railiance-platform/credential-change-requests/CCR-2026-0018-keycape-approval-engine-operator-client.yaml
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Admit KeyCape approval-engine client custody paths and delivery
Answers KEY-WP-0013-T02. Both proposed KV paths are confirmed unchanged; the
field name is corrected to CLIENT_SECRET for the platform uppercase convention
and the CCR validator. Kubernetes delivery references are confirmed against the
live sso namespace. Attended authority is the governed openbao-platform-admin-login
lane, and the rollout is one attended window ordered after the Authelia issuer
precondition.

Adds CCR-2026-0017/0018, two exact-path read policies, two namespace-limited
ClusterSecretStores with Kubernetes auth, two ExternalSecrets, and RPF-WP-0035-T05.
Nothing is applied and no value exists: both CCRs remain proposed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WLUjpv3ssxNRAEPPgLFnEB

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 1275505@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 97265baa-f08f-4032-b290-a1e2965a69c5
2026-09-08 14:53:32 +02:00

148 lines
6.3 KiB
YAML

id: CCR-2026-0018
kind: credential-change-request
schema_version: 1
request_type: workload-kv-read
title: KeyCape verifier custody for the approval-engine-operator confidential client
status: proposed
created: '2026-09-08'
updated: '2026-09-08'
requester:
agent: claude
reason: >-
Second of the two registrations in KEY-WP-0013-T02 (State Hub message
278a3ebe-b529-49f6-bd1a-e3ebcf318260): client approval-engine-operator, subject
service:approval-engine-operator, audience approval-engine, tenant:platform per
resolved decision 5ed3fb35-eca9-413a-82b9-95171ba85bf6, 15m token lifetime.
Scopes are approval:create, read, approve, revoke, supersede, observe and emit,
explicitly without approval:consume. KeyCape owns registration and issuance;
this request establishes only custody and the KeyCape-side delivery.
review:
required: true
required_approvers:
- platform-operator
- key-cape-owner
comments:
- at: '2026-09-08'
reviewer: railiance-platform (codex/claude)
decision: paths_confirmed_field_corrected
comment: >-
KV path platform/workloads/approval-engine/operator-client is confirmed
unchanged and conforms to the platform/workloads/<workload>/<lane>
convention. Field client_secret is corrected to CLIENT_SECRET for the same
uppercase convention and validator constraint as CCR-2026-0017. Kubernetes
Secret sso/keycape-approval-engine-operator-client with key client-secret and
the KeyCape environment name are confirmed as proposed.
target:
domain: financials
tenant: platform
workload: approval-engine
environment: production
purpose: >-
Hold the approval-engine-operator confidential client secret in platform
custody and project it into the KeyCape runtime so KeyCape can verify presented
client_credentials for the operator client.
openbao:
mount: platform
kv_path: platform/workloads/approval-engine/operator-client
fields:
- CLIENT_SECRET
policy_name: workload-kv-read-keycape-approval-engine-operator
policy_file: openbao/policies/workload-kv-read-keycape-approval-engine-operator.hcl
auth:
method: kubernetes
mount: kubernetes
role: external-secrets-keycape-approval-engine-operator
bound_claims:
service_account_names:
- external-secrets
service_account_namespaces:
- external-secrets
bound_claims_confirmed: true
policies:
- workload-kv-read-keycape-approval-engine-operator
ttl: 15m
access_frontdoor:
type: ops-warden
catalog_id: keycape-approval-engine-operator-client
selector: KeyCape approval-engine-operator confidential client secret
command: warden access keycape-approval-engine-operator-client --fetch CLIENT_SECRET
resolvable: false
readiness: pending-review
delivery:
surface: external-secrets
target: >-
ClusterSecretStore openbao-keycape-approval-engine-operator, limited to
namespace sso, to ExternalSecret sso/keycape-approval-engine-operator-client and
Secret sso/keycape-approval-engine-operator-client with key client-secret.
KeyCape resolves it as KEYCAPE_APPROVAL_ENGINE_OPERATOR_CLIENT_SECRET through a
secretKeyRef. Manifests:
argocd/platform-addons/openbao-secretstore/openbao-keycape-approval-clients.clustersecretstore.yaml
and keycape-approval-clients.externalsecrets.yaml.
risk:
classification: high
notes:
- >-
This client carries the widest approval scope set in the pair — create,
approve, revoke and supersede. A leak allows forging approval lifecycle actions,
which is a stronger outcome than the read/consume client in CCR-2026-0017.
- >-
The absence of approval:consume is a deliberate separation of duties. Any later
request to add consume to this client is a new lane decision, not a scope edit.
- >-
Kept on its own policy, role and store so it can be revoked independently of the
secrets-engine-approval client.
- >-
Compromise response is KeyCape disabling the registration plus rotation of this
KV version; approval actions already emitted are not retracted by rotation and
need approval-engine's own audit review.
verification:
positive:
- >-
The ExternalSecret in namespace sso syncs CLIENT_SECRET to Secret key
client-secret without printing the value.
- >-
The KeyCape build issues a token for subject service:approval-engine-operator
with audience approval-engine, tenant:platform and 15m lifetime, verified
against live JWKS signature.
negative:
- >-
A namespace outside the approved ClusterSecretStore condition cannot use this
store to read the path.
- >-
A service account outside external-secrets/external-secrets cannot authenticate
through role external-secrets-keycape-approval-engine-operator.
- >-
The role cannot read the sibling secrets-engine approval-client path, any parent
listing, or any other platform workload path.
- >-
The operator client is denied approval:consume, and denial is observed rather
than assumed.
activation_conditions:
- >-
Same single attended rollout window and prepared-but-undeployed KeyCape image as
CCR-2026-0017; see docs/credential-lane-designs/keycape-approval-clients.md.
- >-
Attended first provision only through openbao-platform-admin-login
(founder_required, attended OIDC via netkingdom role=platform-admin) with a
unique receipt path.
- >-
Policy, Kubernetes auth role and ClusterSecretStore applied before the
ExternalSecret; sync confirmed before the KeyCape rollout.
- Positive and negative results recorded with non-secret request ids or timestamps.
evidence: []
lifecycle:
deactivate: >-
KeyCape disables the approval-engine-operator registration; platform detaches the
policy from role external-secrets-keycape-approval-engine-operator and removes
the ExternalSecret.
rotate: >-
KeyCape mints a replacement client secret; platform writes the new KV version
under the same attended authority. Rotation is independent of CCR-2026-0017.
compromised: >-
Disable the registration at KeyCape, rotate the KV version, and refer emitted
approval actions to approval-engine for audit review.
state_hub:
workplan_id: RPF-WP-0035
task_id: RPF-WP-0035-T05
related_message: 278a3ebe-b529-49f6-bd1a-e3ebcf318260
related_decision: 5ed3fb35-eca9-413a-82b9-95171ba85bf6