First deployment: verified on railiance01

RCP-WP-0002 T02-T04 done, readiness_state verified with evidence attached
rather than ahead of it.

rapp-postgres provisioned canned_prompts on platform-pg-2 and sent a
database-owner receipt with 12 checks proven live. creds/canned-prompts-publish
was deliberately not issued, so the service runs read-only and POST /packages
returns 503 explaining why — the intended posture, not a gap.

Four defects surfaced that only a real rollout could expose, two of them
silent:

- SET ROLE opened an implicit transaction that Alembic nested inside rather
  than owning, so every revision logged as applied and was rolled back.
  Alembic reported success against an empty database.
- The egress NetworkPolicy selected app.kubernetes.io/name, which the
  migration Job does not carry. The Job matched only the default-deny and
  succeeded exactly once, because it ran before the policies existed; the next
  migration would have failed on DNS. Now selects part-of, with ingress split
  into its own policy so the Job is never reachable.
- env.py read database_url rather than resolved_database_url, so the migration
  could never run where the credential is a mounted file.
- live-image-digest-match extracted the pin with a line-offset grep, which
  returned empty once comments were added above `version:`. The check degraded
  to reporting "not pinned yet" while a digest was pinned — it could not have
  passed for any pin. Now parsed as YAML. A verification step that cannot fail
  is worth less than none, because it is trusted.

Evidence: docs/evidence/RCP-WP-0002-T04-first-deployment-2026-09-08.md

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bjefh8NUiEiahN4JLwoSKM

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 388925@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 3507023f-e0fd-4a1e-9d90-a0d4217d1502

manifests/database-secrets.yaml

@@ -69,22 +69,19 @@ spec:
     - extract:
         key: creds/canned-prompts-migration
 ---
-# The publish token. Absent, the service is read-only — which is the correct
-# posture until per-publisher identity exists (canned-prompts service/auth.py).
-apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
-kind: ExternalSecret
-metadata:
-  name: canned-prompts-publish-token
-  namespace: canned-prompts
-spec:
-  refreshInterval: 15m
-  secretStoreRef:
-    kind: ClusterSecretStore
-    name: openbao-canned-prompts-database
-  target:
-    name: canned-prompts-publish-token
-    creationPolicy: Owner
-    deletionPolicy: Retain
-  dataFrom:
-    - extract:
-        key: creds/canned-prompts-publish
+# The publish token is deliberately NOT declared as an ExternalSecret.
+#
+# rapp-postgres confirmed on 2026-09-08 that `creds/canned-prompts-publish`
+# does not exist and is not being created, at our request. An ExternalSecret
+# pointing at it would sit permanently unresolved — indistinguishable from a
+# broken deployment, and an invitation for the next operator to "fix" it by
+# minting a credential nobody decided to issue.
+#
+# Without the secret the service runs READ-ONLY, which is the intended posture
+# until per-publisher identity exists upstream (RCP-WP-0002-T05). The runtime
+# Deployment mounts the secret `optional: true`, so it starts cleanly without it
+# and picks the token up if one is ever added.
+#
+# To enable publishing later: have rapp-postgres issue
+# `creds/canned-prompts-publish`, add the ExternalSecret here, and revisit the
+# NetworkPolicy ingress rule, which currently admits any namespace.