diff --git a/workplans/REEF-RAILIANCE-WP-0003-rapp-qonto-production-gates.md b/workplans/REEF-RAILIANCE-WP-0003-rapp-qonto-production-gates.md
index a933f19..aa803a6 100644
--- a/workplans/REEF-RAILIANCE-WP-0003-rapp-qonto-production-gates.md
+++ b/workplans/REEF-RAILIANCE-WP-0003-rapp-qonto-production-gates.md
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ status: blocked
 owner: codex
 topic_slug: railiance
 created: "2026-07-26"
-updated: "2026-07-29"
+updated: "2026-08-08"
 state_hub_workstream_id: "c3f9fbfd-3db1-4387-8b65-7d53ba57138d"
 ---
 
@@ -119,3 +119,15 @@ workplan is therefore `blocked` until either a second independent failure
 domain is implemented and drilled or the founder explicitly accepts
 single-node production availability risk for Qonto. The current binding
 remains accurately `verified`, not `production-approved`.
+
+2026-08-08 alignment: live inspection still reports one Ready node, which also
+owns the control-plane and etcd roles. `railiance-cluster/RAIL-BS-WP-0007` now
+owns the required three-server embedded-etcd topology, source-backed
+node-to-reef failure-domain map, and machine-readable one-server-loss S2
+drill. `state-hub/CUST-WP-0038` is a downstream stateful consumer and does not
+substitute for the Qonto gate. After the S2 drill passes, T04 closes only when
+the Qonto live verification is rerun with fresh evidence while Railiance01 is
+absent, proving the service path, restricted egress, identity/secret delivery,
+dependency behavior, and restoration on the surviving cluster. The alternate
+closure remains explicit founder acceptance of the single-node production
+availability risk.