railiance-platform/credential-change-requests/CCR-2026-0020-approval-engine-operator-client-read.yaml

id: CCR-2026-0020
kind: credential-change-request
schema_version: 1
request_type: workload-kv-read
title: Client-side read of the approval-engine-operator client secret
status: in_flight
created: '2026-09-09'
updated: '2026-09-09'
in_flight:
  missing_fields:
  - openbao.auth
  blocking_reason: >-
    The presenting actor is not identified by any owner source. approval-engine
    verifies this client's tokens but never presents them, and no other repo
    claims the approver surface that would. Live inspection on 2026-09-09 found
    no approval-engine namespace, workload or Service in the cluster; the owner
    deploy manifest targets namespace approval-engine and remains unapplied. An
    auth method cannot be chosen before it is known whether the presenter is an
    attended operator, an in-cluster component, or an agent surface, and the
    three imply different roles, policies and delivery.
  owner: railiance-platform
requester:
  agent: claude
  reason: >-
    RPF-WP-0035-T06 residual from the completed verifier custody
    (CCR-2026-0018). The verifier copy lets KeyCape authenticate the
    approval-engine-operator client; something must also present it. This request
    holds the client-side reader open with the determined parts recorded and the
    undetermined parts named, rather than guessing a reader for the widest scope
    set in the pair. It reuses existing version-1 custody; no reseed, no rotation.
review:
  required: true
  required_approvers:
  - platform-operator
  - approval-engine-owner
  comments:
  - at: '2026-09-09'
    reviewer: railiance-platform (claude)
    decision: actor_not_determined
    comment: >-
      Determined from owner source: the approval-engine-operator registration
      holds approval:create, read, approve, revoke, supersede, observe and emit,
      and explicitly not consume; approval-engine itself only verifies presented
      tokens (approval_engine/api.py identity check) and does not hold this
      client. approval-engine's own records note the engine does not restrict
      /entries by principal type, so this client can supply approver evidence
      today, and whether it should is approval doctrine owned by gate-house. The
      reader therefore cannot be named here without an owner decision, and
      naming one anyway would hand the widest approval scope to a guessed
      identity. Held in_flight deliberately.
target:
  domain: financials
  tenant: platform
  workload: approval-engine
  environment: production
  purpose: >-
    Establish the separate exact read by which the eventual approval-engine
    operator surface obtains its client secret, once that surface is named by its
    owner.
openbao:
  mount: platform
  kv_path: platform/workloads/approval-engine/operator-client
  fields:
  - CLIENT_SECRET
  policy_name: workload-kv-read-approval-engine-operator-client
  policy_file: openbao/policies/workload-kv-read-approval-engine-operator-client.hcl
access_frontdoor:
  type: ops-warden
  catalog_id: approval-engine-operator-client
  selector: approval-engine operator client secret
  resolvable: false
  readiness: pending-review
delivery:
  surface: undetermined
  target: >-
    Not determined. The delivery surface follows the actor: an attended operator
    implies a protected workstation file, an in-cluster component implies an
    ExternalSecret into the eventual approval-engine namespace, and an agent
    surface implies neither. No surface is admitted until the owner names one.
risk:
  classification: high
  notes:
  - >-
    This is the widest scope set in the pair: create, approve, revoke and
    supersede. A holder can forge approval lifecycle actions, and because
    approval-engine records principal_type rather than restricting it, a
    non-human holder can supply approver evidence. That is why the actor is left
    unnamed rather than defaulted.
  - >-
    approval:consume is absent by design and stays absent. Adding it is a new
    lane decision, not an edit to this request.
  - >-
    The exact-path read policy is written and committed so the eventual reader
    inherits a bounded grant rather than a broad one drafted under time pressure.
    Writing the policy is not admitting a reader.
  - >-
    No reseed and no rotation; custody is the existing version 1 from the
    verifier activation.
verification:
  positive:
  - >-
    Once the actor is named, the bound identity reads CLIENT_SECRET from the
    exact path into its admitted delivery surface with no value in chat, argv,
    shell history or logs.
  - >-
    The named surface obtains a token with subject service:approval-engine-operator,
    audience approval-engine and tenant tenant:platform, verified against live JWKS.
  negative:
  - >-
    An identity outside the confirmed binding cannot authenticate through the
    eventual role.
  - >-
    The role cannot read the secrets-engine approval-client path, cannot list any
    parent, and cannot write or patch the custody path.
  - The reader is denied approval:consume, and denial is observed rather than assumed.
  - >-
    The KeyCape verifier role cannot be substituted for this reader, and this
    reader cannot read the verifier's delivery Secret.
  activation_conditions:
  - >-
    The approval-engine owner names the presenting actor and its placement, or
    records that no client-side reader is wanted and this request is cancelled.
  - >-
    Given that actor, the auth method, mount, role, bound claims and delivery
    surface are completed and reviewed as a concrete request.
  - >-
    Policy and role applied under attended authority
    (openbao-platform-admin-login, founder_required) with metadata-only receipts.
  - Positive and negative results recorded with non-secret request ids.
  evidence: []
lifecycle:
  deactivate: >-
    Detach the policy from the eventual role and disable the ops-warden catalog
    entry. The KeyCape verifier lane and its delivery are unaffected.
  rotate: >-
    Shared with CCR-2026-0018: one client secret, minted by KeyCape and rewritten
    once under attended authority. No independent rotation for this lane alone.
  compromised: >-
    KeyCape disables the approval-engine-operator registration first, then the
    value is rotated; emitted approval actions are referred to approval-engine
    for audit review, since rotation does not retract them.
state_hub:
  workplan_id: RPF-WP-0035
  task_id: RPF-WP-0035-T06
  related_request: CCR-2026-0018