'
lifecycle:
deactivate: KeyCape disables the secrets-engine-approval registration; platform
detaches the policy from role external-secrets-keycape-secrets-engine-approval
and removes the ExternalSecret. The KV version is retained until KeyCape confirms
disablement.
rotate: KeyCape mints a replacement client secret; platform writes the new KV version
under the same attended authority; ESO refresh delivers it and KeyCape restarts
or re-reads. Rotation is independent of the operator client.
compromised: Disable the registration at KeyCape first (that is what stops token
issuance), then rotate the KV version and confirm no other namespace consumed
the store.
state_hub:
decision_id: b533a271-b704-4c5c-98a2-9a5951aadfb6
decision_api_url: http://127.0.0.1:8000/decisions/b533a271-b704-4c5c-98a2-9a5951aadfb6
workplan_id: RPF-WP-0035
task_id: RPF-WP-0035-T05
related_message: 278a3ebe-b529-49f6-bd1a-e3ebcf318260
related_decision: 5ed3fb35-eca9-413a-82b9-95171ba85bf6