rapp-canned-prompts/manifests/database-secrets.yaml

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Package canned-prompts for Railiance Registers the repo with State Hub (agents / practice, prefix RCP-WP) and fills in the rapp shape. declarations/rapp.yaml declares a manifest-managed platform service owned by canned-prompts, bound to rail-kubernetes and reef-railiance, with rollout, smoke and rollback contracts. The image pin says `pending-publication` rather than carrying a placeholder digest. The image builds and was verified locally (canned-prompts CANP-WP-0006-T06) but has never been pushed, so no registry digest exists. A placeholder shaped like a real digest would be worse than a sentinel: it could be mistaken for something deployable. manifests/ follows the rapp-sbom-nexus shape: namespace labelled for the postgres client, external secrets from OpenBao, a migration Job, and the runtime Deployment with a ClusterIP-only Service, dedicated ServiceAccount and default-deny plus runtime NetworkPolicies. Three choices worth stating. Credentials arrive as mounted files, never env vars — an env var holding a password is visible in kubectl describe, in crash dumps, and to anything that can read /proc. Migrations run as a Job rather than at start-up, so a schema rollback stays separate from a code rollback and replicas do not race. Liveness points at /healthz, which checks only that the process is up: pointing it at a database-dependent path would restart every replica during a database blip. Egress is PostgreSQL and DNS only. A package arrives by publish; the registry never reaches out, so it is given no path to. tools/smoke.sh checks what only the cluster can answer and calls canned-prompts' service/tools/smoke.py for health and migration head, rather than holding a second opinion about whether the service is healthy. RCP-WP-0002 carries the two operator actions that block a first rollout — publishing the image and provisioning database roles — and records per-publisher identity as a decision belonging upstream, which this repo must not paper over with cluster configuration implying finer control than exists. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bjefh8NUiEiahN4JLwoSKM Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 388925@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 3507023f-e0fd-4a1e-9d90-a0d4217d1502
2026-09-06 21:44:17 +02:00
# Two credentials, deliberately. The runtime role can read and write rows; the
# migration role owns the schema. A service that can ALTER its own tables at
# runtime turns any code defect into a schema defect.
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
kind: ClusterSecretStore
metadata:
name: openbao-canned-prompts-database
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: canned-prompts
railiance-platform/component: external-secrets
spec:
conditions:
- namespaces:
- canned-prompts
provider:
vault:
server: http://openbao.openbao.svc:8200
path: database
version: v1
auth:
tokenSecretRef:
name: openbao-canned-prompts-eso-token
namespace: external-secrets
key: token
---
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
kind: ExternalSecret
metadata:
name: canned-prompts-postgres-runtime
namespace: canned-prompts
spec:
refreshInterval: 5m
secretStoreRef:
kind: ClusterSecretStore
name: openbao-canned-prompts-database
target:
name: canned-prompts-postgres-runtime
creationPolicy: Owner
deletionPolicy: Retain
template:
engineVersion: v2
data:
url: >-
postgresql+psycopg://{{ .username | urlquery }}:{{ .password | urlquery }}@platform-pg-2-rw.databases.svc.cluster.local:5432/canned_prompts?sslmode=require
dataFrom:
- extract:
key: creds/canned-prompts-runtime
---
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
kind: ExternalSecret
metadata:
name: canned-prompts-postgres-migration
namespace: canned-prompts
spec:
refreshInterval: 5m
secretStoreRef:
kind: ClusterSecretStore
name: openbao-canned-prompts-database
target:
name: canned-prompts-postgres-migration
creationPolicy: Owner
deletionPolicy: Retain
template:
engineVersion: v2
data:
url: >-
postgresql+psycopg://{{ .username | urlquery }}:{{ .password | urlquery }}@platform-pg-2-rw.databases.svc.cluster.local:5432/canned_prompts?sslmode=require
dataFrom:
- extract:
key: creds/canned-prompts-migration
---
First deployment: verified on railiance01 RCP-WP-0002 T02-T04 done, readiness_state verified with evidence attached rather than ahead of it. rapp-postgres provisioned canned_prompts on platform-pg-2 and sent a database-owner receipt with 12 checks proven live. creds/canned-prompts-publish was deliberately not issued, so the service runs read-only and POST /packages returns 503 explaining why — the intended posture, not a gap. Four defects surfaced that only a real rollout could expose, two of them silent: - SET ROLE opened an implicit transaction that Alembic nested inside rather than owning, so every revision logged as applied and was rolled back. Alembic reported success against an empty database. - The egress NetworkPolicy selected app.kubernetes.io/name, which the migration Job does not carry. The Job matched only the default-deny and succeeded exactly once, because it ran before the policies existed; the next migration would have failed on DNS. Now selects part-of, with ingress split into its own policy so the Job is never reachable. - env.py read database_url rather than resolved_database_url, so the migration could never run where the credential is a mounted file. - live-image-digest-match extracted the pin with a line-offset grep, which returned empty once comments were added above `version:`. The check degraded to reporting "not pinned yet" while a digest was pinned — it could not have passed for any pin. Now parsed as YAML. A verification step that cannot fail is worth less than none, because it is trusted. Evidence: docs/evidence/RCP-WP-0002-T04-first-deployment-2026-09-08.md Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bjefh8NUiEiahN4JLwoSKM Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 388925@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 3507023f-e0fd-4a1e-9d90-a0d4217d1502
2026-09-08 08:56:02 +02:00
# The publish token is deliberately NOT declared as an ExternalSecret.
#
# rapp-postgres confirmed on 2026-09-08 that `creds/canned-prompts-publish`
# does not exist and is not being created, at our request. An ExternalSecret
# pointing at it would sit permanently unresolved — indistinguishable from a
# broken deployment, and an invitation for the next operator to "fix" it by
# minting a credential nobody decided to issue.
#
# Without the secret the service runs READ-ONLY, which is the intended posture
# until per-publisher identity exists upstream (RCP-WP-0002-T05). The runtime
# Deployment mounts the secret `optional: true`, so it starts cleanly without it
# and picks the token up if one is ever added.
#
# To enable publishing later: have rapp-postgres issue
# `creds/canned-prompts-publish`, add the ExternalSecret here, and revisit the
# NetworkPolicy ingress rule, which currently admits any namespace.