railiance-platform/credential-change-requests/CCR-2026-0021-approval-engine-audit.yaml
codex bfe65a5b05 Prepare scoped factory audit custody and enforce receiver compatibility
Assistant: codex
Assistant-Model: gpt-6-astra
Assistant-Session: 01a07ff8-19d0-7820-b4d0-1353833cb7fc
2026-09-11 02:01:57 +02:00

110 lines
5.3 KiB
YAML

id: CCR-2026-0021
kind: credential-change-request
schema_version: 1
request_type: workload-kv-read
title: approval-engine load-bearing audit sender custody and delivery
status: proposed
created: '2026-09-11'
updated: '2026-09-11'
requester:
agent: codex
reason: AUDIT-WP-0009-T09 and HFACT-WP-0001-T03 require the existing exact sender declaration. This
request supplies the missing platform custody and ESO delivery; receiver compatibility and service
rollout remain explicit gates.
review:
required: true
required_approvers:
- platform-operator
- audit-core-owner
- approval-engine-owner
comments: []
target:
domain: financials
tenant: platform
workload: approval-engine
environment: production
purpose: Provide only the approval-engine sender with source=approval-engine, tenants=[tenant:platform],
may_write=true, may_read=false, evidence_kind=load-bearing, secret_policy=redact. Preserve the
existing receiver registry and every other sender.
openbao:
mount: platform
kv_path: platform/workloads/approval-engine/audit-sender
fields:
- AUDIT_TOKEN
- CUSTODY_REQUEST
policy_name: workload-kv-read-approval-engine-audit
policy_file: openbao/policies/workload-kv-read-approval-engine-audit.hcl
metadata_read: false
auth:
method: kubernetes
mount: kubernetes
role: external-secrets-approval-engine-audit
bound_claims:
service_account_names:
- external-secrets
service_account_namespaces:
- external-secrets
bound_claims_confirmed: true
policies:
- workload-kv-read-approval-engine-audit
ttl: 15m
access_frontdoor:
type: external-secrets
catalog_id: approval-engine-audit
readiness: pending-review
resolvable: false
delivery:
surface: external-secrets
target: 'ClusterSecretStore openbao-approval-engine-audit restricted to namespace approval-engine;
ExternalSecret and Secret approval-engine/approval-engine-audit, key audit-token. Source: manifests/factory-audit-senders.yaml.
A missing namespace stays a workload-owner prerequisite; this packet creates none.'
risk:
classification: high
notes:
- A bearer permits append for its exact sender and tenant, never reading or changing stored evidence.
- The registry update reads existing sender credentials inside the attended platform process only.
No registry is delivered to a producer.
- OpenBao login TTL limits the ESO reader session, not the audit bearer. Revocation must remove
the sender token from the receiver registry and prove refusal.
- New paths extend the existing coding-agent deny boundary. No existing high-risk grant is widened.
verification:
positive:
- Independent CAS=0 token creation and exact sender merge with registry-version compare-and-set;
repeated runs preserve both tokens and other registry fields.
- ESO delivers only AUDIT_TOKEN into approval-engine/approval-engine-audit:audit-token; source and
receiver copies agree without displaying values.
- Compatible deployed receiver accepts and deduplicates a declared synthetic event for the exact
sender and tenant, retaining load-bearing/redact declarations.
negative:
- Sibling sender path, full registry and parent listing are denied to each workload reader. Wrong
service account/namespace and disallowed store namespace fail.
- Receiver denies sibling source, wrong tenant, every read route and revoked token. No existing
sender is removed or re-scoped.
- Proposed or altered CCR, legacy receiver, malformed/duplicate registry identity, token collision,
stale registry version or partial/conflicting custody refuses without overwriting.
activation_conditions:
- All three named owner reviews are approved before any native credential mutation.
- A current image supporting evidence_kind is published/admitted by audit-core and deployed with
its source scope and network policy; current c2fe39a image fails compatibility.
- Use the Warden attended platform-admin login envelope; preserve independent receipt and revoke
the session on exit.
- Apply reviewed policy/auth metadata and ESO projection only after receiver compatibility and namespace
readiness. An interrupted seed resumes from durable KV values, never blindly rotates or deletes.
- Record native positive/negative evidence before declaring verified or active. Custody alone does
not admit UI, human approval or factory execution.
lifecycle:
deactivate: Stop the exact producer; remove only its admitted token from the registry using CAS
and reload/verify receiver refusal. Then detach its reader policy and remove its ExternalSecret/projection,
retaining KV versions for investigation. Do not delete audit events or other sender entries.
rotate: 'Reviewed overlap-first rotation: append a replacement to this sender only, deliver it,
prove acceptance, then remove the predecessor and prove refusal. The first-provision helper refuses
rotation and unexpected existing values.'
compromised: Stop affected producer and revoke the exact receiver token first; inspect affected
source/tenant events, rotate through a separate reviewed action, and preserve the independent
audit trail.
state_hub:
workplan_id: RPF-WP-0035
task_id: RPF-WP-0035-T08
related_workplan: AUDIT-WP-0009-T09
decision_id: 2c9fe9f0-034a-41d7-9d49-b99df488fdc8
decision_api_url: http://127.0.0.1:8000/decisions/2c9fe9f0-034a-41d7-9d49-b99df488fdc8