f3cf832a35
Layer declaration (gate-house). INTENT.md now carries the declaration in its own voice with layer.yaml as the machine-readable form, adapted from ops-warden's reference. railiance-platform is Staff: operating OpenBao is not a claim to the Tooling layer, because §4 is explicit that no operator-of-third-party-Tooling shape exists and that someone running it stays a declared gap. Six direct Tooling contacts are mapped by capability rather than by file — one §5.2 conduit, one §5.1 diagnostic, four §5.3 gaps with intended owners and review dates — and the uncatalogued contacts are listed so the check is total. We are PEP-shaped and the unreachable-engine stance map is NOT published; that is recorded as an open obligation to build against v0.8, not left silent. Placement admission. canned-prompts was added as a PostgresConsumer on platform-pg-2 in rapp-postgres 1b68b4c without a placement owner here, which is exactly the cross-repo drift the assurance check exists to catch; the check had been failing on it. Registered with its real boundary evidence, corrected the stale test expectation that pinned the overflow cell at one consumer, and updated the SCOPE occupancy line to 2/4. Also records owner input received today: key-cape's issuer view on CCR-2026-0020's presenting actor, and their confirmation that codex-railiance-platform correctly stays tenant:coulomb, so the flagged T02 discrepancy is closed as not-a-defect. The whynot-design npm field is NOT changed. Two dated live receipts here name NPM_AUTH_TOKEN as the field, including an attended founder fetch; that is recorded against the counterparty claim rather than either side being flipped before the session settles it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WLUjpv3ssxNRAEPPgLFnEB Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 1275505@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 97265baa-f08f-4032-b290-a1e2965a69c5
191 lines
9.3 KiB
YAML
191 lines
9.3 KiB
YAML
# railiance-platform — NetKingdom security layer declaration
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#
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# Framework: net-kingdom/canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.7.md
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# Companion: net-kingdom/SECURITY-COMPANION.md
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# Declared: INTENT.md frontmatter and body prose (§2 — own voice, own repo)
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# Form: adapted from ops-warden's reference layer.yaml, offered estate-wide.
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# layer.yaml is a convention, not a schema; gate-house confirmed on
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# 2026-09-09 that v0.7 defines no shape for this file. Following the
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# practice because §5.3 requires gap records to be machine-readable.
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#
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# Conformance rule inherited from tenancy.yaml: accuracy, not altitude. A
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# declared gap is TRACKED NON-CONFORMANCE (§11), never a claim of conformance.
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schema_version: "0.1"
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framework: netkingdom-security-layer-model
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standard_version: "0.7"
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repository: railiance-platform
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layer: staff
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role: null
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declared_by: INTENT.md
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declared_at: "2026-09-09"
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# §8 self-assessed state. Declared gaps below; nothing here is claimed as
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# conforming, and no contact is omitted to improve the label.
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conformance_state: declared-gap
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# §5 / §6.4 — railiance-platform IS PEP-shaped. Applying an OpenBao policy,
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# seeding or rotating a workload credential, and activating a delivery lane are
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# protected side effects caused on this side. Being PEP-shaped does not change
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# the Staff layer (§5 preamble).
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pep_shaped: true
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pep_stance: null # NOT YET PUBLISHED — see gaps.pep-stance-map below.
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# Every direct contact with a Tooling-layer system (§4: key-cape, OpenBao),
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# grouped by capability rather than by file. 28 files in this repository invoke
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# `bao`; they exercise the five capabilities below.
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tooling_contacts:
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- id: openbao-attended-operator-login
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shape: "5.2" # conduit
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module: scripts/openbao-attended-exec.py
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tooling: OpenBao
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operation: "exec into `warden access openbao-platform-admin-login --exec -- <cmd>`"
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write: false
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capability: "Run a reviewed owner command under the founder's own attended OIDC identity"
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supplied_authority: none
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note: >-
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The §5.2 test holds: this repository presents no credential of its own,
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cannot widen what the founder could already do, and every action
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reconstructs as the founder. It supplies only a WSL browser launcher when
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the host lacks one. ops-warden owns the envelope and self-revokes the
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temporary token helper.
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- id: openbao-policy-and-auth-apply
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shape: "5.3" # declared engine gap
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module: scripts/openbao-apply-workload-kv-lanes.sh, scripts/openbao-apply-token-grants.py, scripts/credential-change.py
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tooling: OpenBao
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operation: "policy write; write auth/<mount>/role/<name>"
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write: true
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capability: "Apply the exact-path read policy and bound auth role for a reviewed credential lane"
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intended_owner: secrets-engine
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blocked_on: >-
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secrets-engine owns credential abstraction, custody and lifecycle, and is
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the layer this belongs in, but exposes no policy/role application surface.
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SECRETS-WP-0006 is cutting the first native lanes; until a lane is served
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there, application stays here behind an attended founder session.
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review: "2026-12-09"
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- id: openbao-kv-custody-write
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shape: "5.3"
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module: scripts/keycape_approval_custody.py, scripts/state_hub_preflight_lane.py, scripts/provision-policy-nexus-forgejo-source.py
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tooling: OpenBao
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operation: "kv put / kv patch with compare-and-set, value on stdin, never argv"
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write: true
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capability: "Seed or rotate a workload credential under attended founder custody"
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intended_owner: secrets-engine
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blocked_on: >-
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Same gap as above. No engine exposes an attended provisioning or rotation
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surface for a value the founder holds. Every write here is CAS-guarded,
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attended, and emits a mode-0600 metadata receipt with no value.
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review: "2026-12-09"
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- id: openbao-read-diagnostic
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shape: "5.1" # read-only diagnostic
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module: scripts/keycape-approval-custody-preflight.py, scripts/openbao_open_questions_session.py, scripts/openbao-verify-token-grants.py
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tooling: OpenBao
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operation: "token capabilities; policy read; kv metadata get; kv get (field names only)"
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write: false
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capability: "Produce acceptance and drift evidence for a lane without mutating it"
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note: >-
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No engine exposes these reads. Values never reach argv, disk, stdout or a
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receipt; where a data read is unavoidable to enumerate field names, only
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sorted key names leave the process. This is a gap to close, not a licence.
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review: "2026-12-09"
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- id: openbao-service-operation
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shape: "5.3"
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module: Makefile (openbao-deploy, openbao-overlay-apply), helm/openbao-values.yaml
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tooling: OpenBao
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operation: "helm upgrade of the OpenBao release; unseal and snapshot procedures"
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write: true
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capability: "Operate the OpenBao instance itself — deployment, listener, unseal, snapshot"
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intended_owner: unassigned
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blocked_on: >-
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§4 is explicit that there is no operator-of-third-party-Tooling shape:
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someone must run OpenBao and that stays a declared gap whose review keeps
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returning. Recorded here so the absence is visible rather than assumed
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benign. No engine is expected to take this; the review is the point.
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review: "2026-12-09"
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- id: keycape-client-secret-custody
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shape: "5.3"
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module: scripts/keycape_approval_custody.py
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tooling: key-cape
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operation: "read/patch Secret sso/keycape-config and the client-secret Secrets it references"
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write: true
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capability: "Deliver a KeyCape client secret into the KeyCape runtime and verify the delivery matches custody"
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intended_owner: secrets-engine
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blocked_on: >-
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KeyCape owns registration, issuance and disablement and deliberately ships
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no command for custody writes (their position, which we accept). No engine
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fronts the delivery half. Exercised once, attended, on 2026-09-09 under
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CCR-2026-0017/0018.
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review: "2026-12-09"
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# Contacts recorded so the check is total rather than selectively silent. §4
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# asks for uncatalogued infrastructure to be listed anyway.
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non_tooling_clients:
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- target: Kubernetes / CloudNative-PG / External Secrets (railiance01)
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module: Makefile (db-*, apps-pg-*), argocd/platform-addons/
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rationale: >-
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Not catalogued as Tooling in §4. This is the substrate axis under §9
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(reef-*), and §9 states the axis-to-layer mapping is unsettled (statute
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§20.3). Listed rather than mapped; we are not assuming a mapping.
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note: >-
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This is the largest single contact by volume and the one most likely to be
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recatalogued. If §4 grows to cover the cluster, these become §5.3 entries
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and this file changes shape, not just content.
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- target: State Hub
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module: session protocol in .claude/rules/, scripts/*state_hub*
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rationale: "Not catalogued in §4; the companion names it explicitly as outside the rule."
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note: "Read model. The only sanctioned write is resolving a decision; progress events reflect work already done."
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- target: Forgejo, Scaleway object storage, Nextcloud
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module: scripts/forgejo_package_prune.py, lib/railiance-backup-common.sh
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rationale: "Not catalogued in §4. Backup destinations and the forge are consumed, not operated as security Tooling."
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- target: flex-auth / access-engine, approval-engine
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module: docs/credential-lane-designs/, CCR review flow
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rationale: "Engine APIs — §5 permits it; this is the shape §5 prescribes. Decisions and approvals are consumed as claims, never rendered or cached here."
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# §5 obligations this repository owes and has not met. Declared rather than
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# omitted; the standard ranks a declared gap above silence (§8).
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gaps:
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- id: pep-stance-map
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obligation: "§5 obligation 3 — publish a total unreachable-engine stance map"
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state: not-published
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intended_path: pep-stance.yaml
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blocked_on: >-
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The map must be total over its axis with no implicit default, and this
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repository does not own the zone axis it would enumerate. Every protected
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side effect here is currently attended and founder-gated, so no unattended
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branch has yet had to decide without a reachable engine — that is the
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reason the gap has not bitten, not a substitute for the map.
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build_to: "0.8"
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note: >-
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gate-house advised on 2026-09-09 to build to v0.8's tightened obligation 3
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rather than v0.7's and skip a migration: unknown must resolve to
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fail_closed, the map must enumerate its axis rather than lean on a
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catch-all, and the published-equals-shipped test is being promoted from
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SHOULD to MUST.
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review: "2026-10-09"
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- id: statute-13-1-registration
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obligation: "§5 obligation 3 — register the stance map in statute §13.1"
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state: not-registered
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blocked_on: "Depends on pep-stance-map. A map only we can read is not published."
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review: "2026-10-09"
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- id: conformance-check-script
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obligation: "Mechanical check that this declaration matches the repository"
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state: not-implemented
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blocked_on: >-
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ops-warden's scripts/check_layer_conformance.py and
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tests/test_layer_conformance.py are the part that makes this file more
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than a claim. Until an equivalent runs here, every row above is an
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assertion and is marked as such by this gap rather than by silence.
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review: "2026-10-09"
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