Admit exact frozen Cluster histories after verified receiving

Assistant: codex
Assistant-Model: gpt-6.1-sol
Assistant-Session: 01a1468b-63fa-7710-85dc-8f2e16b3ebfa
This commit is contained in:
tegwick 2026-10-17 02:11:20 +02:00
parent 9ebde0a9bd
commit 70cd754996
7 changed files with 934 additions and 6 deletions

View file

@ -70,6 +70,111 @@ BINDINGS = json.loads(r'''[
"record_id": "CUST-WP-ADHOC-2026-08-25-RETIRED",
"uuid": "1c53d3db-6633-5e2d-987f-10706d73be9e",
"parent_record_id": "CUST-WP-ADHOC-2026-08-25-RETIRED"
},
{
"repo": "railiance-cluster",
"path": "workplans/archived/260622-RAIL-BS-WP-0002-k3s-baseline.md",
"sha256": "8d6f8533c119117686bc0d5bb9ed5349726aa6c3189ff98b53409c68ac685ca9",
"record_id": "RAIL-BS-WP-0002",
"uuid": "4c63dfc6-9eac-4e79-9f77-8f644ad7147d",
"parent_record_id": "RAIL-BS-WP-0002",
"tasks": [
{
"label": "T01",
"uuid": "3f042630-eab0-4c6a-9167-e2b28ff20e40",
"status": "done"
},
{
"label": "T02",
"uuid": "e8510646-46ed-4697-a345-f3d3009eea78",
"status": "done"
},
{
"label": "T03",
"uuid": "dab2c07f-8aa0-4635-8df6-857e87e93fc5",
"status": "done"
},
{
"label": "T04",
"uuid": "5c3d40e4-239b-488e-9519-6f7a38d2325f",
"status": "done"
},
{
"label": "T05",
"uuid": "7f9e0e58-a130-467a-a2d0-b3f2564e496f",
"status": "done"
}
]
},
{
"repo": "railiance-cluster",
"path": "workplans/archived/260622-RAIL-BS-WP-0003-pgpool-ha-failover-fix.md",
"sha256": "4dc2f61e15adc3c5c81f9ecf8b933512275b95e8f829fac52ae7cde1385cea4a",
"record_id": "RAIL-BS-WP-0003",
"uuid": "7ee9ee22-1fae-4567-9194-8d70a9e0f45b",
"parent_record_id": "RAIL-BS-WP-0003",
"tasks": [
{
"label": "T01",
"uuid": "6841c93a-f146-47eb-9f7c-8fa0e02c1bbc",
"status": "done"
},
{
"label": "T02",
"uuid": "ab166073-30a7-4702-a037-4091e8706e20",
"status": "done"
},
{
"label": "T03",
"uuid": "140da396-8e30-4f4d-b88c-c42c0cd46c01",
"status": "done"
},
{
"label": "T04",
"uuid": "d8a3ba40-fda0-4c1f-a9f1-ffcd621a5b3d",
"status": "done"
}
]
},
{
"repo": "railiance-cluster",
"path": "workplans/archived/260622-RAIL-BS-WP-0004-safety-net.md",
"sha256": "04f787078232395bd2d43861de16c521848559fa286f06e1caa9cb779aa71ac3",
"record_id": "RAIL-BS-WP-0004",
"uuid": "7e8b0c20-51eb-40c9-9e3b-85dd380d7625",
"parent_record_id": "RAIL-BS-WP-0004",
"tasks": [
{
"label": "T01",
"uuid": "4526a842-ea31-4874-9231-92ab556cfe7b",
"status": "done"
},
{
"label": "T02",
"uuid": "a6313e06-1976-46a7-8e31-df4eb2eca880",
"status": "done"
},
{
"label": "T03",
"uuid": "05d42a55-921f-4aa7-bb76-e8af9c7e0ac3",
"status": "done"
},
{
"label": "T04",
"uuid": "08233868-d522-4117-bc4e-6c0f52545665",
"status": "done"
},
{
"label": "T05",
"uuid": "2d5acff7-4a4e-4ddd-ad06-08237ad3dac8",
"status": "done"
},
{
"label": "T06",
"uuid": "f8e4a094-c367-40eb-b895-da17bc144b07",
"status": "done"
}
]
}
]''')
@ -83,3 +188,24 @@ def historical_source_paths(repo_root):
raise ValueError("Historical source binding requires owner review: " + entry["path"])
paths.add(entry["path"])
return paths
def historical_source_occurrences(repo_root):
"""Exact frozen closed task occurrences; never a general local-ID alias."""
from repo_manager.parse.workplan import parse_workplan_file
from uuid import UUID
paths=historical_source_paths(repo_root)
occurrences=set(paths)
for entry in BINDINGS:
if entry['repo']!=repo_root.name or 'tasks' not in entry:continue
parsed=parse_workplan_file(repo_root/entry['path'],repo_root=repo_root)
actual=[{'label':task.id,'uuid':task.state_hub_task_id,'status':task.status} for task in parsed.tasks]
if (parsed.id!=entry['record_id'] or parsed.state_hub_workstream_id!=entry['uuid']
or parsed.status not in {'finished','archived','completed'} or actual!=entry['tasks']
or any(task['status'] not in {'done','cancel'} for task in actual)):
raise ValueError('Historical task binding requires owner review: '+entry['path'])
UUID(entry['uuid'])
for number,task in enumerate(actual,1):
UUID(task['uuid'])
occurrences.add(entry['path']+'#task-block-'+str(number))
return occurrences

View file

@ -854,8 +854,9 @@ def ensure_missing_work_record_identifiers(
# allocation candidates. Keep conformance reporting strict while allowing
# ordinary registration to preserve those bindings. Local aliases still
# require the explicit parent allowlist in the kind registry.
from repo_manager.historical_sources import historical_source_paths
historical_sources: set[str] = historical_source_paths(repo_root)
from repo_manager.historical_sources import historical_source_occurrences
frozen_sources = historical_source_occurrences(repo_root)
historical_sources: set[str] = set(frozen_sources)
for path in iter_workplan_files(repo_root):
parsed = parse_workplan_file(path, repo_root=repo_root)
if parsed.status not in {"finished", "archived", "completed"} or not parsed.id:
@ -889,11 +890,18 @@ def ensure_missing_work_record_identifiers(
item for item in identity["invalid_identifiers"]
if item["source"] in historical_sources
]
if invalid or identity["identity_collisions"]:
# Strict scans keep legacy nonconformance. Only collisions wholly contained
# in exact hash-bound closed task occurrences can be preserved by receiving;
# any unknown/live source or qualified/workplan collision remains fatal.
historical_collisions=[item for item in identity['identity_collisions']
if item['kind']=='task' and re.fullmatch(r'T[0-9]{2}',item['id'])
and all(source in frozen_sources for source in item['sources'])]
collisions=[item for item in identity['identity_collisions'] if item not in historical_collisions]
if invalid or collisions:
raise ValueError(
"work-record identities are not safe to derive: "
f"invalid={invalid!r}, "
f"collisions={identity['identity_collisions']!r}"
f"collisions={collisions!r}"
)
rendered: dict[Path, str] = {}
@ -966,6 +974,7 @@ def ensure_missing_work_record_identifiers(
"namespace": namespace,
"assignments": assignments,
"historical_invalid_identifiers": historical,
"historical_identity_collisions": historical_collisions,
"files_changed": sorted(str(path.relative_to(repo_root)) for path in rendered),
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
---
id: RAIL-BS-WP-0002
type: workplan
title: "k3s and Kubernetes Platform Baseline"
domain: financials
repo: railiance-cluster
status: finished
owner: railiance
topic_slug: railiance
repo_goal_id: "70ab2379-fb9d-4fec-a09d-b2a717e4ace8"
state_hub_workstream_id: "4c63dfc6-9eac-4e79-9f77-8f644ad7147d"
created: "2026-03-09"
updated: "2026-03-10"
completed: "2026-03-10"
---
> **Terminology note:** Historical text in this archived workplan may use the legacy term "workstream". The fleet term is **workplan** (`canon/standards/workplan-terminology-fleet_v0.1.md`).
# k3s and Kubernetes Platform Baseline
## Goal
Install k3s, Helm, and the baseline Kubernetes services on the converged
HostEurope node. This workplan picks up exactly where `railiance-hosts`
leaves off: a hardened, verified OS node that is ready for Kubernetes.
## Pre-condition
`railiance-infra` converge + Goss verify must pass before any task here
is executed:
```bash
# In railiance-infra/
make converge
make verify # must exit 0
```
## Boundary
This repo owns everything from k3s upward. It must not re-configure items
defined in `railiance-infra/spec/server-baseline.yaml`. See ADR-003:
`railiance-infra/docs/adr/ADR-003-railiance-5repo-stack-architecture.md`.
**Out of scope here:** platform services (PostgreSQL, storage, identity)
→ `railiance-platform`. Application deployments (Gitea, coulomb services)
→ `railiance-apps`.
---
## Tasks
### T01 — Ansible playbook: install k3s (server mode)
```task
id: T01
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "3f042630-eab0-4c6a-9167-e2b28ff20e40"
completed: "2026-03-10"
```
Harden `ansible/bootstrap.yml` to a production-ready k3s install:
- Use the official k3s install script pinned to a specific version
(`INSTALL_K3S_VERSION=v1.35.1+k3s1`)
- `INSTALL_K3S_EXEC="server --cluster-init --write-kubeconfig-mode=644"`
(cluster-init enables embedded etcd for future HA expansion)
- Wait for node `Ready` before proceeding:
```bash
k3s kubectl wait node --all --for=condition=Ready --timeout=120s
```
- Fetch kubeconfig to the control node as `~/.kube/config-hosteurope`
**Done when:** `k3s kubectl get nodes` returns `Ready` from both the server
and the control node (via kubeconfig).
---
### T02 — Helm installation
```task
id: T02
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "e8510646-46ed-4697-a345-f3d3009eea78"
completed: "2026-03-10"
```
Add a task (or a role `roles/helm/`) that:
1. Downloads the Helm binary (pinned version) to `/usr/local/bin/helm`
2. Verifies the checksum
3. Confirms `helm version` succeeds
**Done when:** `helm version` succeeds on the HostEurope node.
---
### T03 — Smoke test: k3s + Helm
```task
id: T03
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "dab2c07f-8aa0-4635-8df6-857e87e93fc5"
completed: "2026-03-10"
```
Extend `tests/smoke_kube.sh` to assert:
- `k3s kubectl get nodes` → node in Ready state
- `helm version` exits 0
- CoreDNS pod running in `kube-system`
- Traefik ingress controller pod running (default in k3s)
Run via:
```bash
ansible-playbook -i ansible/hosts.ini ansible/smoke.yml
```
or directly over SSH if the kubeconfig is available locally.
**Done when:** all assertions pass and the script exits 0.
---
### T04 — Commit kubeconfig management notes
```task
id: T04
status: done
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "5c3d40e4-239b-488e-9519-6f7a38d2325f"
completed: "2026-03-10"
```
Document in `docs/kubeconfig.md`:
- Where the kubeconfig is fetched to (`~/.kube/config-hosteurope`)
- How to merge it into `~/.kube/config`
- How to switch context: `kubectl config use-context default`
- Security note: kubeconfig is gitignored (contains cluster CA + client cert)
**Done when:** doc written and committed.
---
### T05 — Add `make k3s-install` and `make smoke` targets
```task
id: T05
status: done
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "7f9e0e58-a130-467a-a2d0-b3f2564e496f"
completed: "2026-03-10"
```
Add to Makefile (create one if none exists):
```makefile
k3s-install: ## Install k3s and Helm on all inventory hosts
ansible-playbook -i ansible/hosts.ini ansible/bootstrap.yml
smoke: ## Run Kubernetes smoke tests
bash tests/smoke_kube.sh
```
**Done when:** both targets work and are listed in `make help`.
---
## References
- Repo goal: `70ab2379-fb9d-4fec-a09d-b2a717e4ace8` (Install k3s and Kubernetes Baseline)
- Domain goal: `6f96c712-60e6-4ea9-ab06-168878eafbce` (Three-Phoenix Secure Kubernetes Infrastructure)
- Pre-condition: railiance-infra WP-0001 (Secure Single-Server Bootstrap) — completed 2026-03-09
- Boundary ADR: `railiance-infra/docs/adr/ADR-003-railiance-5repo-stack-architecture.md`
- k3s releases: https://github.com/k3s-io/k3s/releases

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@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
---
id: RAIL-BS-WP-0003
type: workplan
title: "pgpool CrashLoopBackOff on PostgreSQL HA failover — missing secret key"
domain: financials
repo: railiance-cluster
status: finished
owner: tegwick
created: "2026-03-10"
updated: "2026-03-10"
state_hub_workstream_id: "7ee9ee22-1fae-4567-9194-8d70a9e0f45b"
---
> **Terminology note:** Historical text in this archived workplan may use the legacy term "workstream". The fleet term is **workplan** (`canon/standards/workplan-terminology-fleet_v0.1.md`).
# Bug Report: pgpool CrashLoopBackOff on PostgreSQL HA failover
## Summary
On 2026-03-10 a PostgreSQL HA failover caused all three postgresql pods to
restart. pgpool — the connection pooler between Gitea and PostgreSQL — then
entered CrashLoopBackOff and produced no logs. As a result Gitea's login
and all write operations hung indefinitely. The root page was still served
(from Valkey cache) which masked the failure.
The fix was to patch a missing key in a Kubernetes secret. The root cause is
that the `gitea-12.2.0` Helm chart (postgresql-ha subchart v16.2.2) does not
populate the `pgpool-password` key in the `gitea-postgresql-ha-postgresql`
secret, even though the pgpool pod requires it at startup.
---
## Timeline
| Time (UTC) | Event |
|---|---|
| ~09:45 | postgresql-0, postgresql-2 pods restarted (repmgr failover) |
| ~09:45 | pgpool pod restarted and entered CrashLoopBackOff |
| ~11:00 | User noticed Gitea login hanging; home page still loading |
| ~13:00 | Root cause identified: missing `pgpool-password` secret key |
| ~13:10 | Secret patched; pgpool pod deleted and restarted cleanly |
| ~13:15 | Gitea fully operational |
---
## Root Cause
The Bitnami `pgpool` container startup script reads the file
`/opt/bitnami/pgpool/secrets/pgpool-password`, which is mounted from the
`gitea-postgresql-ha-postgresql` Kubernetes Secret via a `subPath` volume
mount. That secret key was never created by the Helm chart, so the file did
not exist. The container exited immediately with no logs.
The pod had been running for 20 days without a restart, so this gap was
never discovered during initial deployment.
---
## Evidence
```bash
# Secret was missing the pgpool-password key
sudo k3s kubectl get secret -n default gitea-postgresql-ha-postgresql -o yaml
# data: keys were password, postgres-password, repmgr-password only
# pgpool-password was absent
# pgpool pod describe showed 824 back-off restarts over 173 minutes
# No logs in either current or --previous output
sudo k3s kubectl logs -n default <pgpool-pod> --previous
# (empty)
# Gitea process had zero TCP connections to PostgreSQL port 5432
# but many connections to Valkey port 6379
cat /proc/<gitea-pid>/net/tcp | grep 1538 # 1538 = 5432 hex — no results
```
---
## Immediate Fix Applied
```bash
# Add the missing key (value = sr-check-password = changeme4 = base64: Y2hhbmdlbWU0)
sudo k3s kubectl patch secret -n default gitea-postgresql-ha-postgresql \
--type='json' \
-p='[{"op":"add","path":"/data/pgpool-password","value":"Y2hhbmdlbWU0"}]'
# Restart pgpool
sudo k3s kubectl delete pod -n default <pgpool-pod-name>
```
---
## Risk: Fix Will Be Lost on helm upgrade
The patched secret is managed by Helm (annotation:
`meta.helm.sh/release-name: gitea`). A `helm upgrade` will regenerate the
secret from the chart template, which does not include `pgpool-password`,
and the bug will recur.
---
## Tasks
### T01 — Add pgpool-password to Helm values
```task
id: T01
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "6841c93a-f146-47eb-9f7c-8fa0e02c1bbc"
```
Create or update `helm/gitea-values.yaml` (or equivalent) to permanently
include the pgpool-password so it survives `helm upgrade`:
```yaml
postgresql-ha:
postgresql:
pgpoolPassword: <value matching sr-check-password>
```
**Done when:** `helm upgrade gitea` completes and pgpool starts cleanly
without manual secret patching.
---
### T02 — Add pgpool health check to smoke test
```task
id: T02
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "ab166073-30a7-4702-a037-4091e8706e20"
```
Extend `tests/smoke_kube.sh` to assert:
```bash
# All postgresql-ha pods Running
kubectl get pods -n default | grep gitea-postgresql-ha | grep -v Running && exit 1
# pgpool specifically not in CrashLoopBackOff
kubectl get pod -n default -l app.kubernetes.io/component=pgpool \
-o jsonpath='{.items[0].status.containerStatuses[0].state}' | grep -v crash
```
**Done when:** the smoke test catches a pgpool failure within 5 minutes.
---
### T03 — Add HA failover test
```task
id: T03
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "140da396-8e30-4f4d-b88c-c42c0cd46c01"
```
Create `tests/test_ha_failover.sh` that:
1. Records Gitea login response time (baseline)
2. Kills the primary PostgreSQL pod: `kubectl delete pod gitea-postgresql-ha-postgresql-0 -n default`
3. Waits for repmgr to promote a replica (max 60s)
4. Asserts Gitea login POST still succeeds within 10s
5. Asserts pgpool pod is Running (not CrashLoopBackOff)
6. Asserts all postgresql pods return to Running
This test must pass before any PostgreSQL HA deployment is considered done.
**Done when:** script exits 0 against a live cluster.
---
### T04 — Document the incident in docs/
```task
id: T04
status: done
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "d8a3ba40-fda0-4c1f-a9f1-ffcd621a5b3d"
```
Add `docs/incidents/2026-03-10-pgpool-missing-secret.md` with the full
timeline, root cause, and fix, so future operators understand what happened
and how to recover.
**Done when:** doc committed and linked from `docs/README.md`.
---
## References
- Bitnami postgresql-ha chart v16.2.2
- Gitea Helm chart v12.2.0
- Related decision: D3 (HA testing policy) in `DECISIONS.md`

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@ -0,0 +1,275 @@
---
id: RAIL-BS-WP-0004
type: workplan
title: "Integrated Backup — S2 Kubernetes Runtime Layer"
domain: financials
repo: railiance-cluster
status: finished
owner: tegwick
topic_slug: railiance
state_hub_workstream_id: "7e8b0c20-51eb-40c9-9e3b-85dd380d7625"
created: "2026-02-25"
updated: "2026-03-26"
---
> **Terminology note:** Historical text in this archived workplan may use the legacy term "workstream". The fleet term is **workplan** (`canon/standards/workplan-terminology-fleet_v0.1.md`).
# Integrated Backup — S2 Kubernetes Runtime Layer
## Goal
Implement the Q3 (Operability & Resilience) integrated backup for
railiance-cluster (S2). Backs up what S2 owns — the Kubernetes runtime state —
encrypted with age, written to a local directory on the server. No external
dependencies required.
## Architecture (Decision D4)
Each railiance repo implements its own backup for what it owns. No central
backup service. See `DECISIONS.md` D4 for full rationale.
**Standard interface every railiance repo must provide:**
```bash
make backup # encrypt + write to /opt/backup/railiance/<layer>/
make restore # restore from most recent local backup
```
Encryption: age, same key pair as SOPS secrets (`.sops.yaml` public key).
Output: `/opt/backup/railiance/cluster/` on the server.
## What S2 (railiance-cluster) owns and must back up
| Asset | Why it matters |
|---|---|
| k3s etcd snapshots | Full cluster state — all workloads, configs, secrets |
| Helm release values | Runtime values not in git (any manually applied overrides) |
| kubeconfig | Admin access to the cluster |
**Not S2's responsibility:**
- Custodian State Hub DB → the-custodian owns this
- Operator workstation config (`.claude/`, `.gitconfig`) → operator's own concern
- Application data (Gitea repos, uploads) → S5 (railiance-apps) owns this
- PostgreSQL data volumes → S3 (railiance-platform) owns this
## Encryption
Reuse the age public key from `.sops.yaml`:
```bash
AGE_PUBLIC_KEY=$(grep 'age:' .sops.yaml | awk '{print $2}')
tar -czf - <assets> | age -r "${AGE_PUBLIC_KEY}" -o backup.tar.gz.age
```
Decryption requires the private key at `~/.config/sops/age/keys.txt`
(same key used for `sops -d`). No additional key management needed.
## Extension Point EP-RAIL-005
Once all five OAS layers implement this interface, the custodian can
orchestrate a full-stack backup with:
```bash
for repo in railiance-infra railiance-cluster railiance-platform \
railiance-enablement railiance-apps; do
make -C ~/$repo backup
done
```
No special protocol needed — just the standard interface.
---
## Tasks
### T01 — Define backup directory and encryption wrapper
```task
id: T01
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "4526a842-ea31-4874-9231-92ab556cfe7b"
```
Create `tools/cmd/railiance-backup-s2` (replacing the old `railiance-backup`):
- Backup dir: `/opt/backup/railiance/cluster/` (create with `mkdir -p`)
- Encrypt each artifact with age using public key from `.sops.yaml`
- Write timestamp-named files: `etcd-<ts>.snap.age`, `helm-values-<ts>.tar.gz.age`, `kubeconfig-<ts>.yaml.age`
- Keep last 7 of each type
- Write `.last-backup` stamp
- Exit 0 on success, non-zero on any failure
- No network required
Also remove the old `tools/cmd/railiance-backup` (backed up Docker-based
custodian DB — wrong scope, not applicable to this server).
**Done when:** `make backup` runs on COULOMBCORE without error and files
appear in `/opt/backup/railiance/cluster/`.
---
### T02 — Back up k3s state (SQLite hot backup)
```task
id: T02
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "a6313e06-1976-46a7-8e31-df4eb2eca880"
```
k3s has built-in etcd snapshot support:
```bash
sudo k3s etcd-snapshot save --name railiance-$(date -u +%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ)
# Default location: /var/lib/rancher/k3s/server/db/snapshots/
```
Add to the backup script: take a fresh snapshot, encrypt with age,
copy to `/opt/backup/railiance/cluster/`.
> **Note — verify etcd is in use before implementing:**
> `k3s etcd-snapshot` only works if k3s was started with `--cluster-init`.
> Without it, k3s uses SQLite and this command will fail.
> Verify first: `sudo k3s etcd-snapshot ls 2>&1`
> **Note — sudo required:** etcd snapshot requires root. See T06 for how
> this is resolved (backup runs under root's crontab).
**Done when:** backup includes a current etcd snapshot.
---
### T03 — Back up Helm release values
```task
id: T03
status: done
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "05d42a55-921f-4aa7-bb76-e8af9c7e0ac3"
```
Capture current runtime Helm values for all releases:
```bash
KUBECONFIG=/etc/rancher/k3s/k3s.yaml helm list -A -o json | \
jq -r '.[].name + " " + .namespace' | \
while read name ns; do
KUBECONFIG=/etc/rancher/k3s/k3s.yaml helm get values "$name" -n "$ns" -o yaml
done
```
Tar and age-encrypt into `helm-values-<ts>.tar.gz.age`.
> **Note — kubeconfig permissions:** `/etc/rancher/k3s/k3s.yaml` is root-readable
> only by default. The backup script must either run as root (see T06) or k3s
> must be configured with `--write-kubeconfig-mode=644`. Running as root
> (via root crontab) is the chosen approach — no config change needed.
**Done when:** backup includes a snapshot of all Helm release values.
---
### T04 — Back up kubeconfig
```task
id: T04
status: done
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "08233868-d522-4117-bc4e-6c0f52545665"
```
Age-encrypt `~/.kube/config-hosteurope` (or `/etc/rancher/k3s/k3s.yaml`)
into `kubeconfig-<ts>.yaml.age` in the backup directory.
**Done when:** backup includes the encrypted kubeconfig.
---
### T05 — make restore target
```task
id: T05
status: done
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "2d5acff7-4a4e-4ddd-ad06-08237ad3dac8"
```
Add `tools/cmd/railiance-restore-s2` that decrypts and lists available
backups, with guided restore for the etcd snapshot case.
Restore of etcd from snapshot:
```bash
sudo k3s server --cluster-reset \
--cluster-reset-restore-path=/var/lib/rancher/k3s/server/db/snapshots/<name>
```
**Done when:** `make restore` prints available backups and a restore guide.
---
### T06 — Install cron job and run restore drill
```task
id: T06
status: done
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "f8e4a094-c367-40eb-b895-da17bc144b07"
```
#### Solving the sudo problem
The backup script needs root for two reasons:
- `k3s etcd-snapshot save` requires root
- `/etc/rancher/k3s/k3s.yaml` (kubeconfig) is root-readable only
**Solution: run the cron under root's crontab.**
This is the correct pattern for system-level backup jobs. It avoids a
proliferating sudoers whitelist (one entry per command, brittle to maintain)
and matches how tools like `rsnapshot`, `bacula`, and `borgbackup` work in
production. The backup writes to `/opt/backup/` which is root-owned anyway.
Install the cron as root:
```bash
sudo crontab -e
# Add:
0 2 * * * make -C /home/tegwick/railiance-cluster backup >> /opt/backup/railiance/cluster/backup.log 2>&1
```
Note: use the absolute path to the repo — `~` does not expand reliably in
root's crontab unless HOME is set.
Verify it is installed:
```bash
sudo crontab -l | grep railiance
```
#### Restore drill
Once T01–T04 are done, run a decrypt-and-verify drill:
```bash
# Decrypt the etcd snapshot and verify it is a valid snapshot file
sudo age -d -i ~/.config/sops/age/keys.txt \
/opt/backup/railiance/cluster/etcd-$(ls /opt/backup/railiance/cluster/etcd-*.snap.age | sort -r | head -1 | xargs basename | sed 's/etcd-//;s/.snap.age//').snap.age \
| file -
# Record the drill
echo "$(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ) restore drill OK" \
>> /opt/backup/railiance/cluster/restore-drill.log
```
**Done when:** cron installed under root, drill completes without error,
log entry written.
---
## References
- Decision D4: Integrated backup per capability (`DECISIONS.md`)
- Decision D2: Nextcloud as optional offsite extension (still valid, not a requirement)
- OAS Q3: Operability & Resilience
- Extension point EP-RAIL-005: Custodian full-stack backup orchestration
- k3s etcd snapshots: https://docs.k3s.io/datastore/backup-restore

View file

@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
import shutil
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
from repo_manager.identifiers import ensure_missing_work_record_identifiers as ensure
from repo_manager.record_identity import scan_record_identities
FIXTURE=Path(__file__).parent/'fixtures/railiance-cluster'
@pytest.fixture
def repo(tmp_path):
root=tmp_path/'railiance-cluster';shutil.copytree(FIXTURE,root)
live=root/'workplans/RCLUSTER-WP-0018.md';live.write_text('---\nid: RCLUSTER-WP-0018\nstatus: ready\n---\n\n```task\nid: RCLUSTER-WP-0018-T01\nstatus: todo\n```\n')
return root,live
def test_exact_three_histories_preserve_15_bindings_and_strict_findings(repo):
root,live=repo;archive={p:p.read_bytes() for p in (root/'workplans/archived').glob('*.md')};before=scan_record_identities(root)
assert len(before['invalid_identifiers'])==15 and len(before['identity_collisions'])==5
preview=ensure(root,execute=False);assert len(preview['assignments'])==2
assert preview['historical_invalid_identifiers']==before['invalid_identifiers']
assert preview['historical_identity_collisions']==before['identity_collisions']
result=ensure(root,execute=True);assert len(result['assignments'])==2
assert all(p.read_bytes()==raw for p,raw in archive.items())
assert not scan_record_identities(root)['ok']
assert ensure(root,execute=False)['assignments']==[]
@pytest.mark.parametrize('change',['bytes','missing','symlink','live','nonterminal','uuid'])
def test_unknown_history_change_refuses_before_any_allocation(repo,change):
root,live=repo;p=next((root/'workplans/archived').glob('*.md'));before=live.read_bytes()
raw=p.read_bytes()
if change=='missing':p.unlink()
elif change=='symlink':p.unlink();target=root/'saved';target.write_bytes(raw);p.symlink_to(target)
elif change=='live':p.write_bytes(raw.replace(b'status: finished',b'status: active',1))
elif change=='nonterminal':p.write_bytes(raw.replace(b'status: done',b'status: todo',1))
elif change=='uuid':p.write_bytes(raw.replace(b'state_hub_task_id:',b'old_task_id:',1))
else:p.write_bytes(raw+b'\nunreviewed change\n')
with pytest.raises(ValueError):ensure(root)
assert live.read_bytes()==before
def test_any_unknown_or_live_source_in_collision_still_refuses(repo):
root,live=repo;before=live.read_bytes();other=root/'workplans/unknown.md'
other.write_text('---\nid: RCLUSTER-WP-0099\nstatus: active\n---\n\n```task\nid: T01\nstatus: todo\nstate_hub_task_id: 11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111\n```\n')
with pytest.raises(ValueError,match='identities are not safe'):ensure(root)
assert live.read_bytes()==before
def test_other_repo_does_not_inherit_exact_frozen_exception(repo):
root,live=repo;other=root.with_name('other');root.rename(other)
with pytest.raises(ValueError,match='identities are not safe'):ensure(other)
def test_qualified_collision_stays_global(repo):
root,live=repo;before=live.read_bytes()
(root/'workplans/other.md').write_text('---\nid: RCLUSTER-WP-0019\nstatus: active\n---\n\n```task\nid: RCLUSTER-WP-0018-T01\nstatus: done\nstate_hub_task_id: 11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111\n```\n')
with pytest.raises(ValueError,match='collisions='):ensure(root)
assert live.read_bytes()==before

View file

@ -4,10 +4,10 @@ type: workplan
title: "Admit exact historical source views after receiving preservation support"
domain: infotech
repo: repo-manager
status: finished
status: active
owner: codex
created: "2026-10-04"
updated: "2026-10-06"
updated: "2026-10-17"
flavor: implementation
depends_on: []
state_hub_workstream_id: "efe0ecb2-2f3f-5f49-baee-b90ad1d353ab"
@ -146,3 +146,96 @@ e22516cc finished) holding 64 tasks (24+12+7+21). Receipt: Activity sync at e809
primary/railiance01, applied, 0 created / 45 updated (ACTIVITY-WP only) / 0 retired
/ 0 refused, 0 task changes, historical UUIDs preserved. Evidence:
state-hub docs/evidence/2026-10-06-activity-stale-retirement-rollout.json.
## Cluster exact historical source successor, 2026-10-17
This scoped extension preserves the completed Activity/Custodian work above.
The cluster publisher now refuses three closed RAIL-BS source files containing
15 existing UUID-bound bare task labels. Preserve all three source bytes, IDs,
and UUIDs. No new alias or general syntax exemption is introduced. Evidence and
exact receiver-first proposal: cluster-historical-publication-r1 in the Custodian
NetKingdom change packet. The existing SHR-WP-0001 project driver owns the
Repo Manager / State Hub cross-owner wait; NK-WP-0049-T35 benefits from the
blocked cluster publication. No worker or human gate is woken here.
## Prepare exact cluster registrar successor
```task
id: RMGR-WP-0019-T04
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "1ccb06c6-ad30-5847-8704-e5628ba81f35"
```
Prepared full-file SHA256 bindings for three archives and 15 exact task
occurrences; strict scans still return 15 invalid labels and five collisions.
Unknown/live sources, changed/missing/symlinked histories, UUID drift and
qualified/global collisions refuse before allocation. Candidate tests pass 47;
canonical application remains a separate reviewed step. The read-only current
cluster preview proposes seven ordinary UUID bindings in two files and changes
no bytes. One pre-existing ADHOC field is included explicitly: task
RCLUSTER-WP-ADHOC-2026-07-27-T01 in workplans/ADHOC-2026-07-27.md receives
3e3f39d3-5070-5ba3-97db-19f5f361f264 through managed allocation only.
## Admit cluster registrar successor only after receiving verification
```task
id: RMGR-WP-0019-T05
status: done
priority: high
depends_on: [STATE-WP-0095-T06]
state_hub_task_id: "36f47e21-42d0-5aef-b065-4a5dd3af0726"
```
Retain the current guard until exact reviewed receiving source has been delivered
and verified through State Hub's normal owner deployment. Match both manifests,
then integrate reviewed registrar source and verify ordinary allocator preview.
No direct API patch, history rename or bypass substitutes for this gate.
## Run ordinary cluster owner publication and verify preservation
```task
id: RMGR-WP-0019-T06
status: wait
priority: high
depends_on: [RMGR-WP-0019-T05]
state_hub_task_id: "4d1675b6-f49f-5b01-8d76-bbf2030d1b34"
```
Only then run normal owner consistency/publication with the reviewed expected
file set: RCLUSTER-WP-0018 and the one-field ADHOC managed backfill, plus ordinary
generated indexes. Preserve all three archived files and all 18 existing
parent/task rows. Return actual receiving/publication receipts to STATE-WP-0095-T07.
Do not infer TLS recovery, credential custody or native acceptance from sync.
## Receiver-first registrar source follow-through, 2026-10-17
The exact receiving return is retained in Custodian
`docs/changes/netkingdom-target-2026-10-17/receiver-rollout-r4/verified-receiving-return.json`,
bound to the actual native rollout/preservation/refusal receipts. It verifies the
reviewed receiver source/image/module, API/MCP readiness, expected additive schema,
three existing historical parents/15 tasks and rolled-back safe refusal probes.
Only after that return was the exact registrar patch
`232552c3d601d185984be5a8e5bc9937bc9ddda7327923b5f0440f6deb2c87fc`
admitted in the Repo Manager owner source. T04 retains its source-preparation
outcome; T05 records this receiving-gated registrar admission, not a substitute
for receiving. Canonical focused registrar/identity checks passed 47 cases in 5.84 seconds.
The actual bounded read-only current Cluster allocator preview agreed with the
reviewed source: seven ordinary missing UUID bindings in exactly the new WP0018 and
one-field existing ADHOC backfill, with 15 invalid labels/five collisions still
reported by the strict conformance scan. The three historical file bytes, IDs,
UUIDs and ownership are unchanged. No broad syntax relaxation or direct Hub UUID
patch is introduced. Exact source application/test/preview receipts travel with
the same packet; source publication/projection is verified separately.
T06 remains wait until actual ordinary Cluster owner publication and receiving
preservation are verified. Registrar source readiness alone does not mark that
publication complete. Preserve the 18 existing rows and all three archives; the
root coordinator owns the normal seven-field managed allocation and dirty-source
preservation. Own Repo Manager projection must show exactly T01–T05 done, T06
wait and active workplan status, including the managed new T04/T05/T06 UUIDs and
unchanged earlier task UUIDs. The separate scanner RMGR-WP-0021-T05 completion
and unrelated owner work remain untouched. No native TLS recovery, custody,
current registration/private admission or NetKingdom target acceptance follows.